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Abstract
This thesis addresses the puzzle of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) 
prominence in regional order negotiation and management in East Asia during times of transition 
and crisis. It argues that ASEAN's prominence is not merely the result of structural dynamics of 
great power rivalry, but due to ASEAN creating a ‘regional conductor’ role in negotiation with great
powers. The thesis contributes to the literature by developing an English School-inspired 'role 
negotiation' framework and uncovering the social foundations for ASEAN’s role, rooted in 
cumulative and on-going role negotiation. The framework shows how actors come to perform social
roles through a process of legitimation: they conceptualise and claim a role and seek endorsement 
from key audiences. This thesis applies the framework to the US in early Cold War Southeast Asia, 
China during the Cambodian Conflict and to ASEAN in post-Cold War East Asia. It finds that 
negotiations over the US' and China's roles during the Cold War established, and reinforced, a 
division of labour where great powers provided security public goods but the key 'great power' 
function of diplomatic leadership was subcontracted to ASEAN. ASEAN's diplomatic leadership in 
Southeast Asia provided a foundation for creating its 'regional conductor' role in the uncertainty of 
the early post-Cold War years. ASEAN extended its diplomatic leadership into the wider East Asian
region, convening the full regional ‘orchestra’ and providing a ‘score’: a framework of norms and 
institutions within which all regional players can operate. However, ASEAN’s position in a post-
Cold War division of labour is insecure because, unlike during the Cold War, there is no clear goal 
shared between all key players. ASEAN’s legitimacy as 'regional conductor' is therefore based on its
neutrality and competence to convene inclusive dialogue; its ability to address substantive issues 
between the great powers is limited. In order for the regional orchestra to play more beautiful 
music, the great powers themselves will need to reach agreement on a more sophisticated 'score'. 
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Introduction
This thesis is concerned with how regional order has been negotiated and managed in Southeast and
East Asia and by whom. In particular it addresses the puzzle of why a group of small to medium 
sized states, organised collectively as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)1, have 
played such a prominent part in regional order negotiation and management at times of transition 
and crisis, when we would most expect the great powers exclusively to play the leading role. Before
illustrating what ASEAN has done for regional order, it is first necessary to outline what is meant in
this thesis by order, regional order and order management. This will provide a conceptual context 
for understanding why ASEAN's prominence constitutes such a puzzle.  
This thesis follows the English School (ES) in conceiving of order as “a formal or informal 
arrangement that sustains rule-governed interaction among sovereign states in their pursuit of 
individual and collective goals”2. In his classic study, Hedley Bull described the goals of 
international society as the preservation of the society of states itself, maintaining the independence 
of states, the limitation of violence, maintaining the sanctity of agreements and upholding property 
rights through the mutual recognition of sovereignty3. The 'rules' that govern states interactions 
towards pursuing such goals take different forms. The most observable are explicit legal rules set 
out in international treaties. Such explicit legal rules may reflect broader and more implicit norms 
that determine what behaviour is considered appropriate and inappropriate4. These in turn will be 
related to the more fundamental 'deep rules' of international society, what are commonly known as 
primary institutions5. Primary institutions are “durable and recognised patterns of shared practices 
rooted in values held commonly by the members of interstate societies, and embodying a mix of 
norms, rules and principles”6. Primary institutions are constitutive of international society; they 
reflect the 'rules of the game' which provide a normative foundation for order that is constitutive of 
who actors are and regulative of their behaviour7. Within modern international society, the state is 
the principal actor, given its identity and rights through the primary institution of sovereignty. 
Sovereignty is therefore widely seen as the most important and fundamental primary institution 
with other primary institutions such as equality of peoples, the market, nationalism and 
1 ASEAN was established in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore. Members that joined 
later include Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Myanmar and Laos (1997) and Cambodia (1999).
2Alagappa (2003a: 39).
3Bull (1995: 16-19). 
4Buzan (2004a: 163-164). See also Krasner (1983). 
5Khong (2014) uses the term 'deep rules' to refer to primary institutions. 
6Buzan (2004a: 181).   
7Reus-Smit (2003), Phillips (2010).
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environmental stewardship existing to various degrees within different interstate societies8. 
As order constitutes an arrangement, it does not come about purely fortuitously; rather, it is 
socially negotiated. States come to agreements over the explicit and implicit rules of the game, but 
also over the legitimate distribution of capabilities and how material capabilities will be used to 
serve order as a whole9. Ideally, international order would have widespread agreement on common 
interests, norms and values and a legitimate basis for the distribution of capabilities. However, a 
certain degree of contestation is always present, reflecting the diversity of actors, interests and 
values within international society. To sustain rule-governed interaction and address the challenges 
of capturing common interests, managing inequalities and mediating difference and value conflict, 
order needs continual renegotiation and management10. Part of order negotiation includes 
establishing certain order functions which need to be be performed to uphold the order. It is through
the performance of these order functions that order is managed. As discussed below, order functions
and the management of order are mostly associated with the primary institutions of diplomacy and 
great power management.  
Within international society order may exist at the global level, but also at the regional 
level11. Put simply, regional order refers to contexts within which states have negotiated the material
and normative foundations of order and how order will be managed within a socially-defined 
region. Regions are constructed based on geographical proximity, security and economic 
interdependence, and social recognition from those states within and outside of the region12. States' 
geographical proximity to one another generally means that their interactions and linkages are more 
intense, which can lead to increased interdependence13. Security interdependence at the regional 
level - what is known as a 'regional security complex'14 - means that the security of any one state 
within a region cannot be considered separately from all the others within that region. Likewise, 
economic interdependence concerns whether economic linkages between states within a region are 
so extensive that each 'national' economy cannot be considered without reference to a broader 
'regional' economy. On their own however, geographical proximity and security and economic 
interdependence do not make a region; rather, they provide material conditions for the social 
8 Buzan (2004a) includes a list of common primary institutions and discusses which ones may prevail within different 
types of interstate society, running on a spectrum from asocial to confederative.
9 Clark (2001).
10 Hurrell (2007: 287).
11 See Hurrell (2007: 239-261).
12 Alagappa (2003b).
13 This 'bottom up' or 'undirected' process of regional interaction, which is mainly led by markets, private trade and 
investment and company decision-making, is known as 'regionalisation'. See Hurrell (1995).  
14 See Buzan (1991) and Buzan and Weaver (2003). 
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process of the 'imagining' of the region15. For a region to come into being, it is necessary that those 
actors 'external' and 'internal' to a region, recognise the region as distinctive and recognise their own
positions as outside of and within the region16. Social recognition is therefore the most important 
factor in producing a region. It provides the 'regional awareness' necessary for the political process 
of regionalism, which itself is explicitly concerned with increasing regional stability and order 
through building regional interconnectedness and regional understandings of identity, norms, rules 
and institutions17.
From an ES perspective, once the boundaries of a particular region have been determined, 
regional order can then be analysed, and differentiated from the global level, by determining what 
prevailing 'primary institutions' exist, how they operate and whether they manifest themselves in 
extant regional secondary institutions (regionalism). This thesis however is not concerned with what
the primary institutions of Southeast or East Asian order are per se, but is interested in how regional
order has been negotiated and managed and by whom18. It therefore limits its interest in primary 
institutions to the two institutions that are concerned explicitly with how order is negotiated and 
managed: diplomacy and great power management. 
Diplomacy is fundamentally concerned with communication between members of 
international society. Indeed, it symbolises the existence of an international society, as the rules and 
procedures that govern diplomacy between members reflect how international society is organised 
and what rules it operates by. Diplomacy enables the negotiation of agreements, the gathering of 
information and intelligence, and the minimising of frictions19. Diplomacy is inclusive in the sense 
that it encompasses state and non-state actors and allows for order to be maintained through the day 
to day interaction between such actors. Buzan discusses bilateralism and multilateralism as 
derivatives of diplomacy, which can be considered the contexts within which key diplomatic 
functions can be performed for managing order20. These functions include, but are not limited to: 
conflict mediation – ensuring disputes are settled in a peaceful manner; agenda-setting – 
determining what key issues and problems deserve attention; and rule-making – drafting and 
amending the rules and norms that govern states' interactions21. These functions can be performed 
by state actors, but also by non-state actors such as technocrats associated with international 
15In this way regions can be considered 'imagined communities' in the same way nations can. See Anderson (2006). 
16Acharya (2012). 
17See Fawcett and Hurrell (1995). 
18Buzan and Zhang's (2014) edited volume discusses the primary institutions of East Asia. Narine (2006) and Quayle 
(2013) discuss the primary institutions of Southeast Asian order. 
19Bull (1995: 163-166).
20Buzan (2004a: 187). 
21See Barston (2014). Also Watson (1991). 
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organisations. Such non-state actors gain prominence especially in dealing with specific and 
complex issue areas such as global finance22. 
However, within the ES literature, great powers are considered to have special 
responsibilities with respect to order negotiation and management, especially during times of major 
crisis or transition in international society. For this reason, great power management is considered a 
primary institution in its own right. Great powers are considered to contribute to order in two 
distinct ways: managing their own relations to ensure that their disputes do not lead to conflict, and 
providing central direction to international society23. By managing relations amongst themselves, 
great powers perform the function of maintaining a general balance of power. Providing central 
direction refers to great power leadership within their own spheres of influence and also, more 
importantly, the notion that the great powers have exclusive responsibility for negotiating the 
foundations of order at times of transition, especially after major conflict24. In this sense, great 
powers perform the function of diplomatic leadership through their foundational rule-making and 
their creation of secondary institutions, otherwise known as international organisations. Secondary 
institutions 'lock in' and legitimise the great power agreement over the distribution of material 
capabilities and the regulative norms of order25. In this way, secondary institutions are a key site for 
the negotiation and management of order, and, as discussed above, become forums within which 
diplomacy is conducted and its associated functions can be performed26.
It is within this context of the great powers' leading role – and other actors' subordinate role 
– in negotiating and managing order, especially at times of transition and crisis, that East Asia 
presents us with a puzzle. During times of transition and crisis in East Asia, the small states of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have played an important part in negotiating the 
foundations of order and subsequently in managing that order. Three empirical examples illustrate 
ASEAN's activism.
At the height of the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s, the US tried to impose its vision for 
an anti-communist regional order in Southeast Asia. It sought to legitimise its unilateral and 
interventionist management of order through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The 
22See Bukovansky et al (2012: 163-209).
23Bull (1995: 194-222). See also Watson (1991: 195-211).  
24Clark (2001), Ikenberry (2001, 2011). 
25The major example is the United Nations which has a legal Charter that provides a framework of rules to govern     
states' interactions. The rules reflect the deeper normative and material foundations which constitute that sovereign 
states are the actors that bear rights and have responsibilities towards one another. The Security Council provides a 
legitimising function with respect to a particular distribution of capabilities at the time of creation, although this has 
since been significantly contested by calls for reform to reflect new distributions of capabilities.    
26See Goh (2013: 28-29).
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US' efforts were resisted not only by communist groups but also nationalist constituencies that 
resented foreign involvement in regional affairs. Order in mainland and maritime Southeast Asia 
was unstable. War raged in Vietnam and Indonesia pursued its Confrontation against the newly 
formed Malaysia. When the anti-communist military took power in Indonesia, the weak non-
communist Southeast Asian states came together to form ASEAN. ASEAN's formation was crucial 
for negotiating order in Southeast Asia. Through ASEAN these states developed a framework for 
managing their relations, avoiding conflict and disputes and cooperating together to promote 
economic development and 'regional resilience'. ASEAN lay down the norm of non-interference, 
establishing that relations within Southeast Asia would be norm-governed. In the context of US 
disengagement from Vietnam, ASEAN played a key part in legitimising the US' continued provision
of security public goods from an offshore position by not challenging the US' bilateral security 
arrangements with regional states. ASEAN's front-line diplomatic activism complimented the US' 
offshore stationing of its capabilities and provision of aid and assistance. Both worked towards 
building a stable non-communist social order in the region. ASEAN's rule-making established that 
order would be based on rules of coexistence27, and its regional institution-building provided a 
legitimate framework through which to manage order. In this respect, ASEAN succeeded where the 
US had failed through SEATO.    
When Vietnam occupied Cambodia from 1978 to 1989, ASEAN was highly active 
diplomatically in opposing the occupation. ASEAN successfully thwarted a Vietnamese challenge 
to the credentials of the ousted Khmer Rouge, prevented the acceptance of the Vietnamese-backed 
People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) within the United Nations (UN) and regularly promoted 
resolutions in the UN condemning the occupation. ASEAN was able to contain the conflict, keep 
the issue on the international agenda and ensure the social estrangement of Vietnam because it 
successfully framed the issue as a violation of the norm of non-intervention and consequently a 
violation of the rule-governed interaction amongst states. ASEAN was unable to resolve this 
conflict alone. It aligned with China which provided the material capabilities to resist Vietnam. 
However, ASEAN contributed to the management of the conflict and thus to the management of 
order as interactions that are governed by rules rather than the arbitrary use of force. More than this 
however, by securing agreement from China for a neutral Cambodia after Vietnamese withdrawal, 
ASEAN asserted the salience of its norms and processes over Cambodia. This ensured that after the 
conflict ASEAN would take primary responsibility for making and managing order in Indochina as 
well as maritime Southeast Asia. This was seen most explicitly in ASEAN's subsequent enlargement
to include the mainland states.  
27 Bull (1995: 64-68).
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Immediately after the end of the Cold War, there was great strategic uncertainty within East 
Asia. The removal of the Soviet threat led to fears within the region of US retrenchment, a 
potentially resurgent Japan and a rising China. Such fears reflected uncertainty over the foundations
of regional order. At this time of transition and uncertainty ASEAN took the initiative to provide a 
regional institution in the form of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which brought together all 
the great powers and major players in the region. Other states such as the Soviet Union, Canada, 
Japan and Australia had tried to promote regional security dialogue but had failed. As mentioned 
above, multilateral institutions can provide sites for the negotiation and management of order 
because they act as forums for communication between states where states can develop common 
interests, address issues and develop new rules and norms. The ARF brought the great powers 
together with a commitment to engage with regional issues and to acknowledge that interactions 
within East Asia were rule-governed. ASEAN contributed to order by supplying a site for the 
negotiation and management of order at a time of major uncertainty. On top of this, ASEAN 
provided a normative framework which all major powers and players could agree to: the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC). First developed by ASEAN in 1976, the TAC contains a list of 
norms through which to regulate interactions between states. The ARF members agreed to it as a 
code of conduct governing regional relations. Since then ASEAN has built up a network of 
overlapping institutions with varying memberships such as the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), East Asia
Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus). It has maintained 
its centrality within these institutions two decades after the initial establishment of the ARF, and in 
each the great powers have committed to ASEAN's leadership. All the great powers have now 
signed the TAC, one of the criteria for membership in the EAS, demonstrating a formal 
commitment to, or at least acknowledgement of, the norms it embodies. Again, this represents an 
acknowledgement that interactions within East Asia should be rule-governed – indeed, governed by 
ASEAN rules. In the context of continued uncertainty about the material and normative foundations
of regional order, the promotion of TAC and the acknowledgement of its norms represents a 
working agreement on the regulatory norms states can agree on.
All three of these examples highlight how ASEAN has been highly active in negotiating the 
normative and institutional frameworks for sustaining rule-governed interaction in Southeast and 
East Asia at times of strategic transition or crisis. Considering IR's common understanding of this 
being the exclusive remit of the great powers, ASEAN's prominence raises two questions. Firstly, 
why have the great powers allowed ASEAN to do so much? Secondly, how has ASEAN been able 
to sustain its prominence for so long?
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This thesis argues that ASEAN has been enabled to play an important part at key junctures 
because it has been given a legitimate social role, first as the 'primary manager' in Southeast Asia 
and then as the 'regional conductor' in post-Cold War East Asia. These roles are legitimate because 
they have been endorsed by the great powers. Indeed, ASEAN has embedded these roles within role
bargains with the great powers, whereby both parties perform corresponding functions towards 
managing regional order. ASEAN has then been able to sustain its prominence in order negotiation 
and management because it has been able to redefine, reclaim and renegotiate its evolving roles and
find continued endorsement and thus legitimacy from the great powers.
ASEAN first became the 'primary manager' of Southeast Asian order during the Cold War. 
By 'primary manager' I mean that ASEAN took on primary responsibility for diplomatic/normative 
order functions in Southeast Asia28. ASEAN intentionally eschewed performing security functions 
such as balance of power and security public goods, leaving these as the responsibility of the 
external great power role, exercised by the US. However, it took on diplomatic leadership, taking 
primary responsibility for managing intra-regional relations through bilateral and multilateral 
diplomacy and for regional rule-making, establishing the normative framework governing relations 
based around the core norm of non-interference. ASEAN's aim was to build 'regional resilience' and
unity, reducing any opportunities for external actors to interfere in the region and foment instability 
through subversion. On top of this, ASEAN's diplomatic leadership had an external aspect, 
principally providing a diplomatic front to legitimise shared US-ASEAN containment imperatives 
within Indochina. This was exercised most clearly during the Cambodian conflict. 
These two aspects of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role accord with what Michael Leifer29 
saw as ASEAN's contributions to regional order: its limited success in managing intra-mural 
relations and its ability to present itself as a 'diplomatic community' when negotiating with external 
partners30. However, Leifer's yardstick for assessing whether ASEAN was a successful manager of 
regional order, was based on the Indonesian vision of regional order defined as the ASEAN states 
themselves playing the proprietary role to the exclusion of external powers. This led to Leifer's 
judgement that “the continuing limitation of ASEAN as an instrument for promoting regional order 
even on a modest scale and basis has been exposed by the external security relationships retained by
all member governments, except Indonesia”31. In contrast, this thesis shows how ASEAN's 'primary 
28See Chapter One for a discussion of 'order functions'. 
29Leifer worked broadly within an English School tradition, emphasising concepts such as international society, regional
order and balance of power. See the essays in Emmers and Liow (2006). 
30Leifer (1989, 2005). 
31Leifer (2005: 105). 
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manager' role was never intended to replace external powers outright, but rather was part of a role 
bargain with external great powers. External powers continued to provide the functions ASEAN was
unable and unwilling to perform, such as security public goods, whilst ASEAN took responsibility 
for those diplomatic/normative functions that it could perform.  
 
By taking on the 'primary manager' role, ASEAN established practical and social 
foundations from which it created a new role entirely in the post-Cold War period, enabling it to 
expand its responsibility for order negotiation and management into the wider East Asia/Asia-
Pacific region. The social role ASEAN created in post-Cold War East Asia is a 'regional conductor' 
role. The 'regional conductor' role is based on an analogy that sees the region as an orchestra where 
the different great powers make up the different sections (brass, percussion etc). They are the ones 
that possess the instruments which represent the material capabilities (military hardware, economic 
and financial resources etc). It is they who essentially 'make the music'. The problem of great power
rivalry however means that the different sections want the orchestra to play their own musical score 
(their own vision of regional order) and thus exist in a state of competition. ASEAN has been able 
to claim the role of 'regional conductor', analogous to a musical conductor who does not possess any
instrument (lacks material capabilities), but has been able to provide a musical score for the 
orchestra to play: a framework of norms and institutions within which the region can operate.
Understanding ASEAN's role as a 'regional conductor' thus captures the two key functions 
ASEAN performs for East Asian regional order: 1) convening all major powers and players together
through an 'inclusive engagement' function and 2) providing a 'score' that all players can agree to 
through its 'rule-making' function. This conception avoids the ambiguity of the commonly used 
'ASEAN driver' role, which raises questions – and provokes mockery - regarding what the 
destination is that ASEAN is driving the region to. The analogy of the 'orchestra' is also useful 
because it helps us understand when ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role is relevant: when the full 
orchestra is convened. This means that other smaller groupings are possible (such as US-led 
alliances or coalitions) that may play more sophisticated 'Chamber music' because the members 
share common visions of regional order and values. These are generally not seen as a threat within 
ASEAN to its 'regional conductor' role. However, when it comes to large-scale cooperative security 
that involves all the major powers, ASEAN takes the lead as the 'regional conductor', and jealously 
guards its role. The orchestral analogy is also useful because all players seek to join and perform 
with the orchestra as it is the medium through which the most impressive music can be played. This
desire therefore means that they are willing to compromise on the quality of the 'score' for the time 
being to maintain harmony. This captures the fact that all the great powers seek to join and be a part 
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of ASEAN-led processes and agree to ASEAN's 'minimalist' normative framework32.
This thesis' argument is rooted in the assertion that analysing the negotiation of social roles 
is crucial for understanding how order is negotiated and managed. Social roles are made up of three 
elements: identity, status and function. So that order can be maintained, states need to reach a 
working agreement on their respective legitimate identities, their places within the society - their 
statuses - and what functions are legitimate for each state to perform in relation to negotiating and 
managing order. As alluded to above, the prevailing arrangement on roles as IR understands it is 
within the primary institution of great power management, and to a lesser extent within the 
institution of diplomacy. However, as we will see, the agreement on the great power role within the 
institution of great power management is not a one-way process of others recognising and 
legitimising the great power role, but rather a role bargain between great and small powers. A role 
bargain is a reciprocal arrangement, whereby negotiating actors agree to a division of labour with 
respect to the performance of order functions. Each party agrees to perform particular order 
functions in return for the other performing complementary order functions. A reciprocal role 
bargain is a key aspect of a broader understanding on what order is (its material and normative 
bases) and how it should be managed (what order functions need to be performed and by whom). 
The implicit role bargain within great power management means there is not only a role for great 
powers but also a corresponding role for small powers. The legitimacy of each role is contingent on 
each power holding up its end of the bargain. Small powers recognise the special status and rights 
of great powers, but great powers need to recognise small power identities, their status as sovereign 
states and also the functions they may perform in upholding order. 
As is discussed later in this introduction, the great power aspect of this role bargain has been
explored extensively in IR. However, within great power management, the functions small powers 
perform has generally been neglected or understood as limited to legitimation, performed when 
small powers recognise great powers. This particular understanding of the great power-small power 
bargain is historically contingent in European international society; it is not necessarily universally 
applicable33. Different social arrangements are possible. ASEAN's activism in regional order 
negotiation and management should prompt us to look for whether different social arrangements on 
roles have been reached in East Asia. This thesis takes up this task. Before discussing the literature 
on great power and small power roles in IR, and how this thesis re-conceptualises the primary 
institutions concerned with order management, this introduction addresses the alternative 
explanations for the puzzle of ASEAN's prominence.
32Goh (2011). 
33Bisley (2012).
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ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
There are three main approaches that provide alternative explanations for understanding ASEAN's 
negotiation and management of regional order: realist, neo-liberal institutionist and constructivist. 
Realists generally seek parsimonious explanations for international outcomes and in doing so posit 
power, defined in terms of material capabilities, as the most important variable in international 
politics34. As a consequence, realists argue that ASEAN and its processes are of secondary 
importance to questions of regional order; great power politics is of primary importance. Great 
powers have subcontracted questions regarding inclusive institution-building and norm provision to 
ASEAN because doing so involves little cost and does not have an impact on great power interests. 
This is because the great powers have not allowed such institutions to manage their key interests 
and the major flashpoints in the region such as the Korean nuclear issue, Taiwan or the East China 
Sea, are not addressed by ASEAN processes. ASEAN's informal institutions and norms can be 
abandoned in situations where the great powers consider their interests at stake35. ASEAN's ability 
to affect the balance of power is therefore limited. Indeed, a stable balance of power is a necessary 
condition for ASEAN's institutions to be effective36. ASEAN's unsuccessful efforts to address the 
South China Sea issue and constrain China within its normative framework, show how limited 
ASEAN's enterprise is without drawing on a conventional balance of power to back it up37. 
ASEAN's contribution to regional order is therefore limited to providing alternative forums within 
which traditional great power politics can take place, through practices such as 'institutional 
balancing'38. In the sense that this moves competition away from more traditional power balancing, 
ASEAN's contribution can be considered at the most to blunt the edges of great power politics.
Realists are right to emphasise the importance of great powers in the negotiation and 
management of regional order. However, by rooting its explanation of the puzzle in a material-
structural account of great power rivalry, realism is deficient in two respects. The first is that it does 
not account for ASEAN's agency nor the ebb and flow of great power contestation and endorsement
of ASEAN's leadership at different times. What part has ASEAN played in promoting and arguing 
the case for its leadership? Also, if the reasons for ASEAN's prominence are essentially fixed, why 
do the great powers at different times seek to challenge ASEAN's leadership (such as after the Asian
Financial Crisis and when China sought to steer regionalism in an exclusive East Asian direction 
with shared leadership) and at other times actively endorse it? Related to this is the second reason, 
34e.g. Waltz (1979), Mearsheimer (2001). See Legro and Moravcsik (1999). 
35Tow (2012). 
36Leifer (1996), Emmers (2003).
37Emmers (2003, 2010). 
38He (2008). 
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which is that this approach is too pessimistic about the basis for ASEAN's prominence. There may 
be more in it for the great powers than merely passing the buck. Great power endorsement of 
ASEAN's position reflects this fact. For example, the Obama administration put a lot of emphasis 
on showing attention, and even deference, to ASEAN's leadership after 2009 as a means to reverse 
the US' perceived loss of influence during the Bush era. This suggests that US officials recognise 
that their country receives legitimacy benefits through endorsing ASEAN's leadership39. This more 
complex and fluid situation can better be captured through focusing on the negotiations between 
ASEAN and the great powers and to see what bargains they may have reached over reciprocal roles,
and how these may serve common interests and goals. 
One approach that seeks to capture bargains between states, expressed within formal 
institutions, is neoliberal institutionalism. It shares with realism a positivist epistemology, arguing 
that states are rational and utility-maximising. However, it differs in that it posits a more optimistic 
and functional theory of institutions, asserting that "[i]nstitutions can provide information, reduce 
transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in 
general facilitate the operation of reciprocity”40. States can successfully develop institutions because
they are concerned with absolute gains, rather than relative gains, and therefore can work together 
to try and solve collective action problems. Neoliberal institutionalists have generally had less to 
say about ASEAN and its processes however, due to ASEAN's informal structure and lack of 
specific outcomes. For example, the Asian Financial Crisis revealed that ASEAN and Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation forum, were clearly not set up to deal with the problems related to the crisis 
as states reverted to unilateral policies which appeared detrimental to regional cooperation. 
Despite this, Kawasaki has applied a rational institutionalist argument to the ARF, which he 
sees as capturing a 'diffused reciprocity' between the major powers. He argues that the production of
the informal 'ASEAN Way' and its voluntary, non-binding confidence-building mechanisms are not 
institutional deficiencies, but the logical result of the 'assurance game' that Asia-Pacific states found 
themselves in in the immediate post-Cold War period41. In an assurance game, the players do not 
fear being cheated as much as they do in a collaboration game such as the 'prisoner's dilemma'; 
therefore, cooperation is the optimum strategy. All the major powers preferred to maintain the status
quo of US strategic engagement in the immediate post-Cold War years because the economic 
benefits of cooperation outweighed the potential geo-strategic benefits of defection. As there is less 
danger of defection or being cheated in an assurance game, the players do not need to set up formal 
39Goh (2011) discusses the legitimising aspect of ASEAN's leadership for great powers. 
40Keohane and Martin (1995: 42). 
41Kawasaki (2006). 
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or binding institutions. They merely need to assure the others that they will not defect through a 
commitment to institutionalising their communication and through unilateral confidence-building 
measures. ASEAN's prominence in order management can therefore be explained by its ability to 
exploit the opportunity available within the assurance game to provide such an institutionalised 
dialogue in the ARF. The soft regionalism and flexible consensus of the ARF is therefore not a 
failure of regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, but an appropriate instrument for optimising the 
mutually beneficial cooperative moves each player needed to make. The problem with this position 
however, is its reliance on the major powers remaining within an assurance game. As soon as one 
major power sees its geo-strategic interests as being served through defection, then ASEAN's 
processes no longer matter. In this way, it too posits a structural explanation of ASEAN's 
prominence, based on the assurance game rather than great power rivalry. Although more positive 
than realism about the stake the great powers have in ASEAN's leadership, it too does not account 
for ASEAN's agency after initially setting up the ARF, nor the ebb and flow of great power 
endorsement and contestation thereafter.  
Constructivism offers the third alternative explanation to the puzzle which seeks to address 
the rationalist approaches' neglect of ASEAN's agency by emphasising social processes rather than 
fixed interests. The key scholars that have highlighted ASEAN's agency are Amitav Acharya and 
Alice Ba. Acharya has focused on how ASEAN agents have shaped regional norms and then 
promoted these norms amongst the major powers through the ARF and its other offshoots42. 
ASEAN, through its processes, has been able to shape the balance of power in the short term by 
providing norms of restraint and avenues for confidence-building, but may in the long term enable 
the major powers to transcend balance of power practices altogether43. This can be achieved by 
ASEAN socialising great powers into adopting its norms and practices and thereby shaping great 
power interests and even identities. Indeed, for Acharya and also Johnston, China's move from 
being a power sceptical of multilateralism to one whose officials were increasingly comfortable 
with multilateralism was due to ASEAN's socialisation44. Chinese officials changed their policy 
discourse from real politik pronouncements of the primacy of bilateral great power relations, to 
pronouncements advocating cooperation and 'mutual security'45. ASEAN's success in initially 
getting the great powers on board with its institutions and norms, was followed by ASEAN 
institutionalising its centrality in Asian regionalism through building further ASEAN Plus 
mechanisms. The status quo took on a path dependency46. Taken together with his work on 'norm 
42  Acharya (2014). 
43  Acharya (2014: 199). 
44 Acharya (1997, 2009), Johnston (2003).
45  Johnston (2003, 2008). 
46 See also Capie (2012).
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localisation' and 'norm subsidiarity', Acharya therefore attributes ASEAN's prominent management 
to its ability to shape the institutional and normative structure of the region47. 
Alice Ba provides a different angle, focusing on ASEAN's negotiation, and renegotiation, of 
more fundamental ideas about how the region(s) should be organised during times of transition and 
crisis48. For Ba, key ASEAN agents have been able to exploit opportunities provided by shifts in the
material power structure (e.g. Nixon Doctrine, communist victory in Indochina, end of the Cold 
War) and make arguments for regional cooperation, initially within Southeast Asia but then in the 
Asia-Pacific and East Asia after the end of the Cold War. ASEAN came up with ideas for 
regionalism - and the norms that would underpin this regionalism - in place of failed attempts by 
other states. In this sense, Ba suggests ASEAN's prominence is due to its ability to shape the 
ideational environment surrounding questions of regional organisation.  
Constructivists are right to highlight the importance of social processes related to ideas and 
norms for understanding ASEAN's prominence. However, they may rely too much on the 
explanatory power of norms. The burden of proof for whether norms have actually been internalised
by key players and whether this has shaped their identities and interests towards regional 
cooperation rather than competition, is quite high, especially in a region where great power 
competition and rivalry is arguably escalating. Also, whereas constructivists such as Acharya start 
with ASEAN's agency, they end up rooting their explanation of ASEAN's prominence in the 
normative structure that ASEAN has created in the region, which in turn constrains ASEAN and the
great powers through a logic of appropriateness. In this sense, much like realism and neoliberal 
institutionalism, this position does not adequately capture the fluidity of ASEAN-great power 
negotiations and mutual understandings because of its ultimate concern with structure49. Ba's work, 
however, is more nuanced in this respect. Ba focuses on interaction and negotiation and the ideas 
that she posits as a determining factor in explaining ASEAN's prominence are not fixed but need 
constant renegotiation. In this sense, her work is much closer to the approach adopted in this thesis 
of looking for mutual understandings and bargains. Ba’s principle concern however, is internal 
ASEAN negotiations, treating the external as triggers for these periods of renegotiation. She does 
not explicitly look at the bargains that ASEAN may have reached with the great powers. In later 
work Ba has addressed the question of ASEAN's internal and external legitimacy50. This work 
focuses on ASEAN's responses to external challenges by pushing back or resisting (e.g. by 
47 Acharya (2009, 2011). 
48 Ba (2009).
49 See Acharya (2014). For a critique of ASEAN's adherence to its norms see Jones (2012).
50 Ba (2013). 
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admitting Myanmar in the face of Western pressure) and through internal reform, most notably to 
the norm of non-interference and the ASEAN Charter. She focuses however, on ASEAN's 
legitimacy as an institution rather than the wider issue of its contribution to regional order 
negotiation and management. She thus focuses on ASEAN's status but not on the functions ASEAN 
performs in regional order management and how these may be embedded within bargains with the 
great powers. 
It is here that this thesis makes its contribution. By focusing on negotiation between ASEAN
and the great powers and analysing the mutual understandings they reach over their respective roles,
we can better capture why ASEAN has been able to do so much for so long. Role negotiation shifts 
our focus away from structures of material capabilities or norms to the relational dynamics of 
legitimacy: how actors negotiate their legitimate identity, status and functions within international 
society51. ASEAN has been able to negotiate a legitimate role for itself that has enabled it to 
perform important order functions. It can use this role because the role is considered legitimate by 
the great powers. The role continues to be considered legitimate because ASEAN has been able to 
redefine, reclaim and renegotiate this role and root it within role bargains with the great powers. On 
top of better capturing the complexity and fluidity of ASEAN-great power interactions, this 
approach also balances between the implicit pessimism and optimism with respect to the basis of 
ASEAN's prominence of realism and constructivism respectively. The role bargains that sustain 
ASEAN's role can be underpinned by both instrumental and normative factors. 
This introductory chapter now goes on to look at how great power-small power roles are 
commonly understood within the primary institutions of great power management and diplomacy. It
proposes that the general neglect of the small power role is unwarranted and shows how we can re-
conceptualise the key institutions of 'great power management' and 'diplomacy' by merging them to 
form a broader primary institution of 'order management'. Doing so provides us with a more neutral 
conceptual starting point from which to analyse how a wide range of actors could engage in role 
negotiation towards reaching bargains over their respective contributions to order negotiation and 
management.
51 Stubbs (2014) similarly argues that ASEAN's prominence is due to its entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership and 
the fact that it is perceived as non-threatening and neutral by the great powers. Stubbs therefore highlights ASEAN's 
legitimacy, as well as arguing that ASEAN's leadership is not all-encompassing, but limited to specific sectors, 
principally providing initiatives for consultation and cooperation (Stubbs 2014: 530). He thus suggests that there may 
have been a division of labour negotiated between ASEAN and the great powers, but does not go into an analysis of 
how this may have been negotiated over time.
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THE GREAT POWER ROLE
The notion of a distinct role for great powers is widespread across different theoretical traditions. 
For neorealists, great power responsibilities to the international system are rooted in their interests 
in maintaining stability. Only great powers can maintain stability; as Waltz stated: “[g]reat tasks can
be accomplished only by agents of great capability”52. Classical realists like Carr and Morgenthau 
also saw the great powers as having a role in the settlement of political issues and governance based
on their superior capabilities53. Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST), which has both neorealist and 
neoliberal roots, clearly recognises the interests a preponderant power has to upholding the 
international system that it dominates54. The material bases of these theories mean that they equate 
order with stability regarding the distribution of capabilities; great powers necessarily have an 
interest in maintaining such stability so that they can maintain the distribution of capabilities in their
favour. 
 
The ES institution of great power management therefore gives the clearest expression of the 
great power role being based on social recognition by other members of international society and 
consisting of responsibilities in the social negotiation and management of order55. Indeed, some 
scholars have dubbed them the 'Great Responsibles', reflecting the primacy of social recognition 
and great power responsibilities to order as the basis for distinguishing great powers from the rest56. 
The social, and even legal, recognition of a distinct great power role dates back to at least the 
Congress of Vienna in 181557 and has been characterised by one scholar as 'legalised hegemony'58. 
When we analyse Bull's understanding of what makes a great power, we can clearly identify the 
three aspects of a social role: identity, status and function. Bull states that great powers recognise 
themselves as great powers with rights and responsibilities (identity), that they are recognised by 
their own population and other members of international society as such (status) and that they 
perform the functions or responsibilities of the great power role59.
The great power role includes the primary functions of diplomatic leadership, balance of 
power and the provision of security and economic public goods60. These functions are directly 
52  Waltz (1979: 109).
53  See Carr  (1939: 137), Morgenthau (1948: 356-368).
54  Kindleberger (1973), Gilpin (1981).
55  Bull (1995: 196).
56  See  Zimmern (1936) and Wight (1979). For a critique of the US and Soviet Union neglecting this responsibility and 
acting as 'irresponsibles' see Bull (1980).
57  Clark (1989: 114).
58  Simpson (2004).
59  Bull (1995).
60  These functions, among others, are discussed in detail in Chapter One.
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related to the twin responsibilities of great powers mentioned above of managing relations amongst 
themselves and providing central direction to international society. Within the ES, the fundamental 
aspect of great powers' managing relations amongst themselves is creating and maintaining a stable 
balance of power as a condition for international society from which other institutions can operate61.
For this reason, many scholars treat balance of power as a derivative institution of great power 
management rather than a primary institution in and of itself62. It is in this sense a function of order 
to be performed by the great powers. The second responsibility of providing central direction to 
international society could be considered a special diplomatic responsibility, performing the 
function of diplomatic leadership. 
Diplomatic leadership can be distinguished from the day to day practices associated with the
institution of diplomacy as it involves the great powers exercising their preponderance to negotiate 
the material and normative foundations of order, particularly at times of transition and crisis63. 
These moments of great power negotiation are most clearly seen in the great peace conferences over
the last few centuries64. Major wars represent times of upheaval and transition, when the 
foundations of order – material and normative – are up for renegotiation. Ian Clark discusses these 
foundations in his study of distributive and regulative aspects of peace settlements65. Peace 
settlements include the distribution of the 'spoils of peace' and sanctify the new distribution of 
power that arises out of war. By legitimising the distribution of capabilities through negotiating the 
distributive settlement, great powers can then use these capabilities for the common benefit of order.
The two primary functions of the great power role that encompass this aspect are the provision of 
security and economic public goods. The notion of public goods provision is mostly associated with
HST which analyses how a single preponderant power provides stability and order within the 
international system by using its capabilities to provide goods such as security of sea lanes, acting 
as a lender of last resort and material aid and assistance66. However, we need not only consider 
these public goods as universal, in the sense of being provided globally, nor limited to being 
provided by a single hegemon. To the extent that public goods can be provided at regional level or 
to a particular constituency (as club goods) we can consider them functions of the great power role 
more generally67. As part of the regulative settlement, great powers use their diplomatic leadership 
to perform the derivative functions of rule-making and secondary institution-building to ensure the 
61 Bull (1995: 201-202). For an analysis of US-China management of a stable balance of power in the Asia-Pacific from 
an ES perspective see Odgaard (2007). 
62 Buzan (2004a). 
63 Watson (1991: 195-211). 
64 Major studies of these times of post-war order-building include:  Holsti (1991), Osiander (1991), Knutsen (1999), 
Clark (2001, 2005), Ikenberry (2001, 2011).
65Clark (2001).
66 Kindleberger (1973), Gilpin (1981). 
67  For discussion of a hegemon providing club goods, see Brawley (2003/04). 
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peace lasts for as long as possible68. As discussed at the start of this introduction, the rules and 
norms to regulate states interactions are essential for order. The secondary institutions that great 
powers establish as part of the regulative settlement act as mechanisms through which rule-
governed interaction will be upheld. These 'lock in' and formalise the arrangement over the material 
and normative foundations of order. 
San Francisco in 1945 represents the clearest example to date of great powers exercising 
their prerogative as primary negotiators and managers of order. The victorious powers of the 
Second World War established the United Nations, providing a clear legal framework which 
outlined rules to govern interaction amongst states revolving around sovereign equality, non-
intervention and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Security Council was tasked with 
managing issues and conflicts that arose within international society, ensuring that the rules of order
were upheld and that there was a cost to violation through sanctions or the threat or use of force. 
The five victors had a permanent seat on the Council and veto powers, embedding their special 
responsibilities in managing order within the UN framework.
However, the role of great powers is “given to them ... and is in significant measure 
constituted in the giving”69. Recognition of great powers' identity, status and function is crucial for 
the performance of a great power role and the order that they negotiate needs to be accepted by 
other members of international society to have legitimacy70. In this sense, implicit within the 
institution of great power management is not just a role for great powers, but also a corresponding 
role for small powers. In this arrangement great powers provide diplomatic leadership, balance of 
power and security and economic public goods, but small powers perform functions with respect to 
recognising the great powers and their visions for order as legitimate. It is this mutual understanding
that gives the respective roles meaning. The next section will look at the small power side of this 
arrangement to see what other functions in order management the IR literature has ascribed to small
powers.
THE SMALL POWER ROLE
Generally, IR has ignored small powers, particularly when it comes to theory-building. For 
positivists, because of their disposition towards explanatory power and parsimony, small powers 
have been peripheral to the real story of great power politics. Waltz considered it “ridiculous to 
68  Clark (2001: 53).
69  Donnelly (2006: 153), see also Simpson (2004: 68).
70  Bull (1995: 195-196).
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construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica” because “a general 
theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers"71. They were relevant only 
as objects of great power rivalry, especially so as newly independent states arose during the height 
of the Cold War. Their position was defined by the material inequality of the international system72 
and they were therefore highly vulnerable in the face of larger powers, particularly the closer to a 
great power's sphere of influence they were73. This meant a limited range of policy options were 
available, mostly bandwagoning or balancing. Any influence a small power could have was mostly 
exercised within an alliance with a great power partner74.
More recent literature however has begun to consider small power agency within 
international institutions. Small powers' weight of numbers enables them to form voting coalitions 
and push certain agendas. The potential for this to change the nature of international society as 
states emerged from colonialism was noted by Bull in his idea of a ‘revolt against the West’75. Small
powers can also engage in more specific agenda-setting on policy issues and also act as norm 
entrepreneurs76. Certain small powers can also act as neutral mediators for peace talks. These 
responsibilities suggest the small power role in order negotiation and management is limited to the 
'normal' politics of international society. In this sense, the small power role would come under the 
primary institution of diplomacy. Small powers contribute to the development of rules and norms 
within specific policy areas and provide support in managing specific conflicts, but there is little to 
indicate that they can play a more expansive part in order negotiation and management during times
of transition and crisis. These are the times when the great power role is most clearly relevant as 
discussed in the section above. The case of ASEAN in East Asia stands out in this respect because 
ASEAN was not merely supporting great powers in their initiatives at key junctures but was 
actively providing initiatives itself.
The contribution small powers can make to the ‘normal’ politics of international society 
within the institution of diplomacy is not the only sense in which a small power role relates to order 
in IR literature. As mentioned above, implicit within great power management is not only a great 
power role but also a corresponding small power role. Great and small powers strike a bargain. 
Small powers recognise great powers as legitimate, and great powers agree to use their power 
71  Waltz (1979: 73).
72  Vital (1967).
73  Mathisen (1971).
74  Keohane (1971).
75  Bull (1984).
76  Ingebritsen (2002), Petrova (2007), Bjorkdahl (2008), Cooper and Shaw (2009), Panke (2012).
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within certain constitutional limits77. These limits usually mean upholding the norms and social 
structure that protect small states' identity and their status as sovereign states with certain degrees of
autonomy78. Great powers should also recognise the legitimising function that small powers have. 
The recent revisionist approach to order of the Bush Administration shows the consequences of not 
acknowledging the legitimising function other states have for a great power or hegemon role79.  
This bargain has been made more explicit in recent writings on hierarchy in international 
relations. For David Lake this is mostly expressed in hierarchical dyads, where one state will 
develop legitimate authority over another by providing them with inter alia security, aid and access 
to markets. In return, the subordinate state complies with the dominant state's wishes80. Evelyn Goh 
has a wider focus of hierarchy, looking at how a hierarchical order can have layers of different 
actors81. This “layered hierarchy” is maintained through social processes of assurance and 
deference. Assurance includes providing public goods, demonstration of benignity, provision of 
normative leadership, and provision of a mechanism for maintaining order. Deference includes not 
challenging the dominant state's position, adopting policies to reinforce its dominant position, 
ideological affinity, accommodation of dominant state's security imperatives, and greater 
prioritisation of their relationship over the subordinate's relationship with other great powers82. 
David Kang adds a cultural aspect to hierarchical orders, seeing East Asia before its interaction with
the West as unusually peaceful83. He argues that the legitimacy of the Confucian social order 
maintained the hierarchy, even if the state of China itself was not held in such esteem (notably by 
Japan)84. He asserts that the history of hierarchical relations within East Asia has given regional 
states an inclination towards deference, especially to China, which accounts for the fact that these 
states have not tried to balance China's rise85.
Brantly Womack also notes the exceptional nature of East Asian history that defies western 
IR's theoretical assumptions. He rejects the idea that there will be any return to the type of hierarchy
that used to exist in East Asia, but sees similarities in the current asymmetry in China's relations 
with its neighbours86. His concern is not necessarily with the more tangible forms of assurances and 
77  Ikenberry (2001), Finnemore (2009).
78  Suzuki (2008).
79  Reus-Smit (2004).
80  Lake (2007), (2009a), (2009b).
81  Goh (2008).
82  Goh (2008: 359). For an extensive analysis of how this hierarchy has been negotiated in post-Cold War East Asia see
Goh (2013).
83  Kang (2010a).
84  Kang (2010b).
85  Kang (2003, 2007).
86  Womack (2010: 3).
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deference that Lake and Goh highlight, but with the fundamental relationship of respect between a 
larger and smaller power that serves to manage the inherent asymmetry in their relations. Instability 
comes from the tendency of the larger state to be inattentive to the smaller state's position, and for 
the smaller to be over-attentive towards the larger, creating tension and leading to crises. In order to 
manage this, the larger state assures the smaller that it will uphold their autonomy and identity and 
the smaller state reciprocates with deference. An example of this may be the larger state respecting 
the small state's right to make its own policies in certain areas free from interference, with the small 
state deferring to the larger's position perhaps in a dispute with a third party. This pattern can be 
peaceful because, as long as the reciprocal recognition continues, there will be a framework for 
dealing with problems that avoids the cycle of rise and fall that domination and resistance produce87.
Womack claims this can be maintained through the rituals of diplomacy, especially high level visits 
of state.
Perhaps the most thorough treatment of the negotiated bargain between great powers and the
rest in determining the terms of the great power's role is in the work of G. John Ikenberry88. He has 
explored how hierarchy can operate in international orders. He defines power in terms of material 
capabilities but argues that we need to look at how power is used. A leading state can use its power 
to enforce its dominance through coercion or can establish agreed upon rules and institutions which 
it operates through. This involves a bargain between the leading power and subordinate states by 
which they develop these rules and institutions to manage order. The dominant power will show 
strategic restraint by operating within these rules and institutions and in return receives support for 
its policies. The type of bargains that are struck will determine where the hierarchy operates on the 
continuum between imperial and liberal89. These bargains can be made through multilateral 
institutions which determine the rules through which states should operate – 'rule through rules' – or
bilaterally  through the provision of public goods in return for political support – 'rule through 
relationship'90. 
Ikenberry’s work is problematic in that it tends to be ideological, equating US post-war 
hegemony with the ideal type of ‘liberal hierarchy’. However, he makes an interesting point in that 
different bargains can be struck depending on the states involved, meaning that there can be 
differing degrees of hierarchy, as well as different meanings attached to the great power social role. 
The role of a great power can therefore mean different things in different political spaces depending
87  Womack (2010: 29-30).
88  Ikenberry (2001, 2011).
89  Ikenberry (2011: 75).
90  Ikenberry (2011: 81).
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on the kind of bargain that has been struck between the great and small powers. This thesis agrees 
on this point. For this reason the next section makes the case for how we can conceptually move 
away from understanding roles within the separate primary institutions of great power management 
and diplomacy, to situating them within the more neutral institution of 'order management'. This 
allows us to be more flexible in analysing different manifestations of great power and small power 
roles in different social contexts. 
FROM 'GREAT POWER MANAGEMENT' TO 'ORDER MANAGEMENT'
Implicit within all the work on the great power-small power bargains is a social arrangement on 
respective roles: a role bargain. Great and small powers reach a working agreement on their 
respective identities, statuses and functions, although the literature pays less attention to the small 
power side of the bargain. There is some recognition of the functions small powers can perform 
within international institutions in specific policy areas; however, there is little indication that small 
powers can perform key functions related to the negotiation and management of order at times of 
transition or crisis. As suggested above, the type of social arrangement made between great and 
small powers can vary depending on the social context and the different states involved. There is 
therefore a need to broaden our understanding of how order is negotiated and managed. For this 
reason, this thesis posits that we should conceptually merge the institutions of 'diplomacy' and 'great
power management' to form a the more general institution of 'order management'. Order 
management can be made up of roles for various different actors, providing a more neutral territory 
from which to analyse different actors' responsibilities that does not assume that the key functions 
are always performed by the great powers. As Bisley91 has pointed out, the very prominent role for 
great powers in order negotiation and management is a historically contingent social arrangement 
rooted in European international society. It is not universally applicable to all international societies.
Likewise, great power ‘special responsibilities’ do not necessarily apply across the board, but can be
issue-specific and different actors can have different responsibilities depending on the issue at 
hand92. Other social arrangements are therefore possible; other actors can have important roles in 
negotiating and managing order. 
The rationale of merging diplomacy and great power management to form the institution of 
'order management' becomes clearer when we consider how these institutions have been applied in 
the case of East Asia and the question of ASEAN's role. Yuen Foong Khong argues that ASEAN has
contributed to regional order through acting as the main driver of multilateralism – which he 
91  Bisley (2012).
92  Bukovansky et al (2012).
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includes within the primary institution of diplomacy93. For Khong, this is separate from, but 
fundamentally linked to, the lack of a completely functioning institution of great power 
management in East Asia. China and Japan have been unable to perform the associated functions of 
great power management – managing relations with each other and providing central direction 
within regional society94 - and therefore the US and ASEAN have stepped in to take over these 
functions. This is also the major conclusion of Evelyn Goh in her study of great power management
in East Asia95. Rosemary Foot treats diplomacy as part of the primary institution of great power 
management because, as she argues, its “derivative institutions of bilateralism and multilateralism 
function in important ways as a means to deal predominantly with forms of power”96. This also 
allows her to deal with ASEAN's multilateral diplomacy as part of great power management, in a 
similar fashion to Khong and Goh. However, by treating ASEAN's managerial prominence as part 
of 'great power management', the conclusion reached, especially by Goh, is that there is a failure of 
great power management in East Asia as the regional great powers (China and Japan) have passed 
the buck up (to the US) and down (to ASEAN). Using the broader institution of 'order management' 
does not presuppose that great powers exclusively have primary responsibility for negotiating and 
managing order. It therefore does not presuppose that there is a deficiency where great power 
management does not operate as assumed. It also allows us to look more deeply at how actors may 
have negotiated variegated responsibilities in managing order in the region. 
As indicated throughout the discussion in this introduction, when analysing social roles it is 
conceptually more fruitful to consider the functions that need to be performed in managing order, 
rather than ascertaining actors' responsibilities from the derivative institutions commonly associated
with diplomacy and great power management. This thesis therefore posits that the primary 
institution of 'order management' does not have associated derivative institutions, but consists of 
'order functions' that need to be performed. These order functions differ depending on the particular 
order under study and will be performed by different actors according to the particular negotiations 
over social roles. The next section shows that the key for understanding what order functions are 
relevant and which actors' will perform them as part of their roles, is legitimacy. Negotiating a 
legitimate social role involves establishing a working agreement on actors’ respective identities, 
statuses and the order functions they will perform. This is achieved through the practice of 
legitimation.  
93 Khong (2014). 
94 Bull (1995: 200). 
95 Goh (2014a). 
96 Foot (2014: 191). 
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SOCIAL ROLES AND LEGITIMACY
Legitimacy in international society is an empirical question97. If the actor’s identity, status and 
function are considered rightful then they have a legitimate role. In this way legitimacy should not 
be conflated with any particular norms. Legitimacy is not synonymous with legality, morality or 
constitutionality but is a composite of, and an accommodation between, a number of different 
norms98. It does not have its own standard by which identity, status and function can be measured. 
Instead actors must engage in the political practice of legitimation to gain acceptance that these 
elements are rightful99. States must make legitimacy claims with respect to their identity, status and 
function to claim a role. Norms are still very important because it is through the language of norms 
that legitimation takes place100. However, legitimacy depends on the responses of other actors: 
claims need to be endorsed. This practice of claims and endorsement will be expanded into an 
analytical framework for analysing role negotiation in the next chapter. The key for now is to 
acknowledge the importance of the legitimacy of an actor’s identity, status and function for 
establishing the role it performs.  
ARGUMENT IN BRIEF AND CHAPTER PREVIEWS
This thesis shows how role bargains have been negotiated between ASEAN and the US and 
ASEAN and China at different points from to Cold War to the present day. These bargains have 
been cumulative, laying social foundations for ongoing role negotiation, which accounts for why 
ASEAN has been so prominent in regional order negotiation and management. It is worth noting at 
this point that, unless otherwise stated, the terms used to describe each actors' roles throughout the 
thesis have been coined by the author himself based on the key identity, status and function 
elements identified as part of the thesis' analysis of role negotiation. The reason for this is that these 
roles were not necessarily explicitly identified by the key actors themselves, and therefore were not 
given names. The names for the roles posited by the thesis are intended to capture the key features 
of the implicit mutual understandings of the actors at the time and to provide analytical clarity in 
trying to understand complex processes of negotiation over time.
The first key role bargain, discussed in Chapter Two, was that which emerged in the late 
1960s/early 1970s between the newly formed ASEAN and the US. The US' 'offshore great power 
guarantor' role was first legitimised within this bargain, and has since been upheld through further 
97  Clark (2005: 254).
98  Clark (2005: 207).
99  Clark (2005: 3), Reus-Smit (2007).
100  Clark (2007: 4).
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role negotiation. The term 'offshore great power guarantor' captures the fact that the US maintains 
its dominant military presence within the region through its naval bases and its series of bilateral 
security alliances and relationships with maritime states. Apart from in South Korea, since its 
withdrawal from Vietnam and Thailand in the 1970s, the US has not maintained bases on 'mainland'
East Asia. The US' nature as a guarantor of security and order, comes from the perceived stability its
predominance produces, through reassuring partners and deterring potential challengers, notably 
China. Robert Sutter in a recent study interviewed a number of Asia-Pacific government officials, 
who nearly all viewed the US as performing the “leading role as the Asia-Pacific region's security 
guarantor”101. Natasha Hamilton-Hart also notes the near uniform positive views of Southeast Asian 
practitioners regarding the US' security role102. Regional officials are therefore comfortable with the 
US' strategic dominance103. However, they are less comfortable with the US' occasional political 
interference in what they consider domestic or regional affairs. Hence the preference for the US' 
'offshore' position refers not just to its strategic-military presence, but also its political presence, as 
an actor to be invited in rather than to wield overt political leadership104. I argue that the US' 
'offshore great power guarantor' role needs to be understood as situated within role bargains vis a 
vis ASEAN's 'primary manager' role in Southeast Asia and 'regional conductor' role in the Asia-
Pacific. The ASEAN-US role bargain during the Cold War redefined the great power role by 
decoupling the key function of diplomatic leadership and transferring it to ASEAN. It suited the US 
at this point to not interfere in regional or domestic affairs too overtly and allow ASEAN to perform
diplomatic leadership. The US had achieved its goal of nurturing anti-communist regimes in the 
five founding ASEAN member states and did not want to disrupt the legitimacy of these regimes 
and ASEAN by appearing to be too involved in their politics. ASEAN did not challenge the US' 
interests but rather legitimised US imperatives regarding communist containment in the region 
through its diplomatic leadership by: managing intra-ASEAN relations and engaging in regional 
reconciliation; determining regional norms such as non-interference which would be directed at 
trying to limit Chinese and Soviet influence within the maritime subregion; and in providing 
diplomatic initiatives to support US actions in Indochina. This last aspect was demonstrated in the 
Jakarta Conference on Cambodia in 1970, which sought to legitimise US support for the anti-
communist Lon Nol government.   
This redefinition of the great power role was further consolidated during the Cambodian 
conflict, discussed in Chapter Three, as ASEAN negotiated a role bargain with China. Thailand, and
101Sutter (2009: 271). 
102Hamilton-Hart (2012). 
103See Goh (2008). 
104Examples of such sentiment are numerous. For example, a recent backlash against 'US interference' came in the wake 
of US officials criticising the May 2014 coup in Thailand. 
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by extension ASEAN, needed to draw on a source of countervailing power to balance Vietnam's 
potential hegemony in Indochina after it invaded Cambodia. As the US was acting as the 'offshore 
guarantor' in the wake of the Vietnam conflict, China stepped in to take on the role of 'regional great
power guarantor', through which it performed the function of holding the line against Soviet-
Vietnamese expansionism. China therefore provided the needed balance of power within Indochina.
China was the guarantor of ASEAN, and its established non-communist status quo, against any 
possible Soviet-Vietnamese backed insurgency or direct penetration. ASEAN as the 'primary 
manager' provided the diplomatic vanguard internationally for the anti-Vietnamese coalition which 
served to legitimise the opposition to Vietnam's actions, especially China's support for the ousted 
Khmer Rouge. Through this bargain, ASEAN was able to expand its diplomatic leadership over the 
full extent of Southeast Asia by having China, as well as other external partners, recognise that 
ASEAN norms and processes should take precedent over Cambodia in the event of Vietnam's 
withdrawal. When the Vietnamese did eventually withdraw, this removed the basis for China's 
'regional great power guarantor' role, but China had become a key player in the region and therefore
the need for China's regional role-taking continued. ASEAN emerged with its 'primary manager' 
role strengthened and expanded as it had gained substantial status recognition for its diplomatic 
activism during the conflict.
Within the post-Cold War context however, not only was the bargain with China destabilised
but so was the bargain with the US. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the rationale for the 
US' strategic presence in the region. ASEAN therefore engaged both powers as a means to 
legitimise the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role in the new strategic context and begin a 
process of socialising China into taking on a 'responsible regional great power' role. However, 
ASEAN could not guarantee its relevance in a context where the major strategic issues, and great 
power attention, were no longer focused on Southeast Asia. As shown in Chapter Four, ASEAN 
captured the debate over the formation of a regional security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific and in the 
process created for itself the 'regional conductor' role. It enacted the role by establishing the ARF 
and putting its norms within the TAC forward as a regional code of conduct. ASEAN ensured its 
continued relevance by situating its 'regional conductor' role within a role bargain with the US by 
giving the US an invitation to engage the region, bolstering the Clinton administration's efforts to 
garner domestic support for its continued commitment to Asia through the 'offshore great power 
guarantor' role. ASEAN also situated its role within a bargain with China by offering China a forum
within which it could begin to demonstrate its desire to take on a 'responsible regional great power' 
role, and therefore avoid containment and promote inward investment, but also a forum within 
which its interests - especially over Taiwan - would not be at stake. The subsequent years of the 
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post-Cold War period have seen ASEAN respond to challenges to these initial bargains by 
redefining and reclaiming its role, seeking to further embed its 'regional conductor' role in more 
consolidated bargains with the US and China. These negotiations have seen ASEAN expand its role 
by exercising its inclusive engagement of all major powers in more forums (ASEAN Plus Three, 
East Asia Summit, and ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting Plus) and by securing formal 
commitment to its norms as part of the criteria for membership of the EAS (through having to sign 
the TAC). At the same time, this has put pressure on ASEAN to reform its 'primary manager' role to 
demonstrate credibility in performing functions at the wider Asia-Pacific level. This effort at reform
has revealed tensions between the imperative of maintaining the 'regional conductor' role as a 
means to shape the external environment ASEAN operates within, and the imperative of the 
'primary manager' role to insulate Southeast Asia from external interference. This makes it difficult 
for ASEAN to maintain unity and a common understanding needed for boosting its 'regional 
conductor' role, which accompanied by increasing great power rivalry over the South China Sea 
dispute, threatens ASEAN's ability to keep performing the role.    
Having presented the main flow of the thesis' argument, it is necessary to outline each 
chapter more systematically. Chapter One, outlines the framework through which to analyse role 
negotiation. It reviews how role theory has been used in IR and identifies the constituent elements 
of identity, status and function in the emphases of different approaches to roles in the literature. It 
shows that roles need to be negotiated through the practice of legitimation and identifies three role 
processes that will be applied in the empirical chapters: role redefinition, role taking and role 
creation. It then discusses the methodology used in this thesis and how the role negotiation 
analytical framework is operationalised.
Chapter Two is the first empirical chapter which analyses the process of role redefinition in 
Southeast Asia in the early Cold War decades. It focuses on negotiations that took place from the 
establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 up to the end of the 
Vietnam War and shows how the US and regional states redefined the great power role in Southeast 
Asia. The function of diplomatic leadership was decoupled from the great power role and 
transferred to regional states. This came about through a struggle between the US and Indonesia to 
establish a grand strategic narrative for the region. The US' ‘containment’ narrative identified the 
boundaries of non-communist Southeast Asia that needed to be protected through containment of an
expansionist communist threat. The US' ‘great power guardian’ role conception envisioned its own 
deep involvement in the region through military intervention, showing similarities to the colonial 
great power role in its concern for the stewardship of newly independent states. Indonesia's 
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‘autonomy’ grand strategic narrative recognised a more diffuse region of emerging post-colonial 
states that should have autonomy over their own affairs. Indonesia's ‘indigenous great power 
liberator’ role conception sought to exclude and replace any role for external powers. Indonesia 
tried to enact its role claim through confrontation first against the Dutch in West Papua and then 
Malaysia. In the late 1960s, political change in Indonesia brought to power a staunchly anti-
communist regime and the US began to disengage from Vietnam. This allowed for the US to 
subcontract diplomatic leadership to regional states in order to satisfy the goals of containment of 
the communist threat and autonomy through the concept of national and regional resilience whereby
regional states would take primary responsibility for security through combating insurgency and the
US would provide security public goods. This redistribution of functions with respect to great and 
small power roles laid the groundwork for the further negotiation of roles in the two later periods.
Chapter Three analyses the process of role-taking during the Third Indochina War. It argues 
that the conflict acted as a catalyst for China taking on a ‘regional great power guarantor’ role. 
ASEAN and China negotiated a division of labour with respect to managing the conflict which 
brought China out of its previous social alienation to perform legitimate regional order functions. It 
also shows how ASEAN’s diplomatic leadership was expanded from its initial maritime sub-region 
to cover the full extent of Southeast Asia. Through this expanded diplomatic leadership, ASEAN 
was able to limit the extent of China's great power role-taking to the specific circumstances of the 
Third Indochina conflict by diluting the influence of the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge and 
asserting the salience of their own rules and processes over Cambodia. The expansion of ASEAN’s 
remit built on the negotiations during the period covered in Chapter Two and provided foundations 
for creating ASEAN’s ‘regional conductor’ role in post-Cold War East Asia.
Chapter Four analyses this process of role creation in post-Cold War East Asia. It shows how
ASEAN conceptualised the ‘regional conductor’ role as part of an effort to maintain its relevance in 
the emerging order, but also as part of an effort to legitimise and embed complimentary great power
roles for the US and China within a regional role bargain. The great powers endorsed ASEAN's 
role, enabling ASEAN to perform important functions with respect to the negotiation and 
management of the emerging regional order. The chapter shows how ASEAN's 'regional conductor' 
role subsequently faced challenges from Western constituencies that contested ASEAN's 
competence to lead institutions, and also from China which contests ASEAN's rule-making in the 
South China Sea dispute. ASEAN has maintained its role by re-conceptualising and reclaiming the 
role at key junctures, brokering transitional role bargains that allow ASEAN to keep performing 
diplomatic leadership. However, this chapter also shows how ASEAN's impact on regional order 
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through its role is limited; it cannot address fundamental issues between the great powers. It also 
identifies the challenges for ASEAN's role in the future, principally the need to stay united in the 
face of emerging great power rivalry. 
 
The thesis ends with a concluding chapter summarising the findings of the thesis and 
highlighting possible avenues of further research.  
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Chapter One - Role negotiation in international society
The introductory chapter to this thesis showed how, when it comes to the big questions of order 
negotiation and management, IR has generally focused on the role of great powers, neglecting the 
contribution small powers can make. However, the puzzle of ASEAN's important part in negotiating
and managing order in Southeast and East Asia at times of transition and crisis, shows that we need 
to broaden our understanding of order negotiation and management beyond great powers. An 
analysis of social role negotiation can explain this puzzle because roles capture how power is 
constituted through relationships of legitimacy and thereby how small powers can be enabled to act 
in areas traditionally deemed the realm of great powers. ASEAN has successfully created a 'regional
conductor' role which it has been able to sustain through redefining, reclaiming and renegotiating its
legitimacy.
The previous chapter provided the conceptual framework for this thesis, rooting social roles 
in the primary institution of 'order management' – a merging of the ES institutions of great power 
management and diplomacy. Order management provides a more neutral category for understanding
who performs what roles in relation to order negotiation and management. In theory, any actor can 
contribute as long as the actor's role has been given legitimacy through negotiation. It is the process 
of role negotiation therefore that is crucial for understanding actors' roles in order negotiation and 
management. Social roles have three elements: identity, status and function. Role negotiation in 
international society involves establishing the legitimacy of the these three elements. This chapter 
focuses on developing an analytical framework for capturing the process of role negotiation. In 
developing the analytical framework, this chapter has two parts. 
The first part reviews the literature associated with role theory and how it has been applied 
in IR so far. This review shows how scholars have mainly focused on the identity and status 
elements of roles. Those emphasising identity focus their analysis on national role conceptions, 
looking at what roles state actors believe their state should perform. Their analysis is mainly 
focused on the domestic constructions of such role conceptions1. Scholars that account for status 
have mainly done so within a structural analysis of roles. For these scholars, roles exist 
independently from individual states within the social structure of international society. Status 
provides the link between an individual state and a social role. Once the state comes to perform the 
role, the role then prescribes what is appropriate behaviour for the state in that role2. The reason 
1Holsti (1970), Walker (1987), Chefetz et al (1996), Le Prestre (1997).
2Wendt (1999), Doran (1991, 2000), Thies (2012). 
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these two branches of role theory overlook the question of functions is because they generally seek 
to explain individual states' foreign policy behaviour rather than exploring how roles can be 
negotiated between states to perform functions related to order negotiation and management. It is 
here that this thesis advances the state of the art, based on the conceptual framework provided by 
the English School. This thesis conceptualises roles as social objects that have a shared existence 
within international society based on their legitimacy. This contrasts with previous scholars' 
conception of roles as existing within the subjective 'mind' of states or within the social macro-
structure of international society. Social roles are linked to order through the functions associated 
with the role. If an actor successfully negotiates for itself a legitimate social role, it can use the role 
to perform functions related to the negotiation and management of order. As legitimacy is an 
empirical question based on states' mutual understandings, we therefore need to develop an 
analytical framework that can capture the actual negotiations that take place within international 
society. 
The second part of the chapter moves on to outline such a role negotiation framework. It 
identifies three role processes that illustrate how states come to perform legitimate social roles 
within international society and how new roles can be created: role redefinition, role-taking and role
creation. It then discusses types of order functions that may need to be performed by actors in 
managing order. The chapter then outlines the framework of legitimation, which provides a basis for
analysing how actors negotiate roles through a two-way process of role claiming and endorsement. 
This offers the most effective means for capturing the process of negotiation between actors on their
way to reaching mutual understandings over their respective roles. The resulting mutual 
understandings are then captured through the analytical tool of the 'role bargain', which was 
discussed in the last chapter as being implicit within the existing literature of great power/small 
power roles. This chapter finishes by discussing the methodology and the data sources used in 
gathering evidence for the thesis' analysis of the role bargains reached between the ASEAN states 
and the great powers. This sets up the next three empirical chapters which trace the processes by 
which ASEAN came to perform its prominent role in regional order negotiation and management. 
ROLE THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Role theory developed from sociological analysis. Sociological role theory has traditionally been 
split between structural role theory and symbolic interactionism. Structural role theory defines roles 
as a collection of normative expectations about appropriate behaviour for an individual in a 
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particular position within society3. In this view, roles are played according to a script of role 
expectations that are embedded within the social structure. The strength of structural role theory is 
its ability to account for the effects of social structure on interactions and on human behaviour. 
However, as with all structural theories, it struggles to account for individual agency. This is where 
symbolic interactionism is more useful. Symbolic interactionism developed principally from the 
work of George Herbert Mead and Herbert Blumer4 who define roles not in terms of social 
structure, but in terms of interaction. When individuals engage in interaction, they take on roles by 
taking on the perspective of the Other. The Other, or “generalised other”, rather than social position,
becomes the principle source of role behaviour. This accounts for agency by showing how 
individuals create shared meanings between each other through gestures. However, symbolic 
interactionism has less to say about the effect of social structure on behaviour. Later scholars 
therefore sought to integrate the structural and interactionist approaches to develop a more holistic 
role theory that could account for structure and agency5.
Both structural role theory and symbolic interactionism have been highly influential within 
IR. However, much of role theory in IR departs from these traditions that put an emphasis on status 
and instead emphasises role identity as the primary explanation for state behaviour. Indeed, the 
principal fault line in the debate over roles in IR is not whether we should look at social structure or 
interactions; rather, it is whether to locate roles within the subjective understanding of the state 
itself – its own role conception – or as an objective part of the social structure of international 
society. The first tradition has been popular within Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) whereas the 
second is associated with recent constructivist work. This chapter finds that both traditions have 
something to say for the negotiation of roles in international society because together they highlight 
two of the three elements of a role: identity and status. Their neglect of functions however, means 
they are limited in advancing our understanding of how roles are negotiated in international society. 
The next two sections explore these limits before discussing how a focus on functions provides the 
key for developing a more flexible framework that avoids the limitations of looking at identity and 
status in isolation.
Role conceptions and identity
The identity element of roles is most clearly associated with the literature on role conceptions. Kal 
3  Turner (1956: 316).
4  Mead (1934), Blumer (1969).
5  Stryker (1980), Stryker and Statham (1985), see also Handel (1979), Callero (1986).
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Holsti6 introduced role theory to IR and set the tone for this literature when he emphasised how a 
state's 'role conception' was the key to understanding its foreign policy behaviour. Holsti's 
framework was based on four key role concepts. The first is role performance, which is the actual 
foreign policy action that states take. Second, role conception, which is the self-defined, subjective 
understanding of a role a state feels it should play. Third, role prescriptions, which are the 
expectations about behaviour that are external to the individual state, coming from the structure of 
the international system, social norms and other actors. Finally there is the social position or status 
that the state occupies which consists of a system of role prescriptions7. Holsti wanted to explain a 
state's foreign policy decisions and actions (role performance) and posited that national role 
conceptions (subjective) and role prescriptions (expectations about behaviour coming from others 
and the structure of international society) as possible independent variables.
Holsti chose to analyse role conceptions and rejected role prescriptions as a useful variable 
for explaining role performance because he saw international society as too underdeveloped. As he 
states: “the expectations of other governments, legal norms expressed through custom, general 
usage, or treaties, and available sanctions to enforce these are ill-defined, flexible, or weak 
compared to those that exist in an integrated society and particularly within formal organisations”8. 
In this context, a state’s identity, embodied in its subjective role conception, took precedence over 
status and function. Others followed Holsti in neglecting role prescriptions and focusing on 
subjective role conceptions9. Most of this research used quantitative data, based on a collection of 
references to roles made in speeches and communiques by national leaders, building up a picture of 
how states viewed their own roles and how this affected foreign policy behaviour. This research 
programme went through various different states and analysed and compared how they viewed 
themselves.
More recent literature has drawn on the work of Sheldon Stryker who sought to integrate 
structural role theory and symbolic interactionism10. It has begun to explore the actual interactions 
of states in international politics and how roles may provide a bridge between agent and structure. 
These studies have begun to take account of role prescriptions and social position11. They provide a 
good update to Holsti's work, as they consider the effects of status. However, their analysis remains 
focused mostly on how role prescriptions affect states' own role conceptions. Flockhart recently 
6  Holsti (1970).
7  Holsti (1970: 241).
8  Holsti (1970: 243).
9  Walker (1987), Chefetz et al (1996), Le Prestre (1997).
10  Stryker (1980), Stryker and Statham (1985), see also Handel (1979), Callero (1986).
11  Harnisch, Frank and Maull (2011), see also January issue of Foreign Policy Analysis (2012).
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stated that “[r]ole theory is useful for explaining the interactive processes between agents and the 
structural conditions affecting the individual agent, but in the end the outcome of the influence 
exercised through structure and interactive processes is the agent's own role conception”12. The 
focus remains on individual states and trying to explain or understand their foreign policy behaviour
through role conceptions. This has neglected the possibility that through interaction states may 
negotiate roles that exist in some way beyond any one individual state's role conception, having a 
shared and negotiated existence within the society of states. 
This work on role conceptions is useful for establishing how states understand their own 
roles. This thesis incorporates role conceptions as a crucial part of the analytical framework 
developed later in the chapter. By itself however analysis of role conceptions is not enough for our 
purposes of understanding the negotiation of roles in international society. Role conceptions are the 
beginning of the role negotiation process, forming the basis for role claims, which need to be 
endorsed in order for the actor to legitimately perform the role. Status must be considered as a 
crucial element of roles and not just for its effect on how a state perceives itself. The next section 
will look at how analyses that emphasise role prescriptions have accounted for status, but have 
tended to do so from a structural perspective. As will be shown, this makes them less flexible in 
understanding how roles can be changed. This provides the rationale for the chapter to move on to 
discuss how functions need to be incorporated. 
Role prescriptions and status
Those that emphasise the salience of role prescriptions for explaining state behaviour have situated 
roles outside of individual states' subjectivity as part of the social structure of international society. 
Alexander Wendt states that “[u]nlike foreign policy role theorists, who treat roles as qualities that 
states attribute to themselves, and thus as properties of agents ... I have focused on the role 
attributed to the Other, and thus on role as a position in or property of a social structure”13. Wendt 
considers a role conception as a subjective role-identity, but sees roles themselves as an objective 
social fact within the social structure of international politics. For Wendt, status is the link between 
an actor and the objective role. He identifies three principal roles: enemy, rival and friend. These 
roles accord with his three cultures of anarchy respectively: Hobbesian, Lockian and Kantian14. The 
problem with Wendt's roles are that they are very abstract collective representations within the 
macro-structure of his three cultures of anarchy. He does not provide any empirical analysis of 
12  Flockhart (2011: 99).
13 Wendt (1999: 264) original emphasis.
14 Wendt (1999: 246-312).
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roles. However, he does suggest that roles could be a property of micro-structures – what he 
understands as the level of interaction between states - and elsewhere gives the example of Great 
Britain performing the role of 'balancer' in the Concert of Europe15. The notion that roles are 
developed through interaction is taken further by Charles Doran and Cameron Thies, who also hold 
a structural view of roles.
Doran sees roles as a product of structure, linked closely with material power. A state's 
'international political role' consists of the responsibilities associated with its relative position in the 
international system i.e. provider of security or dependent on security, aid giver or aid recipient, 
lender or debtor16. Although these roles depend mostly on what a government does, a role cannot 
exist unless other states acknowledge that role. Roles consequently need to be legitimised through 
an informal process of strategy and bargaining17. Doran has integrated this understanding of role 
into his power-cycle theory emphasising how 'power-role' gaps can arise when states have power 
not commensurate with their international political role (or vice-versa)18. A major example would be
the inter-war years where the US had the power to underwrite the international economic system 
but did not accept the role and thus did not try to legitimise it. Although this analysis relies heavily 
on material power, it also acknowledges the social aspect of how roles are negotiated or legitimised 
within international society through interaction. It is also useful when thinking about how states 
may have roles that do not necessarily accord with their material capabilities as is arguably the case 
now in East Asia.   
The importance of negotiation or bargaining is also acknowledged by Cameron Thies19. He 
argues that his 'socialisation game' can help understand the way states interact in negotiating roles, 
and how those roles link with the material structure. Indeed he claims that socialisation itself is 
essentially a role bargaining process20. His game includes two players, A and B, who interact within 
'nature' –i.e. the material and normative factors that make up the international system. Player A 
engages in a process of 'role location' where it locates a role within the social structure that it would 
like to play in the international system. Nature decides whether they are a 'type one' player (have the
capabilities to perform the role) or a 'type two' player (lack the necessary capabilities). A can try to 
enact the role and B responds by either accepting A in the role or rejecting it. Depending on whether
A is a 'type one' or 'two' player, and whether B accepts or rejects, will determine whether the 
15 Wendt (1999: 257, 259).
16  Doran (1991: 30-31).
17  Doran (2000: 338-339).
18  Lahneman (2003).
19  Thies (2012).
20  Thies (2012: 29).
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outcome accords with structural conditions. For example, if A is 'type one' and B accepts their 
enactment of the role then this accords with structural conditions and counts as B socialising A into 
the system. Similarly, if A is a 'type two' player and B rejects their role enactment then this accords 
with structure and also counts as socialising. B gives A an indication of A's incapability to perform 
the role. However, if A is 'type two' and B accepts the role enactment, then this does not accord with
structure and the players may experience problems further down the line. If A is 'type one' and B 
does not accept the role enactment then this would also not accord with structure and perhaps A will
try to enact the role regardless causing friction between the players. Thies considers there to be four 
'master roles' of emerging state, small member state, large member state/regional power and great 
power. These master roles are considered to exist across all social systems but may include many 
auxiliary roles that states may locate to perform21.
Thies' conception of roles is similar to Wendt's in that he considers them to be a part of the 
overarching social structure. He takes the analysis further however in introducing agency in the role
claimant's initial 'role location', and interaction by showing the necessity for a response from 
another player. The framework remains rather restricted to socialisation and the role location 
process relies on prior existence of a social structure made up of roles from which a state can 
choose. However, is useful when considering how existing roles can be redefined and how these 
roles may link back to the material structure. For example, if the US' great power role was redefined
as not including the function of diplomatic leadership, then this may not be in line with structure as 
the US is the one with the capabilities to effectively perform diplomatic leadership through strong 
and substantive institution-building and rule-making. The 'players' in the region may experience 
problems down the line in that institutions for seriously addressing the various conflicts and 
disputes in the region may not be in place, as many would argue is the case in East Asia. However, 
Thies' socialisation game does not deal with the creation of new roles, which is the primary case in 
this thesis. A more useful framework would include scope for novelty in A's initial move, by 
allowing it to conceptualise and claim a new role.
Identifying roles as part of the social structure helps us move beyond the analysis of 
individual states' role conceptions and overemphasis of identity. Wendt acknowledges how role 
identity and the role itself are separate. His roles are very abstract as he is more interested in making
meta-theoretical claims about how macro-structures and actors are mutually constituted. The role 
bargaining frameworks discussed by Doran and Thies are more useful as they include clear 
bargaining over both identity and status. This thesis recognises that roles can already exist within 
21  Thies (2012: 33-34).
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international society and that states can negotiate themselves into a pre-existing role or can be 
socialised into a role. Thies' socialisation game is useful for establishing how states can engage in 
the processes of role redefinition and role taking. These processes would start with role location and
then involve the practice of legitimation – seeking to gain endorsement from others that the state's 
identity and status match the role and it can thus perform the legitimate functions of that role. This 
thesis also posits that roles can be created, which raises the question of how this can be done. 
However, although Thies' framework is helpful to a certain extent in understanding processes of 
role redefinition and role-taking, a structural approach to roles still lacks flexibility when it comes 
to understanding change. It therefore cannot fully account for the creation and redefinition of roles. 
The next section will explore how to conceptualise social roles in a way that allows for them to be 
an objective aspect of international society but also malleable in the sense that they can be redefined
and even created by actors through negotiation. It argues that the key to this is to emphasise the 
overlooked element of functions.
Roles negotiation: roles as social objects and the importance of functions
The challenge for understanding how roles can be redefined and created involves showing how 
roles can be linked to structure and individuals. Hollis and Smith argue that social structure and 
elements of structure, such as roles, are external from actors individually, but are internal to them all
collectively22. Hollis and Smith see roles as a part of structure that both constrains and enables an 
actor. They constrain because of the norms and expectations attached to them, but they also enable 
because these norms and expectations are “underdefined” which means that actors have to use their 
own judgement in order to perform the role23. Aggestram24 also looks at how individuals use their 
own judgement. She uses structuration and the concept of the 'situated actor' to establish an 
ontology that takes account of the individual, interaction and structure. The situated actor is 
embedded in various institutional structures from which role expectations are generated. However, 
the actor does not operate mechanically but reflexively, interpreting the expectations and 
experimenting with different ways to adequately perform the role. This is considered to be a process
of learning and can lead to the adoption of new roles. The degree to which roles can change 
22  Hollis (1994: 180). John Searle (2010) splits objectivity and subjectivity into two areas: ontological and epistemic. 
Ontological objectivity and subjectivity have to do with the existence of entities; empistemic objectivity and 
subjectivity have to do with the epistemic status of claims. He thus poses the problem as: “How can there be an 
epistemically objective set of statements about a reality which is ontologically subjective?” (Searle 2010: 18). An 
example being that Barack Obama is the President of the US – an epistemically objective statement (independent of 
anyone's feelings or attitudes) but ontologically subjective (the position of President and the US as a nation are 
categories dependent on the common intentionality of people).
23  Hollis and Smith (1990: 157), Hollis (1994).
24   Aggestram (2006).
41
depends on the extent to which the actor is role-playing or non-reflexively role-taking25. The idea 
that the actor is situated within certain interactions and institutional structures, as well as the 
introduction of novelty from an actor's own interpretation and experimentation with roles, is 
perceptive. Again this represents a negotiation over an actor's identity and status.
This 'shared existence', individually interpreted is best captured by positing roles as social 
objects26. Roles can be more than just subjective role conceptions but also need not solely be 
properties of macro-structures. They can be negotiated within the actual interactions that go on 
between states. Through negotiation, roles take on existence as social objects, that is, social 
constructions that have a shared meaning within a particular community and experienced as an 
objectively real aspect of the community. They prove themselves to be social objects because they 
need to be taken into account within interaction much like physical objects. Physical objects show 
their existence through 'contact experience' because they offer brute resistance – i.e. if you walk into
a coffee table, you know about it! Social objects are validated through interaction – if the social role
facilitates the completion of a social act then by definition it must be shared27. Roles can be used as 
a resource to facilitate social action28. This is due to the functions that are attached to them. 
This ontology fits the English School conceptual framework set up in the introductory 
chapter. We can demonstrate this through applying the ontology to our earlier discussion of the 
great power role. The role of ‘great power’ exists as a social object in international society because 
it needs to be taken into account within interactions and can facilitate the completion of social acts. 
Indeed it has been a dominant feature of interactions since at least 1815. Large and small actors 
alike cannot ignore the great power role. It can also be used as a resource to facilitate significant 
social action because of the functions attached to it. Once a state is recognised as a great power, 
they become imbued with all the rights and responsibilities attached to the role – they can perform 
its functions. The remit of legitimate social action changes and the state can use the role to engage 
in social action it may not have been able to before. No doubt being accepted as a great power in the
late 19th/early 20th Century greatly facilitated Japan's imperial actions in its near abroad at a time 
when imperialism and the civilising mission were key functions of the great power role. It is within 
this that we see how identity, status and function combine to form a social role.
However, roles change over time. David McCourt shows how this was the case with the 
25  Aggestram (2006: 25).
26  Callero (1986), Callero et al (1987).
27  Callero et al (1987: 248-249).
28  Baker and Faulkner (1991), Callero (1994).
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great power role. He analyses Britain's response to the Suez Crisis in 1956 using an interactionist 
role framework that draws on George Herbert Mead. He argues that states role-play but not solely 
from a script like in structuralist theory, but rather through engaging in the processes of role-taking, 
role-making and alter-casting. Interestingly, his 'role-making' process indicates how new roles can 
be created. The three processes of interaction work when “[p]olicy-makers and elites gain a sense of
the appropriate and possible responses to a given situation through the process of ‘taking the role of 
another’ — viewing their state’s Self or identity from the perspective of others — on the basis of 
which they try to ‘make’ a particular role and ‘alter-cast’ Others into complementary roles”29. Eden 
and Macmillan interpreted US and French views on Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal as an
act that threatened Western interests and demanded action. An appropriate response from Britain 
would thus be to reclaim the Canal through force and they proceeded to make the role of 'residual 
great power' and alter-cast the US into a supportive ally. However, Britain misinterpreted the others'
views at the role-taking phase as well as the norms and cultural content of the 'great power' role30. 
The US, which had itself made the role of 'leader of the West' a key function of which was 
restraining allies - opposed the action and alter-cast Britain and France as 'colonial powers'. In this 
analysis, the problem for Britain in trying to make the role of 'residual great power' was not 
necessarily its own identity and status, but rather that the 'cultural content' of the great power role in
1956 had changed from 50 years previously. We can understand this 'cultural content' as the 
functions that the 'great power' role performed in international society. The functions associated 
with the great power role had changed. McCourt does not go further to show how the functions of 
roles are changed through interaction and his example shows the failure of Britain trying to create a 
role rather than successful role creation. However, it highlights the importance of focusing on 
functions in understanding how roles can be created and redefined. A more general framework of 
role negotiation, which will be outlined in the next section, could trace these processes over time. 
In this thesis then, social roles are not constitutive of a society - like they may be for a more 
theoretical study of macro-structure - but functionally specific. Roles involve the performance of 
particular functions in relation to order depending on social context. As was discussed in the 
introductory chapter, a crucial part of order negotiation is the development of mutual 
understandings about what order functions need to be performed. The negotiation of these order 
functions is inherently tied up with the negotiation of social roles because negotiating functions also
involves negotiating who will perform the functions. Particular order functions and associated 
social roles are negotiated by members of international society at particular times to serve specific 
purposes. For this reason, order functions and social roles are an empirical question rather than a 
29 McCourt (2011: 2).
30 McCourt (2011: 18).
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theoretical question. They must be looked for within the actual interactions of members of 
international society. By looking at how actors negotiate the performance of order functions in their 
society, we can better capture how roles come to be created and redefined. The next section outlines
the role negotiation framework used in this thesis which enables us to do this. 
FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY: LEGITIMATION AND FUNCTIONS
This section presents the role negotiation framework used in this thesis and shows how it will be 
operationalised. It first looks at the basic framework of role negotiation and the three role processes 
used in this thesis before moving on to look at functions, developing broad categories of order 
functions that states may claim during role negotiation. It then looks at the practice of legitimation 
itself, showing how we can operationalise the two-way process of role claiming and endorsement, 
before developing a spectrum for judging how substantive claims and endorsement may be. It 
finishes by discussing the question of how substantive ASEAN's role is and the data and sources 
used in this thesis to provide the empirical evidence for role negotiation.
Role processes
The three role processes of role redefinition, role-taking and role creation, are specific processes 
that result from actors reaching a role bargain after a period of generic role negotiation. Generic 
role negotiation involves three stages: role conceptualisation, role claiming and role enactment. As 
discussed in the first part of this chapter, the analysis of role conceptions is a well developed aspect 
of the role theory literature, and this thesis accepts that this is the best place to look for the initial 
development of a role during role negotiation31. An actor first needs to conceptualise a role (identity,
status, function) that they want to perform, either by locating a pre-existing role or conceptualising 
a new role. To move this role beyond the mind of the actor and to seek to actually perform it within 
international society, however, the actor then needs to claim the role. If the actor receives 
endorsement for their role claims then they can legitimately enact the role by performing the 
functions associated with the role. This process of claiming and endorsement is captured by the 
practice of legitimation which is outlined further below. If others contest the actor's role claims then
the actor can either give up or re-conceptualise the role and re-claim it. This basic framework is 
common to all three role processes.
However, role negotiation is rarely a simple process of claiming a role and having all aspects
31e.g. Holsti (1970), Flockhart (2011). 
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of the role claim endorsed. There will usually be contestation from key constituencies within the 
audience over all or aspects of the role claim, and often counter-role claims from certain key 
constituencies. This will most likely occur at times when order is in transition or unstable. In 
contrast, when order appears to be stable it may mean that the role claimant and the audience have 
reached an agreement on what part different actors will play in making and managing order. In this 
case we can look for whether a role bargain has been established. Specifically a role bargain refers 
to an implicit or explicit reciprocal arrangement on a division of labour according to functions: B 
endorses A's performance of function X in return for A endorsing B's performance of function Y. 
Actors usually reach some sort of role bargain at the end of a particular phase of role negotiation. 
Each of the empirical chapters in this thesis finds that the great powers and ASEAN came to 
perform particular roles at particular junctures as part of a role bargain. Each of the role processes - 
role redefinition, role-taking and role creation – came about as part of these role bargains reached 
between the great powers and ASEAN. Each new phase of role negotiation was then initiated after 
one party destabilised the previous role bargain by not holding up their end of the bargain. As the 
empirical chapters will show, it was usually the great power that reneged, or threatened to renege, 
on the previous ASEAN-great power bargain. This is why ASEAN has had to constantly re-
conceptualise, reclaim and renegotiate its role, so that it can nest its role within a role bargain 
acceptable to the great powers.     
Role redefinition is generally understood within the social-psychology literature as a process
individuals use to cope in situations where there is a conflict between two different roles that the 
individual may perform (i.e. one's role at work vs one's role as a parent)32. Role redefinition as this 
thesis understands it is different: it refers to situations where an actor has unsuccessfully tried to 
claim or enact a pre-existing role that they may perform in one social context, into a new social 
context. The claimant may have experienced significant contestation of all or aspects of its role 
claim from key constituencies. These constituencies may have tried to alter-cast the role claimant 
either into a different role or no role at all. The role is redefined when certain (contested) aspects of 
the original role claim are withdrawn in order to reach a role bargain with the key constituencies. 
This will usually involve withdrawing a claim to a contested function and sub-contracting this 
function to actors whose identity or status makes them a more acceptable performer of the function. 
If the function was previously a key aspect of the original role in another social context, then by 
detaching it from the role and transferring it to other actors in the new social context, the claimant 
and key constituencies have redefined the role. 
32Perry and Wynne (1959), Hall (1972), Hage and Powers (1992).  
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Role-taking is most commonly identified with symbolic interactionism and refers to a 
process whereby actors take on the role of the Other when interacting with them33. However, this 
thesis instead uses the term to refer to a process similar to that outlined by Thies in his role 
socialisation framework34. Role-taking can be initiated by an actor trying to claim a pre-existing role
or by others trying to socialise the actor into a role. The actor, or those wanting to socialise the 
actor, first locate an existing role within the social context. The next stage involves the actor 
claiming the role or others alter-casting the actor into the role. If both claiming and alter-casting 
occurs at the same time then legitimation can be achieved if the actor's role conception matches the 
others' role expectations. If they do not match then either the actor will need to re-conceptualise the 
role claim or the others will need to change their expectations. If there is an actor's role claiming 
without alter-casting, then the claim will need to be endorsed by others. If there is alter-casting 
without a role claim, then the actor themselves will need to accept the others' understanding of the 
actor's role. Once legitimation has occurred, the actor has successfully taken on the role and can 
legitimately perform the associated functions.  
Role creation differs from the previous role processes because it involves creating a new 
role entirely. This process starts with an actor conceptualising a role that it would like to perform. 
The actor then makes a role claim, consisting of claims about the identity and status of the actor and
what proposed functions the role would perform. If these claims are contested then the actor can 
either give up or re-conceptualise the role depending on what aspects of the claim were contested. If
they are all endorsed then the actor has had its identity, status and the functions of the role 
recognised as legitimate. The role now exists as a social object within the society and can be used to
facilitate social action by performing the functions of the role. Once the role exists and is enacted it 
faces two pathways depending on whether it continues to receive endorsement or faces contestation.
If there is universal endorsement then the role will go down the path of consolidation as it gets 
further entrenched within the social structure of the society. If it faces increasing contestation 
however, it will deteriorate. The end point of deterioration is role death. If an actor faces 
contestation over its role once it is enacted, it can again re-conceptualise the contested aspects of the
role and reclaim the role by making new legitimacy claims. An actor can thereby avoid the path of 
role deterioration by skilfully redefining, reclaiming and renegotiating the role so that it continues 
to receive endorsement. In situations where there are two or more constituencies of legitimation and
one constituency contests the role, the role claimant can aim for endorsement from the other 
constituencies to avoid deterioration. However, this may leave the role in an uneasy balance 
between consolidation and deterioration. 
33Mead (1934), Blumer (1969), McCourt (2011). 
34Thies (2012). 
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Order functions
Having outlined the role processes, it is necessary to expand on the issue of functions which, as we 
have seen, is crucial to understanding role negotiation. As discussed in the last chapter, this thesis 
conceptually positions order functions within the primary institution of 'order management'. Order 
management is a merging of great power management and diplomacy and therefore it could 
encompass the recognised order functions – what Buzan calls 'derivative institutions' – of great 
power management and diplomacy35. However, rather than presuppose that any particular functions 
are necessary 'derivatives' of order management - which would apply across different types of 
societies or orders - this thesis instead posits that order functions are contingent on social context. 
That is, different functions will be relevant depending on the particular order under study, and these 
functions will be performed by different actors according to the particular negotiations that have 
taken place within that society. The key therefore for understanding which order functions are 
relevant, and which actors will perform such functions, is legitimacy and, more specifically, how 
legitimacy is negotiated between the relevant parties. Table 1 below therefore outlines broad 
categories of order functions that might be found across different types of order. These are split into 
security, economic and diplomatic/normative functions. The list of functions draws on a wide range 
of literature that moves beyond the ES to include realist, institutionalist, constructivist and critical 
insights. The criteria for choosing these functions therefore is not a commitment to a particular 
theoretical view but rather to try and capture a full range of functions that scholars have identified 
actors performing in relation to order broadly defined. To understand which functions may be 
relevant to a particular order depends on looking at the negotiations between the actors within that 
order. These negotiations can be captured through the framework of legitimation. 
During role negotiation, the three elements of a role (identity, status and function) need to be
legitimised through endorsement. This thesis focuses more specifically on the legitimation of 
functions because functions are the most important aspect for understanding social roles. On their 
own, functions tell us more about the role than identity or status; roles can be more clearly 
differentiated by the functions that are associated with them and it is the functions that contribute to 
the society. If we think of the role of 'medical doctor', it is most clearly differentiated from other 
roles by the specific functions a doctor performs. 
Functions are also more encompassing than identity or status alone. The negotiation of 
identity and status are intrinsically involved in how an actor views itself and presents itself in 
35Buzan (2004a). 
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seeking to perform a certain function and how others see that actor and determine their competence 
to perform that function. A trainee doctor will need to go through medical school and prove her 
competence to perform the necessary medical functions; however, in claiming her competence in 
performing these functions she is also negotiating her identity and status as a doctor. Once she has 
been recognised as competent in legitimately performing the functions, she will receive the identity 
and status recognition as the title of doctor is bestowed upon her. Functions are also most useful in 
the case of ASEAN because of their importance for actors that lack the kind of high status and 
identity that great powers may have. Whereas a great power may come to perform a role because it 
already has a distinct status, ASEAN is more likely to claim its competence to perform functions in 
claiming a role because it lacks the distinct identity and status to draw on.  
Christian Reus-Smit has provided a useful outline of the practice of legitimation. It is worth 
quoting him at length. He states:
“Ascribing legitimacy is ... inextricably linked to, and dependent upon, social communication. Actors establish
their legitimacy, and the legitimacy of their actions, through the rhetorical construction of self-images and the
public justification of priorities and practices, and other actors contest or endorse these representations
through similar rhetorical processes. Establishing and maintaining legitimacy is thus a discursive
phenomenon, and the nature of this discursive phenomenon will depend heavily upon the prevailing
architecture of social norms, upon the cultural mores that govern appropriate forms of rhetoric, argument,
and justification, and upon available technologies of communication”36.
This practice points to the three elements of a role. Actors seek to establish the legitimacy of their 
own self images (identity) and status. They also seek to legitimise their actions, suggesting the 
desire to present these not as isolated actions but related to the performance of broader order 
functions. With specific respect to roles this suggests not so much a 'prevailing architecture of 
norms'; rather, a prevailing architecture of functions within which legitimation may take place. 
There may be certain order functions that need to be performed for the maintenance of order as 
rule-governed interaction. Table 1 below shows a preliminary list of various order functions split 
into three categories of security, economic and diplomatic/normative. Primary functions designate 
the most important functions that include one or more derivative secondary functions.  
 
36  Reus-Smit (2007: 163).
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Security Economic Diplomatic/Normative
Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary
Grand strategic narrative Economic 
public goods 
provision
Lender of last 
resort
Financial 
leadership
Reducing 
poverty and 
development 
asymmetry
Aid provision
Diplomatic 
leadership
Institution 
building
Conflict 
mediation
Brokerage
Rule-making
Agenda setting
Advocacy
Security public 
goods
Security of sea 
lanes
Military 
assistance/aid
Rule-
enforcement
Holding the line
Alliances Alliance 
leadership
Alliance 
confidence
Balance of 
power
Deterrence
Disaster 
management
Mitigation
Emergency relief
Strategic 
restraint
Institutional 
binding
Table 1 – Order functions
The aim of this list is to provide some broad categories of order functions that could be 
found across different types of order, but as already stated, particular orders will have particular 
order functions, and some of these functions may be specific to that particular order or to a 
particular time period. The empirical chapters of this thesis show that some order functions come 
and go depending on circumstances and actors' negotiations. This has an impact on the relevance of 
particular roles. This section will now expand on each of these functions in table 1 to see how they 
could be related to the management of order.
Security functions
The function of grand strategic narrative is not split into the categories of primary or secondary 
because it acts as a key function on its own. This is because, to a significant extent, other security 
functions are contingent on the prevailing grand strategic narrative of a social order. If accepted, 
grand strategic narrative become part of public discourse and links apparently disparate and 
complex events and phenomena into a common narrative. Grand strategic narrative has three 
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aspects: presentation of an 'in-group', threat to the 'in-group' and necessary strategic response. The 
presentation of an 'in-group' can be linked to Foucault's37 notion of productive power: discourses 
produce meanings, norms, customs and social identities which determine subjects and limit or 
enable action. Those that are 'in' are considered 'normal' and worthy of the benefits of inclusion. 
Those who are 'out' are considered 'abnormal' or a threat and need to be opposed or co-opted into 
the 'in-group'. An example is how Europeans determined as subjects those that were 'civilised' and 
'uncivilised' in 19th Century international society. The civilised that were part of the 'in-group' were 
deserving of certain rights and responsibilities in international society. The uncivilised that were 
part of the 'out-group' and were subject to colonisation and 'civilising' practices. Grand strategic 
narrative also determines what constitutes a threat to the 'in-group' and what the necessary strategic 
response to the threat is. For this reason, other security functions are contingent on the acceptance 
of a particular grand strategic narrative. For example, the provision of alliances and a deterrent 
balance of power will be determined by the prevailing grand strategic narrative. The grand strategic 
narrative will determine who is 'in' and needs to be protected through alliances, and who or what the
threat is that needs to be deterred. Grand strategic narrative was particularly important during the 
Cold War as the two superpowers sought to legitimise their global security strategies and mobilise 
allies against the other. 
Apart from grand strategic narrative, security functions more generally are needed for 
fostering a stable environment so that states can pursue their private and collective goals. Security 
functions can be public, club or private goods38. The primary function of security public goods 
shown in table 1 includes public and club goods. In a region that is significantly maritime based, 
security of sea lanes is a key secondary function that needs to be performed and could be considered
a public good in that, to a certain extent, it is non-excludable and non-rival39. The majority of trade 
passes through sea lanes and some, such as the Malacca Straits, are considered crucial 'choke points'
that figure highly in regional states' strategic outlooks. Maintaining freedom of passage through 
these lanes is recognised to benefit the region as a whole.  
Military assistance/aid can be considered a club good in that it will most likely be provided 
to those states considered to be within the 'in-group' of the dominant grand strategic narrative. It 
contributes to order by building the capacity of states and was used extensively by the US and the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War. Military assistance and capacity-building can thus form a 
significant part of a sub-contracting arrangement whereby a major power gives primary 
37  For a collection of Foucault's writings and lectures on power, see Foucault (2002).
38 Krahman (2008).
39 Kaul et al (1999).
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responsibility to another smaller state for providing security in their immediate locale. This can 
occur within a formal alliance relationship or an informal security partnership. At its extreme, this 
sort of arrangement has been advocated as a possible grand strategy for the US in the post-Cold War
period known as 'offshore balancing', whereby the US pulls back from its alliance commitments and
leaves the heavy lifting in balancing challengers to regional states40.  
A club good that could be considered a secondary function of security public goods 
provision is ‘holding the line’. Holding the line is very much associated with the strategy of 
containment41 whereby a line is drawn representing the boundary between a protected 'in-group' and
the threatening 'out-group'. The power that commits to holding the line essentially commits to 
containing the threat the out-group poses at that line. In the context of the Cold War, containment 
was a key US strategy in Europe and Asia, and lines were drawn between Western and Eastern 
Europe, within Korea and in Vietnam.  
Alliances can be considered a separate primary function as it more clearly entails club 
goods. Those that are part of an alliance system receive the majority of the benefits. Alliance 
leadership entails building alliances that offer protection and reassurance through deterrence of 
threats, as well as material benefits to junior partners such as training and capacity-building. They 
also serve to restrain allies by eliminating the need to engage in potentially destabilising self help 
measures42. Since the Second World War states in Western Europe and East Asia have faced a 
variety of internal and external threats and alliance formation has provided one way of seeking 
assurance against such threats. Alliances can deter those who may be seeking revision of order 
through military means and, in this sense, perform a wider function for order by ensuring actors 
continue to pursue their goals through rule-governed interaction. Ensuring alliance confidence by 
demonstrating commitment to maintaining the alliance, reassures junior alliance partners so that 
they do not need to seek other means to ensure their security. In particular John Ikenberry argues 
that alliance confidence is developed because alliances form a key political architecture through 
which officials from allied nations are linked and enabled to do business together. They also provide
a means through which the more powerful partner can demonstrate strategic restraint by opening up
its decision making processes to junior partners43. Operationally, confidence can be built through 
actions such as joint military exercises which contribute to the coordination of states' militaries. In 
coordinating military operations they also contribute to the management of regional problems 
including natural and humanitarian disasters. However, alliances can also have negative 
40Layne (1997). 
41Art (2003: 111-120).
42Thalakada (2012: 3-5). 
43Ikenberry (2011, 2013). 
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consequences as they can be perceived by external actors as constituting a threat, potentially 
triggering a security dilemma. Beyond deterrence and reassurance however, alliances have also 
come to be seen in the post-Cold War period as a formal means through which the US as the sole 
superpower can share the burden of maintaining its preponderance and upholding its 'liberal 
international order'44. This can be seen through the use of NATO in undertaking military 
interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya, as well as the expansion of the remit of the US-
Japan alliance in covering situations beyond Japan's immediate area.  
Balance of power is a primary security function that has long held a central place in 
international relations. It could also encompass many of the other secondary security functions 
especially alliances as they have been a key means through which states have sought to balance 
power and perceived threats45. As Hedley Bull46 pointed out, local balances of power serve to 
protect the independence of states by preventing the dominance of any one power as well as 
providing the conditions within which other functions can be carried out. This is important in a 
region where there is significant asymmetry with respect to material capabilities. Having a balance 
between major powers means that there are more strategic options available for small states seeking
to maximise autonomy47. A military balance also deters threats and can be used explicitly for 
deterrence or containment purposes. 
Despite all this, rules do get broken, so there need to be consequences such that rule-
enforcement is a major secondary security function. Enforcing rules through punishing those that 
break them validates those rules, contributing to their salience and sanctity within actors' 
interactions. This can deter others from breaking rules through a logic of consequences but can also 
further enforce the social logic of the appropriateness of the rules. The primary means through 
which rules are enforced in international society is through sanctions, and in extreme cases, military
intervention48. 
Disaster management is a primary function particularly in a region that is prone to natural 
disasters such as earthquakes, cyclones and tsunamis. Mitigating procedures in case of a disaster 
limit the damage and loss of life of such disasters. Emergency relief also serves to limit the 
devastating consequences of disasters49.
44 Thalakada (2012). 
45 Walt (1987). 
46 Bull (1977: 102).
47 Ciorciari (2010).
48 For a discussion of the debate surrounding the benefits of coercive enforcement see Thompson (2012). 
49 For a recent, and critical, overview of the international politics of disaster management see Hannigan (2012). 
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Strategic restraint can be considered another primary security function. States that have 
superior capabilities can consciously reassure neighbours by committing to show restraint in their 
foreign policy. The usual way to do so is through institutional binding: agreeing to be bound within 
cooperative frameworks and rules50.  
Economic functions
The primary function of economic public goods providion includes a number of secondary 
functions which derive mostly from Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST), especially the work of 
Kindleberger51. Financial leadership and acting as a lender of last resort provides investment, 
liquidity and coordination of financial cooperation and macroeconomic policy. These are supposed 
to ensure the functioning of the market economy but also provide safety nets in the case of crises by
ensuring access to emergency liquidity. This is especially salient in a region that experienced a 
significant financial crisis that had far reaching political effects in the late 1990s.
Reducing poverty and asymmetry comes from Dent's52 work on regional leadership and, 
together with aid provision, reflect the collective goal of development. Economic development has 
long been associated with domestic stability and so has been advanced as a way to improve 
international security and also as a normative aspect improving the living conditions of the world's 
population. This is especially so in East Asia where the conception of 'comprehensive security' or 
'resilience' has focused on economic development for internal security purposes.  
Diplomatic/normative functions  
Diplomatic leadership is a primary function that can be highly encompassing. It can refer to the 
coordination of states and other actors on a grand scale, such as at international peace conferences 
after major wars, or refer to the general coordination of diplomatic initiatives on a global or regional
scale. It can also be issue specific, such as when a particular actor is given leadership over a 
particular issue. Institution-building is a key secondary function of diplomatic leadership, providing 
forums within which regional states interact. This again is related to the function of agenda-setting. 
An actor performing this function can determine what will be discussed and what constitute 
important issues.
50  Ikenberry (2001, 2011), Goh (2013: 28-71). 
51  Kindleberger (1973).
52  Dent (2008a).
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Conflict mediation and brokerage are important secondary diplomatic functions because 
conflicts and differences are common in international society. Indeed, mediating value difference is 
a key function of any social order53. Conflicts need to be managed so that they do not escalate to the 
detriment of rule-governed interaction. Brokerage relates more specifically to the brokering of 
agreements between parties that may have conflicting interests and values. This is an important 
function because it can bring parties together to realise common interests whilst downplaying the 
areas of difference. This can contribute to rule-governed interaction by ensuring that differences and
disagreements do not escalate and also facilitating the creation of new rules.  
Rule-making is needed because, put simply, order needs rules and rules need to come from 
somewhere. This is related to the idea of norm entrepreneur54 as new rules or norms can be 
introduced by actors into international society. Advocacy is also related as a new norm or rule can 
take time to be accepted by international society and so may need continued advocacy from an actor
to keep it on the agenda. This can contribute to significant normative change, such as the abolition 
of the slave trade, or to more specific or technical rules such as within the WTO mechanisms.  
Great and small power functions
Great powers are assumed to provide a grand strategic narrative for order by determining the 'in-
group' of states, the threat to that group and the necessary response55. As great powers have superior
capabilities they are also assumed to perform the function of balance of power, provide security 
public goods, economic public goods and perform the primary diplomatic/normative function of 
diplomatic leadership, especially through institution-building. This is apparent primarily at times of 
crisis and transition when great powers are expected to provide diplomatic leadership in negotiating 
order as well as building institutions to express and lock in the new arrangement for order.
 
The small power role is considered to include diplomatic/normative functions in the day to 
day politics of order, not at times of transition. These might include conflict mediation, advocacy 
and rule-making with respect to specific issues but not deeper questions of order. As we will see, the
novelty of decoupling diplomatic leadership from the great power role and transferring it to the 
small power role in Southeast Asia, has led to ASEAN's unusual prominence in the negotiation and 
53 Hurrell (2007).
54 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998).
55 This can be seen when we think of the US' mobilisation of coalitions of states particularly during the Cold War but 
also in the post-Cold War with respect to 'rouge states' and non-state terrorist organisations.
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management of post-Cold War East Asia. In order to find out how this was done, we first need to 
look at how the framework of legitimation can be operationalised so that we can capture role 
negotiation during the three periods under study.
Legitimation – claims and endorsement
States negotiate a division of labour with respect to order functions through the process of 
legitimation. Actors make claims about their competence to perform particular functions that need 
endorsement from others. Some functions more clearly require substantial material capabilities such
as those in the security and economic categories. Others do not necessarily require substantial 
material capabilities such as those in the diplomatic/normative category.
Reus-Smit56 points to legitimation as occurring through discursive social communication. 
This serves his purpose of highlighting the way the US rhetorically justified its power during the 
Bush Administration. When considering the broader subject of the negotiation of social roles 
however, we need to go beyond discursive communication. In doing so we can understand 
communication in terms of how substantive claims and endorsements are. Figure 1 shows a 
spectrum of claims and endorsement moving from the least substantive, purely discursive 
claims/endorsement, to the most substantive claims/endorsement. In between there are two 
intermediate degrees of the symbolic and performative. Symbolic may move beyond the merely 
discursive by including gestures and actions that indicate the deeper meaning or intention. 
Performative bridges the symbolic and the substantive when the actor seeks to perform the function 
or aspects of the function as part its claim. Substantive would constitute fully implemented policy 
action which actually carries out the function.    
Figure 1 – Spectrum of claims and endorsement
The spectrum essentially reflects the degree of cost to the actor in making its claim or giving
endorsement. A purely discursive claim is the least costly as it involves merely rhetoric. A 
substantive claim is the most costly because implementing policy action may require significant 
mobilisation of resources and/or tackling domestic opposition. This section expands on these 
56  Reus-Smit (2007).
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SubstantivePerformativeSymbolicDiscursive
categories using the example of a state claiming the function of 'conflict mediation' to illustrate the 
differences between the types of claims and endorsement.
Claims
Discursive claims are things that are actually said by key actors. These will be included in policy 
papers, concept papers, speeches and things said in meetings. What do actors say about themselves 
and their ability to perform certain functions? For example, if two states were experiencing a crisis 
or conflict in their relations, a leader from another state may make a speech saying that her state 
will offer to mediate the conflict. On its own, this speech would constitute a discursive claim to 
perform the function of conflict mediation. It involves little cost and may have some benefits in 
making the leader look like a responsible statesperson.
Symbolic claims and endorsement may be more implicit in the words, gestures and actions 
of actors57. Symbolic interactionism has highlighted the importance of the presentation of gestures 
and a response to the meaning of those gestures for communication. As stated by Blumer, “[a] 
gesture is any part or aspect of an ongoing action that signifies the larger act of which it is a part”58. 
An actor's gestures convey an idea of their intention and plan for forthcoming action. The actor who
responds organises their response on the basis of the meaning the gesture has for them. The gesture 
has meaning for both actors. This mirrors the two-way process of legitimation. If we think of the 
'larger acts' as being the acts of 'claiming' and 'endorsement', then we will need to look at gestures as
the 'part or aspect of' these larger ongoing acts. For example, in our case introduced above, a gesture
that may constitute a symbolic claim to the function of conflict mediation may be that the claimant 
state actually prepares a venue for the two sides to meet for discussions. This is more costly than 
merely announcing such an intention in a speech as above, and gives a clearer indication of the 
claimant's intentions to actually perform the function should the intended constituency endorse its 
claims.
Performative claims involve policy action that goes some way towards performing a 
function or at least represents an attempt to perform the function. An example may include our 
claimant state travelling to visit the feuding states to try to persuade them to agree to a ceasefire and
negotiations towards conflict resolution. Alternatively it could involve actually getting the parties 
around the table but on terms that fall short of what may be considered meaningful steps towards 
conflict resolution – i.e. for informal or exploratory dialogue with no formal commitments. These 
57 Charon (2000: 43-44).
58  Blumer  (1969: 9).
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actions involve reasonable cost but may not go fully towards performing the function of conflict 
mediation.
Substantive claims involve fully implemented policy action that actually explicitly performs 
the function being claimed. This in a sense would be the provision of policy that meets the need 
required by the function. In our example this may involve the claimant state successfully getting the
feuding parties around the negotiating table within a formal dialogue, with a commitment to 
discussing the key issues of their conflict and making meaningful steps towards conflict resolution 
such as implementing a ceasefire. This would constitute the claimant state actually enacting the 
function of conflict mediation, enactment being the most substantive claim to that function.
As these types fall within a spectrum there may often be overlap in practice. An actor may 
also pursue more than one type of claim at once. The fact that words can also constitute symbols 
means that the discursive and symbolic will often go hand in hand. This is an important point in 
international politics because conventions of diplomatic language may mean that something that is 
said (or not said) can have deeper symbolic meaning or indicate some intention that cannot be 
rhetorically expressed. The recent disagreements over the language contained in the final 
communiqué regarding the South China Sea at the ASEAN AMM in July 2012, which led to 
ASEAN not releasing a final communiqué for the first time in its history, shows the symbolic 
importance words can have.
Endorsement
When thinking about endorsement it is first necessary to think about who an actor needs 
endorsement from. Reus-Smit employs the concepts of the 'realm of political action' and the 'social 
constituency of legitimation' to show that if an actor intends to act in a particular political 
area/region, there will be a particular constituency from which the actor will need to receive 
endorsement. In order to gain legitimacy, the realm of political action and social constituency of 
legitimation need to correspond59. In this thesis the realm of political action is Southeast and East 
Asia and the constituencies of legitimation are geographically situated, or politically active in these 
regions. Within these regions there are three distinct constituencies of legitimation that ASEAN 
requires endorsement from: the great powers, ASEAN itself (individual member states) and the 
domestic populations within regional states. Claims will be directed at these constituencies and the 
fact that these constituencies may have different expectations regarding ASEAN's competence and 
59 Reus-Smit (2007: 164).
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what ASEAN should do, may pull ASEAN in various, often conflicting directions.
Similarly, the great powers' constituencies of legitimation are regional states and the 
domestic constituencies within individual states. This is particularly important during the periods 
covered in Chapters Two and Three dealing with role redefinition and role-taking. The dominant 
domestic constituencies within regional states determined whether regional states would endorse or 
contest the US' and China's role claims. For example, the role bargain established at the end of 
Chapter Two was only feasible after the emergence of a staunchly anti-communist domestic 
constituency in power in Indonesia.
As with claims, endorsement also comes in degrees. Again the degree of endorsement 
reflects the cost to the actor endorsing. There may be little cost in rhetorically endorsing a claim. 
Indeed, an actor can discursively endorse whilst taking contradictory policy action. Substantive 
endorsement is costly because it involves policy implementation.
Discursive endorsement is found in speeches, official statements, published communiques 
and things said in meetings. Have key others vocalised support for the role claimant's specific 
claims? For example, a state may rhetorically support a policy initiative and help in advocating the 
initiative that constituted a claim to perform a function. In our example above, one of the feuding 
states or an interested third party may express support for the claimant state's policy for conflict 
mediation through a speech or by issuing a declaration or communiqué.
Symbolic endorsement includes gestures such as attendance at meetings and official visits. 
High level attendance and visits to claimant states, as well as timing and prioritising some meetings 
over others, indicate the importance the actor claiming a function may have to the one endorsing. 
How visits are framed and what activities are undertaken on visits – signing of agreements, policy 
speeches and where speeches are given (place can have deep symbolic meaning) – can all act as 
indicators of the degree of endorsement or contestation. For example, a state endorsing our claimant
state's policy of conflict mediation, may make a visit to the claimant state's capital during 
negotiations as part of an effort to demonstrate its support.
Performative endorsement involves performing in a way that corresponds with the actor 
claiming the function. This could include taking part in a claimant's initiatives, following the lead of
a claimant on an issue, or acquiescing to the claimant's actions by not pursuing alternative policies 
and allowing the actor to go through with a policy. This acquiescence can even come after 
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discursive contestation. Perhaps there was some rhetorical protest during a meeting but the protester
acquiesced to the final outcomes/agreements of the meeting. For example, the feuding states or 
interested third parties may participate in the claimant state's proposed talks but on the condition 
that they are informal with no prior commitments. This would fall short of substantive endorsement 
as it would not involve the cost of fully implemented policy, but it would demonstrate performing in
a way that indicated endorsement of the claimant's state's claims.
Substantive endorsement is concerned with policy – policy positions represent a major 
symbol of endorsement or contestation. Does an actor's policy position support the claimant's 
position? This is a costly form of endorsement as new policy may need to be introduced or policy 
position may need to shift. Substantive endorsement may be easier for smaller states who may see 
greater reward from shifting their policy and who may not incur such cost. The states of Western 
Europe after the Second World War gave substantive endorsement to the US' substantive claims to a
hegemon role by adjusting their policy to align with the US'. Conversely, substantive endorsement 
will be more difficult for stronger states as it may involve costly policy change (in terms of 
domestic opposition) or opportunity costs. In our case, the feuding states might show substantive 
endorsement for our claimant state's claims by engaging in talks with formal commitments to a 
ceasefire and a genuine desire to seek some resolution to the conflict. This may be politically costly 
domestically as it would constitute a change of policy from seeking a military solution to a 
diplomatic solution based on the claimant's mediation. 
Policy action can also often override contradictory discursive statements in the sense that a 
state may rhetorically express a certain position but its actions and policies suggest a different 
position. In such a case the policy position would provide stronger evidence of whether there is 
endorsement or not. For example, one of our feuding states may express a desire to engage in 
negotiations over resolving its conflict, but then not attend dialogue, not adhere to the preconditions
for engaging in the dialogue or break an agreed ceasefire etc. These actions would override any 
discursive or symbolic endorsement of the claimant's claims to conflict mediation.
The purpose of role negotiation is to reach mutual understandings over what functions are 
needed within a particular order and who will perform them. The framework of legitimation 
outlined in this section shows how we can capture the negotiation process through claims and 
endorsement. As mentioned earlier in the chapter however, to go beyond generic role negotiation 
and identify the processes of role redefinition, role-taking and role creation, this thesis employs the 
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concept of a role bargain. A role bargain is characterised by the mutual understandings that states 
reach as part of their role negotiation, more specifically, the reciprocal arrangement that underpins 
who will perform what function and the basis upon which this arrangement is recognised as 
legitimate. This chapter finishes by expanding the discussion of the role bargain and shows how this
thesis will go about studying role negotiation and identifying whether role bargains have been 
reached between ASEAN and the great powers. Before that however, the next section briefly 
discusses the issue of how the degree of claims and endorsement effect the efficacy and efficiency 
of ASEAN's role.
Efficacy and efficiency – how substantive?
The key question for ascertaining the efficacy and efficiency of a role is: was there clear policy 
action that came about as a result of the endorsement? Was ASEAN able to act and perform certain 
order functions as a result of the endorsement from others? That ASEAN has indeed been able to 
perform key order functions at times of transition shows that this process of role negotiation has 
indeed worked. This thesis argues that ASEAN has been able to use its role to perform these 
functions. Not only has ASEAN been able to use its role at particular junctures but, because role 
negotiation is cumulative, in each period ASEAN has been able to build on the foundations of the 
previous role negotiation to extend the order functions it is legitimately able to perform and thus 
extend the scope of its role. In this way the current situation of ASEAN's prominence in East Asia is
not merely an accident of the region's present structural dynamics but is part of this historical 
process of cumulative role negotiation. Having said this, there is also a question of how much 
ASEAN can do with its role and for how long. This is related to the degree of substance to 
ASEAN's claims and the endorsement it receives. Have claims been primarily towards the 
discursive or substantive end of the spectrum? What about endorsement from the different 
constituencies of legitimation? This thesis shows that particularly with respect to its ‘regional 
conductor’ role, ASEAN’s claims, and the endorsement it has received from the different 
constituencies of legitimation, have been closer to the discursive end than the substantive end. This 
raises questions regarding the future of ASEAN’s role, which will be explored in Chapter Four.
Data and sources
This final section discusses the sources I used to find the evidence for role negotiation and discusses
how I went about studying role negotiation and role bargains. As discussed, role negotiation is tied 
up in the process of order negotiation more generally, and they are linked together by the 
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negotiation of order functions – what order functions are considered necessary for order and who 
should perform which functions. As negotiation is considered to be more than merely discursive 
communication in this thesis, I looked at the actions and policies that key actors pursued throughout
the period under study and considered whether these could constitute the types of role claims and/or
role endorsement outlined above, and whether they constituted negotiation over order functions. To 
look at the events and actions themselves I consulted secondary scholarly studies and news sources 
from the time of the events, as well as scholarly historical accounts. These helped me determine 
how events and negotiations occurred and in what political context. On top of this, I looked at how 
state actors framed their actions within speeches and discussions with other states. For the historical
chapters, primary sources from online archives (including the US Department of State Office of the 
Historian series Foreign Relations of the United States, National Security Archives and the National
Australian Archives) were particularly useful in this respect. These included speeches, declassified 
official documents, minutes from meetings and oral history interviews. I also consulted personal 
biographies of key officials and diplomats. These sources gave me an insight into the internal policy
discourse of states as well as what was said and agreed at key meetings and negotiations between 
leaders and top officials. This enabled me to build up a better picture of key actors' role conceptions 
from which I could determine whether the actual policy or action the state undertook was consistent
with such a role conception. Determining the cost of the action allowed me to identify where it 
could be placed on the spectrum from discursive to substantive claims/endorsement.
In order to determine whether negotiating states had reached a role bargain, I looked at the 
junctures where order seemed to be relatively stable and looked at whether the states' behaviour 
during these times appeared complementary or even coordinated. This would give an indication that
there may be mutual understandings between the states over pursuing a common aim/goal, and 
alongside this, understandings over respective responsibilities in pursing such an aim/goal – i.e. 
responsibilities to perform complementary order functions. I could then look at the minutes and 
accounts of key meetings that took place around the same time, and see whether explicit 
negotiations actually occurred between key actors, whether their action/policy was coordinated or 
whether they came to any agreements over how to pursue common aims/goals. If there was 
evidence of implicit or explicit agreement over what each party should do towards achieving their 
common aim/goal and that each party implemented such policy, then this pointed to the existence of
a role bargain based on the performance of complementary order functions. I could then determine 
the basis upon which states built their role bargains by looking at the nature of any implicit or 
explicit agreements as well as the wider political and social context at the time of role negotiation. 
In this sense, I could look for the instrumental and normative factors that underpinned the states' 
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mutual understandings over their respective responsibilities to order and how the bargain fit within 
the political and normative context.
For the later Cold War and post-Cold War chapters, I also used semi-structured interviews with 
policy-makers, diplomats and region-based academics to provide data from those that have actually 
attended high-level meetings and have been directly involved in the negotiations on the issues 
covered in the thesis. In February and March 2014 I travelled to Bangkok, Singapore, Jakarta and 
Kuala Lumpur where I arranged interviews with key actors from the four countries who were 
involved in various capacities in ASEAN activities during the Cambodian conflict and during post-
Cold War ASEAN activities - from the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum in the early 1990s 
up to the present day. I chose these four countries because they constitute four of the five founding 
ASEAN members and have consistently been the most active members in developing ASEAN 
initiatives. Before each interview I prepared questions about what different ASEAN members states'
positions were on various issues to try to trace processes of deliberation within ASEAN towards 
reaching a common policy position. This gave me a sense of what different constituencies at the 
domestic and international level expected of ASEAN in its role, enabling me to build up a picture of
ASEAN's collective role conception. I also enquired as to what the responses of external actors such
as the US, China and Japan were to ASEAN initiatives to get an idea of whether external actors 
endorsed ASEAN's claims and for what reasons.
These sources necessarily raise issues of reliability. Secondary sources contain biases and 
authors' interpretations of events and evidence. Interviews also involve bias and memory lapses. 
This can lead to different interviewees presenting contrasting information. This problem was 
combated through triangulation as things said within interviews were cross-checked against other 
documentary evidence as well as the secondary literature. Where two sources may have clashed, 
they were checked against another source to determine which version of events is most reliable.
As this study relies on qualitative methods of social science there is also an issue of my own 
subjectivity and interpretation. This required thinking reflexively about how I use and interpret the 
data. Also, as it seeks to go in depth with respect to the case of ASEAN, there may be an issue of 
generalisability as far as the role negotiation framework is concerned. As the thesis specifically 
seeks to explain the empirical puzzle of ASEAN prominence in order negotiation and management 
in East Asia this should not matter too much at this stage. The generalisability of the framework 
could be determined through further research using other cases.
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Chapter Two - Role redefinition: the US and Southeast Asia 1954-1975 
“Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the 'falling domino' principle. You 
have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it 
will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound 
influences1.”
United States President Dwight Eisenhower, April 1954
“I beg of you do not think of colonialism only in the classic form which we of Indonesia, and our brothers in different 
parts of Asia and Africa, knew. Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual 
control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skilful and determined enemy, 
and it appears in many guises. It does not give up its loot easily. Wherever, whenever and however it appears, 
colonialism is an evil thing, and one which must be eradicated from the earth2.”
Indonesian President Sukarno, April 1955
This chapter covers a period of major transition, when the pressures of the Cold War and 
decolonisation engendered a fundamental contest over the type of order that would emerge in post-
colonial Southeast Asia3. During the 1950s and early 1960s, one side of the contest saw the US try 
to establish an anti-communist order under US great power leadership, advocating the containment 
of communism. This push for containment included the establishment of a series of US-centred 
bilateral alliances and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), as well as the US-led 
intervention in Vietnam4. On the other side, Indonesia pursued an autonomous regional order 
dedicated to expelling external great power influence under its own indigenous great power 
leadership. The push for autonomy was reflected in the organisation of the Bandung Conference, 
MAPHILINDO (Malaya, Philippines, Indonesia) and Indonesia's Confrontation against the 'neo-
colonial plot' of Malaysia5. Competing visions of order in Southeast Asia led to instability not only 
at the 'front-line' against communism on mainland Southeast Asia, but also in maritime Southeast 
Asia as regional states bitterly contested the legitimacy of each other's governments and territorial 
borders. 
By the end of the 1960s however, a different picture emerged. Although SEATO had become
obsolete, the US' bilateral security ties with regional states remained. These existed alongside 
ASEAN - an effort at indigenous regionalism involving the US-supporter states of Thailand, the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore, as well as the former challenger Indonesia. All the ASEAN 
states supported the US' military involvement in Vietnam as buying time for them to consolidate 
1 Dwight D. Eisenhower "The President's News Conference," April 7, 1954. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10202> accessed 2/7/14. 
2  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia (1955: 19-29). 
3Volumes that assess the impact of these processes on the region include Frey, Pruessen and Yong (2003), Goscha and 
Ostermann (2009), Lau (2012), Murfett (2012). See also Berger (2004). 
4Mcmahon (1999) provides a useful overview of US strategy in Southeast Asia during the Cold War.
5Leifer (1983) provides an excellent account of Indonesian foreign policy during this period.
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their domestic regimes. Through ASEAN they developed a means for managing intra-regional 
relations, agreeing to support each other's regime consolidation through non-interference6. 
Practically this meant not supporting opposition groups challenging a regime's legitimacy, and 
avoiding the escalation of disputes such as those over territorial claims. At the bilateral level 
member states cooperated to combat communist insurgency. ASEAN states even provided the 
diplomatic vanguard for US imperatives. For example, the Jakarta Conference on Cambodia in 
1970 sought to legitimise the US' military position in Indochina whilst demonstrating regional 
activism on the part of the Indonesian government. 
How do we explain this move from a deeply contested pattern of order, to one that 
established a legitimate military presence for the US and a space for indigenous states to exercise 
autonomy through regional organisation and diplomatic initiatives? This chapter argues that it is 
best understood as the result of an explicit regional division of labour, developed between the US 
and regional states after two decades of negotiation and contestation. The division of labour was 
part of a US-ASEAN reciprocal role bargain, which entailed the redefinition of the great power role
in Southeast Asia. The generic great power role includes the key functions of security public goods 
and diplomatic leadership. In the US-ASEAN role bargain, security public goods provision 
remained intrinsic to the regional great power role, but the function of diplomatic leadership was 
detached from the great power role and transferred to regional states.  
Analysing events during this period through the lens of role redefinition helps us better 
understand why US-led bilateral security ties were acceptable in Southeast Asia, but not US-led 
multilateralism as seen in the failure of SEATO. Likewise, it also helps us understand why ASEAN 
emerged as a successful effort at regionalism whereas other efforts such as SEATO, Bandung and 
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) failed. These were both part of a regional division of labour 
determining the US' and regional states' respective roles. Bilateral security ties were the means 
through which the US provided security public goods as part of its newly negotiated 'offshore great 
power guarantor' role. ASEAN took on its own 'primary manager' role, through which regional 
states managed their own affairs and collectively performed diplomatic leadership in support of the 
US' role. This gives us a more holistic picture of this period than approaches that focus solely either 
on great power initiatives or on indigenous state agency. It also helps us understand the foundations 
laid for regional order and how order would be managed; these foundations were subsequently built
on through the processes of role-taking and role creation in subsequent decades. The analysis of role
6On ASEAN's formation as primarily an exercise in regional reconciliation see Leifer (1989). On ASEAN's 
development of regional norms and contribution to order over time see Haacke (2003) and Acharya (2014). For a 
critical perspective which questions the salience of ASEAN's norms and prioritises analysis of domestic social forces, 
see Jones (2012).
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redefinition contributes to two key questions regarding US security ties and ASEAN's success.
Firstly, why did the US' military commitment to Asia take the form of a series of bilateral 
security ties rather than a multilateral security arrangement such as NATO? The US faced a similar 
communist threat, there was a similar mix of medium and small sized states to those in Europe and 
many US officials desired a multilateral arrangement in both regions. Previous studies have tried to 
explain this by either emphasising the US' choices or factors indigenous to the region. Both sides of 
the debate come up short however because they emphasise one side of what is a two-sided, 
interactive process. In doing so, they overlook or downplay significant empirical details that are 
better understood through the complex negotiation of instrumental and normative factors between 
the US and regional states. 
For instance, emphasising US choices downplays the extent to which the US desired a 
multilateral security arrangement in both Europe and Asia. To take one example, the National 
Security Council agreed in December 1954 that one of the aims of US policy in Asia was to 
“encourage the conditions necessary to form as soon as possible and then participate in, a Western 
Pacific collective defence arrangement including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China and 
the Republic of Korea eventually linked with the Manila Pact and ANZUS”7. Why was this never 
formed? The argument that the US faced a greater threat in Europe than Asia, and therefore took 
riskier policies and made firmer commitments, can help us account for the urgency with which the 
US saw the need for a collective security arrangement. However it still cannot fully account for why
it never materialised8. If US officials were being more cautious, what were they waiting for and 
what other factors were involved? Likewise, the argument that the US and Europe shared a common
identity which brought them closer together, whereas US officials had a racial bias against Asians, 
cannot fully account for why certain parts of the US foreign policy establishment still wanted a 
multilateral alliance to be formed9. If key officials thought Asian states could not contribute 
strategically, what purpose did they see such an arrangement serving? 
As becomes clear through the discussion below, elements such as threat perception and 
identity are important, but they are factors that feed into the US' role conception. For example, the 
perception that there was not an immediate threat in Asia led US officials to wait for the initiative 
for regional cooperation to come from regional states themselves. They wanted regional states to 
legitimise the US' strategic imperatives and role through inviting the US to protect their region. It is 
7  “Note to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay), 19th November 1954” Foreign Relations of 
the United States 1952-1954, Vol XII Part 1 Doc 394 (hereafter FRUS).  
8  He and Feng (2012). 
9  Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002). 
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this legitimising factor that explains why the US wanted such an initiative despite viewing Asian 
states as incapable of contributing practically. However, after Dien Bien Phu and the French 
withdrawal from Indochina, the US perceived a greater threat from communism and could no 
longer wait for the initiative to come from the region. It tried to develop a multilateral security 
arrangement itself through SEATO but received mixed responses in the region. The US' racial bias 
meant that it often acted and presented itself in a way that offended regional states sensitive to 
colonialism, complicating its search for legitimacy. However, we need to look to the region itself to 
see why regional states were for the most part unwilling to invite the US to establish a collective 
security organisation. 
One argument posits that the strong regional norm of anti-colonialism precluded the 
development of a multilateral security arrangement because regional states were adverse to being 
dominated by former colonial powers. Instead, the norm of non-interference became rooted in the 
region, preventing any collective pooling of resources10. This highlights the importance of the 
normative appeal of autonomy in post-colonial states. However, how do we account for the fact that
many states opted for bilateral security ties that have more potential for domination and interference
than multilateralism? This suggests that the salience of anti-colonialism, or at least how it 
manifested itself in practice, was contested and uneven. A more promising avenue is to look within 
the newly emerging states at domestic power struggles. One in-depth study by Natasha Hamilton-
Hart has shown how bilateral alignments in Southeast Asia resulted from these struggles. The 
groups that won were able to seize the opportunity of US anti-communism to secure access to 
resources, enabling them to consolidate their domestic power. Over time, various sociological 
factors within regional states contributed to a deeply entrenched belief of the US as a 'benign' 
security guarantor11. Although important for understanding how the US' role was eventually 
accepted, Hamilton-Hart's historical analysis remains limited to the origin and endurance of these 
beliefs. It mostly deals with the initial factors that led individual countries to align with the US; it 
does not cover the period before when the US' role was still contested, and an alternative indigenous
great power role was promoted by Indonesia.  
By applying the role negotiation framework, we can simultaneously capture both the US 
side and the regional side of the story by analysing US claims and regional responses. We can also 
capture how both instrumental and normative factors shaped these claims and responses. For 
example, how regional states required access to US material assistance and security guarantees to 
consolidate their domestic power (instrumental), but how the appeal of anti-colonialism and 
10   Acharya (2009).
11  Hamilton-Hart (2012). 
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autonomy complicated their endorsement of the more overt US diplomatic leadership (normative). 
The bargain between the US and regional states, which transferred diplomatic leadership to regional
states and kept security public goods provision at the bilateral level, solved this problem by offering
a means to satisfy both instrumental and normative demands. 
Secondly, why did ASEAN emerge as successful whereas other efforts at regionalism failed?
At the time of ASEAN's creation in 1967, there was little reason to expect it to be successful 
considering the diversity of the region, recent experience of intra-regional conflict and continuing 
mutual mistrust and territorial disputes. Most studies explain ASEAN's success as lying in regional 
states' responses to changing structural dynamics, particularly domestic political change in 
Indonesia and the shifting balance of power as the great powers began to withdraw from the region. 
These studies have provided persuasive and extensive accounts of internal negotiations and shown 
how different factors such as the accommodation of Indonesia12, the establishment of regional 
norms13 or founding ideas14 helped to promote cooperative behaviour between regional states. 
However, they tend to treat the US as external to this process, triggering regional negotiations but 
not really involved. This chapter instead views ASEAN as an expression of the division of labour 
between regional states and the US whereby regional states would manage their own relations and 
the US would provide security public goods from its offshore position. Through ASEAN, regional 
states were not just responding to external factors such as the changing balance of power, they were 
responding to Washington's expectations that ASEAN would play its part in facilitating and 
accommodating American withdrawal to an offshore position. Part of managing their own relations 
was negotiating Indonesia's regional role in the wake of its failed claims to replace external great 
powers and establish itself as an indigenous great power. This included the acceptance of 
Indonesia's ideas for regional autonomy through building regional resilience, offered in return for 
Indonesia's strategic restraint.    
The negotiations that eventually led to the role bargain between the US and ASEAN 
involved two processes. Between 1954 and 1965, we can identify a more general role negotiation 
over the specific identity and functions of the great power role in Southeast Asia. The US and 
Indonesia sought to legitimise two different grand strategic narratives, with two different 
understandings of the great power role. The US sought to legitimise a 'containment' grand strategic 
narrative and associated 'great power guardian' role conception. As discussed below, the 'great 
power guardian' role conception mixed elements of the European great power role and the colonial 
12   Leifer (1989), Emmers (2003). 
13   Acharya (2014). 
14  Ba (2009). 
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great power role. It satisfied regional regimes' desire for access to material assistance and an 
external security guarantee, but the tendency for the US to treat Asian states as unequal and attempt 
to manipulate domestic politics to strengthen anti-communist elements, came up against the need 
for ruling regimes to demonstrate independence and autonomy. In this sense, the US' role claims 
were contested by nationalist constituencies. Indonesia sought to legitimise its 'autonomy' narrative 
and associated 'indigenous great power liberator' role conception, claiming to lead other regional 
states to true independence. This was rejected by most regional states as Indonesia did not have the 
material capabilities to replace external great powers and some states saw Indonesia as a threat. 
However, the 'autonomy' narrative had significant normative appeal for domestic constituencies 
within regional states which put pressure on ruling regimes to demonstrate their independence and 
autonomy. Before 1965, both Indonesia and the US were unsuccessful in fully legitimising their role
claims because they were unable to gain endorsement from all relevant constituencies of 
legitimation. This prevented any role bargain being reached on what constituted the 'great power' 
role in the Southeast Asian context. 
After 1965 however, the US and regional states moved from general role negotiation over 
the 'great power' role to the process of role redefinition. The US' desire to withdraw from Vietnam 
removed the more overt interventionist aspect of the US' role claims and domestic political 
upheaval in Indonesia brought to power an anti-communist regime. The key constituencies now 
accepted the imperatives of both 'containment' and 'autonomy' rather than just one or the other. To 
achieve both, regional states and the US sought to build the resilience of ruling regimes against 
communist insurgency. A division of labour towards pursuing these goals could now be reached. 
The US re-conceptualised its role as an 'offshore great power guarantor' and the new leadership in 
Indonesia abandoned Indonesia's claim to perform an 'indigenous great power' role and re-
conceptualised a 'leading-from-behind' role. However, it was not enough for the US to merely 
assign a regional leadership role to Indonesia. Indonesia's role needed to be endorsed by regional 
neighbours still wary after Indonesia's Confrontation. This was achieved through ASEAN. 
Indonesia shared responsibility for diplomatic leadership with the other ASEAN states by agreeing 
to be bound within ASEAN's institutional framework and norms. ASEAN took on the 'primary 
manager' role through which regional states acted collectively to perform the function of diplomatic
leadership. As discussed in Chapter One, a role bargain entails a reciprocal agreement on the 
respective functions each actor will perform as part of their roles towards a shared goal. The US 
supported regional regimes' consolidation through security public goods provision and in return 
ASEAN performed diplomatic leadership, promoting (non-communist) social stability in Southeast 
Asia through regional institution-building and rule-making, as well as providing diplomatic 
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initiatives that supported the US' position in Indochina. Through this bargain, the US and ASEAN 
redefined the great power role. The function of diplomatic leadership within Southeast Asia was 
decoupled from the great power role and transferred to ASEAN as part of its 'primary manager' role.
The chapter divides role negotiation into three distinct phases. Firstly, role conceptualisation 
in 1954-1955, when the US and Indonesia both conceived of their strategic narratives and roles and 
made performative claims by organising SEATO and Bandung respectively. Secondly, role 
enactment between 1956 and 1965, when the competing grand strategic narratives and associated 
role conceptions were put into practice through US interventions in Indonesia and Vietnam, and 
Indonesia's confrontations against Dutch New Guinea and Malaysia. Lastly, the chapter will analyse
role redefinition after 1966 when the US and regional states reached their reciprocal role bargain. 
Before moving onto the first phase of role conceptualisation, the next section provides the historical
and contemporary context for the ensuing role negotiation. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
Colonial great power role
The task of negotiating the great power role in the post-colonial period was complicated by the fact 
that Southeast Asia had no historical experience with a 'European' model of the great power role, 
discussed in the introduction to this thesis, but rather its colonial manifestation. The colonial 
manifestation overlapped with the European great power role particularly in the function of security
public goods as colonial powers policed threats to trade routes and defended their territories against 
external threats. The major difference however, was that instead of providing diplomatic leadership 
in a society of formally equal states, colonial great powers performed the self-appointed function of 
stewardship within a formally and substantively hierarchical system15. 
The stewardship function justified the establishment of European control over territory, trade
routes and indigenous people in Southeast Asia as part of bringing 'civilization'. Europeans 
established colonies with defined political borders, sovereignty over which was held by the 
metropolitan governments in the capitals of Europe. European responsibility for the management of 
internal political and economic structures of the Southeast Asian polities was premised on the logic 
that indigenous rulers were uncivilised and therefore, in order to bring the the economic, political 
and judicial benefits of civilisation, sovereign prerogatives should be held by civilised Europeans16. 
15  See Keene (2002: 76-96, 112-117). 
16  Gong (1984), Suzuki (2009).
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Indigenous peoples were for the most part denied a legitimate voice in the organisation of their own
states and the wider regional order. This contrasted with the previous regional society in Southeast 
Asia which operated under entirely different norms, rules and practices. Polities were mostly 
organised into relatively small kingdoms where the ruler enjoyed localised authority based on a 
system of rule emphasising kinship17. In what was known as the 'mandala system', kingdoms vied 
with each other to extend their authority by establishing vassals and tributaries. Polities were 
defined by their centres rather than territorial boundaries and different centres' circles of authority 
would expand and contract over time and could have overlapping tributaries18. 
At decolonisation there was no going back to this previous regional society. Independent 
states inherited the externally imposed colonial borders and the centrally organised colonial state 
institutions. Central control was often weak, making ruling regimes fragile and control over the 
apparatuses of the state was often bitterly contested by rival groups. In this context, 'nationalism' as 
defined against the 'other' of colonialism was a keys means of legitimising ruling regimes and 
constructing new national identities that corresponded with the territories of the new states19. Thus 
the US' task of negotiating its legitimacy as a regional great power post-independence meant 
dealing with the normative baggage of the self-defined function of colonial stewardship and the 
resulting political need for newly independent ruling regimes to appear fully independent from 
former colonial powers. Southeast Asian states and their domestic constituencies were highly 
sensitive to action on the part of external powers which seemed to reflect colonial stewardship. This
complicated negotiations over diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia because the US' claims to 
this function could easily be contested as constituting colonialism. 
Transition into a Cold War context
The fact that newly independent states were emerging into the overarching struggle of the Cold War
exacerbated the fragile nature of ruling regimes and internationalised struggles between rival 
factions over control of state apparatuses. The US and the West sought to ensure that newly 
independent states developed into strong, anti-communist states integrated into the capitalist 
economic system. The US and Britain in particular were deeply concerned with the internal politics 
of newly independent states and the decolonisation process itself was engineered towards achieving 
their strategic imperatives. Indicative of this was how Britain remained in Malaya to fight 
communist guerillas during the Malayan Emergency in order to ensure the survival of the pro-
17  Andaya (1993). 
18  Wolters (1999). 
19  Anderson (1991, 1998), Reid (2009). 
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Western administration of Tunku Abdul Rhaman. To the extent that the internal structures of states 
were of concern to the great powers, there was not a significant departure from the previous 
colonial great power role. There was still a 'standard of civilisation'; civilisation now meant being 
anti-communist. This blurred the line between the functions of diplomatic leadership and 
stewardship in US great power role claim.
Previous US role
Prior to 1954, the US did not perform an extensive role throughout the whole of Southeast Asia. Its 
colonial influence was formally limited to the Philippines. The rest of Southeast Asia came under 
European colonial rule and Britain underwrote the region's maritime security. The US was more 
willing to withdraw its colonial control promising the Philippines independence in 1935 and 
granting it in 1946. Although the US was the main power behind the liberation of Southeast Asia 
from Japanese rule, Britain headed up Southeast Asia Command and took control of maritime 
Southeast Asia from the Japanese in 1945. Nationalist China was given responsibility for liberating 
much of mainland Southeast Asia. The US rhetorically supported independence and self-
determination for regional states in the post-war period. However, the fall of China to communism 
and the onset of the Korean war meant the US could no longer offer a benign promotion of self-
determination; independence movements could choose communism. The incoming Eisenhower 
administration in 1953 could not lose another another Asian state to communism after the domestic 
political fallout over 'who lost China'20. The US sought to establish its 'containment' grand strategic 
narrative for the region and perform security functions to insulate Southeast Asia from communist 
influence. These were new role claims for the US that needed to be legitimised through negotiation 
with the newly independent states. However, doing so meant competing with a newly independent 
Indonesia. Indonesia was crucial for shaping regional order in Southeast Asia due to its size, 
strategic location between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and abundant natural resources. However, 
the group that assumed control of the apparatuses of the state at independence in Indonesia did so 
through active revolution and were therefore vehemently nationalist. Apart from the communists, 
Indonesia stood as the most significant challenger to US designs on post-colonial Southeast Asia.  
1954-1955 – ROLE CONCEPTUALISATION: ESTABLISHING THE NARRATIVES 
This section analyses the US' and Indonesia's competing visions for Southeast Asian order and their 
competing great power role conceptions. The US and Indonesia conceived and claimed their roles 
20  Kahin and Kahin (1997). 
71
throughout 1954 and 1955 in response to the end of the First Indochina Conflict. In the wake of the 
failing French military effort there was a flurry of diplomatic activity in which the arguments for the
'containment' and 'autonomy' grand strategic narratives, and associated 'great power guardian' and 
'indigenous great power liberator' role conceptions, were articulated. This section shows how the 
US and Indonesia conceptualised their respective roles and how they made performative claims to 
have their narratives accepted and their roles legitimised through alliances (convening the Manila 
and Bangkok conferences) and a broader movement of Afro-Asian solidarity (Bandung conference) 
respectively. 
US' 'containment' narrative and 'great power guardian' role conception
The US' 'great power guardian' role conception derived from its grand strategic narrative and 
perception of Southeast Asia. As discussed in the previous chapter, the concept of grand strategic 
narrative derives from Foucault's notion of 'productive power'21. It involves the presentation of an 
'in-group', a threat to that 'in-group' and the necessary strategic response to counter the threat. 
Establishing an 'in-group' determines the subject positions of those who are 'in' and those who are 
'out'. Those who are 'in' are considered deserving of the benefits of inclusion. Those who are 'out' 
either need to change their ways and be brought into the 'in-group', or actively opposed. 
Constructing an overarching threat to the 'in-group' helps to further define the boundaries between 
the subject positions of 'in' and 'out' and provides the basis upon which to mobilise peoples and 
resources towards countering the threat through the necessary strategic response. 
The US' 'containment' narrative unfolded in response to the Soviet Union consolidating its 
influence over Eastern Europe. The 'in-group' were capitalist states of the 'free world' under threat 
from a monolithic and expansionist communist bloc. The necessary strategic response was 
containment under US leadership. The US' identity of 'leader of the free world' shown in table 2, 
was also linked to the US' understanding of itself as 'exceptional' due to its apparently unique 
origins and institutions22. It saw itself as a model for the rest of the world. Those that identified 
themselves as part of the free world and joined the US in countering the threat of communism were 
able to gain access to US military and economic assistance. Those that did not were for the most 
part excluded from these material benefits. 
 Containment became policy in Europe through the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and NSC 68 in
1950. The US provided substantial aid and assistance to European allies and coordinated collective 
21  Foucault (2002). 
22  See the essays in Edwards and Weiss (2011). 
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security through NATO. The US performed a European great power role through the provision of 
security and economic public goods, diplomatic leadership and institution-building. This came after 
debate within the US over whether it should establish itself as an offshore great power and build up 
European states' capabilities to manage their own defence. The European powers lobbied the US 
government to establish a firm commitment and military presence which acted as a significant pull 
factor, bolstering the arguments of Atlanticist constituencies in Washington23. European 
expectations therefore helped shift the US' understanding of its role towards a European great 
power role. The US' identity as 'exceptional' and 'the leader of the free world'24 were not particularly
problematic in the European context. Through European recognition, the US also gained its status 
as a established great power or even hegemon in Western Europe.
In Southeast Asia however, the US initially saw itself as performing an offshore great power 
role. US officials were aware of the anti-colonial sentiment in Asia which made for a less hospitable
context. In particular, its identity as 'leader of the free world' and its status as an established great 
power/hegemon were problematic in a region where opponents alter-cast the US as having an 
'external' identity and a status as a coloniser. For this reason, the US did not wish to claim overt 
diplomatic leadership or regional institution-building without first being invited as it had been in 
Europe. Such an invitation would off-set its external identity. For example, the National Security 
Council (NSC) in December 1949 stated that it would be counterproductive for the US to appear to 
be taking the lead on regional cooperation but that it should regard Asian initiatives in this direction 
sympathetically and “be prepared, if invited, to assist such associations to fulfil their purposes under
conditions which would be in [their] interest”25. 
However, only strong US allies such as Philippine President Quirino, South Korean 
President Syngman Rhee and Republic of China's (ROC) president Chiang Kai-Shek, were willing 
to explicitly invite the US to establish a 'Pacific Pact' comparable to NATO. The US did not 
consider such a pact as credible. Firstly it was felt that the pact would not be 'mutual' but merely 
involve a one-way commitment from the US. Secondly, Secretary of State Dean Acheson deferred 
to Nehru's position that conflicts within Asia needed to be resolved before any Pacific pact could be 
feasible. India and Indonesia in particular were not interested in any arrangement that would 
compromise their non-aligned status. They also considered South Korea and the Philippines as 
'satellites' of the US and did not want to deal with Chiang Kai-Shek. They recognised the People's 
23  Lundestad (1986), Ikenberry (1989).  
24  See Weldes (1996: 283). 
25 Colbert (1977: 140-142). 
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Republic of China (PRC) rather than the ROC as representing 'China'26. US officials encouraged the
Philippines to distance itself from Chiang and reach out to Nehru by proposing regional cooperation
on an economic and cultural, and not military, basis. By emphasising economic cooperation and 
development this could serve US imperatives by reducing the appeal of communism within the 
region. It could also be cast as anti-colonial because Asian states were acting under their own 
initiative. Once established, the US could invited to join. However, Philippine efforts at organising 
regional cooperation ended with the unsuccessful Baguio Conference in May 1950. India attended 
but opposed any moves to set up a Pacific association27. 
A Pacific pact linking Western powers with Japan and the Philippines, was again debated 
within the US in the lead-up to the Peace Treaty with Japan. For US officials, “[t]he type of pact 
which had the greatest appeal was an "offshore" Pacific pact which did not involve U.S. military 
commitments with respect to the Asian mainland”28. Australia and New Zealand opposed Japan's 
involvement in a multilateral pact and the British successfully argued that by just admitting the “US
Satellite” of the Philippines, the pact would have even less appeal to other regional states29. 
Although the US did intervene on the mainland in Northeast Asia during the Korean war, in 
Southeast Asia it maintained its offshore great power role through defence pacts with the 
Philippines and with Australia and New Zealand in 1951. Its defence perimeter ended at the chain 
of islands linking its bases in Guam, the Philippines and Okinawa; that was as far as the US wanted 
to commit itself strategically30. It envisioned providing military and economic aid and assistance to 
emerging states through the Mutual Security Act 1951, as well as security of sea lanes from its 
bases in the Philippines. This was tenable as long as it could subcontract containment in Indochina 
to the French. The US increasingly underwrote the French military struggle in Indochina such that 
by 1954, the US was covering 66.7 per cent of French war expenditures31.  
US officials maintained their interest in “measures to promote the coordinated defence of 
Southeast Asia” but held that “the initiative in regional defence measures must come from the 
governments of the area”32. This position was abandoned when the French sought a diplomatic 
compromise at Geneva so as to withdraw from Indochina. US officials feared that the communists 
would win a diplomatic and military victory. The US expressed the 'containment' narrative and the 
26  For an analysis of the debate on a Pacific Pact 1949-1951 based on FRUS documents, see Mabon (1988).
27  Mabon (1988). 
28  “Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Howard) to the Minister in France (Bohlen), March 31st 
1950” FRUS 1950 Vol VI pp. 1159.  
29  Mabon (1988: 171).
30 Fifield (1963: 37). 
31 Cesari (2007: 178). 
32 Colbert (1977: 292-293). 
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urgency of the perceived threat to Southeast Asia through the 'Domino theory' first articulated by 
President Eisenhower in April 1954. Eisenhower argued that if Indochina fell to communism then 
the other states in the region would fall like a series of dominoes. Containment was necessary, 
insulating Southeast Asia from communist China. The 'containment' narrative gave regional actors a
stark choice by defining the 'in-group' as those states aligned with the 'free world' of which the US 
was the leader. Those states that did not join the US containment strategy were presented as part of 
the 'out-group'. For the US neutralism was not an option, reflected in Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles reference to neutralism as 'immoral'33.   
Along with the US expression of the 'containment' narrative in Southeast Asia came its 'great
power guardian' role conception, shown in table 2, that mixed elements of the European and 
colonial great power roles. Based on its identity as 'leader of the free world' and status as a great 
power/hegemon, the US saw itself performing the primary functions of diplomatic leadership and 
security public goods. Through trying to organise the region around containment and create 
collective defence under its leadership, the US claimed diplomatic leadership and the secondary 
function of regional institution-building. However, the US' claim to diplomatic leadership often 
merged into a claim to the stewardship function as it saw Southeast Asian states as weak and 
vulnerable in the face of communist insurgency, requiring the US, and also Britain, to nurture anti-
communist regimes. The principal secondary function the US saw itself performing as a security 
public good was 'holding the line' against communist expansion in Vietnam. Between 1954 and 
1965 the US saw itself 'holding the line' through deterrence, holding out the threat of military action
against any communist advance. From 1965 the US sought to hold the line through direct 
intervention in Vietnam. The other secondary functions were security of sea lanes and military aid 
and assistance to build up regional anti-communist allies.   
33  “The Cost of Peace: Address by Secretary Dulles”  US Department of State Bulletin Vol. 34 18/6/56 pp. 999-1000.
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Identity Status Function
Primary Secondary
Exceptional
Great power/hegemon
Diplomatic 
leadership 
(stewardship)
Regional 
institution-
building
Leader of the free world
Security public
goods 
provision
Holding the 
line (through 
deterrence, 
intervention)
Security of sea 
lanes
Military aid and
assistance
Table 2 – US' 'great power guardian' role conception 
Indonesian 'autonomy' narrative and 'indigenous great power liberator' role 
conceptualisation
In contrast to the 'containment' narrative, Indonesia's 'autonomy' grand strategic narrative argued 
that the newly emerging independent states of Africa and Asia were the 'in-group' and colonialism 
and neocolonialism were the primary threats to the independence of the emerging states - not 
communism. In the face of this threat, states needed to expel the last vestiges of colonialism from 
the region. The necessary strategic response was to maximise autonomy through the diplomacy of 
non-alignment and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which would promote security and 
peace in place of military-security ties34. The Five Principles were developed between the PRC and 
India in 1954 in the context of the Sino-Indian dispute over Tibet35. They were subsequently 
invoked by the Chinese as part of a conscious demonstration of a friendly and moderate foreign 
policy towards newly independent states. Adopting the Five Principles therefore represented an 
'engagement' approach towards communist China, an alternative to the alienation and containment 
promoted by the US. The 'autonomy' grand strategic narrative left no room for an external great 
power role as external great powers were seen as the problem for regional security, rather than the 
solution. This sought to de-legitimise regional actors that maintained links with external partners, 
and legitimise groups seeking to sever such links.
34  The Five Principles were 1) respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, 2) non-aggression, 3) non-interference in 
internal affairs, 4) equality and mutual benefit and 5) peaceful coexistence.   
35 Chen (2008: 134). 
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In place of external great power involvement was Indonesia's 'indigenous great power 
liberator' role conception. As shown in table 3, Indonesia's role conception included the identity of 
being an indigenous state and its status as 'independent', rooted in the fact that Indonesia achieved 
independence through revolution rather than being given it by the departing colonial power. For 
Indonesian leaders this meant Indonesia also upheld a 'non-aligned' status in international society. 
Indonesia was not subservient to, nor a product of, external powers' machinations. It also did not 
take either superpowers' side in the Cold War rivalry. Due to its indigenous identity and uniquely 
independent status within Southeast Asia, Indonesia saw itself as well placed to perform the primary
function of diplomatic leadership, especially through the secondary function of rule-making. 
Indonesia would lead other emerging states towards autonomy and true freedom by establishing the 
rules appropriate for Southeast Asian order: the Five Principles of Coexistence. Table 3 also shows 
that the primary function of 'revolutionary regional leadership' and the secondary function of 
'subversion' became intrinsic to Indonesia's 'indigenous great power liberator' role conception 
between 1963 and 1966. As we will see, these replaced the diplomatic leadership and rule-making 
as Sukarno sought to enact Indonesia's 'liberator' role through active revolution.  
Identity Status Function
Primary Secondary
Indigenous
Independent (won through 
revolution)
Diplomatic 
leadership 
Rule-making 
(Five 
principles)
Non-aligned
Revolutionary 
regional leadership 
(1963-65)
Subversion
  
Table 3 – Indonesia's 'indigenous great power liberator' role conception
Indonesia's role conceptualisation was rooted in its domestic politics. Unlike in US-
supporter states like Thailand and the Philippines, domestic legitimacy for Indonesian governments 
did not depend on access to US material assistance. Indeed, close ties with the US had the opposite 
effect. In 1952 the Sukiman Cabinet was brought down by domestic pressure after it was revealed 
that Foreign Minister Subardjo had secretly signed an agreement in Washington through which 
Indonesia would receive economic and military assistance from the US under the terms of the 
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Mutual Security Act 195136. Legitimation instead came from upholding the principles of anti-
colonialism and bebas actif (independent and active). These principles were deeply held by the 
domestic population and were rooted in the struggle to win independence from the Dutch. There 
was little support from the West for Indonesia's independence struggle, making Indonesians see 
Western powers' interests as synonymous with colonial powers' interests and revealing US rhetoric 
of self-determination as untrustworthy37. 
Indonesia was in the process of building a modern state coterminous with the Dutch East 
Indies where none had existed prior to colonisation. This meant trying to unite a highly diverse 
archipelago around a common idea of the 'Indonesian nation'. Domestically, the state philosophy of 
Pancasila (five principles) was established in 1945 to counter proposals for the establishment of 
Islam as the state religion. Pancasila was designed in universal terms in order to appeal to all 
groups in the archipelago38. It did not prevent various groups competing to dominate domestic 
policy however. Broadly speaking, policy-makers were divided between 'administrators'  - who saw 
the revolution as having ended with independence and wanted to focus on internal stability and 
development by fostering friendly relations with the west - and 'solidarity-makers' led by Sukarno 
and supported by nationalists (PNI) and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), who saw the 
revolution as ongoing39. The solidarity-makers were the dominant political force in the 1950s and 
were the ones to conceive of Indonesia as an 'indigenous great power liberator'. Although outside of 
the official political framework, the military was a major force in Indonesian politics that aligned 
more with the administrators and viewed itself as the guardian of Pancasila. This stemmed from its 
role in the revolution and in quashing rebellions such as the communist-led rebellion in Madiun in 
1948, the Darul Islam rebellion and outer island rebellions. It saw itself as the only genuine national
institution and the failure of parliamentary democracy to bring national unity in the 1950s further 
entrenched the army's view of its own legitimate political role40. 
In the context of divisions over domestic policy, foreign policy became highly important 
both for legitimising governments in power and for the broader project of Indonesian nation-
building by uniting disparate peoples and constituencies around a common cause. Prime Minister 
Hatta set the tone for Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy in September 1948 when he 
36 Anwar (2008: 184-185). 
37 Sukma (1995: 306). 
38 Pancasila consisted of belief in the one and only God, a just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, 
democracy guided by consensus and consultation and social justice for all of the people of Indonesia. See Ramage 
(1995). 
39 Feith (1962), Anwar (2005: 142). 
40 Ramage (1995: 8). 
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spoke of Indonesia 'rowing between two coral reefs'; charting its own course and avoiding the 
dangers of the two superpower blocs41. Domestic legitimation was thus a major motivating factor 
behind Ali Sastroamidjojo's cabinet's role claim through hosting Bandung. By getting the people 
behind the ideal of Third World solidarity against colonialism and neocolonialism it was hoped that 
he would boost domestic support for his PNI-led government42. Indonesia's conception of itself as 
an 'indigenous great power liberator' that could provide diplomatic leadership in the region was thus
to a large extent directed towards domestic constituencies. However, to be successful at home it 
would also need to also gain recognition in the region.   
Claiming the 'great power guardian' role: SEATO
The US' initial efforts to legitimise its 'containment' narrative and 'great power guardian' role 
involved the call for 'united action' and subsequently establishing a collective security arrangement 
through the Manila Treaty. These represented claims to perform the functions of 'holding the line' 
against the communist advance in Indochina and diplomatic leadership through regional institution-
building. These claims were directed at the key constituencies of legitimation, the Colombo Powers 
(an informal grouping which linked India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon and Pakistan), Thailand and 
the Philippines.    
The US' call for united action was made by Secretary Dulles in March 1954. Dulles hoped 
that a collective stand by non-communist regional states would deter the communist advance at 
Dien Bien Phu. Thailand and the Philippines supported the idea but Britain and France were 
reluctant as they preferred to await the outcome of diplomatic negotiations over a resolution to the 
First Indochina Conflict at the Geneva Conference. United action failed to prevent communist 
victory at Dien Bien Phu and in May US attention turned towards establishing a collective defence 
treaty for Southeast Asia. Thailand and the Philippines were keen for a NATO-like organisation. 
Under the leadership of Phibun Songkram, Thailand entered into a firm alignment with the US and 
neutralist sentiment within the country was actively suppressed43. The Philippine government was 
however sensitive to internal neutralist sentiment and so President Magsaysay offered Philippine 
support with two qualifications: “First, that the right of Asian peoples to self-determination is 
respected; and second, that the Philippines be given a plain and unequivocal guarantee of US help 
in case of attack under our Mutual Defence Pact”44. These conditions reflect well the dilemma faced 
41 Sukma (1995: 308). 
42 Anwar (2008: 185). 
43  Fineman (1997). 
44  Fifield (1958: 102). 
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by the ruling regimes in the Philippines, and to a lesser extent Thailand, which were dependent on 
US material support for their domestic legitimacy but also had domestic constituencies sympathetic 
to the 'autonomy' narrative. For this reason, they wanted as firm a commitment from the US to their 
security as possible in order to justify their overtly pro-US foreign policy.
However, the US did not see a collective defence arrangement in Southeast Asia as taking 
the form of NATO. The US' security arrangements with Thailand and the Philippines were primarily
bilateral, limiting the US' commitment and giving it more room for manoeuvre. For example, the 
Mutual Defence Treaty with the Philippines only required that the parties consider an attack on each
as 'dangerous to the security of the other' and that they should meet the common danger through 
action in accordance of constitutional processes45. In the case of Thailand there was as yet no formal
commitment. The advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defence was that the “US 
should not enter into combined military planning for the defence of the treaty area … nor should 
details of unilateral American plans for military action in the event of Communist aggression be 
disclosed to the other powers”46. Southeast Asian allies were not considered equal partners, rather 
their participation was only necessary as a means to legitimise US containment imperatives and its 
'guardian' role in Southeast Asia. Indeed, the US initially pursued negotiations over collective 
defence without any Southeast Asian states. Dulles had initially invited representatives in 
Washington of Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and the 
Indochinese states to meet with him and establish a formal working group. However, Foreign 
Secretary Eden opposed this move, criticising Dulles' unilateralism over deciding who should be 
involved in negotiating a Southeast Asian collective defence treaty. Eden insisted that Burma and 
India needed to be consulted before any regional states were involved in the process. He proposed 
that Britain and the US start secret talks to get the ball rolling on the purpose, form and membership
of collective defence47. “Five Power” military talks began in May between the US, Britain, France, 
Australia and New Zealand. The lack of Asian input was further reflected in the fact that substantive
discussions over the form of the treaty were then carried out by an Anglo-American Study Group 
and a draft prepared in the State Department that became the basis of discussion at the Manila 
Conference in September. From this we see that US officials saw their country's performance of 
diplomatic leadership in terms of organising the region around the limited goal of containment, 
without accommodating any input from regional states or any particular desires they may have for 
their region. By excluding regional states from substantive discussions about the security and shape 
45  A copy of the treaty can be found online as part of the Yale Law School Avalon Project 
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp> accessed 17/11/14. 
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of regional order, the US claim to diplomatic leadership leaned more towards the function of 
stewardship.
When news of the Five Power talks leaked, protests erupted from friendly Asian states over 
their exclusion. Thai diplomats described the talks as “another example of the archaic idea of the 
white man’s burden”48. Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos Romulo warned that the 
Western powers were being accused in Manila of “‘drawing a color line’ in Asia”49. This showed the
US that even apparently reliable allies in the region were extremely sensitive to anything that still 
appeared to be colonialism. The US responded by quickly offering membership to Thailand and the 
Philippines. President Eisenhower stated to the NSC in May 1954: “small or not, such nations as 
Thailand at least provided the semblance of Asian participation”50. US officials began to recognise 
that the US needed these states to legitimise its 'containment' narrative and 'guardian' role, but they 
had to be given a voice.
To go beyond a “semblance of Asian participation” however, the collective defence 
arrangement needed the involvement of the Colombo Powers whose espoused neutralist policies 
would make the arrangement more credible. Eden appealed to them directly, but only Pakistan 
agreed to participate51. The states that eventually met in Manila in September 1954 were the US, 
Britain, France, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan. They signed the 
Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (SEADT) known as the Manila Treaty or Pact, and the 
Pacific Charter (1954). The Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation was set up under Article V to 
“provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in
the Treaty Area may from time to time require”. The first clause of Article IV was the heart of the 
Treaty and stated that “[e]ach Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the 
treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by 
unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and 
agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional 
processes”52. This was a reduced form of collective defence that fell short of Philippine and Thai 
expectations of a NATO-like commitment where an attack on one would be considered an attack on 
all. A protocol to the Treaty stated that a threat to the newly independent states of Indochina (Laos, 
48 “Memorandum of conversation by the ofﬁcer in charge of Thai and Malayan Affairs, 27th May 1954” FRUS 1952-
1954 Vol XII Part 1 Doc 208.  
49 “Telegram: The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, 4th June 1954”  ibid Doc 
215. 
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South Vietnam, Cambodia) could be considered a threat to the alliance and therefore these 'protocol 
states' were covered by SEATO. This avoided needing to invite these states to join the alliance and 
thereby contravening the Geneva Accords53. The Pacific Charter was adopted on the initiative of the 
Philippines in order to show the commitment of SEATO members to the principle of self-
determination. However, the promotion of self-determination and independence was limited to 
those countries “whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities”. This 
qualification maintained an element of stewardship that was opposed to the Philippines' position 
that self-determination should be unconditional. In this sense, SEATO remained an easy target for 
those that wished to paint it as a modern day protectorate. 
India and Indonesia were vocal in expressing their opposition to SEATO. India saw SEATO 
as subordinating Asian wishes to Western decisions and undermining Asian hopes for keeping the 
Cold War out of South and Southeast Asia. Krishna Menon, Indian Ambassador to the UN, 
described SEATO as a “modern version of a Protectorate … an organization of some imperial 
powers … to protect a territory which they say may be in danger. We are part of that territory and 
we say that we do not want to be protected by this organization”54. Indian officials saw SEATO as 
an example of how the Imperial powers continued to perform the function of stewardship. 
Indonesian officials asserted that SEATO would bring the world closer to war than peace and that it 
was not consistent with Indonesia's independent foreign policy55. Indian and Indonesian officials 
were keen to alter-cast the US as having no regional role, based on its external identity and its status
as a coloniser. 
Despite also being Colombo Powers, Ceylon and Burma did not share India and Indonesia's 
opposition. Ceylon56 was sympathetic to the anti-communist cause but did not feel in a position to 
commit to SEATO despite Britain and the US even suggesting that the conference be held in 
Colombo instead of the Philippines57. Burma did not join but also did not share India and 
Indonesia's opposition. Burmese officials later stated privately that they were reassured by SEATO's
existence and the protection it gave Southeast Asia58. 
India and Indonesia's efforts to associate SEATO with continued stewardship - and alter-
53 Fenton (2012: 29). 
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casting of the US as having no regional role - concerned US officials, especially as Indonesia began 
preparations for the Bandung Conference. US officials were worried that the 'autonomy' narrative 
presented at Bandung could push Western powers out of Asian affairs. Recognising the US' 
'external' identity within Southeast Asia, US officials thought it would be counter-productive to 
oppose the conference or prevent any delegation attending; doing so would only fuel Indian and 
Indonesian criticism. The Afro-Asian Working group, set up to advise Washington on the position 
the US should take to Bandung, advised that the US “should be chiefly concerned with impact on 
uncommitted elements in neutralist countries and in countries aligned with the West” and its 
objective should be: “(1) successful rebuttal of Communist charges, and (2) encouragement of an 
affirmative attitude by the Conference toward Free World and U.S. achievements and goals”59. To 
achieve these, the US was to avoid commenting on the Bandung Conference directly whilst taking 
public positions on issues that were likely to arise at the conference. More specifically, the US 
sought to counter the effect the 'autonomy' narrative may have on neutralist and pro-Western states, 
by subcontracting the legitimacy work for the 'containment' narrative and 'guardian' role at Bandung
to friendly states. The US re-conceptualised the 'guardian' role by accepting its external identity and
that to off-set its identity it needed regional states to advance diplomatic initiatives. As part of this 
subcontracting, the US encouraged these states “to propose courses of action which would 
embarrass Communist China and minimize the danger that the Conference might lead to the 
formation of an Asian-African bloc which could ultimately weaken relations between non-
Communist Asia and the United States”60. This aimed directly at highlighting how China was a 
threat and therefore the 'containment' narrative was justified, and also at blocking any political 
organisation that could arise from Indonesia and India's promotion of the 'autonomy' narrative. The 
British also sought to influence their commonwealth contacts61. 
Carlos Romulo, head of the Philippine delegation at Bandung, said he was “eager to act as 
the principal protagonist of the Western position in the Conference”. He explained that he would be 
making speeches in Manila and Bandung “which would be given a distinctly Asian cast and that . . .
would embody some adverse criticism of the U.S.—this to associate himself sympathetically with 
the Asian community”. He affirmed his intention to work closely with other pro-Western states at 
the conference and asked the Americans to supply him with “basic material” on issues that would 
arise at Bandung. William Lacy, head of the Afro-Asian Working Group, reportedly promised 
Romulo “counter resolutions” to resolutions on colonialism and the admission of the PRC to the 
59  “Memorandum From the Acting Chief of the Reports and Operations Staff (Gilman) to the Secretary of State, 
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UN62. Romulo was keen to emphasise “the imperative necessity of concealing his intimate relations 
with the U.S. in every possible way”63. In return for Asian allies promoting the 'containment' 
narrative at Bandung, the US accepted discursive criticism of some US policy. US and Philippine 
officials hoped this criticism would promote trust with neutralist states and give legitimacy to the 
Philippines as an actor with its own voice. Indeed, on the eve of the Bandung Conference the 
Philippine Senate adopted a resolution stating that a nation's right to self-determination included its 
right to decide exclusively by itself its ability to assume the responsibilities inherent in independent 
political status64. This formally rejected the qualifications set out in the Pacific Charter. 
Before Bandung however, the SEATO Conference in Bangkok in February 1955 presented 
an opportunity to make a performative claim to the relevance of the 'containment' narrative and the 
US' 'guardian' role in Southeast Asia. It could also work to redress the US' tendency towards the 
stewardship function. By highlighting that the US was working together with Asian states as equals 
on Asian issues, the US hoped to show that its claim was to the function of diplomatic leadership 
and that the Asian states were endorsing that claim. Dulles stated that “it was of first importance 
that the Bangkok Conference should present a success to the world and thereby demonstrate that 
free Asian countries and Western countries could deal together with profit and harmony”65. Bangkok
could anticipate the issues to arise at Bandung and produce statements, declarations, resolutions and
a communiqué on these same issues. Manila Pact members could also reaffirm their commitment to 
self-determination embodied in the Pacific Charter and their concern to combat communist 
expansion, colonialism and promote economic development. For example, during the conference 
the Thai delegate Prince Wan “pointed to the realization of independence by Laos, Cambodia and 
Vietnam and to forthcoming elections in Malaya as strengthening the principles of self-
determination, self-government and independence embodied in [Manila] Treaty and Pacific 
Charter”66. This aimed to show that SEATO was not an organisation concerned with US neo-
colonial imperatives, but an Asian institution addressing regional issues - the same issues as 
Bandung. Romulo agreed that “it would be useful indirectly to point to the Bangkok Conference as 
proof of the fact that there can be cooperation between Asian and Western nations, regardless of 
color, race, or creed”. Romulo was “particularly concerned about the ‘color’ question in terms of the
Bandung Conference”67. The Bangkok Conference could be construed as a hierarchical 'white man's
62  “Memorandum for the Record by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur), Washington, 10th February 
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club' as most of the delegations were from predominantly white nations whereas Bandung would be
distinctly non-white. By highlighting that Asian and Western states were working equally together 
at Bangkok it was hoped that the racial charge could be countered68.  
The final communiqué of the Bangkok Conference sent a cordial greeting to Bandung which
Dulles hoped would have “excellent propaganda value, and to some extent put that conference on 
the spot”69. Dulles wanted SEATO not only to show that Asian and Western states could work 
together but also as the pioneer of 'Asia for Asians' and anti-colonialism and that Bandung could 
follow in its footsteps70. By including issues such as national self-determination, and in particular 
pointing out how communist expansion represented a new form of colonialism, SEATO 
incorporated aspects of the 'autonomy' narrative. Dulles hoped that doing so would undermine the 
rationale for Indonesia's diplomatic leadership by showing that 'external' great powers were invited 
and working with Asian states on Asian issues. There would thus be no need for Indonesia's 
'indigenous great power liberator' role. The SEATO Secretariat was established in Bangkok and 
primarily staffed by Asians in an attempt to demonstrate the Asian credentials of the organisation. 
Claiming the 'indigenous great power liberator' role: Bandung
Indonesia's efforts to legitimise the 'autonomy' narrative and claim its 'liberator' role were pursued 
through platforms that emphasised its indigenous identity and status as independent and non-
aligned. This began with the Colombo Power grouping first convened in April 1954 to influence the
negotiations at Geneva. It brought together the Prime Ministers of India, Indonesia, Ceylon, Burma 
and Pakistan. Indian Prime Minister Nehru and Indonesian Prime Minister Ali  Sastroamidjojo 
sought to instil in the grouping that colonialism and not communism was the principle issue in Asia.
Reflecting this, they argued that the Colombo Powers should call on the great powers not to 
intervene in Indochina, by refraining from providing aid to combatants or intervening with troops or
war material. This would leave the people of Indochina to work out their future themselves. 
However, the other three Prime Ministers did not agree that colonialism was more of an issue than 
communism. The Colombo Powers reached a compromise in their joint communiqué by merely 
encouraging the great powers to take “steps necessary to prevent the recurrence or resumption of 
hostilities”71. However the Colombo Powers did call for the PRC to be admitted to the UN, showing
that they were not united with the West in seeking to contain China. Indonesia also responded 
68 Jones (2005), Parker (2006). 
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directly to Dulles' 'united action' by proposing that India, Burma, and Indonesia join a non-
aggression pact with Communist China based on the Five Principles. This was its first claim to 
diplomatic leadership and offered an explicit alternative for managing regional relations with China 
to Dulles' collective defence. It was clear however that the differences between the Colombo 
Powers precluded a united stance on this issue. 
Indonesia renewed its suggestion of a non-aggression pact with China after the Manila 
Conference was announced. Sastroamidjojo travelled to India where he sought support for the 
proposed pact, strongly denounced the Manila Treaty and discussed ways to counter the 
'containment' narrative reflected in the Manila Treaty72. Although the non-aggression pact would not
materialise, a means to counter the US' 'containment' narrative took the form of the proposal to 
convene a conference of independent Asian and African leaders at Bandung. It was hoped this 
would provide a forum to promote the 'autonomy' narrative and to demonstrate newly independent 
states' non-alignment in the Cold War rivalry. The Colombo Powers decided at their meeting in 
Bogor in December 1954 to send out invitations to 30 Asian and African nations for the Bandung 
Conference the following April. The fact that communist China was invited represented a major 
contestation of the 'containment' narrative. Sastroamidjojo stated that the most important aim of the 
conference was “[t]o view the position of the Afro-Asian countries and their peoples in the world 
today and the contribution they can make to the promotion of world peace and cooperation”. This 
revealed Indonesia's desire to make an impact on international order through its claim to diplomatic 
leadership73. 
The Bandung Conference was Indonesia's most explicit performative claim to diplomatic 
leadership. In preparation for the conference, the streets of Bandung were renamed, thoroughly 
cleaned and new conference venues were created. The main conference building was renamed 
“Freedom building” to reflect the 'autonomy' narrative74. The conference itself consisted of twenty 
nine nations from Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Substantively, the discussions at Bandung were 
concerned with sovereignty and national independence. However, as was the case with the Colombo
Power meetings, participants were divided over whether Western colonialism or communism 
constituted the principal threat to sovereignty. The different positions of conference attendees 
became clear when discussing the principles and norms that should guide relations between newly 
independent states and the appropriateness of military ties and alignment with major power blocs75. 
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President Sukarno set the tone for the discussion in his opening address. Presenting the 
'autonomy' narrative he said: “I beg of you, do not think of colonialism only in the classic form … 
Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual 
physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skilful and determined 
enemy, and it appears in many guises”76. Sukarno equated the continuing presence of external 
powers, in various forms, with colonialism. The continued subjugation of Asian and African peoples
under colonialism was only heightened by the bipolar Cold War conflict. The necessary strategic 
response was to seek autonomy through non-alignment, pursuing relations based on the Five 
Principles rather than security ties with external powers. Sukarno pointed to the recent Colombo 
Power meetings as an example, stating that the grouping played an important part in ending the 
fighting in Indochina by bringing a “fresh approach” that did not include ultimatums or military 
mobilisation but rather consultation, diplomacy and ideas. He stated that “[s]ome countries of free 
Asia spoke, and the world listened. They spoke on a subject of immediate concern to Asia, and in 
doing so made it quite clear that the affairs of Asia are the concern of the Asian peoples themselves. 
The days are now long past when the future of Asia can be settled by other and distant peoples”77. 
Sukarno thus emphasised the Colombo powers' concrete contribution as indigenous states to the 
settlement of the First Indochina Conflict through the diplomacy of Five Principles, a direct and 
better alternative to the military solutions of external powers.  
Defenders of regional security pacts such as Romulo responded that voluntarily taking part 
in such pacts was an act of self-determination and a protection of sovereignty. They argued that the 
threat to sovereignty came not from Western colonialism/neo-colonialism – as Western states were 
giving up their colonies and working with Asian states as equal partners – but rather from 
communist subversion. Ceylon's Prime Minister John Kotelawala, despite not being a member of 
SEATO, argued that communism should be considered as a new form of colonialism and that the 
Conference should condemn Soviet domination in Eastern Europe as colonialism78.  
During the conference Nehru, Sukarno and Zhou En Lai personally met leaders from various
nations and tried to persuade them of the value of the Five Principles as an alternative to collective 
defence. China's Premier Zhou En Lai stood out as the major talking point of the conference in this 
respect. That China was represented in the first place was a symbol of the 'autonomy' narrative that 
Bandung offered and the diplomacy of Zhou En Lai seemed to give weight to the appeal of non-
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alignment and the Five Principles as an approach to security. At Bandung, Zhou impressed many 
with his apparent reasonable, conciliatory attitude and sincerity to establish China's peaceful 
inclinations79. This contradicted the US' narrative that presented China as a threat to other states 
which needed to be contained. Indicative of this challenge were the effects it had with respect to 
Thailand and Cambodia. It is worth looking briefly at these cases as they reflected US officials' 
concern regarding the impact the 'autonomy' narrative might have on pro-Western and neutralist 
opinion. Thailand was a key ally of the US on mainland Southeast Asia and Cambodia was 
considered by the US a 'front-line' state in the struggle against communism in Indochina. 
Zhou went to great lengths to reach out to Prince Wan, the Thai representative at Bandung. 
He invited Wan to a private dinner and the Prince was apparently very impressed at Zhou being able
to address Thailand's concerns regarding China. After the conference secret moves were made to 
establish diplomatic relations. Thailand sent a delegation for talks in Beijing in December 195580. 
The Thai government relaxed its policy on Chinese minorities and made other indications of 
warming ties with Beijing. Press commentary became critical of the US and especially SEATO and 
many new leftist groups were formed merging as the Socialist Unity Front in February 1957. The 
new grouping called for a neutral foreign policy and the return of exiled former leader Pridi 
Panomyong, a figurehead for the Thai nationalist movement and those that opposed military rule81. 
This highlighted a growing Thai constituency that was opposed to the alienation of China 
encouraged by the US' 'containment' narrative and Thailand's close alignment with the US. 
As a front line state in Indochina, Cambodia faced a more imminent communist threat than 
Thailand. It initially tried to cast its lot with the US requesting military assistance after the 
conclusion of the Geneva agreements. Negotiations were complicated by the Geneva Accords and 
by the French who wished to remain the principle trainers of the Cambodian military82. Cambodia's 
Prime Minister Prince Sihanouk then refused to join SEATO because it did not offer the firm 
protection he felt Cambodia required. It seemed clear that the US was reluctant to commit troops to 
Indochina83. Bandung came as an important turning point after which Sihanouk started vocalising 
Cambodia's commitment to neutralism and the Five Principles. In February 1956 Sihanouk made a 
visit to China where he discussed possible aid. Shortly before this he visited Manila and made a 
speech to the Philippine Congress explaining Cambodia's neutral policy84. He had apparently been 
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pressed by the Philippine leader to join SEATO but responded by asserting that to join SEATO 
would be overly provocative and provide the communists with an excuse to intervene in Cambodia. 
The speech apparently went down well with congressmen and even led to calls by some for a 
reassessment of Philippine policy85. In private however, Sihanouk expressed more positive views of 
SEATO and its protection of Cambodia86. Cambodia's pursuit of neutralism was thus more out of 
necessity than the appeal of the 'autonomy' narrative itself. It did not represent an endorsement of 
Indonesia's claims to diplomatic leadership but rather was a strategic effort to coexist with China.   
Despite the efforts of Indonesia and others and the fears of the US, the eventual outcome of 
Bandung was not the establishment of an Afro-Asian bloc committed to ousting Western powers 
from Asia. The divisions over the the threat posed by colonialism and communism respectively to 
national sovereignty were accounted for within the final communiqué. As a compromise, the 
communiqué promoted Ten principles; these included the Five Principles but also the principle of 
respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, as long as arrangements for
collective defence were not used to serve any particular interests of the big powers. The use of the 
word 'particular' suggested a vague understanding that SEATO and other arrangements should be 
limited to defending the national security of participating states rather than serving to legitimise 
specific foreign policy aims or designs of external powers. By including these principles, the 
conference upheld the right of states to choose defence ties with external great powers. It therefore 
did not represent as substantive a challenge to the US as may have been feared; Dulles even stated 
that it was a document that the US could subscribe to87.   
Implications of SEATO and Bandung for the great power role
With respect to the US' 'great power guardian' role conception, the Manila and Bangkok 
conferences reflected the 'containment' narrative and represented the US' performative claim to the 
functions of 'holding the line' and diplomatic leadership. This was substantively endorsed by 
Thailand and the Philippines and at least acquiesced to by states such as Ceylon and Burma. Only 
India and Indonesia showed significant opposition. For the most part, regional states were willing to
endorse the US' provision of security public goods and even the function of 'holding the line' against
any communist advance. However, the function of diplomatic leadership was problematic. US 
officials saw their country's performance of diplomatic leadership in terms of organising the region 
around the limited goal of containment. Regional institution-building was considered to serve the 
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purpose of legitimising US containment imperatives and its 'guardian' role, rather than the 
expressed needs of Asian states. US officials tended to treat regional states as unequal and therefore 
acted more in terms of stewardship, offending even strong US allies such as Thailand and the 
Philippines. Washington tried to redress this by emphasising cooperation between Asian and 
Western states as equals at the Bangkok conference and encouraging Thai and Philippine activism 
in promoting the 'containment' narrative and necessity of the US' 'great power guardian' role at the 
Bandung conference. However, the specific 'great power guardian' role conception and its tendency 
towards stewardship was problematic. 
Despite the problems with the 'guardian' conception, Bandung failed to present a viable 
alternative for most emerging states. Indonesia and India failed to have the 'autonomy' narrative 
substantively endorsed. Those states that were part of SEATO and other collective defence 
arrangements successfully defended their right to enter into those arrangements as an act of 
autonomy. Many states still accepted that they faced a threat from communism and that the only 
means of meeting that threat was through external security guarantees. In this respect, the external 
great power role - in some form - was still endorsed as a necessity. The 'indigenous great power 
liberator' role that offered diplomatic leadership through non-alignment and the Five Principles was 
not seen as a credible alternative to the external great power role. 
Bandung did however establish autonomy arguments that, in principle, states were willing to
discursively endorse. The 'autonomy' narrative and its links to nationalism provided a powerful 
normative discourse for opposition groups within pro-Western states to use in challenging ruling 
regimes. The example of Thailand and how certain domestic constituencies were strengthened after 
Bandung to be far more critical of SEATO, and how Thailand even made moves to establish links 
with the PRC, demonstrated this. In the case of Thailand however this was short lived. Successive 
coups staged by Sarit Thanarat in 1957 and 1958 ensured Thailand's continued commitment to the 
US. The new leader made public his government's commitment to SEATO and ended the opening to
China, quashing criticism of the US through a massive crackdown on the press and a ban on 
political parties88.
In this way, the legacy of Bandung can be summarised as not “strategic and organisational, 
but educational and normative”89. Regional states did not move to renegotiate their ties with external
powers, but the appeal of the 'autonomy' narrative in principle complicated the degree of 
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endorsement regional states could offer and thus the legitimacy of the US' 'great power guardian' 
role. We can conclude at this stage that there was only a partial bargain over the US' 'great power 
guardian' role; security public goods and 'holding the line' endorsed, but diplomatic 
leadership/stewardship contested due to the US' external identity. There was no agreement over the 
alternative of Indonesia's 'indigenous great power liberator' role however as this was not endorsed 
by any of the regional constituencies of legitimation. It was however endorsed by key Indonesian 
constituencies including the PKI which, as we will see in the next section, led President Sukarno to 
attempt to enact the role despite the lack of regional endorsement.  
1956-1965 ROLE ENACTMENT: PRACTISING THE NARRATIVES 
The decade following Bandung saw the US and Indonesia re-conceptualise their roles and make 
substantive claims through enacting their role conceptions. US officials were no longer concerned 
about performing diplomatic leadership, as it was clear that SEATO was waning as a mechanism to 
legitimise the US' role. Instead, Washington committed to more overt stewardship, intervening 
within states in order to prevent the spread of communism. This was clearly seen in the US' 
intervention in Indonesia. Its performance of 'holding the line' also moved from deterrence to 
intervention as seen in Vietnam.   
With increased power, but a precarious domestic position balanced between the anti-
communist military and PKI, President Sukarno pursued a more radical foreign policy, re-
conceptualing the 'liberator' role from performing diplomatic leadership to revolutionary regional 
leadership. Sukarno enacted the 'indigenous great power liberator' role by taking radical steps to 
purge any external great power presence from the region. Indonesia seized foreign assets and 
pursued active confrontation against West Irian (still under Dutch influence) and Malaysia 
(considered a British plot to maintain its influence). Sukarno framed these confrontations as the 
continuation of Indonesia's revolution and tried to enlist support through a new grouping to rival the
UN, the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS). 
The audience for these role claims was an emerging Southeast Asian regional constituency 
of legitimation consisting of Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. This emerging, if partial, 
regional constituency endorsed the US' 'containment' narrative, security public goods provision and 
'holding the line' function. The three states also pursued regionalism in the Association of Southeast 
Asia (ASA) to buttress the region from communist influence and compliment their external security
ties. ASA was promoted as non-political, with leaders highlighting the 'autonomy' aspects of 
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cooperation as Asian solutions to Asian problems. It fell victim to the unfolding instability of 
Confrontation in 1963 but set a precedent for not only a conception of region and institutional form,
but also the pattern of a division of labour with the US that would be realised through ASEAN. 
Enacting the 'great power guardian' role: stewardship and 'holding the line' through 
intervention
Intervention in Indonesia
In the late 1950s regional military commanders in the islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi rebelled 
against Indonesia's central government by declaring regional autonomy. They were disaffected by 
Jakarta's leadership and concerned by the rising influence of the PKI. The US intervened in support 
for the rebel groups because of their anti-communist credentials. The US' intervention represented a
clear claim to stewardship, showing its willingness to interfere in domestic politics to try to 
manipulate outcomes towards its containment imperatives. Washington saw an opportunity to bring 
Indonesia into alignment with itself and the rest of Southeast Asia by weakening the solidarity-
makers and bringing anti-communists into power. Based on information from the CIA, and against 
that coming from the US Embassy in Jakarta, Washington officials believed Java was edging 
towards communism and Indonesia was likely to break up90. The rise of the PKI, and Sukarno's 
apparent willingness to allow this rise, compounded these fears. President Eisenhower and 
Secretary Dulles hoped that through support for outer island rebels, the US could leverage the 
central government to make moves against communists within Java. If Java did go communist, US 
officials hoped that communism could be contained within Java and not spread to the outer islands. 
The consequences of Java becoming communist were considered twofold. In the short term 
were detrimental psychological and political effects for non-communist Southeast Asian states that 
would feel squeezed between communist China and North Vietnam and communist Java. In the 
long term the military consequences were reported to be “grave” as bases from Java could be used 
by communist bloc forces to threaten US regional allies. A communist Indonesia would “split off 
Australia and New Zealand from Southeast Asia ... sever sea lines of communication and hinder air 
communication between the Pacific and Indian oceans. Additionally, it would make very difficult 
the provision of U.S. military support to Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam and Malaya”91. It was 
thus considered to severely impair the US' ability to provide security public goods to the region and 
90  See Kahin and Kahin (1997). 
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directly threaten US allies and even its island defence perimeter. To counter this, Washington 
decided to maintain formal relations with the government of Indonesia but increase its support for 
anti-communist elements in the outer islands and Java. It sought to strengthen the anti-communists 
by encouraging coordination between non-communist parties, and at the same time weaken the PKI 
by undermining its nationalist credentials through identifying it with the Sino-Soviet bloc. 
In December 1957 naval ships were readied for action around Indonesia to prepare for “any 
contingency including evacuation U.S. personnel and landing Marines to protect U.S. lives and 
property in Indonesia especially Java and Sumatra”92. Meanwhile, the CIA landed officers in 
Sumatra and distributed arms to rebels, leading rebel leaders in February 1958 to form the 
Revolutionary Government of the People of Indonesia (PRRI). The central government responded 
with force and civil conflict broke out. Secretary Dulles and his brother, CIA Director Allen Dulles, 
considered ways for direct military intervention but struggled to find legal justification. Secretary 
Dulles also started making public statements that were highly critical of the central government in 
order to justify Washington's position with respect to the rebellions. Despite claiming that the US 
was not involved, the Indonesian press linked Dulles' critical statements with the rebel ultimatum 
and inferred that the US must be involved. Foreign Minister Sanbandrio protested that Dulles' 
statements constituted “unwarranted interference”93.
The Dulles brothers hoped that rebel bombing raids over Java would act as leverage with the
central government and decided to offer aid to anti-communist elements within the Indonesian army
as long as it was not used against the rebels94. However, the Indonesian army discovered truck-loads
of unpacked crates filled with new military equipment, ammunition, foodstuffs and money which 
had American markings. Prime Minister Juanda pleaded with US Ambassador Howard Jones to get 
his government to stop the bombing raids and support for the rebels, informing him that the 
revelation of foreign involvement in the bombing raids had played into the hands of the PKI and 
made things very difficult for pro-US elements in Jakarta. He requested that Secretary Dulles make 
a statement indicating US determination to do what it can to halt the raids95. 
The US continued to deny involvement whilst pushing for anti-communist figures such as 
Juanda and Army Chief of Staff General Nasution to make moves to eliminate communist influence
within Java. Secretary Dulles proposed a plan that would begin with him proposing a cease fire, 
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December 1957” ibid Doc 312. 
93 Gardner (1997: 149). 
94  “Editorial Note” FRUS 1958-1960 Vol XVII Doc 73. 
95  “Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, 6th May 1958” ibid Doc 80. 
93
during which anti-communist elements in Jakarta could move against the communists and make 
changes to bring about an anti-communist cabinet. The US would then offer military and economic 
support starting with an initial gesture of $7 million dollars' worth of equipment. The new 
government and the rebels could then seek a resolution to the conflict96. However, Juanda and 
Nasution had no intention of negotiating with rebels that had been fighting with external assistance 
as this would compromise their standing with the Indonesian people97. The plan was aborted when a
captured bomber pilot was identified as US Civil Air Transport (CAT) bomber Allen Pope. Dulles 
pulled the plug on the operation and made a statement that all conflicts in Indonesia were a matter 
for internal affairs and that there should be no foreign interference. However, on the same day as 
Dulles' press statement Indonesia was commemorating its declaration of independence and many 
speeches by Sukarno and others were scathing of foreign intervention, some directly mentioning the
US. Even anti-communist commentators expressed outrage at the actions of the US and its allies in 
trying to “Balkanise” Indonesia98. 
Without external support the rebellions petered out by June 1958. The anticipated cabinet 
reshuffle did not bring about the changes that Washington hoped for. Indeed, the US' intervention 
had the adverse effect that the Indonesian public became increasingly anti-American. They believed
the US had masterminded the PRRI rebellion from the start and were susceptible to accusations of 
US involvement in anti-Indonesian activities for a number of years to come, reinforcing the US' 
status as a coloniser. This strengthened the solidarity-makers and reduced the ability of 
administrators such as Juanda to influence Indonesian foreign policy.
The only constituency the US was able to maintain links with was the Indonesian army. US 
officials decided to provide the military aid first offered by Dulles in May as a way to counter 
Soviet support being provided to the Navy and Air force99. However, the West Irian dispute and 
President Sukarno's policies became obstacles; nearly all US assistance to the army was cut off with
the onset of Confrontation and Sukarno's speech in 1964 that told the US to “go to hell with your 
aid”. Despite this, a Civic Action Program (CAP) was initiated for Indonesia in 1962 and remained 
in place throughout Confrontation, providing direct links between the US and the Indonesian army 
that bypassed the central government. The CAP focused on the development of farming techniques 
and acted as a counterweight to PKI rural programmes. Indonesian officers increasingly went to 
study in the US: 0 in 1958, 41 in 1959, 201 in 1960, peaking at 1017 in 1962100. The US' courtship 
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of the military paid off after the 1965 coup as the army became the dominant force in Indonesia's 
politics. 
Intervention in Vietnam
The US' intervention in Indonesia was for the most part opportunistic and short-lived. In contrast, 
the intervention in Vietnam was seen as fundamental for proving US resolve in acting on the 
'containment' narrative and making good its claim to the function of 'holding the line'. The US 
initially committed to building a strong anti-communist South Vietnam to resist communist pressure
by providing aid, technical and military advisers and consumer products. Between 1956 and 1961 
an average of 58 per cent of the South Vietnamese budget was provided by the US, making South 
Vietnam dependent on US aid. However, the US-backed Diem regime failed to gain popular support
due to its authoritarianism and dependence on US aid101. Despite this, the commitment the US made 
to South Vietnam created a path dependency and, in the eyes of officials in Washington, became a 
crucial bellwether for US commitments across the globe. The US was therefore concerned with the 
impact not intervening may have on its own identity as 'leader of the free world' and status as a 
great power/hegemon.
In the context of this growing commitment to South Vietnam, SEATO became less useful as a
mechanism for deterrence and for legitimising the US' 'containment' imperatives and 'guardian' role.
British and French aversion to military involvement in Indochina meant any collective action was 
unlikely due to the need for consensus, as seen during the Laotian crisis in 1960-61. After coming 
under increasing pressure from communist and neutralist forces, Laos made a request for SEATO 
observers, prompting Secretary of State Dean Rusk to introduce plans for intervention in Laos at the
SEATO conference in 1961. Rusk hoped that the threat of SEATO intervention would force the anti-
government Pathet Lao into a ceasefire. Britain and France opposed such an ultimatum, with Britain
approaching the Soviet Union to persuade the Pathet Lao to a ceasefire102. The US issued a unilateral
warning by mobilising elements of the 3rd Marine Division and Seventh Fleet and dispatching 
advance elements of a Marine helicopter squadron to Udorn airbase in northeastern Thailand. This 
may have contributed to the Soviet acceptance of British diplomatic initiatives103. In the end the US 
and SEATO chose to pursue a diplomatic solution to the Laotian crisis with President Kennedy 
'drawing the line' in Vietnam instead.  
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The US had already considered the usefulness of the Manila Treaty lying less in its basis in for 
collective action, than in its legal justification for US unilateral military action in Indochina. The 
NSC document titled “Current U.S. Policy in the Far East” was revised in August 1956 to say: 
“Should overt Communist aggression occur in the Southeast Asian treaty area, invoke the UN 
Charter or the SEATO Treaty, or both as applicable; and subject to local request for assistance take 
necessary military and any other action to assist any Mainland Southeast Asian state or dependent 
territory in the SEATO area willing to resist Communist resort to force”104. This willingness to act 
unilaterally under the cover of the Manila Treaty was expressed publicly in 1962 with the Rusk-
Thanat Agreement. In the wake of the Laotian Crisis, Thailand was concerned that SEATO may not 
provide adequate defence and sought a commitment to Thai security from the US. The resulting 
agreement overrode the consensus principle of SEATO by stating that the US acting under the 
Manila Treaty “does not depend on prior agreement of all the parties to the treaty since this treaty 
obligation is individual as well as collective”105. On the US side, this represented a more substantive 
claim to 'holding the line' through deterrence. On the Thai side it showed the increased nature of the
threat to the Thai regime which drove its endorsement of, and reliance on, the US' role.  
This unilateral declaration was especially salient as the communist insurgency in South 
Vietnam picked up momentum. The National Liberation Front (NLF), with the support of North 
Vietnamese troops, was showing success against the better equipped South Vietnamese army. The 
NLF was also able to garner popular support from the rural population. After the battle of Ap Bac, 
when an outnumbered NLF force managed to inflict a major defeat on the South Vietnamese army, 
it became clear that the Diem regime could not hold out. A brutal crackdown on Buddhist protesters 
in 1963 was the last straw, and Diem was brought down by a US-backed coup. This did nothing to 
help the military situation on the ground and the US moved towards direction military intervention. 
In August 1964 two US destroyers reported that they had been attacked by North Vietnamese 
torpedo boats. The facts of the incident are disputed106 but it was used by the Johnson administration
as a means to increase the President's freedom of action in Vietnam. The resulting Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution allowed Johnson “to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist 
any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance 
in defense of its freedom” without a declaration of war from Congress107. This satisfied the 
'according to constitutional processes' clause in Article IV of the Manila Treaty. 
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By removing the barriers of the need for consensus within SEATO and the need to satisfy 
constitutional processes, President Johnson was able to directly intervene in Indochina. This began 
with a systematic bombing campaign over North Vietnam in February 1965, followed a few months
later by the introduction of ground troops. The US was making a substantive claim to perform the 
function of militarily 'holding the line' in Vietnam. To legitimise this, regional governments were 
enlisted to provide support under the “many flags” programme. 
 
Responses from Southeast Asian states
Thailand considered the expansion of communism in Indochina as a direct threat to its security and 
therefore gave substantive endorsement. US intervention reassured Thailand of US resolve and 
provided an opportunity to extract greater military and economic assistance. Thailand offered land 
in the northeast for US-built and operated air bases. Over the course of the conflict 80 per cent of 
US bombing in Indochina was conducted from Thailand108. Thailand hosted 300,000 US servicemen
and their presence led to the development of infrastructure and their use of Thai resorts for R&R 
dramatically boosted the tourist industry. In 1967 Thailand sent the Queen's Cobra division to 
Vietnam which included a force of 2,200 men to guard the highway between the US air base at Bien
Hua and the port of Vung Tau. Thailand increased its contribution in 1968 through the Black 
Panther division109. Between 1968 and 1971 Thailand maintained a division size of 11,000 men, the 
third largest contingent of foreign troops after the US and South Korea110. This contribution was 
underwritten by the US. Thai forces were officially volunteers and there was widespread support 
within Thailand for their efforts. Thailand's major contribution to the US effort was its clandestine 
operation in Laos. Up to 23,000 Thai troops dressed in Royal Lao Army uniform and flew Lao 
aircraft in operations to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the main route for transporting North 
Vietnamese troops and supplies into South Vietnam111.  
The Philippines endorsed the US' 'holding the line' by sending an engineering task force 
called the Philippine Civil Action Group (PHILCAG). Negotiations over PHILCAG originally 
revolved around funding of combat forces. The Philippines required that the US completely fund 
the forces and also offer additional concessions. This was unacceptable to the US at the time and it 
was settled that PHILCAG could consist of an engineering task force funded by the US. The 
PHILCAG bill experienced heated debate within the Philippines Congress but was passed in June 
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1966 subject to yearly review112. This contribution can be considered on the borderline between 
performative and substantive endorsement because, although rather insignificant strategically, it was
costly due to domestic opposition.    
The new states of Malaysia and Singapore also endorsed the US' claim. Malaysia's 
endorsement was more clearly performative than substantive. Malaysia did not send forces to fight 
in Vietnam but between 1961 and 1966 helped train a number of South Vietnamese officers in 
jungle warfare, anti-guerrilla operations and police administration. The Tunku thought Malaysia's 
policy on Vietnam would hurt its standing with Afro-Asians but was convinced that the US was 
taking the correct course as he believed from experience that communists would never negotiate 
until they were sure they could not take what they wanted through force. The US saw Malaysia as 
key for legitimising its efforts in Vietnam. Secretary Rusk told Deputy Prime Minister Tun Razak 
that it would be good if Southeast Asian leaders found a way to tell non-aligned countries outside 
Southeast Asia not to speculate but to listen to what Asian countries close to the danger were saying 
and support their peace initiatives113.
For Singapore, public endorsement of the 'containment' narrative and the US' 'holding the 
line' were difficult in 1965 as the country, newly departed from Malaysia, needed to be accepted by 
the Afro-Asian group prior to the September 1965 vote for its UN membership. The ruling People’s 
Action Party (PAP) regime also needed to squash the left-wing opposition Barisan Socialis' efforts 
to exploit the base issue at home. Although Barisan Socialis had been weakened through PAP 
crackdowns, it still posed a potential challenge through its ability to link the British military 
presence to neo-colonialism. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew countered the Barisan Socialis effort by
publicly criticising the US, making clear that the government was in full control of the bases and the
US would not utilise them in their military effort against Vietnam114. Privately however, Permanent 
Secretary of the Ministry of Defence George Edwin Bogaars said that the Ministry of Defence 
would not interfere with existing British-US arrangements and the transportation of Vietnamese 
officers through Singapore for training in Johor115.
The fear of a possible Malaysia-Indonesia condominium against Chinese populations after 
Confrontation contributed to the improvement in relations between Singapore and the US by 1966. 
In February 1966, Singapore allowed US troops to come to Singapore for R&R as long as they did 
112 Jagel (2013). 
113 Ang (2010: 30).
114 Ang (2010: 27).
115 Ang (2010: 28).
98
not appear on the streets in their uniforms. Lee began to endorse the 'containment' narrative and 
'holding the line' by stating in June 1966 that people in Vietnam were dying to ensure that what was 
happening there was not repeated elsewhere in Southeast Asia. He hoped “the United States, despite
domestic criticism ... would be able to hold the line through at least one more presidential election” 
emphasising that the Southeast Asian countries must make the most of the time which was being 
bought for them116. By not interfering in the transport of troops through Singapore to the Johor 
Jungle Warfare School and allowing US troops to undertake R&R in Singapore, Singapore also 
gave performative endorsement to the US' claims.
It is clear from the above that the non-communist states of Southeast Asia endorsed the 
'containment' narrative and the functions of security public goods and militarily 'holding the line' in 
Vietnam. This endorsement varied in degree: the extent of each state's endorsement was largely 
determined by what they considered the primary threat to their own security and their sensitivity to 
their own domestic constituencies and the non-aligned group of states. As far as the non-communist 
regimes were concerned, the US' performance of 'holding the line' bought time to focus on 
economic development and political stability in order to ensure they met the challenge of 
communist subversion. US provision of security public goods guaranteed their external security and
provided material assistance for their regime consolidation.
Crucially Indonesia was not part of this developing regional constituency that endorsed the 
US' role until 1966. The next section will look at how Indonesia made its substantive claims to its 
'indigenous great power liberator' role conception through confrontation and how this was rejected 
by regional states. 
Enacting the 'indigenous great power liberator' role: autonomy through revolution
Confrontation
Foreign involvement in the Sumatra and Sulawesi rebellions, the failure of parliamentary 
democracy to bring national unity and the lack of success obtaining West Irian through diplomacy 
provided the conditions for President Sukarno to take a leading role in Indonesian politics. He 
implemented his concept of 'Guided Democracy' in 1959, revoking the 1950 provisional 
constitution, re-establishing the 1945 constitution and banning parties opposed to the changes 
including Masjumi and the PSI. Guided Democracy was justified in terms of bringing a truly 
116 Ang (2010: 29), see also Ang (2009).
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'Indonesian' political system to replace the inapplicable Western parliamentary model. Sukarno 
consolidated his power through mass mobilisation, carried out through the PKI and its allies. This 
put a check on the anti-communist military, the biggest challenger to Sukarno's position; the 
military was also given a stake in Sukarno's system through the imposition of martial law, which it 
used to seize major sectors of the economy from the Dutch. Sukarno subsequently maintained an 
uneasy balance between the army and the PKI which were bitterly opposed to one another. In this 
context domestic policy issues became even more divisive. This further encouraged Sukarno to 
focus on foreign policy in an attempt to unite Indonesians through evoking nationalist feeling. 
Making substantive claims to pursue the 'autonomy' narrative through performing a new function of
revolutionary regional leadership was thus a key means of legitimising Sukarno's power117. 
The first major expression of this was the coercive diplomacy used to obtain West Irian from
the Dutch. Sukarno first seized Dutch assets and expelled Dutch nationals, but this did not deter the 
Dutch from moving West Irian towards self government. Indonesia then sought heavy arms 
transfers from the Soviet Bloc, including sixty jet fighters, twenty bombers, two destroyers, two 
submarines and torpedo craft118. The Dutch responded by sending additional reserves to West Irian. 
By the end of 1961, Sukarno had created an atmosphere of crisis by threatening war through 
establishing a military command charged with the liberation of West Irian and infiltrating the 
territory by sea and parachute drops. The US moved from a position of neutrality to an active effort 
to mediate the dispute fearing that opposing Indonesia's claim would drive the country further 
towards communism119. A final accord was reached in August 1962 which allowed for temporary 
UN administration of the territory before being handed over to Indonesia in May 1963. This was on 
the provision that an 'act of free choice' be held in 1969 allowing the inhabitants of West Irian to 
choose whether they wanted to remain part of the Republic. The proposed act of free choice also 
gave the semblance of a compromise, although Indonesia never fulfilled its obligation. 
 
The next, more substantive claim to revolutionary regional leadership, was Indonesia's 
Confrontation against Malaysia. Indonesia opposed the formation of the Federation of Malaysia 
which sought to join the British colonies of North Borneo and Singapore with Malaya. The PKI 
were the first to publicly express their opposition describing the proposed Federation as a “new 
concentration of colonial forces on the very frontiers of Indonesia”120. The Brunei rebellion in 
December 1962 allowed Sukarno and the PKI to mobilise mass domestic support for the rebels as 
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an example of NEFOS in action. Sukarno announced in early 1963 that “Malaysia is a manifestation
of neo-colonialism. We do not want to have neo-colonialism in our vicinity. We consider Malaysia 
an encirclement of the Indonesian Republic … [w]e are determinedly opposed, without any 
reservation, against Malaysia”121. 
Not only was the Federation considered a neo-colonial project designed to perpetuate British
interests in Southeast Asia, it was also a major affront to Indonesia's sense of entitlement as the 
'indigenous great power liberator'. Sukarno resented that a colonial power could decide the 
territorial configuration of a part of Southeast Asia considered vital to Indonesia's security without 
its participation or approval122. Indonesia aimed to subvert the Malaysian government's authority 
over North Borneo by arousing popular unrest through armed infiltration. It also allowed the British
embassy in Jakarta to be burnt down by rioters and seized British assets. In August and September 
1964, Indonesia even landed infiltrators on Peninsula Malaya. Britain responded by sending troop 
and aircraft reinforcements to Singapore and sailing HMS Victorious through Indonesian waters in a
show of military strength123. This deterred the Indonesian army from escalating the military aspect 
of Confrontation, so Sukarno tried more radical diplomacy within the UN and the Afro-Asian group
to enlist support for the condemnation of Malaysia as a neo-colonial plot. He sought to link 
Confrontation with his wider espousal of the struggle of NEFOS but other states did not share 
Sukarno's view of Malaysia as a 'neo-colonial' creation and were concerned by Indonesia's military 
incursions into Malaysia which were seen as violating the UN framework. In December 1964 
Malaysia was given a seat in the UN Security Council, compounding Sukarno's frustrations with the
organisation and leading Indonesia to leave the UN. 
Domestically the PKI became more dominant in politics, leading to a growing alignment 
between Indonesia and the PRC. Sukarno's radical foreign policy resonated with China which was 
disillusioned with Soviet 'coexistence' policy under Khrushchev. Indonesia and China aligned in 
establishing an 'international united front' to drive the UK and US out of Southeast Asia. China 
became the strongest supporter of Indonesia's confrontations and NEFOS124. The alignment reached 
its peak in 1965 after Indonesia withdrew from the UN and tried to set up the alternative 
Conference of the New Emerging Forces (CONEFOS).  
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Responses from Southeast Asian states
Confrontation alienated many Western states and discredited Indonesia within the non-aligned 
movement, as it was seen as abandoning the principles of Bandung. Sukarno was therefore 
unsuccessful in undermining the legitimacy of Malaysia in international society and instead 
undermined Indonesia's own legitimacy, as well as its domestic economy125. Within Southeast Asia, 
Indonesia's efforts to expel external powers from the region were viewed as an attempt to establish 
its own hegemony126. The opposition this engendered proved that there was no place in Southeast 
Asia for the function of revolutionary regional leadership and Indonesia's 'indigenous great power 
liberator' role.  
Before Confrontation however, Indonesia had some limited success in enlisting the support 
of the Philippines in opposing Malaysia and committing Malaya to respect the self-determination of
the people of Borneo. The Philippines opposed Malaysia because it had its own territorial claim to 
Sabah. The Philippines considered itself the successor state of the pre-colonial Sultanate of Sulu 
and thought it should inherit sovereignty over the Sultanate's territory, which included parts of 
North Borneo. However, the Philippine government did not agree with Indonesia that external 
powers should be expelled from the region. President Macapagal saw the Sabah claim as a means 
for the Philippines to present its Southeast Asian identity, and sought to legitimise the claim as part 
of indigenous Malay people finding their own solution for regional confederation rather than 
leaving it to the outgoing colonial powers127. Macapagal offered an alternative regional arrangement 
to the Malaysian Federation through a 'Confederation of Nations of Malay Origin' which became 
MAPHILINDO, an abbreviation of the names of the three member states. The Manila Accord 
signed by Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines in July 1963 committed Malaya to a declaration of 
adherence to the principle of self-determination for the people of Borneo under UN supervision. It 
also contained a clause stating that “the Ministers are of one mind that the three countries share a 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion 
in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their respective national identities”128. For 
Indonesia this represented a diplomatic success as two nations in formal alliance with external 
powers had given at least discursive endorsement to Indonesia's 'autonomy' narrative, excluding the 
external great power role. The three states also agreed to a joint statement that foreign bases in the 
region were temporary and would not be used to subvert the independence of any of the three 
countries. The fact that the Philippines agreed to this clause (which it opposed in the Bangkok 
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Declaration in 1967) reflected its desire to enlist Indonesian support for its claim to Sabah. The 
states also agreed that the UN Secretary General would carry out an opinion survey in North Borneo
regarding the proposed Malaysian Federation. 
As the survey was taking place however, Malaya announced that it was going ahead with the
formation of the Federation in September regardless of the results. The survey confirmed that the 
majority of North Borneo was in favour of the Federation, but Indonesia refused to recognise 
Malaysia and diplomatic relations were severed by Kuala Lumpur. Sukarno visited Manila in 
January 1964 to enlist the Philippines' further support in Confrontation but it had waned since the 
Manila meetings the previous July. The Philippines did not see Confrontation, especially its aim to 
expel external powers, as the best means to pursue its Sabah claim. Indeed, in March Manila and 
Kuala Lumpur agreed to exchange consular officials denting any hopes of Indonesian-Philippine 
solidarity on the matter. The Philippines subsequently joined Thailand as a mediator between 
Malaysia and Indonesia.  
For Malaysia and Singapore, Confrontation represented a threat to their very existence. By 
utilising Britain as an external security guarantor, Malaysia and Singapore showed the most 
significant contestation of Indonesia's revolutionary regional leadership. Consequently, no 
Southeast Asian state made any moves to follow Indonesia in removing external powers from the 
region, nor join the NEFOS movement. Thailand and the Philippines' decision to recognise 
Malaysia showed the failure of Sukarno's attempts to oppose the Federation and a contestation of its
claimed revolutionary regional leadership. 
Thai and Philippine attempts to mediate were backed by the US, reflecting Washington's 
developing expectations that regional states manage their own affairs. Just before Sukarno visited 
Manila in January 1964, President Johnson made clear to Macapagal his support for Philippine 
efforts to bring about a peaceful solution to Confrontation129. US officials were also keen to stress to
the British the importance of tripartite talks between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines and 
that the Thai initiative in this respect should be encouraged130. By the mid-1960s this also involved a
positive endorsement of the Association of Southeast Asia as a means of complimenting the US 
position in Vietnam. Regionalism could not be successful without the largest state of Indonesia on 
board, and so ASA remained only a partial fulfilment of US expectations.
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Development of the partial regional constituency and moves towards regional cooperation
The Association of Southeast Asia resulted from a Malayan initiative for a Southeast Asia 
Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET), which envisioned a cultural and economic pact 
between the independent nations of Southeast Asia. SEAFET was undermined when the Philippine 
Foreign Secretary Serrano indicated that it could be the economic off-shoot of SEATO, making it 
unacceptable to Indonesia131. Negotiations continued however, and ASA developed as an informal 
association, reflecting the Thai position that this, rather than a treaty-based organisation, would 
increase the chances of broader membership132. Member states stressed that ASA had no connection 
to any 'bloc'. Tunku Abdul Rhaman said “this organization is in no way intended to be an anti-
Western bloc or an anti-Eastern bloc, or for that matter, a political bloc of any kind. It is not 
connected in any way with any of the organizations which are in existence today; it is purely a 
Southeast Asian Economic and Cultural Cooperation Organization and has no backing whatsoever 
from any foreign source”133. The failure to enlist the support of other states however and the close 
connections the three member states had with Western powers, made ASA seem distinctly anti-
communist despite the Tunku's claims. For example, Sihanouk declined the invitation for Cambodia
to take part in negotiations saying that Cambodia could not join something that was a 'shadow' of 
SEATO134. 
ASA members still tried to fit ASA within the 'autonomy' narrative by claiming it 
represented a distinctly Southeast Asian initiative. Prior to the Second ASA Foreign Ministers' 
Meeting in April 1962, the Tunku issued a statement saying "it was the intention of the ASA 
countries - . . . to show the world that the peoples of Asia could think and plan for themselves"135. 
The member states viewed the pursuit of regional cooperation as a way to contribute to the 
strengthening of their own nations in the face of continued communist subversion and the increased 
threat from the PRC in backing subversive movements. Member states realised that short term 
security needs could not be met by local resources but also that external support was not a 
comfortable long term prospect because of domestic constituencies calling for greater autonomy 
rather than dependence on external powers136. ASA thus represented a first attempt to reconcile the 
conflicting pulls of security and autonomy. In this way, it lay the foundations for the pattern of 
reconciling the US' role with regional attempts at autonomy that would be expressed in the role 
131  Poulgrain (1998: 237).
132  Jorgensen-Dahl (1982).
133  Pollard (1970: 247). 
134  Leifer (1962: 131-132). 
135  Pollard (1970: 250). 
136  Gordon (1969: 75-84).
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bargain after 1966. However, without the involvement of Indonesia, ASA, and Southeast Asia as a 
region, were incomplete. 
Implications for the great power role
The deep polarisation between the US' and Indonesia's role conceptions, and the means through 
which they enacted them, prevented a bargain on the great power role. For the US, the 'great power 
guardian' role entitled it to intervene within regional states in order to protect its allies from a 
common menace and to influence domestic power struggles in its favour. This did little to 
distinguish it from the colonial great power role in the eyes of some in Southeast Asia. The regional 
constituency that began to appear through ASA, although still partial at this stage, was aligned with 
the US and endorsed the US' 'holding the line' function in Vietnam whilst beginning to seek ways of
supplementing great power guarantees with regional cooperation. This gave the 'great power 
guardian' role partial legitimacy; however it could not be fully legitimised because of the significant
contestation from Indonesia. 
For Indonesia, the 'indigenous great power liberator' role meant leading regional states to 
autonomy through revolution. Sukarno's claim to revolutionary regional leadership alienated other 
states in Southeast Asia which considered Indonesia itself as a significant threat. There was no 
legitimacy for the 'indigenous great power liberator' role. 
The fundamental obstacle to a role bargain at this stage was the fact that the legitimacy 
dynamics of the US' and Indonesia's role claims were completely out of alignment. The US needed 
sympathetic constituencies in power but its attempts to manipulate regional politics through 
stewardship led to deeper criticism from leftist and nationalist constituencies which were 
particularly strong in Indonesia. Sukarno drew his domestic legitimacy from these leftist and 
nationalist constituencies by more actively opposing the US and Britain's involvement in Southeast 
Asia. It would require the elimination of the solidarity-makers in Indonesia and a desire for the US 
to disengage from the region to provide the conditions necessary for a role bargain. 
1966 – 1975 ROLE REDEFINITION: SYNTHESISING THE NARRATIVES 
This section details how the US and regional states began to reach a nascent role bargain and in the 
process redefined the great power role in Southeast Asia. This was made possible by changing US 
and Indonesian role conceptions and expectations which opened the way for the 'containment' and 
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'autonomy' strategic narratives to be merged. Autonomy and containment were no longer competing
goals but were linked by the common effort to build a resilient non-communist social order in 
Southeast Asia. The emergent reciprocal role bargain consisted of: the US providing security public 
goods as the 'offshore great power guarantor' in support of non-communist states' regime 
consolidation, in return for regional states collectively performing diplomatic leadership as part of 
ASEAN's 'primary manager' role, not challenging the US' military presence in the region and 
providing diplomatic initiatives to legitimise its position in Indochina.  
Domestic change in Indonesia saw the new Suharto regime give up the 'indigenous great 
power liberator' role and instead conceive the 'leading-from-behind' role, as a partner of the US and 
regional states. The US' growing desire to withdraw from Vietnam in the midst of domestic 
criticism led the US to propose instead the 'offshore great power guarantor' role. As discussed in the
introduction, the 'offshore' aspect of the US' redefined role had a military-strategic aspect and a 
political aspect. The former involved the withdrawal of US forces from mainland Southeast Asia, 
and the latter saw the US leave regional states to manage their own relations with each other.  
Although the substance of the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role conception was developed 
during the Nixon administration, its full enactment came only in 1975 when Thailand requested that
the US withdraw from its Thai bases. The US' steady disengagement meant the withdrawal of any 
US claims to stewardship or diplomatic leadership. The US no longer explicitly sought to organise 
the region as it had before, but expected regional states to do this themselves. This left space for 
regional states to play a bigger part in shaping regional order. Negotiations around ASEAN 
therefore had important implications for the division of functions in Southeast Asia. Through 
negotiations to create ASEAN, regional states eschewed collective security functions but took 
responsibility for diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia as part of ASEAN's 'primary manager' 
role. Indonesia's 'leading-from-behind' role was endorsed within ASEAN as the other ASEAN 
members accepted Indonesia's designs on the association in return for securing its strategic 
restraint.. ASEAN endorsed US provision of security public goods by accommodating external 
power military bases in the region.  
ASEAN’s diplomatic leadership had two aspects. First, regional states began to manage their
own relations through reconciliation, regional institution-building and rule-making in their 
subregion, as well as tackling communist insurgency on a bilateral level. This aspect was 
subcontracted to the ASEAN states in 1968/69 as the US deliberately kept its distance as the 
Corregidor affair nearly pulled ASEAN apart. Second, regional states provided a diplomatic front in
support for communist containment in Indochina as shown through the Jakarta Conference 1970 
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where the US made clear its desire for regional states to spearhead a diplomatic initiative. These 
events reflected the emerging US-ASEAN division of labour as part of their role bargain. The 
generic great power role included the functions of security public goods provision and diplomatic 
leadership. Security public goods remained intrinsic to the external great power role, specifically 
the US’ ‘offshore great power guarantor’ role; Indonesia's neighbours and the great powers 
contested any Indonesian claims to provide security public goods in Southeast Asia. Only 
diplomatic leadership was subcontracted. By decoupling diplomatic leadership from the great power
role and transferring it to regional states, ASEAN and the US redefined the great power role in 
Southeast Asia.  
Indonesia's re-conceptualisation – 'leading-from-behind' 
Indonesia's 'leading-from-behind'137 role conception resulted from the elimination of the solidarity-
makers from politics and the rejection of the 'indigenous great power liberator' role conception. The 
army, led by General Suharto, used an abortive coup by dissident army and air force officers and 
PKI members, as a pretext for seizing power in late 1965. The army instigated a systematic 
campaign of violence against the PKI and its sympathisers, resulting in over 500,000 deaths and the 
political elimination of the PKI. The army and Muslim leaders, supported by US and British 
propaganda, painted the PKI as an agent of China attempting to stab the Republic in the back138. 
President Sukarno's apparent association with the coup leaders and his failure to denounce their 
murder of six generals discredited him politically139. In March 1966, Sukarno was forced to transfer 
executive powers to General Suharto who immediately made the PKI an illegal organisation. 
Suharto's “New Order” regime was concerned with internal stability and identified 
communist subversion as the primary threat. Suharto advocated building 'national resilience' 
through economic development and political stability to insulate Indonesia from external 
interference and subversion140. The new regime promoted itself as correcting the deviations from 
Pancasila and bebas aktif during the Sukarno era141. Suharto argued that Sukarno's alignment with 
China was a major infringement of bebas aktif and that China was involved in the abortive 
'communist' coup. He appointed a group of US-trained technocratic economists to revive the 
economy, which had a negative growth rate, 600 per cent inflation and a national debt of over $2 
137  See Anwar (1994, 2006). 
138  Easter (2005), Simpson (2008). 
139 See Hunter (2007). 
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141 Ramage (1995: 9). 
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billion142. Suharto's domestic legitimacy rested on the promise to restore domestic stability, ensure 
the unity of the nation and pursue a programme of economic development and modernisation143.
Suharto ended Confrontation in 1966 and phased out the radical rhetoric of Sukarno, 
withdrawing Indonesia's claims to revolutionary regional leadership. He endorsed the 'containment' 
narrative by seeking assistance from the West, expressing support for the US in Vietnam and 
breaking off relations with communist China. The new regime's conception of the tut wuri 
handayani 'leading-from-behind' role, was initially used by Suharto to describe the army's 
involvement in domestic politics, but came to be associated with Indonesia's commitment to 
Southeast Asian cooperation144. As table 4 shows, Indonesia still held its identity as an indigenous 
and independent state as well as the largest state in Southeast Asia. The principles of anti-
colonialism and bebas aktif were still strong amongst the population. The Suharto regime's new role
conception had to reflect and demonstrate Indonesia's independent and active credentials. Key 
figures such as General Nasaution and Lieutenant-General Djatikusumo also held a sense of 
Indonesia's entitlement within Southeast Asia, due to its size and revolutionary history, and 
cautioned against any alignment that would compromise bebas aktif145. Other prominent army 
figures also tried to push regional military cooperation under Indonesia's leadership to replace 
external power security guarantees146. To satisfy domestic opinion, Indonesia could not just be equal
to the other states in the region, but needed to be recognised as the first amongst equals (primus 
inter pares). As discussed below, based on this 'sense of regional entitlement'147 Indonesia claimed 
to perform diplomatic leadership within Southeast Asia by offering a proposal for regional 
cooperation that showed its commitment to cooperative foreign policy, but also reflected aspects of 
the 'autonomy' narrative in its proposals regarding regional states' shared responsibilities vis a vis 
external powers. However, Indonesia's claim needed endorsement from neighbouring states 
suspicious of Indonesia in the wake of Confrontation. Suharto therefore also claimed the primary 
function of strategic restraint by ending Confrontation, agreeing to be bound within the cooperative 
framework of ASEAN and showing its willingness to compromise with respect to the status of 
external military bases. This acted as a key form of reassurance to its neighbours. As part of the 
agreement to end Confrontation, Indonesia dropped its demand for a referendum to be held in North
Borneo on accession to the Federation of Malaysia148. We will see below how Indonesia and its 
neighbours negotiated Indonesia's 'leading-from-behind' role within ASEAN and collectively took 
142 Vatikiotis (1993: 33). 
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responsibility for diplomatic leadership through ASEAN. One specific secondary function 
Indonesia also saw itself performing was promoting conflict mediation initiatives for the Indochina 
conflict in support of US containment objectives. Indonesia's traditional non-aligned status could be
used as leverage in legitimising containment objectives. We will see this demonstrated through the 
Jakarta Conference 1970.    
Identity Status Function
Primary Secondary
Indigenous Primus inter pares 
Diplomatic leadership
(in partnership with 
ASEAN members)
Regional initiatives for 
Indochina (Conflict 
mediation)
Largest state
Non-aligned Restraint Institutional bindingIndependent (won through 
revolution)
Table 4 – Indonesia's 'leading-from-behind' role
The US' re-conceptualisation – US 'offshore great power guarantor' role 
The US' re-conceptualisation evolved over the late 1960s as its efforts in Vietnam appeared to be 
failing. Its use of overwhelming force and conscription elicited domestic and international criticism,
raising the financial and political costs of the intervention. The major shift in perception of the US' 
role came after the communist Tet Offensive in early 1968. Prior to this, US officials believed that 
they would be able to win the war by reaching a crossover point when communist casualty rates 
would exceed the number of new recruits, and over 1966 and 1967 US troop deployments were 
steadily increased. The Johnson administration sought to combat domestic criticism by playing up 
the success of the US effort and fostering general optimism the US would win. When the 
communist forces launched their large scale Tet offensives throughout South Vietnam in January 
1968, it led to protracted and bitter fighting which contradicted the US government's optimistic 
propaganda. President Johnson's response was to halt the bombing campaign in North Vietnam and 
in March 1968 call for a negotiated settlement to the conflict149. From then on, US officials looked 
for a face-saving way to disengage from Vietnam whilst reassuring regional allies that the US would
still provide some form of protection. This was manifested in the 'Nixon Doctrine' announced in 
1969.  The Nixon administration no longer saw the communist threat as monolithic (seen 
particularly in subsequent moves towards rapprochement with China); communism was less an 
external threat to the region than an internal problem for regional states through subversion perhaps 
149On the Johnson adminstration and the Vietnam war see Van de Mark (1991), Khong (1992) and Dallek (1998). 
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with Chinese support. The 'Nixon Doctrine' lay down three principles to guide US policy. First, the 
US would keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, it would provide a nuclear shield if a nuclear 
power threatened an ally or a state whose survival the US considered in its interest. Third, in cases 
involving other types of aggression, the US would support allies with military and economic 
assistance but would look to the nation directly threatened to provide the manpower for its 
defence150. The US would no longer commit troops; rather Asian armies would face threats on the 
ground through performing the function of communist counter-insurgency. The US would support 
this through continued Military Assistance Programs. 
The Nixon Doctrine reflected the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role conception 
shown in Table 5. The 'great power guardian' identity elements of 'exceptionalism' and 'leader of the
free world' were replaced by a realisation of the US' 'external' identity in Southeast Asia. US actions
in Vietnam dealt a psychological blow to the US population; 'US exceptionalism' lost its 
legitimacy151. The Vietnam War also affected the US' status. Despite maintaining its status as a 
global great power, the US was now a weakened hegemon. Vietnam revealed the limits of US 
power both in terms of its inability to defeat a weaker enemy using superior capabilities, and in 
terms of its loss of legitimacy as 'leader of the free world' amongst its domestic population and 
international critics. By staying 'offshore', the US hoped to foster a more 'benign' status by not 
intervening directly in regional affairs. From its 'offshore' position it could still provide security 
public goods such as security of sea lanes and military aid and assistance but not directly intervene 
in conflicts with troops. This would encourage regional allies and partners to take more 
responsibility for their own security and, according the National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, 
help build a capitalist world order that served US interests but one “in which the U.S. does not have 
to carry the entire burden”152.  In justifying the need to provide such aid and assistance, President 
Nixon reported to Congress that “there is built into the decision to reduce our own presence the 
obligation to help our allies create the capacity to carry the responsibilities we are transferring”153.
Subsequent US negotiations with the Soviet Union, China and North Vietnam to find a way 
out of Vietnam, served notice of the limited time for which the US would continue performing the 
secondary function of 'holding the line'. After withdrawal from Vietnam, 'holding the line' would be 
replaced by the Nixon Doctrine's emphasis on offshore deterrence, especially the threat of a 
150 Gurtov (1974: 205).
151 Bell (1975). 
152 “Memorandum of conversation. San Clemente, California, September 2, 1969” FRUS 1969-1976 Vol I Doc 35. 
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possible nuclear strike154. By holding out deterrence from its bases in the Philippines, the US would 
perform the primary function of balance of power against any potential external threat to regional 
partners and allies. To iterate this commitment, Nixon repeatedly reassured regional allies that 
withdrawal from Vietnam did not mean complete withdrawal from the region; rather than US would
remain in the region to ensure no strategic vacuum opened up155.  
   
Identity Status Function
Primary Secondary
External Great power (weakened 
hegemon)
Security public
goods 
provision
Security of sea 
lanes
Aid and 
assistance
Holding the 
line
Benign (non-interference) Balance of 
power
Offshore 
deterrence
Table 5 – US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role
In order to facilitate a face-saving withdrawal from Vietnam, the US expected regional states
to: 1) pursue regional cooperation amongst themselves to strengthen their own stand against 
communism; and 2) engage in regional initiatives for managing the Vietnam conflict. Whereas 
before the US had hoped for regional cooperation to be initiated by regional states, and for the US 
to then be invited, it now hoped regional states could cooperate on their own to strengthen their 
resolve156.
In 1966, President Johnson toured the region and expressed his support for Asian regional 
cooperation. Likewise, Secretary Rusk iterated that “[w]e will see substantial advantage in the 
development among the Asian nations themselves of systematic machinery for consultation on 
political problems and security questions in which they are all involved”157. Rusk pointed to the 
Manila Conference in October 1966 as a promising start. Philippine President Marcos invited the 
US and other nations involved in the Vietnam effort to meet in Manila to discuss the situation in 
Vietnam and the prospects for negotiations with North Vietnam. US officials realised this would not
154 Gurtov (1974: 208). 
155  For example “Memorandum of Conversation, Oval Office, Friday September 21st 1973” Ford Library 
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produce any substantive outcomes, but saw the conference as another opportunity to show that the 
US was standing together with Asians158. John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs, reported that the conference was a success in its “[d]isplay of not-
US-aloneness, of resolve, of beginnings of an awakening responsible Asia, and of concern for the 
miseries of the Asian billions”159. 
US officials hoped that this 'awakening responsible Asia' would facilitate the US' shift to an 
'offshore great power guarantor' role by easing US withdrawal from Vietnam. Rusk made this point 
to Tun Razak as early as October 1966160. He later reflected that his view since the early 1950s was 
that it was “far better to let the Southeast Asian countries evolve their own regional security 
arrangement without the United States being a direct party, and then we could stand in powerful … 
second line support to the region, if it ever got into trouble”161. Nixon also saw regional cooperation 
as the key counterforce to Chinese influence and so regional states' contribution to security would 
be to reduce the appeal of communism by promoting development through cooperation162. In a 
report to Congress on his administration's foreign policy, Nixon stated that: “[w]e look forward to 
an Asia in which the task of ensuring security, development, and political consolidation can be 
carried primarily by the governments and peoples of Asia. Similarly, we believe they have an 
indispensable role to play in creating effective mechanisms of regional collaboration and in shaping 
the broader structure of international relations in Asia”163.  However, US officials were keen to 
ensure that US support for regionalism came from behind the scenes and that the Southeast Asian 
states themselves took the lead. Indeed, the US was pleased with the potential of ASEAN, but was 
sure to emphasise that US support should be “decidedly low key” so that it would not appear as a 
'Western puppet'164
US re-conceptualisation primarily reflected its goal of withdrawing from Vietnam. In this 
sense, any concern for how regional states organised themselves in the wake of US withdrawal was 
of secondary importance. However, through its re-conceptualisation the US withdrew its claim to 
158  “Summary Notes of the 565th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, 15th October 1966” FRUS 
1964-1968 Vol IV Doc 272. 
159  “Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to 
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the functions of stewardship and diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia. The US no longer 
explicitly sought to organise the region, leaving space for regional states to play a bigger part in 
shaping regional order in Southeast Asia. Regional cooperation along the lines the US desired was 
possible now that leftist constituencies had been defeated in Indonesia. Indonesia had withdrawn its 
claim to the function of revolutionary regional leadership and no longer sought to replace external 
powers or drive them out of regional affairs. The new anti-communist regime in Indonesia still 
claimed the function of diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia and the US hoped it would enact its 
claim through regional cooperation.  
Mutual endorsement between US and New Order
In August 1966, Secretary Rusk reported to President Johnson that US objectives of keeping 
Indonesia out of the hands of domestic communists and out of the orbit of communist China had 
been achieved. He stated “our objective now is to help this populous, potentially rich and 
strategically placed nation ... develop an effective government, and become a constructive force in 
the area”165. This indicated that the US had achieved the aims of its long-running intervention in 
Indonesian affairs, as its favoured constituency had now come to power and defeated the US' most 
formidable opponents within maritime Southeast Asia. In this way there was no need to interfere so 
readily in Indonesian affairs but maintain distance. This turn of events paved the way for the 
evolving bargain not just between the US and Indonesia, but also by extension ASEAN as we will 
see below. The US pursued its objective of helping Indonesia become a constructive regional force 
through military and economic assistance, but also by appearing to keep its distance so as not 
compromise the new regime's position domestically. The US re-started the MAP for Indonesia and 
training under International Military Education and Training (IMET). US officials also coordinated 
the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), a long-term mechanism to provide assistance. 
Formed in February 1967, the IGGI included donor countries such as the US and Japan and 
multilateral lending agencies. It was chaired by the Netherlands so that it did not appear to commit 
Indonesia too closely to a US initiative. The donors agreed in 1970 to spread Indonesian debt 
repayment over thirty years and issued assistance totalling $200 million in 1967, $360 million in 
1968 and $500 million in 1969166. This material assistance helped consolidate the new regime by 
enabling it to focus on domestic economic priorities. 
Endorsement also flowed the other way. In September 1966, US Vice President Hubert 
165  “Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, Washington, 1st August 1966” FRUS 1964-1968
Vol XXVI Doc 215.
166  Leifer (1983: 116).
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Humphrey reported that Foreign Minister Adam Malik “made clear ... his country's sympathetic 
understanding of the U.S. role in Asia and Vietnam”. Stating that Suharto's success in defeating the 
PKI was directly influenced by US determination in Vietnam, Malik warned that “U.S. withdrawal 
and a Communist victory in Vietnam would be a direct threat to his country”167. Indonesia now 
shared the view of other Southeast Asian states that the US was buying time by 'holding the line' in 
Vietnam so that regional states could focus on their own development and stability. Malik told 
President Johnson that his government had been discussing Vietnam with officials from Thailand, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and other Asian countries and that they all had a common stake in seeking
peace in Vietnam. He said that any role Indonesia may play in promoting peace should be pursued 
quietly without public notice and that he hoped Indonesia could bring about a useful influence in 
resolving the conflict. For now however, Malik saw no other option than for the US to take a strong 
position in defending South Vietnam168. The Indonesian government's position, though it could not 
express it publicly, was that the US should remain in Vietnam and that the US should consider the 
need to maintain the general security of Southeast Asia in any assessment over drawing down. The 
Suharto regime was not opposed to the external great power presence as Sukarno had been. Indeed, 
Malik even stated that he had no objection to the continued presence of Commonwealth troops in 
Malaysia and Singapore after the British withdrawal but hoped that no other foreign force would fill
the gap left by the British169.
Despite Indonesia and the other Southeast Asian states wishing the US to continue 'holding 
the line' in Vietnam, the US was set on drawing down its presence. This meant that regional states 
had to come to terms with each other, especially in the context of the recent Confrontation and 
extant territorial disputes; they could no longer simply rely on external security guarantees. This 
entailed accommodating Indonesia's role in Southeast Asia. Indeed, in its early years, ASEAN was 
viewed in Washington primarily as a vehicle for promoting reconciliation between Indonesia and its
neighbours, but that it could develop “a useful morale and authenticating function against future 
aggression directed at any of its members or countries in the area”170. US Ambassador to Indonesia 
Marshall Green suggested the US encourage Indonesia to pursue regional cooperation but that 
“Indonesia's neighbors ... must be responsive ... we should encourage these nations to realize that a 
“New Order” has taken over in Indonesia and that ... the best and most pragmatic way to guard 
against the possibility of future Indonesian adventurism is to embrace Indonesia's new government 
167  “Memorandum From Vice President Humphrey to President Johnson, Washington, 25th September 1966” FRUS 
1964-1968 Vol XXVI Doc 222.  
168  “Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, 27th September 1966” ibid Doc 224.
169  “Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, 29th July 1969” FRUS 1969-1976 
Vol XX Doc 271.
170“Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, Washington, 13th October 1967” FRUS 1964-
1968 Vol XXVI Doc 284.
114
and interweave it inextricably in responsible regional activities”171. The US encouraged regional 
states to develop mechanisms for managing their relations with Indonesia, rather than relying on the
US or other external partners to protect them. Through negotiations to create a framework for 
managing regional relations, regional states resolved the issue of Indonesia's leadership claim and 
its neighbours' wariness by endorsing Indonesia's 'leading-from-behind' role within the ASEAN 
framework. The next section shows how this was done and how these negotiations led to ASEAN 
taking on the first aspect of its diplomatic leadership through its emerging 'primary manager' role. 
Diplomatic leadership: regional cooperation
Establishing ASEAN: the 'primary manager' role with Indonesia 'leading-from-behind' 
ASEAN negotiations took place in the context of the space given to regional states in shaping 
regional order by external power disengagement and US expectations that they manage their own 
relations. ASEAN negotiations covered three themes: Indonesia's role within ASEAN; ASEAN 
states' collective responsibility through ASEAN; and the question of security public goods provision
in relation to external power military bases. These negotiations directly related to the functions 
ASEAN members saw themselves performing in relation to external great powers. They produced 
ASEAN's claim to the 'primary manager' role (table 6) with Indonesia 'leading-from-behind', and 
the continued endorsement of US provision of security public goods.  
In negotiating Indonesia's role there was a need to consider Indonesian constituencies that 
still demanded an independent and active foreign policy, but also Malaysia and Singapore's 
suspicion of Indonesia's regional intentions. To reassure its neighbours, Indonesia showed restraint 
by ending Confrontation and agreeing to be bound within a cooperative framework. ASA was 
restarted in 1966 but Suharto could not associate Indonesia with ASA without damaging his 
regime's independent and active credentials. Indonesia's population considered ASA an anti-
communist, neo-colonial club. Creating a new grouping in the form of ASEAN allowed Indonesia 
to demonstrate its independent and active credentials by influencing the shape of regional 
cooperation. The Malaysians in particular were keen to tie Indonesia into a regional framework and 
were thus willing to disband ASA in favour of ASEAN and to acquiesce to Indonesian efforts to 
shape the new association if this served to strengthen the domestic position of the Suharto's 
government172. 
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On the question of membership, Indonesia pushed for ASEAN, at least in spirit, to be 
inclusive of all Southeast Asian states. ASEAN states did not invite North and South Vietnam as 
this was considered too provocative, but Malik visited Yangon and Phnom Penh to enlist support 
and Ceylon was also invited to join. These states declined as they thought membership in ASEAN 
would compromise their neutralist (for Burma also isolationist) foreign policies. However, the 
Suharto government used the gesture of seeking wider membership to show Indonesia's domestic 
population, and other non-Western countries, that regional cooperation was consistent with its 
independent and active foreign policy173. As shown in table 6 below, it also gave ASEAN, at least 
nominally, a non-aligned status and demonstrated ASEAN's 'indigenous' identity as a grouping 
limited to 'Southeast Asian' states174. No external powers or large regional powers such as India 
were invited to join.
Another gesture of Indonesia's independent and active credentials was the principled stand it
took during negotiations over the paragraphs in the draft ASEAN declaration referring to member 
states' shared responsibilities and foreign military bases. As a demonstration of the importance this 
had for bolstering the domestic credentials of the Suharto regime, Foreign Minister Malik sent 
emissaries to Bangkok in advance of the foreign ministers' meeting to inform Thanat Khoman that 
Malik would not attend the meeting if reference to regional responsibility and military bases were 
not made in the ASEAN declaration175. Indonesia's original draft declaration adopted wording from 
the Manila declaration of 1963 to demonstrate its continuity with MAPHILINDO and the 
'autonomy' narrative. 
The Indonesian draft proposed sharing responsibility for economic and social stability and 
“for ensuring the stability and maintaining the security of the region from external interference”. 
Singapore and the Philippines opposed this wording, rejecting the idea that ASEAN should have 
any security dimension. Explicitly stating shared responsibility for regional security came too close 
to the old 'autonomy' narrative of regional states replacing external great powers. Indeed, some in 
the Indonesian military wanted to establish a military alliance as part of ASEAN to replace external 
powers and balance the Chinese threat under Indonesian leadership176. Other member states 
objected as did elements within Indonesia that wanted to avoid military pacts. The wording of the 
paragraph was eventually split: shared responsibility was affirmed for economic and social stability,
but by stating that member states were “determined to ensure their stability and security from 
173  Anwar (1994: 52).
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external interference”, security was kept as an individual responsibility177. Philippine Foreign 
Minister, Narcisco Ramos iterated that “[t]here is no obligation on the part of any Asian member 
state to go to the aid of another member state in cases of outside intervention; neither is there any 
intention or commitment for the Asian states to 'share' in the responsibility of resisting foreign 
intervention. Each state must look after its own security”178. ASEAN would perform no security 
functions. 
The question of security public goods provision was the subject of the paragraph relating to 
foreign bases. Indonesia's draft also drew on the Manila and Bandung declarations saying that bases
were “temporary in nature and should not be used directly or indirectly, to subvert the national 
independence of Asian countries, and … arrangements of collective defence should not be used to 
serve the particular interest of any of the big powers”179. The Philippines and Singapore again 
opposed such wording, seeing it as inconsistent with maintaining strong defence relationships with 
external powers. Indeed, the Philippines initially opposed any reference to military bases. Thanat 
Khoman reportedly held threatened that Thailand was willing to form the new grouping without the 
Philippines if it did not compromise on including a reference to military bases180. The Indonesians 
also assured the Philippines that they were not asking for bases to be removed and that they 
recognised that the Western military presence would need to remain for some time but that they 
believed it was a matter of principle for the ASEAN states to declare their primary responsibility for
regional security181. The Philippines relented and the member states agreed to a revised statement, 
redrafted by the Thai and Malaysian foreign ministers, that “all foreign bases are temporary” but 
that they “remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned”182. This 
compromise accommodated the 'autonomy' narrative by allowing member states to declare as a 
'region' that foreign bases were on their way out. It also legitimised the status quo by making bases 
a 'bilateral' issue between individual states and external partners. That this did nothing to challenge 
the US' military position was reflected in the lack of any concern in Washington over this 
paragraph183. ASEAN's position on bases essentially endorsed US provision of security public goods
and its balance of power function from its base in the Philippines, but relied on the Philippines to 
shoulder the responsibility for hosting the bases. As we will see in the next chapter, this became an 
issue when nationalist constituencies in the Philippines demanded an end to US bases. 
177  ASEAN (1967), Acharya (2014: 44-46). 
178  Acharya (2014: 59). 
179  Irvine, R (1982: 12). 
180Inward Cablegram from Australian Embassy, Bangkok, 15th August 1967, NAA: A1838, 3004/13/21 PART 2. 
181Inward Cablegram from Australian Embassy, Jakarta, 23rd August 1967, NAA: A1838, 3004/13/21 PART 2. 
182  ASEAN (1967). Inward Cablegram from Australian Embassy, Washington D.C., 17th August 1967, NAA: A1838, 
3004/13/21 PART 2.
183Ibid.
117
In the end, ASEAN states established that their shared responsibility would be to build 
“regional resilience”, an extension of Indonesia's notion of 'national resilience'. Member states 
would concentrate on economic development and nation-building and avoid conflict with each other
and interference in each other's affairs. Through this they could cumulatively achieve unity and 
strength and avoid fragmentation and intervention by external powers. Regional resilience was the 
key part of ASEAN's strategic narrative, which allowed the 'autonomy' and 'containment' narratives 
to be reconciled. Southeast Asia was the 'in-group': regional fragmentation leading to external 
intervention was the threat; building regional resilience was the necessary response. Resilience 
could achieve autonomy as ruling regimes would grow stronger and insulate themselves and the 
region from external influence. Resilience through economic development and political stability 
would also help contain insurgency movements and regional discontent which might find support 
from outside the region.  
Through these negotiations we can identify agreements reached on each of the three themes 
identified above. Firstly, by accommodating the 'autonomy' narrative and much of Indonesia's ideas 
within ASEAN, the other ASEAN states endorsed Indonesia's 'leading-from-behind' role in return 
for Indonesia's restraint184. This is clear from their decision to create a new grouping and disband 
ASA and their compromise on Indonesia's preferred wording within the declaration. ASEAN 
members also developed a practice of giving more weight to Indonesia's position on regional issues 
and consulted Jakarta first on matters that ASEAN was to deal with185. For example, Jakarta secured
agreement from the other ASEAN states in 1971 that they would not rush into normalising relations 
with China but rather consult each other first186.In return Indonesia showed restraint by not asserting
its dominance. For example, Indonesia ultimately did not impose its view regarding the threat it saw
China posing, but left the matter of normalisation to each individual ASEAN state. Indeed, this 
demonstrated the limits of other ASEAN states' endorsement of Indonesia's 'leading-from-behind' 
role; they were willing to show a certain amount of deference to Indonesia's position, but unwilling 
to let Jakarta determine their own foreign and security policy positions. Jakarta also demonstrated 
restraint in 1968 when Singapore hanged two Indonesian marines accused of bombing a bank 
during Confrontation, ignoring Suharto's calls for clemency. Suharto did not take punitive action 
despite domestic protests and calls from the military to act, showing his commitment to 'leading-
from-behind'187. In 1973, Singapore showed deference to Indonesia's position when Lee Kuan Yew 
184  Emmers (2003). 
185  Chong (2011: 152).
186 Telegram from American Embassy, Jakarta to US State Department, December 8th 1971, NAA: A1838, 3004/13/21 
PART 13. 
187  Emmers (2003: 63-64). 
118
lay flowers at the marines' graves.  
Secondly, by creating ASEAN and determining ASEAN's strategic narrative, regional states 
collectively began the process of claiming ASEAN's 'primary manager' role, which is outlined in 
Table 6 below. As has been pointed out by ASEAN scholars, the process of establishing ASEAN's 
legal rational and diplomatic-cultural norms (the 'ASEAN Way') took around a decade, coming to 
fruition around the first ASEAN summit in 1976 and expressed within the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC)188. However, the founding of ASEAN represented the initial performative claims
to the secondary functions of regional institution-building and rule-making, even if the functions 
would not be fully enacted straight away. ASEAN claimed regional institution-building by creating 
ASEAN as a regional framework open for accession by all Southeast Asian states. Regional states 
agreed to work together to ensure social stability – i.e. non-communist social stability – through 
regional cooperation. ASEAN claimed the function of rule-making in Southeast Asia by asserting 
non-interference as the central norm underpinning regional relations. Non-interference was applied 
internally and externally. Internally, ASEAN states agreed not to interfere in each other's affairs by 
supporting dissident or insurgent groups. Externally, non-interference was ostensibly directed at all 
external powers, but in light of the US' determination to take a back seat and have regional states 
manage their own affairs, was directed more specifically at China, to de-legitimise Chinese support 
for communist insurgency movements189. Regional-institution-building and rule-making constituted 
the first aspect of the primary function of diplomatic leadership subcontracted to ASEAN: regional 
states managing their own relations through regional reconciliation and cooperation. ASEAN 
cooperation was supplemented by bilateral practical cooperation between member states in 
combating insurgency, particularly in border areas. Regional states therefore also took on the 
function of counter-insurgency, with the backing of US aid and assistance. 
Thirdly, ASEAN would not take on any security functions as part of its 'primary manager' 
role. Security public goods provision remained the responsibility of external great powers shown by
the fact that ASEAN did not directly challenge the legitimacy of external security guarantees. In so 
doing, ASEAN states endorsed the US' security public goods provision from its bases in the 
Philippines.  
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Identity Status Function
Indigenous Non-aligned (nominally)
Primary Secondary
Diplomatic 
leadership 
Regional institution-building
Rule-Making
Regional initiatives for 
Indochina (Conflict 
mediation)
  
Table 6 – ASEAN's 'primary manager' role
Enacting ASEAN's 'primary manager' role: Corregidor
ASEAN's 'primary manager' role was immediately tested by the Corregidor affair. In April 1968 the 
Philippine press reported that a secret Philippine force was being trained on Corregidor island in 
Manila Bay for the apparent infiltration of Sabah. This initiated a series of protests and mutual 
incriminations in Malaysia and the Philippines which led to severing of relations. The responses to 
this dispute demonstrated that a division of labour was emerging between the US and the ASEAN 
states, where the US expected the ASEAN states to manage regional relations themselves rather 
than calling on the US to act. The US purposefully remained at a distance despite a request from 
Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to put pressure on the Philippines. Assistant Secretary for 
East Asia and the Pacific William Bundy made clear that “advice or pressure from outside powers, 
however well-intended, would only weaken the sense of responsibility of ASEAN members for 
handling their own affairs ... [W]e can best encourage the development of ASEAN by standing 
aside and letting the member states decide for themselves how to deal with the potential threat 
posed by the Sabah dispute”. More specifically, there was a danger that US pressure would 
“reinforce the view held by other Southeast Asian nations that the Philippine Government cannot be
dealt with as a responsible Government, but must be approached through Uncle Sam, who will keep
them in line”190. This position was reiterated when Marcos asked the US to put pressure on 
Malaysia. Bundy stated that US involvement “would be most unwise, but ... Asian friends of both 
parties might play [a] useful role particularly in the corridors at the forthcoming ASPAC and 
ASEAN meetings ... both Thai[land] and Indonesia were interested and objective nations”191. 
Thailand and Indonesia did indeed seek to mediate the dispute through informal discussions.
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Malik hosted a meeting in August 1968 where Malaysia and the Philippines agreed to a 'cooling off 
period' for six months; neither side would take any action to escalate the dispute. However, 
Malaysia refused to convene ASEAN meetings in 1969 unless the Philippines withdrew its claim to 
Sabah. Many delegations from Indonesia and Thailand visited Malaysia and the Philippines hoping 
to get Malaysia to reconvene ASEAN meetings and for the Philippines to tone down its Sabah 
claim. Malaysia-Philippine relations were eventually re-established in December 1969 on the 
sidelines of the ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM). According to a British diplomatic 
note, the value Malaysia and the Philippines put on ASEAN membership and the mediation of 
Indonesia in promoting mutual restraint, were key for the de-escalation of the dispute192. The Moro 
rebellion in the southern Philippines was also a major factor in Marcos agreeing to lay the Sabah 
claim to one side as he required Malaysian cooperation to combat the insurgency. ASEAN's 
management of the dispute without significant US involvement demonstrated ASEAN's emerging 
'primary manager' role as regional states took responsibility for managing their own relations. 
Nixon highlighted the example of the resumption of Malaysia-Philippines relations under ASEAN 
auspices, as part of Asia's more “[a]ctive regionalism ... Its vigor [being] one of the guarantees of 
the influence of Asia's smaller states in the future political structure of the region”193.
 
The ASEAN states' recognition of such responsibility was further underlined by Adam 
Malik's efforts at the 1969 AMM to initiate a dialogue between Thailand and Malaysia over the 
issue of the Muslim-majority southern Thai provinces. The Indonesians saw it as important for the 
two states to increase their cooperation over the provinces to combat communist insurgents in the 
area but also to manage separatist discontent. The two states needed to avoid falling out over the 
issue, which was a “real foreseeable danger to ASEAN”194. Although the issue was at that point not 
an immediate threat to relations, Malik's efforts to try to pre-empt any possible downturn over the 
issue, demonstrates the ASEAN states' recognition of the need to manage their own relations. 
Suggestive of the fact that the ASEAN states began to view this responsibility as linked with the 
US' provision of security public goods was that Malik told Nixon that enthusiasm for regional 
cooperation within ASEAN was also given a boost by President Nixon's speech to the American 
people in November 1969. Nixon had stated in the speech that the US would not pursue a 
precipitous withdrawal from Vietnam but seek a negotiated solution whilst trying to strengthen the 
South Vietnamese195. US officials also saw it as important that the ASEAN states were aware of the 
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US' view of mutual responsibilities within such a division of labour. Indicative of this was Kissinger
advice to Nixon on his meeting with Suharto in 1970 to assure that “favourable developments in 
regional identification would not be taken by us as an excuse to get out, but as a basis for a new, 
broader partnership with Asian countries. So long as we can play a useful, stabilizing role, and are 
wanted, we will remain”196. The ASEAN states would continue to indicate that the US was wanted 
as part of their negotiations over the notion of Southeast Asian neutralisation.
Legitimising the US' 'great power guarantor' role: ZOPFAN
The Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) agreement was the culmination of a debate 
over ASEAN's collective expectations regarding external great powers, initiated by Malaysia's 
proposal for the neutralisation of Southeast Asia. The proposal was made just after the January 1968
announcement of Britain's withdrawal east of Suez and became Malaysia's official policy when Tun
Razak became Prime Minister in 1970. Malaysia's proposal was notable for covering the whole of 
Southeast Asia and also because it recognised communist China as a great power. Tun Razak was 
determined to move Malaysia away from its pro-Western position and also made efforts to open 
bilateral links with communist China. He hoped that in return for being recognised as a great power,
China would recognise the legitimacy of Malaysia's ruling coalition and the norm of non-
interference197. This would help manage domestic ethnic relations in the wake of Malaysia's race 
riots in 1969 by neutralising the threat from Chinese subversion. The neutralisation proposal called 
for a guarantee by external powers to respect Southeast Asia as neutral and to set up a supervisory 
mechanism for ensuring that guarantee. It represented a major shift in Malaysia's expectations of 
external great powers, seeing them as supervisors of Southeast Asian neutrality rather than directly 
involved through the provision of security public goods. In this sense, the proposal not only had 
implications for the great power role, but also how ASEAN's putative 'primary manager' role might 
fit in. Removing the great power presence within the region would theoretically give the Southeast 
Asian states more strategic space to manage their own relations, potentially taking on security 
functions as the great powers ended their alliances and military involvement in the region.
Regional states did not take much of an interest in Malaysia's proposal until the shock 
announcement in 1971 that President Nixon was to visit Beijing, sparking fears the US was seeking 
to withdraw from Vietnam by offering China a sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. This 
challenged regional states' expectations regarding the speed of which the US was moving towards 
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26th 1970” <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB242/19700526_memo.pdf> accessed 22/5/15. 
197  Haacke (2003: 55).
122
the 'offshore great power guarantor' role. A precipitous US withdrawal would mean an end to US 
performance of the function of 'holding the line', considered vital in buying ASEAN states time to 
work on their resilience. The ASEAN states met in October and November to discuss a common 
position on these events. Malaysia's neutralisation proposal was on the table, but the other ASEAN 
states opposed its adoption. The Philippines was concerned with how it would affect its alliance 
with the US and the US' naval presence in the region. Thailand opposed a guaranteed neutrality as it
was suspicious of China as a reliable guarantor and saw a direct threat from China and North 
Vietnam, especially considering its involvement in the Vietnam war. Thailand was in favour of 
strengthening ASEAN's political cooperation as a way to achieve armed neutrality rather than 
guaranteed neutrality198. Singapore was concerned by Malay dominance in the region should the 
external great power presence be removed, preferring the involvement of all great powers to 
provide an equilibrium in the region199. Indonesia also opposed the proposal arguing that a great 
power guarantee might create opportunities for intervention rather than prevent them. In Jakarta's 
view, ASEAN states should instead focus on regional resilience to avoid external intervention.
ASEAN agreed that “the neutralization of South East Asia is a desirable objective” and that 
members were “determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and 
respect for, South East Asia as a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or 
manner of interference by outside powers”200. The agreement reaffirmed that autonomy was 
desirable and needed to be worked towards through building regional resilience, but that the status 
quo of US military involvement and provision of security public goods should not be challenged. 
Indeed, there was an apparent back room deal that whatever the ZOPFAN declaration stated, it 
would not call into question members' ties with the US201. The contradiction between ASEAN's 
espoused desire for neutrality and its satisfaction with the status quo of the US military presence 
shows that ZOPFAN was targeted not at great powers in general but specifically at China and the 
Soviet Union. ZOPFAN was part of ASEAN's claim to rule-making in Southeast Asia, especially in 
its promotion of non-interference, to try to shape regional order in Southeast Asia so that China or 
the Soviet Union did not fill the vacuum US withdrawal from Vietnam would leave behind. The US 
welcomed the Kuala Lumpur meeting and ZOPFAN to the extent that they demonstrated ASEAN's 
desire to consult and cooperate on security matters. The State Department was relieved that the 
notion of formal great power guarantees was rejected in favour of a call for outside powers to 
'respect' ASEAN's neutrality through non-interference202. This reflected the fact that ASEAN's rule-
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making fit into the US-ASEAN division of labour by complimenting the US' desire to draw China 
into a rule-governed regional society. In the wake of Nixon's meetings in Beijing, Green told 
President Marcos that Nixon charged him to “convey to Asian friends and allies that [the] U.S. is 
not going to leave [the] western Pacific but rather find [the] right way to remain. He said we should 
be and act confident, that Peking might be hypocritical but we stand to gain to [the] extent Peking 
follows norms of international behavior”203. If China recognised non-interference then by extension 
it would recognise the legitimacy of the non-communist ruling regimes in ASEAN; if it recognised 
ASEAN regimes as legitimate it would not need to try to subvert them.  
Diplomatic leadership: initiatives to manage Indochina conflicts
Aside from the question of regional states managing their own relations through regional 
cooperation, there was also the question of what to do about the conflicts in Indochina. The US and 
ASEAN shared the view that communism needed to be contained in Indochina. However, the US 
wanted to withdraw from Vietnam and expected ASEAN states to provide diplomatic initiatives to 
manage the conflict in support for its drawing down. This could be done by promoting initiatives 
that legitimised communist containment. Some within the state department considered ASEAN 
useful for making supporting statements regarding Vietnam as early as 1967204. However, this was 
not to materialise until Indonesia, with ASEAN members' support, provided a diplomatic initiative 
in response to the Cambodian coup in 1970.
Prime Minister Lon Nol's coup in Cambodia resulted in civil war when ousted Prince 
Sihanouk gave his support to the communist Khmer Rouge and the North Vietnamese intervened in 
support. The conflict took the same form as those in Laos and South Vietnam with a communist 
insurgency backed by North Vietnam and a non-communist government backed by the US and the 
'free world'. The presence of North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia posed a threat to Nixon's policy 
of withdrawal as bases in Cambodia provided a relatively secure place for North Vietnamese 
operations into South Vietnam. On the 29th April South Vietnamese and US troops entered 
Cambodia and attacked the major communist bases in an effort to eliminate this threat. However, 
much of the communist force had moved deeper into the countryside and US troops withdrew after 
one month.   
Before the US launched its Cambodia campaign, it made clear that it expected regional 
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states to take a stand on Cambodia, as a means to legitimise US military action. Assistant Secretary 
of State for East Asia and the Pacific Michael Green said that it “would be most useful if Asian 
countries were to register their concern over developments in Cambodia and their support for 
Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity ... If this could be done by ASEAN countries speaking
with common voice, this would be particularly impressive, but if ASEAN as an organization shrinks
from being involved in this kind of an issue, then it would be second best if ASEAN member 
countries could speak up on their own. In any event, it is better for Asians to take the lead than it is 
for US or European countries”205. 
Indonesia responded positively, initially offering to act as a channel for US arms to the anti-
communist forces in Cambodia. Despite the apparent desire of the White House to channel such aid,
Washington rejected the offer because it would raise questions in Congress. Malik persuaded 
Suharto that a diplomatic response was the correct way forward rather than direct military 
support206. Indonesia prepared to host a conference on Cambodia. The US supported this but 
emphasised that it should be an Asian initiative and the US would give no public endorsement. 
Malik saw the conference as a means of promoting Indonesia's Southeast Asian leadership, of 
boosting his own government's prestige and forestalling pressures from abroad and from generals 
for more concrete aid to Cambodia. He intended the Jakarta Conference to legitimise the 
'containment' narrative and US' 'holding the line' in Vietnam, telling US officials it aimed to counter 
communist propaganda and open the eyes of the world to the truth that communists had been 
subverting South Vietnam for a long time and that the US was supporting the South Vietnamese 
struggle207. This arrangement worked to reinforce the legitimacy interdependence between the US 
and Indonesia as it provided a key means for the Suharto regime to prove its independent and active
credentials whilst legitimising the US' strategic imperatives in Indochina. 
Indonesia invited 21 countries but almost all non-aligned invitees declined208. The fact that 
the US launched its military campaign the day after the invitations were sent out raised questions 
regarding the neutrality of the conference. Malik sought to distance the conference from US action 
by publicly expressing that US withdrawal of troops would be beneficial for the conference. 
Privately however, Malik was not disturbed by the US' action. Other Southeast Asian statesmen 
either publicly or privately expressed support for the US. 
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The ASEAN states for the most part also endorsed Jakarta's initiative for a conference on 
Cambodia. Malaysia was supportive but preferred a conference on general Southeast Asian security 
as a platform to promote its neutralisation proposal. Both Marcos and Romulo of the Philippines 
supported Malik's initiative, seeing it as similar to Marcos' failed proposal for an Asian Forum of 
Asian Nations to explore avenues that might lead to a unified Asian position on regional 
problems209. Only Singapore was unsure. Singapore's Ambassador to the US consulted Marshall 
Green to see what US views on the conference were. Green encouraged Singaporean participation 
but Singapore did not send Foreign Minister S Rajaratnam as it saw the conference as impotent210. 
The fact that Singapore felt the need to seek the US' position on an Asian conference reflected its 
continued wariness of Indonesian leadership and support for US military involvement in Southeast 
Asia. The US criticised Singapore's decision not to send S Rajaratnam however, calling it a “bad 
move”211; support for its strategic imperatives should be expressed precisely through participation in
regional diplomatic initiatives such as the Jakarta Conference.   
The conference took place in May and called on the co-chairman of the Geneva Conference 
to reconvene the International Control Commission on Cambodia (ICC) and for the hosting of an 
international conference. The foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia and Japan were encouraged 
to consult with the co-chairman of Geneva and the Secretary General of the UN on how the above 
could be implemented. Subsequent efforts to convene an international conference to guarantee 
Cambodian neutrality were unsuccessful. The civil war continued with the US supporting Lon Nol 
forces through a sustained bombing campaign. The conference was however a foreign policy 
triumph for Malik. Domestic commentary hailed the conference as an example of Indonesia's 
independent and active foreign policy. It embodied both the 'containment' and 'autonomy' 
narratives; the support given to the Lon Nol regime and the call for the withdrawal of foreign forces
aimed to contain the communist advance in Cambodia, but the fact that this was an Asian initiative 
seeking to resolve Asian problems reflected the 'autonomy' narrative. Though it was not explicitly 
an ASEAN initiative, ASEAN states tried to coordinate a common position on the conference and 
ASEAN delegates played an important part at the conference itself. It was an explicit example of 
the second aspect of diplomatic leadership subcontracted to ASEAN states and can be seen as the 
first step towards ASEAN extending its reach to mainland Southeast Asia. The US was pleased with
the conference and Kissinger advised President Nixon to congratulate Suharto on its success, 
especially in light of the difficulties it potentially posed to Indonesia's non-aligned status. He wrote 
that the conference “helped greatly in solidifying the diplomatic position of the Lon Nol 
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government, and helped to preserve Cambodian neutrality and sovereignty. It will also strengthen 
the hand of those seeking a peaceful settlement of the fighting throughout Indochina”212. Such 
statements clearly reflected the US' view that the conference served its imperatives of legitimising 
the anti-communist government in Cambodia and its broader containment objectives in Indochina. 
No subcontracting of security public goods
For some in Indonesia, the Cambodian coup provided an opportunity to gain access to US military 
assistance by claiming that Indonesia could perform more expansive military-security functions in 
the region. In May 1970 the opportunistic State Secretary H. Alamsjah indicated to US officials that
Indonesia could take on more regional responsibility as part of a “special role” in Southeast Asia213. 
General Sumitro agreed, saying this “special role” would involve Indonesia becoming more active 
in the wake of great power disengagement to ensure that there was no strategic power vacuum in 
the region. Sumitro argued that military assistance from the US and Western Europe was needed to 
replace old Soviet equipment214. An Indonesian five year plan envisioned Indonesia taking on 
responsibility for training and advising regional militaries and developing mobile land and navy 
strike forces for deployment around the region215. No doubt the main instrumental reasons behind the
acquisition of US aid related to domestic stability; however, claiming this 'special role' was seen by 
Alamsjah and Sumitro as a means to acquire such aid. 
The response within the US to expanded Indonesian role claims was mixed. The White 
House was interested, although raised concerns regarding the US' ability to supply necessary 
equipment. The State Department however was concerned that these claims reflected opportunistic 
behaviour by certain Indonesian individuals with political ambitions, and did not reflect the policy 
consensus within Jakarta. More importantly, such claims would never be endorsed by other regional
states. Executive Secretary of the Department of State, Theodore Eliot warned that the US “should 
discourage the Indonesians from thinking that we will underwrite a regional security role for them 
over the next five years” saying that “[e]ven should funds for such a program be available, we 
cannot promote Indonesia into a role to which it must be elected by its neighbors. Indeed, efforts to 
do so would probably be counterproductive as other nations would resent Indonesia's serving as a 
middleman for U.S. military assistance … [and] ... some of Indonesia's neighbors might well view 
an Indonesian external defense capability as a threat rather than a contribution to their own 
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security”216. Malaysia and Singapore had only recently experienced Confrontation and the issue of 
Indonesia's 'leading-from-behind' role had been dealt with through ASEAN. ASEAN states rejected 
any overt military-security leadership from Indonesia and were happier to keep their links with 
external powers.    
The question of regional responsibility for security public goods arose again in 1971 when 
Malaysia and Indonesia announced the Malacca Declaration. It declared that the Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore were not international straits but came under the jurisdiction of the coastal states, 
which would provide safe passage for international shipping. It proposed preventing a vacuum 
opening up after British withdrawal, which a maritime power such as the Soviet Union could 
exploit. The Soviets had already sent naval ships through the straits into the Indian ocean in an 
apparent display of a more overt regional presence. Japan tried to set up a international board to 
oversee the safety of navigation through the Straits to which the coastal states would be 
accountable217. The coastal states however wished to assert their own jurisdiction over the Straits, 
keeping them off the agenda of the International Maritime Consultative Organisation. The Malacca 
Declaration represented Indonesia's concerns regarding its 'archipelago principle' which asserted 
that the gaps between the islands of Indonesia should be treated as bridges to bring the different 
islands and ethnic groups together. As pointed out by Leifer and Nelson, “[t]he assertion of joint 
control over the Straits by Indonesia and Malaysia is thus seen as a claim to restrict the strategic 
mobility of maritime powers which possess the capacity to pose a challenge to the security of 
Indonesia and to its own conception of regional order”218. In this sense, it represented a claim to 
perform the public good of security of sea lanes in these Straits and represented a more specific 
expression of the principle that security was the primary responsibility of regional states. 
Both the Soviet Union and the US contested this declaration however and both sent naval 
squadrons through the Straits to perform competitive exercises in the Bay of Bengal in the closing 
stages of the Bangladesh war in December 1971219. Singapore also objected, fearing a pan-Malay 
primacy may be established in the region. The status of the Straits was taken up within the broader 
negotiations over the issue of jurisdiction in coastal seas and freedom of navigation covered by the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) III between 1973 and 1982. The US, Japan and 
the Soviet Union were in consensus that straits should be governed under a liberal regime of 'transit 
passage'220. Only China supported Indonesia and Malaysia's claim in the hope of constraining Soviet
216  Ibid. Emphasis added. 
217  Leifer (1989: 60).
218  Leifer and Nelson (1973: 192).
219 Leifer (1983: 145). 
220  Leifer (1989: 61).
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freedom of navigation. This episode highlighted that the great powers, the key audience for regional
states' role claims, were not willing to subcontract security public goods provision in Southeast Asia
to regional states when an issue considered vital to their interests, such as freedom of navigation, 
was at stake.   
Great power role redefined
Negotiations after 1966 produced a nascent role bargain between the US and ASEAN which served 
the twin goals of 'containment' and 'autonomy'. The substantive endorsement given by all the 
ASEAN states to the US' 'holding the line' function in Vietnam and its security public goods 
provision, showed their commitment to communist containment and legitimised the US' newly 
negotiated 'offshore great power guarantor' role. The US' new role was not fully enacted until 1975 
after its withdrawal from Vietnam and after the Thai request for withdrawal of US forces from 
Thailand. The US military presence had left the mainland, being concentrated on its bases in the 
Philippines. As is clear from US documents dating from immediately after the fall of Saigon in 
1975, the sense within ASEAN states was that, although the communist victory was detrimental to 
regional security, it would at least help dampen opposition within the US Congress to increased US 
provision of military and economic assistance. Secretary of State Kissinger reported to President 
Ford that “[t]here is a uniform desire that the U.S. play a supporting—and deterrent—role in the 
region”221. In light of the fact that “all the ASEAN states have separately indicated their desire for 
increased U.S. military assistance and for a continuing strategic balance in the Western Pacific 
favorable to the United States”, US officials hoped a Presidential trip to Southeast Asia would 
reassure ASEAN states of the “continuing major U.S. interest and role in Southeast Asia”. The US' 
role would no longer be focused on Indochina; rather, the desire was to “[d]emonstrate that outside 
of Indochina, the U.S. remains the permanent friend and preferred power of the ASEAN states”. US
deterrence would “[u]nderscore to the Chinese, the Soviets, and others, the continuation of a 
strategic balance favorable to the U.S”. Officials hoped President Ford's visit would “boost the 
confidence and morale of the ASEAN states” and “[p]rovide a self-confident environment for a 
possible subsequent move of reconciliation with the Indochina states”222.
The US' intended, and then actual, withdrawal paved the way for regional states to take on 
the function of diplomatic leadership as part of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. The US endorsed 
this because it no longer served as a means to replace external great powers, as had been proposed 
during the Bandung era, but instead served to support the US' reduced strategic imperatives in the 
221“Memorandum for the President, Washington, June 13th 1975”  FRUS 1969-1976 Vol E-12 Doc 16.
222“Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger, September 11th 1975” FRUS  1969-1976 Vol E-12 Doc 20.
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region. Diplomatic leadership had two aspects: first, regional states managed their own relations 
through regional institution-building and rule-making in their subregion, as well as performing the 
function of communist counter-insurgency on a bilateral level; second, regional states provided a 
diplomatic front in support for communist containment in Indochina. For example, during the lead 
up to the International Conference on Vietnam (ICV) in 1973, US officials discussed how ASEAN 
could be useful in associating itself with the outcome of the ICV. Key to US hopes for the ICV was 
securing Hanoi's commitment to recognise South Vietnam's right of self-determination and the 
independence of Cambodia and Laos. Part of US coordination with ASEAN was to ensure 
ASEAN's plans to host a 10 nation Southeast Asian summit did not come about until after the 
ICV223. US officials clearly had in mind the way ASEAN could support the ICV agreements through
any such summit. As it was, no summit was held and the Indochinese states fell to communism. 
However, within the context of improving Sino-US relations, the threat to the ASEAN states was 
reduced. US officials saw ASEAN states' efforts at reconciliation with the Indochinese states as 
serving the purpose of containing any further threat of externally sponsored subversion224. The next 
chapter documents how ASEAN attempts at reconciliation with Vietnam played out before the 
Cambodian conflict.
ASEAN's diplomatic leadership also provided a means to demonstrate regional activism, 
satisfying domestic demands within regional states for autonomy. In this way, the regional division 
of labour was upheld by mutually reinforcing legitimacy dynamics. Furthermore, the US' provision 
of security public goods and, prior to its withdrawal, its 'holding the line function' in Vietnam, 
provided regional states with access to US aid and assistance and bought time for them to 
concentrate on economic development and regime consolidation. The failed negotiations over a 
possible Indonesian military role and indigenous provision of security of the Malacca Straits, put 
limits on regional states' performance of security functions and reinforced that the US' 'offshore 
great power guarantor' role maintained responsibility for security public goods provision whilst 
ASEAN performed diplomatic leadership. However, concerns over the extent of the US' 
disengagement from the region and commitment to continue providing security public goods left 
some uncertainty over how long the nascent role bargain would be upheld in its current form. The 
next chapter shows how this uncertainty destabilised the US-ASEAN bargain and led ASEAN to try
to negotiate regional order first with Vietnam and then with China.
223“Memorandum from Richard Kennedy and John Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s 
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 5th 1973” FRUS 1969-1976 Vol X Doc 8.
224“Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger, September 11th 1975” FRUS  1969-1976 Vol E-12 Doc 20.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown that in Southeast Asia in the early Cold War period, the meaning of the 
great power role was in constant flux. The opposing 'autonomy' and 'containment' grand strategic 
narratives provided competing pulls on regional states as they emerged from decolonisation, 
complicating the great power role claims of both the US and Indonesia throughout the role 
conceptualisation and role enactment phases. After 1966 however, an emerging role bargain 
consolidated an understanding of order that accommodated both the 'containment' and 'autonomy' 
narratives and established the legitimate contributions to order of both the US as the 'offshore great 
power guarantor', and regional states as part of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. 
In terms of how we understand the great power role in international society, this chapter 
shows how in a context other than Europe, the great power role operates in a different way. In 
Southeast Asia diplomatic leadership was decoupled from the great power role and transferred to 
regional states. This lay the foundations for further role negotiation between China and ASEAN and
for the creation of ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role in the post-Cold War period. The fact that the 
great power role did not include diplomatic leadership provided the space for ASEAN to assert, and 
extend, its own diplomatic leadership over the whole of Southeast Asia and then into the wider 
Asia-Pacific. The next chapter shows how this was done in response to Vietnam's invasion and 
occupation of Cambodia. 
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Chapter Three - Role Taking: China, ASEAN and the Third Indochina Conflict
On Christmas Day 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia. Within a month, the Vietnamese had 
overthrown the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime and set up a new government. The Vietnamese 
military occupied Cambodia for a decade, propping up its new rulers. Vietnam's actions ousted a 
horrific regime that had murdered around a quarter of the Cambodian population. As one Thai 
diplomat reflected, the Vietnamese had “cut the 'Gordian knot'” by dealing with a “malignant 
cancer” that had caused problems not just within Cambodia but also for neighbouring Vietnam and 
Thailand1. However, ASEAN did not welcome Vietnam's actions but opposed them on the basis of 
Vietnam's violation of Cambodia's sovereignty. ASEAN aligned with China in opposition to 
Vietnam's continued occupation of Cambodia and in the process aided the ousted Khmer Rouge. 
Considering its small size and problematic domestic politics, why did ASEAN see Cambodia as so 
important for regional order? Also, in enacting their mutual containment strategies in Cambodia, 
both China and Vietnam claimed to be protecting Southeast Asia from the other. Why did ASEAN 
collectively choose to side with China – an external great power that many within Southeast Asia 
still felt was the primary threat to regional order - and not Vietnam, a fellow Southeast Asian state? 
Indeed, Indonesia and Malaysia made repeated efforts to reach some kind of regional compromise 
with Vietnam in resolving the conflict. How do we understand these efforts outside of ASEAN's 
espoused position on the conflict, and why did Malaysia and Indonesia repeatedly fall back in line 
with the other ASEAN states? 
This chapter answers these questions using role theory. It argues that the China-ASEAN 
alignment during the Cambodia conflict represented more than just a balance of power approach to 
a perceived threat to regional security; it constituted a role bargain through which China took on a 
great power guarantor role in Southeast Asia and ASEAN expanded its 'primary manager' role – 
previously negotiated with the US – through gaining endorsement from China. The role negotiation 
framework employed in this chapter helps us go beyond both the realist understanding of the Third 
Indochina Conflict2 which focuses solely on security, and the constructivist approach which focuses 
on norms. 
The realist approach posits that the Sino-Soviet split led to two rival communist great 
1 Interview with Tej Bunnag, Thai Red Cross, Bangkok, 24/2/14. 
2 'Third Indochina Conflict' refers here to the period of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia until the Paris Peace Agreement
(1978-1991), also known as the 'Cambodian conflict'. The terms are used interchangeably throughout.
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powers which competed for influence over other communist movements. Vietnam's relations with 
China deteriorated as it increasingly chose to align with the Soviets after the Vietnam War. The 
Khmer Rouge aligned with China to resist the Vietnamese and carry out attacks on the Cambodian-
Vietnamese border. Vietnam drew closer to the Soviet Union to counter Khmer adventurism and 
assert its hegemony over Indochina – seeking to eliminate the threat from an independent Cambodia
and contain Chinese influence in Indochina. China opposed Vietnam's subregional hegemony and 
sought to contain Soviet influence on its southern borders through putting military pressure on 
Vietnam. The US aligned with China against what it saw as global Soviet expansionism, engaging 
in offshore balancing by allowing China to shoulder the military opposition to Vietnam in 
Indochina. ASEAN also aligned with China in support of Thailand which faced a direct threat from 
a preponderant Vietnam on its border. This pattern produced a stalemate which remained until 
Soviet backing for Vietnam ended in the late 1980s leading to Vietnam's withdrawal from 
Cambodia3. 
The realist approach is helpful in capturing the international dimensions of the conflict and 
how it related to Cold War great power rivalry. It is less helpful however when determining 
ASEAN's response and the significance of Cambodia for Southeast Asian order. The realist focus on
material structural dynamics tends to assume that states act in a similar manner when faced with a 
changing balance of power. It is therefore less accommodating of nuance in ASEAN's response and 
ASEAN's agency. For example, for realists, ASEAN considered Cambodia important as a buffer 
between Vietnam and Thailand. Vietnam's invasion removed the buffer, shifting the balance of 
power in mainland Southeast Asia in Vietnam's favour. Thailand aligned with China to balance the 
Vietnamese threat and ASEAN followed suit because of its members' shared sense of common 
predicament due to all being weak non-communist states4. However, only Thailand faced a direct 
threat from Vietnam, and Malaysia and Indonesia considered China the principal threat to the 
region. Indonesia had significant reason to support Vietnam due to its military's sympathy towards 
the Vietnamese and disdain towards China, and the government's desire to consolidate its hold over 
East Timor after its own intervention. Why did Malaysia and Indonesia join a balancing coalition 
that promoted China's military involvement in Southeast Asia and sought to weaken the only 
credible Southeast Asian military counterweight to China? Even when we consider that ASEAN 
elites were united in wanting to insulate their own domestic social conflicts from any kind of 
external support, we still cannot fully account for Indonesia's tacit support for China considering its 
3  Most accounts are empirical but reflect this line of thinking. For example, Elliot (1981), Gordon (1986). 
4  Leifer (1986: 127). 
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ruling elite's concern over Chinese rather than Vietnamese subversion5. 
 We need to look beyond threat perception and balance of power to understand why 
Cambodia was important and why ASEAN collectively chose to align with China. Likewise, we 
also need to look beyond balance of power to understand ASEAN's agency. The realist approach 
assumes that because ASEAN was the weaker partner in the balancing coalition, ASEAN's political 
objectives were necessarily subservient to China's military objectives. ASEAN therefore failed in its
effort to manage the problem the Cambodian conflict posed for regional order6. However, rather 
than viewing the Cambodian conflict as a problem for regional order that could be managed either 
through ASEAN's associative approach or a traditional balance of power approach, it may be more 
fruitful to understand ASEAN's response as part of as a process of order negotiation as well as 
management. 
Constructivists have thought along these lines. They highlight how for ASEAN the 
Cambodian conflict was not just about security but also about seeking external recognition of 
ASEAN norms – particularly non-interference7. In this sense, Cambodia was important for ASEAN 
because it became the theatre for a broader conflict over what type of order would prevail in 
Southeast Asia. Would a Vietnamese-dominated communist order form in Indochina from which 
Vietnam could subvert ASEAN's non-communist regimes, or could ASEAN secure its vision of a 
coexistence order based on the norm of non-interference? The constructivist norm-focused account 
better captures what was at stake for ASEAN in the Cambodian conflict than a purely security-
focused approach. It also better captures the nuance in ASEAN's response, especially the tension 
between trying to punish Vietnam for violating non-interference and non-use of force through 
internationalising the conflict (led by Thailand and Singapore) and trying to reach a regional 
compromise with Vietnam according to the norm of regional autonomy (led by Malaysia and 
Indonesia)8. However, constructivists may focus too much on norms. By analysing how a structure 
of norms shaped ASEAN's response and then studying what effect the conflict had on those norms, 
constructivists overlook the wider social implications of the Cambodian conflict. The conflict did 
not only raise the question of what type of order would prevail in Southeast Asia, but also what part 
ASEAN, Vietnam and China would play in making and managing regional order. ASEAN did not 
only seek recognition for its understanding of regional order in Southeast Asia as embodied in its 
5  Jones (2012). 
6  For a sophisticated presentation of this argument see Emmers (2003).
7  Haacke (2003). See Emmers (2003) and Acharya (2014) for different conclusions on ASEAN's success. 
8  Acharya (2014: 79-96).
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norms, but also for its role as the 'primary manager' in Southeast Asia vis a vis China, Vietnam and 
other external great powers. This chapter therefore focuses more specifically on the question of 
what part each actor would play in making and managing order and how this was negotiated 
through the processes of role claiming and role endorsement/contestation. 
This chapter frames the dynamics of the Cambodian conflict within a process of role 
negotiation. China and Vietnam sought to legitimise their actions over Cambodia with ASEAN by 
claiming competing 'great power guarantor' roles. In responding to their claims, ASEAN, as the 
regional constituency of legitimation, had to take into account: 1) China and Vietnam's respective 
threats to stability and order through expansionism and support for insurgencies; 2) their potential 
contributions to securing ASEAN's preferred vision of order, particularly in relation to ASEAN's 
'primary manager' role. ASEAN was divided on the first aspect; although all states recognised 
Vietnam's potential threat, they differed with respect to whether China constituted a greater threat. 
On the second aspect however, ASEAN was united. ASEAN collectively endorsed China's role 
claims because China was willing to recognise ASEAN's vision of a coexistence order based on 
non-interference and ASEAN's 'primary manager' role within that order. Vietnam's invasion and 
occupation of Cambodia represented its refusal to recognise ASEAN's espoused coexistence order 
and ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. 
To oppose Vietnam's creation of an alternative communist order under Vietnamese 
dominance, ASEAN reached a reciprocal role bargain with China, through which China took on the 
'regional great power guarantor' role in Southeast Asia and ASEAN upheld its 'primary manager' 
role. China contributed to regional order as ASEAN understood it through expressing support for 
non-interference and, by offering a security guarantee to Thailand and the rest of ASEAN as well as
backing the Cambodian resistance, performing the function of 'holding the line' against Soviet-
Vietnamese expansionism. China was able to use its 'regional great power guarantor' role to carry 
out its strategy of containing Soviet-Vietnamese influence in Indochina as part of its contribution to 
regional order and gain access to material and social support from the US, Thailand and ASEAN. 
ASEAN gained further endorsement for its 'primary manager' role from China and other external 
partners and was able to use it to assert the salience of its rules and processes over Cambodia in the 
face of great power involvement. ASEAN led the international campaign against Vietnam's actions 
within the UN and the Non-aligned Movement ensuring the conflict was defined as an illegal 
intervention and establishing that Cambodia should be returned to neutral and independent status 
after Vietnam's withdrawal. The reciprocal legitimacy dynamics that upheld the bargain were that 
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ASEAN needed China to bolster the Cambodian rebels' military opposition so that it remained 
credible as a fighting force and China needed ASEAN to perform the diplomatic legitimacy work 
within international society so that broad-based opposition towards Vietnam could be sustained.  
However, Malaysia and Indonesia still considered China the principal threat and made 
repeated efforts to reach out to Vietnam during the conflict. This represented resistance to China's 
role-taking in Southeast Asia by trying to undermine the China-ASEAN bargain and hold out the 
possibility of negotiating an alternative role bargain with Vietnam. However, Vietnam remained 
intransigent, insisting that the situation in Cambodia was “irreversible”. At the same time however, 
the ASEAN states were keen to limit China's influence in Southeast Asia. ASEAN asserted the 
salience of its norms and processes over the whole of Southeast Asia to ensure that China's 
contribution was limited to the function of 'holding the line', a function specific to the Cambodian 
conflict. Likewise, key ASEAN states lobbied the US to ensure its continued military engagement 
in the maritime region and provision of security public goods. The ASEAN states did not want 
China taking on more general security functions in Southeast Asian order, which they were more 
comfortable with the US performing. In asserting the salience of its norms and processes in 
Indochina, ASEAN aimed to secure endorsement from China, as well as other external powers, for 
it to play the predominant part in order negotiation and management in the whole of Southeast Asia 
through its 'primary manager' role, after the Cambodian conflict was resolved. In this sense, this 
chapter shows a transition between ASEAN enacting its 'primary manager' role in its maritime 
subregion and having the role recognised as operating over the full extent of Southeast Asia. 
ASEAN would not actually enact its role in the mainland until after the Cambodian conflict was 
resolved and the Indochinese states recognised ASEAN and its processes as operating in their 
subregion and indeed sought to join the association. As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, 
the 'primary manager' role involved the ASEAN states taking on primary responsibility for 
managing intra-regional relations through performing diplomatic/normative functions. It did not 
involve ASEAN taking on security functions. ASEAN could not resolve the Cambodian conflict 
itself because of the great power interests and rivalry tied up in the conflict, notably the Sino-Soviet 
dispute. For this reason, Leifer was correct in asserting that ASEAN was not a “security manager in 
the manner of a dominant power”, and that ASEAN conducted itself as a 'diplomatic community' 
throughout the conflict9. What is interesting in terms of our analysis of role negotiation however, is 
that ASEAN was able to position itself during the conflict in such a way that it gained endorsement 
to perform the diplomatic functions of rule-making and regional reconciliation through institution-
9 Leifer (1989: 86).
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building after the great power rivalry was withdrawn from Indochina. It could also continue 
situating its 'primary manager' role in a division of labour with the US, with the US providing 
security public goods.  
 
This chapter therefore shows both China's role-taking and the expansion of ASEAN's 
'primary manager' role. The process of role negotiation in this chapter is analysed in two main parts.
The first looks at China and Vietnam's great power role contest, how they conceptualised and 
claimed their roles and how the US endorsed China's claims to the function of militarily 'holding the
line' in Indochina. The second part looks at regional responses to China's claims: regional 
legitimation from Thailand and ASEAN collectively as it took up its part in the division of labour; 
regional reticence and resistance from Malaysia and Indonesia as these states pursued individual 
efforts to reach out to Vietnam outside of the China-ASEAN division of labour. The chapter finishes
by looking at how the resolution of the Cambodian conflict and the end of the Cold War impacted 
on China's role-taking and the social foundations laid that would carry into the post-Cold War 
period. 
Before moving onto the main analysis however, the chapter outlines events leading up to the
outbreak of the Cambodian conflict to show why Cambodia became a theatre for conflict over what 
type of order would prevail in Southeast Asia, and what was at stake for ASEAN's 'primary 
manager' role. 
CONTEXT: ASEAN SEEKS ACCOMMODATION WITH VIETNAM
As we saw in the last chapter, ASEAN established its 'primary manager' role as part of the role 
bargain reached with the US in the late 1960s/early 1970s. The US-ASEAN role bargain gave the 
ASEAN states space to demonstrate regional autonomy by managing their regional relations 
without direct interference, as well as spearheading diplomatic initiatives to legitimise the US-led 
battle against communism in Indochina. The US provided aid and assistance to ASEAN states and, 
until 1973, also performed the function of 'holding the line' in Indochina, insulating maritime 
Southeast Asia from events on the mainland and buying time for the ASEAN regimes to consolidate
their domestic power. This role bargain redefined the great power role in the Southeast Asian 
context by transferring the function of diplomatic leadership to regional states, but keeping the 
function of security public goods provision for the US. ASEAN therefore performed the function of 
diplomatic leadership as part of its 'primary manager' role in Southeast Asia.   
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As we also saw, the Sino-US rapprochement and US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973 
altered the terms of this bargain as the US moved more quickly towards taking on its 'offshore great 
power guarantor' role. Maritime Southeast Asia was no longer insulated from Indochina; the two 
previously separate regional security complexes began to merge as there was no longer an external 
power 'holding the line' against communist Vietnam10. Order needed to be negotiated between the 
merging regional security complexes. The challenge for ASEAN was twofold: first, it needed to 
commit Vietnam to a 'coexistence order'11 where all Southeast Asian states recognised each other's 
sovereignty and sought to promote regional autonomy by not drawing external great powers into 
regional affairs; second, in the context of US disengagement it needed recognition of its 'primary 
manager' role from other key actors, especially Vietnam. Thus, between 1973 and 1978 ASEAN 
sought to negotiate a coexistence order with Vietnam that upheld ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. 
ASEAN began to reach out to Vietnam after the Paris Peace Accords in 1973. As the 
ASEAN states were no longer actively backing the fight against communism in Indochina, ASEAN 
leaders hoped that they could reach agreement with Vietnam on maintaining the status quo. They 
hoped that in return for ASEAN recognising the legitimacy of the communist government in Hanoi, 
North Vietnam would recognise the legitimacy of the non-communist regimes within ASEAN 
states. ASEAN also hoped that Hanoi would recognise ASEAN’s 'primary manager' role by 
endorsing its rule-making in Southeast Asia. ASEAN held out ZOPFAN for Hanoi to subscribe to in
spite of not being a member of ASEAN, hoping that the goal of regional autonomy and reducing the
influence of great powers in Southeast Asia would resonate with the leadership in Hanoi12. 
However, North Vietnam refused to recognise ASEAN and declined to attend its ministerial 
meetings. Hanoi viewed ASEAN as a US 'lackey', part of an imperialist project of counter-
revolution in Southeast Asia. Hanoi considered ASEAN's concept of 'regional resilience' to be a 
means to build up military capabilities and engage in defence cooperation to suppress regional 
revolution13. 
In 1975 the unprotected non-communist regimes in Cambodia, South Vietnam and Laos fell 
in quick succession to communist forces. These communist victories reignited domino theory-type 
concerns within ASEAN that the internal communist insurgencies they were trying to contain would
10  A regional security complex refers to system of geographically contiguous units whose security cannot be analysed or
resolved apart from one another. See Buzan (1991), Buzan and Waever (2003). Also Collins (2003). 
11 Bull (1977: 62-73), Buzan (2004a: 139-160). 
12  Haacke (2003: 61-64). 
13  Nguyen (2006: 111). 
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be strengthened through access to external material support and invigorated fighting spirit. ASEAN 
officials perceived Vietnamese leaders as highly arrogant in the wake of their victory over the US. 
They feared that captured US arms could end up in the hands of communist insurgents as Vietnam 
sought to subvert the non-communist ASEAN regimes14. Vietnamese leaders spoke of supporting 
the “just and victorious struggle of the peoples of Southeast Asia for peace, national independence, 
democracy and social progress”15. ASEAN officials received such comments as an indirect threat to 
support subversion. Parallel to this, Vietnam seemed intent on developing an Indochinese 
communist order from which it could launch such subversion. Laos signalled its willingness to fall 
into Vietnam's sphere of influence by signing a Treaty of Friendship in 1975. However, an 
independent Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge reassured ASEAN states that Vietnam's efforts to 
consolidate a Vietnam-led communist order would be frustrated for the time being. 
ASEAN’s collective response to the communist victories in Indochina was to host its first 
summit in 1976. The ASEAN members sought to demonstrate their solidarity and commitment to 
regional cooperation as part of the 'primary manager' role. They also sought to formalise rules 
governing interaction in Southeast Asia that could be accepted by the new Indochinese states. The 
ASEAN Concord affirmed ASEAN's intention to expand concrete cooperation in the political, 
economic and social spheres, whilst the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) established a 
modus vivendi for relations within and outside of ASEAN16. The TAC was open for accession by 
other states in Southeast Asia and ASEAN hoped this would provide a mechanism through which 
Vietnam could sign up to ASEAN norms – especially non-interference - and thus be co-opted into a 
coexistence order. This represented both a vision of ‘one Southeast Asia’ that blurred the lines 
between communist/non-communist states, and also an attempt to extend ASEAN's resilience 
narrative to Indochina so as to keep it free of great power alignment and rivalry. Hanoi responded 
by offering its own Four Point proposal for developing relations, which ostensibly corresponded 
with ZOPFAN and TAC, but in its call for 'genuine independence and neutrality' suggested that 
Vietnam did not yet consider the ASEAN states independent or neutral17. 
Hanoi's continued rejection of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role contrasted with the 
significant boost ASEAN's role received from Western states and Japan. In 1977, ASEAN hosted a 
second summit where it was joined by a number of new dialogue partners, which all recognised 
14   Interview with Tan Seng Chye and Mushahid Ali, RSIS, Singapore, 5/3/14. 
15   Leifer (1989: 73-74). 
16   Irvine, D (1982).
17   Nguyen (2006: 116).
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ASEAN as a single collective actor. Western states and Japan institutionalised their endorsement of 
the 'primary manager' role through the Post-ministerial Conference (PMC) and the forum was used 
for coordinating primarily economic, but also political support for ASEAN's 'primary manager' role.
For example, in the same year that the PMC was set up, Japan introduced the “Fukuda Doctrine”. 
This doctrine aligned with ASEAN's aims by seeking to strengthen ASEAN countries' resilience and
bolster ASEAN as a regional organisation, as well as promoting coexistence between ASEAN and 
Indochina18.   
Despite this, ASEAN's need to commit Vietnam to recognising a coexistence order and its 
'primary manager' role was made more acute because of lingering doubts over the US' credibility as 
a provider of security public goods in Southeast Asia. The second half of the 1970s saw a dramatic 
reduction of US military and economic assistance to ASEAN states as aid conditionality became a 
feature of the new Carter administration. The US' withdrawal from Vietnam removed its need for 
regional states to provide diplomatic initiatives in support for its position in Indochina; the narrow 
concern for containment through bolstering regional non-communist regimes was replaced by 
President Carter's emphasis on human rights. Anti-communism in itself was therefore no longer 
sufficient for regional regimes to gain access to US aid and assistance. There was also uncertainty 
over the future of the US-Philippine bases treaty. Philippine nationalists questioned the usefulness 
of the bases considering the lack of a direct external threat and resented that the Philippines was 
shouldering the entire burden of hosting bases upon which other ASEAN states could free-ride. The 
Philippines demanded that the US end the practice of extraterritoriality and recognise Philippine 
sovereignty over the bases, support the Philippine government's fight against the Moro rebellion in 
the south, and provide $1 billion of assistance. Considering the Thai decision to close US bases in 
1976 and SEATO's disbandment in 1977, the ongoing US-Philippine negotiations on amending the 
bases treaty added to the uncertainty over both the US' future commitment to the 'offshore great 
power guarantor' role and ASEAN states’ commitment to endorse the US’ role by hosting its 
military presence.  
In 1978, ASEAN thought it had received assurance of Vietnam's commitment to a 
coexistence order in Southeast Asia. Although not accepting the ASEAN process itself, Vietnam 
made a rhetorical commitment to non-interference in other states’ affairs. This rhetorical 
commitment seemed credible in the light of Vietnam's struggle to exert influence over a fiercely 
independent Cambodia. Vietnam was tied down in Indochina, reducing its ability to support 
18   Pressello (2014). 
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insurgency within ASEAN states. This situation was not to last long, however, as the Vietnamese-
Cambodian conflict escalated, drawing great power rivalry back into Indochina. The Khmer Rouge 
aligned with China and the Vietnamese moved closer towards the Soviet Union, pitting China and 
Vietnam against each other. The next section details how the Sino-Vietnamese conflict played out 
into a role contest over who would perform the role of great power guarantor in Southeast Asia. 
CHINA AND VIETNAM'S GREAT POWER GUARANTOR ROLE CONTEST
This section explores the conceptualisation, claiming and enactment of China and Vietnam's 
respective role conceptions. China conceived of itself as the 'regional great power guarantor' of 
Southeast Asian neutrality. Vietnam considered itself revolutionary leader in Indochina, and sought 
to legitimise this with ASEAN by conceiving the complementary 'indigenous great power buffer' 
role. China and Vietnam's claims sought to achieve mutual containment: China sought to contain 
Vietnam and the Soviet Union within the wider Southeast Asian region, and Vietnam sought to 
contain China within Indochina. China's role conception was more extensive in terms of the scope 
and domain of enactment – it aimed to be the sole guarantor of the whole of Southeast Asia, whilst 
Vietnam's was for the most part limited to hegemony over former French Indochina. Both claimed 
their roles and sought to deny the other's claims through courting the ASEAN states in the lead up 
to the outbreak of military conflict at the end of 1978. Vietnam enacted its role through military 
intervention and occupation in Cambodia. China enacted its role in response through its punitive 
military action against Vietnam in February 1979. The US endorsed China taking on the function of 
'holding the line' in Indochina by acquiescing to China's military action, and even providing 
logistical support. The ASEAN states thus needed to respond not only to Vietnam and China's role 
claims, but also the US-China division of labour with respect to the Cambodian conflict. 
Role conceptualisation and role location  
China's 'regional great power guarantor' role 
As summarised in Table 7, China's 'regional great power guarantor' role conception contained 
identity elements specific to the Chinese leadership's view of itself in relation to Southeast Asia. 
Leaders still held 'paternalist' perceptions from previous eras when Beijing was the centre of the 
Chinese World Order and Southeast Asians paid it tribute19. As a consequence, Chinese officials 
19   Fairbank (1968). See also Suzuki (2009), Kang (2010a) and Phillips (2010). 
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often spoke of China and Southeast Asian states having 'brotherly' relations, using language that 
implied that China was the older brother20. On top of this, the Chinese viewed their country as the 
leader of the Third World21. In this sense there appeared a broad, but inchoate, conception of China 
providing the function of regional political leadership. This replaced its previous claim to 
revolutionary political leadership seen through its material and political support for regional 
communist movements, but maintained an idea of leading and assisting other 'third world' states in 
resisting superpower hegemonism22. 
China's status as an 'emerging great power' came from its increasing engagement with wider 
international society. Since gaining UN membership in 1971, the PRC and international society had 
engaged in 'mutual legitimation' through which China began to see itself, and be recognised by 
others, as a global great power23. The PRC's assumption of the 'China' seat at the UN meant it 
became a permanent member of the Security Council – the formal expression of the 'legalised 
hegemony' of the great powers24. The Malaysian neutrality proposal, discussed in Chapter Two, also
gave China similar status recognition by placing it, along with the US and the Soviet Union, as a 
great power guarantor of Southeast Asia's neutrality, even before the Sino-US rapprochement. There
was initially a security dimension to China's re-engagement with international society; China 
believed it was in danger of being encircled by Soviet expansion and sought to form an alliance of 
states to oppose the Soviets. This coalesced with an economic dimension in the late 1970s after 
Deng Xiaoping and the 'moderates' won the Post-Mao leadership struggle and pursued massive 
domestic reform in the wake of the cultural revolution. Their policies emphasised “reform and 
opening up” in order to modernise the country, and required a more moderate foreign policy in 
order to gain access to Western technology and investment.  
China located the 'regional great power guarantor' role principally from Malaysia's 
neutralisation proposal and ZOPFAN25. These provided the language through which to legitimise 
China's ambitions on ASEAN's terms. Although China did not explicitly describe itself as a 
'guarantor', Chinese officials on numerous occasions leading up to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia 
expressed China's support for ASEAN neutrality and ZOPFAN26. Chinese Premier Zhou En Lai 
20   Chang (1987: 189).
21   Shih (1993). 
22   Shih (1993: 48). 
23  Zhang (1998).
24  Simpson (2004).
25  See discussion in Chapter Two.
26  Chang (1979). 
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expressed China's support for neutrality in discussion with Malaysian officials as early as 1974 and 
the Peking Review, a PRC mouthpiece, praised ASEAN's economic cooperation and ZOPFAN as 
efforts to do away with foreign control27. This was quite a turnaround for a state that only a few 
years before had denounced ASEAN as a “tool of US imperialism”28. Chinese Foreign Minister 
Huang Hua told Malaysian Foreign Minister Rithauddeen in 1978: “I would like to take this 
opportunity to reiterate that the Chinese government and people support the people of all Southeast 
Asian countries in their just struggle to free themselves from superpower interference and control 
and to realize their goal of the neutralization of Southeast Asia”29. Likewise, they sought to impress 
on the ASEAN states the danger that Vietnam and the Soviet Union posed to the region through 
their 'hegemony' and that China would not stand idly by if Vietnam sought to expand its hegemony 
into Cambodia but would take action30. In Bangkok in late 1978, Deng Xiaoping told Thai Prime 
Minister Kriangsak that China's wanted to “teach Vietnam a lesson” was for the sake of the security 
and stability of Southeast Asia and especially Thailand31. Coupled together, Chinese expressions of 
support for ASEAN's 'neutrality' and its reassurances that it would not allow Vietnam to achieve its 
ambitions of regional hegemony, indicate that the China saw itself as a regional guarantor of 
ASEAN independence and neutrality as expressed in ZOPFAN. China's concern to contain Soviet-
Vietnamese ambitions in Indochina, and the fact that Chinese officials promised to check 
Vietnamese ambitions, shows a commitment to the primary function of balance of power through 
performing the secondary function of 'holding the line' against any potential Soviet-Vietnamese 
expansion. China's language of support for Southeast Asian states' efforts to free themselves from 
superpower influence more generally - rather than strictly Soviet influence - was consistent with 
China's aim of freeing its near abroad from the dominance of any potentially hostile power. This 
suggests that China saw itself as the sole great power guarantor of Southeast Asian order when it 
came the time for the Soviets and the US to withdraw their influence.   
 
27  Chang (1979:250).
28  Khaw (1977).
29  Ta Kung Pao Weekly Supplement, 28th September 1978.
30 This was the impression left on the Thai and Singaporean Prime Ministers during Deng Xiaoping's visit to Thailand 
and Singapore in November 1978. See Chanda (1986: 325-327) and Lee (2000: 661-662).
31 This was reported by a Thai official present at the meeting in an interview to Nayan Chanda. Chanda (1986: 326).
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Identity Status Function
'Older brother' Emerging great power
Primary Secondary
Regional political 
leadership
Assistance to groups 
resisting 'hegemonism'
Leader of the 
Third World
Balance of power Holding the line
Table 7 – China's 'regional great power guarantor' role conception
Vietnam's 'indigenous great power buffer' role
Table 8 shows Vietnam's 'indigenous great power buffer' role which was built on its 
conception of itself as revolutionary leader in Indochina. Vietnam's identity as superior in Indochina
came from historical and contemporary factors. Historically, Vietnamese leaders saw their position 
in Indochina within the Sinic tradition as the seat of the Son of Heaven to which vassals should pay 
tribute. Vietnam vied with Siam throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to establish 
tribute relations with the smaller polities in modern day Laos and Cambodia. The logic of Indochina
as a political space was then given expression by the French when they established the Indochinese 
Union in 1887. The French saw the Vietnamese as the dominant group within Indochina and 
worked to gain their collaboration in the colony. As such, a vast majority of the bureaucrats and 
administrators working in Vientiane and Phnom Penh during the colonial period were Vietnamese. 
The communist resistance to French colonial rule replicated and reinforced the Indochinese political
space; the concept of an Indochinese Federation, with Vietnam as the dominant partner, was deeply 
infused in the minds of many Vietnamese communist leaders, reinfocing a sense of superiority32. 
Vietnam's revolutionary status came from the Communist International delegating leadership
of the communist revolution in Indochina to the Vietnamese and from its continued struggle to fight
imperialism against the French and the Americans. The Indochinese Communist Party established 
in 1930 consisted wholly of Vietnamese as there were no communist movements within Laos and 
Cambodia. The Vietnamese communists saw it as their duty to bring communism to Indochina and 
were instrumental in developing indigenous communist movements in Laos and Cambodia33. They 
thus performed the primary function of 'revolutionary regional leadership' through the secondary 
32  Goscha (1995), Morris (1999).
33  Goscha (2006). 
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function of aid and assistance to revolutionary groups within Indochina. Indochina constituted a 
single battlefield in the First and Second Indochina wars against the French and the US. After 1975, 
leaders in Hanoi did not speak of an Indochinese Federation but of the 'special relationship' between
Vietnam and the two other states. This was disrupted by the emergence within Cambodia of the 
anti-Vietnamese Khmer Rouge which had eliminated the pro-Hanoi elements within its ranks34. The 
victory of the KR in Cambodia before the fall of Saigon prevented the Vietnamese from intervening
in Cambodia and ensuring that a pro-Hanoi government was established. The Democratic 
Kampuchea government was hostile to Vietnam, breaking off relations in 1977 and undertaking 
military incursions across the border. Within Vietnam's revolutionary leader conception there was 
no room for an independent and aggressive Cambodia, especially one that was increasingly 
receiving support from a now hostile China. 
It was this China factor that led Vietnamese leaders to seek to legitimise their hegemony 
within Indochina amongst the other states of Southeast Asia. Vietnam conceived that its dominance 
in Indochina could perform a balance of power function by acting as a buffer against the further 
expansion of Chinese influence into Southeast Asia. It built its 'indigenous great power buffer' role 
conception on its idea of itself as revolutionary leader. Vietnam could guarantee Southeast Asian 
order against the expansion of an external and aggressive China by performing the primary function
of balance of power simply by providing a counterweight to Chinese influence. China's 
involvement in Cambodia was highlighted as part of aggressive hegemonic strategy which needed 
to be contained. In contrast to China's 'regional great power guarantor' role conception, Vietnam 
could use its identity as an indigenous Southeast Asian actor and fit its conception within the 
narrative of regional autonomy. It also sought to highlight its independent status, achieved through 
its revolutionary struggles against imperialism. Vietnam hoped that because its 'indigenous great 
power buffer' role claim was limited to Indochina rather than covering the extent of Southeast Asia, 
it would not imply any threat to the maritime ASEAN states.     
34  Morris (1999: 59-62). The KR forces also repeatedly attacked Vietnamese forces in an attempt to expel them from 
Cambodia.
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Identity Status Function
Superior in 
Indochina 
Revolutionary 
Primary Secondary
Revolutionary 
regional leadership
Aid and assistance to 
revolutionary groups
Indigenous (SEA) Independent Balance of power Counterweight to 
China
Table 8 – Vietnam's 'indigenous great power buffer' role conception
Role claiming and role denial
In the lead up to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, both China and Vietnam engaged in a discursive 
contest of role claiming and mutual role denial. This was most clearly evident in the tours of the 
region undertaken by Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and Chinese leader Deng 
Xiaoping in October and November 1978 respectively.
On his tour, Pham Van Dong sought to reassure ASEAN states of Vietnam's benign 
intentions and of its value as a counterweight to expanding Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia. 
Pham assured ASEAN leaders that Vietnam had no intention of supporting insurgencies. He even 
laid a wreath at a cemetery in Malaysia that honoured war dead killed fighting the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP). He apologised for previous Vietnamese support of the MCP saying that 
Vietnam was unaware of the internal situation. Alongside this assurance he emphasised China's 
identity as external to Southeast Asia, meddling in regional affairs by actively supporting such 
insurgencies and therefore China constituted the principal threat to Southeast Asia. Pham's intention
was to sign each state up to a bilateral friendship treaty, again refusing to recognise the collective 
position of ASEAN. Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak and Pham Van Dong issued a joint 
communiqué pledging to refrain from subversion but the Thais rejected the inclusion of a 'third 
country' clause that seemed to be directed towards China's activity in Cambodia35. The Thais were 
keen to commit the Vietnamese to formally reject support for insurgency, but would not reciprocate 
by signing up to Vietnam's containment of China. In Singapore, Pham was again perceived as being 
arrogant, stating that the Singaporeans had gained from the Vietnam war and therefore had to 
35  Chanda (1986: 319).
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contribute to Vietnam's development36. 
In response, the ASEAN states contested Vietnam's vision of regional order by collectively 
refusing to sign bilateral non-aggression treaties, perceiving them as an attempt to divide the 
Association37. By coordinating their individual responses to Vietnam in this way, the ASEAN states 
reasserted ASEAN's 'primary manager' role by holding out ASEAN's collective identity and the 
salience of its instruments for regional order, ZOPFAN and the TAC. Regional leaders were 
heartened over Vietnam's assurances of upholding the norm of non-interference however.
In November Deng sought to persuade ASEAN states that China could act as a good 
neighbour and a force for stability against the 'little hegemonist' Vietnam backed by the 'hegemonist'
Soviet Union. His tour came just days after the Soviet Union and Vietnam signed their Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation and this was used as an example of a Southeast Asian state bringing a 
hostile external superpower into regional affairs contrary to the spirit of ZOPFAN. Deng then took 
every opportunity in public forums to express Chinese support for ASEAN and ZOPFAN. He also 
explained China's distinction between government-to-government and party-to-party relations – 
ridiculing Pham Van Dong's insincerity with respect to Vietnam giving up support for regional 
insurgencies38. He told his hosts they should not take Vietnamese warnings to support 'genuine 
independence' lightly but that if Vietnam did begin its quest for hegemony through invading 
Cambodia, then China would teach it a lesson39. 
In contrast to the unity ASEAN presented during Pham Van Dong's tour, Deng's tour 
highlighted ASEAN's growing divergences. Thailand accepted China's definition of the unfolding 
conflict in Indochina and endorsed China's support for the Khmer Rouge by signing an agreement 
allowing the overflight of Chinese planes destined for Cambodia. In contrast, Malaysia was 
cautious after Deng could not renounce support for the MCP and Indonesia was not part of the tour 
and maintained the most reservations regarding Chinese motives. The responses to China and 
Vietnam's mutual role claiming and role denial highlighted the emerging tensions within ASEAN. 
These would be heightened by Vietnam and China's moves to enact their role claims.    
36  Interview with Tan Seng Chye and Mushahid Ali, RSIS, Singapore, 5/3/14. 
37  Narine (2002: 41). 
38  Lee (1981) provides a good overview of Deng's tour. 
39  Interview with Tan Seng Chye and Mushahid Ali, RSIS, Singapore, 5/3/14. 
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Role enactment: Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and China's 'lesson'
Vietnam followed the logic of its role claim through its invasion of Cambodia on 25th December 
1978 and subsequent occupation over the next decade. Vietnamese forces were accompanied by a 
Cambodian faction, the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (KPRAF)40, and 
quickly overran Khmer Rouge forces. In January 1979 Hanoi installed a new regime under Heng 
Samrin called the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Vietnam enacted its role through force 
but sought to legitimise it through partnership with the KPRAF and then through the PRK regime. 
Vietnam signed a twenty five year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation modelled on the 
similar treaty with Laos. The Treaty accepted the presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia and 
recognised Vietnam's dominance over Cambodian affairs. Vietnam's intention to establish an 
Indochinese Federation under its leadership was partially realised. 
Internationally Vietnam sought to legitimise its role by arguing that its initial actions were 
undertaken in self-defence in response to repeated border incursions by the KR and that the 
overthrow of the Democratic Kampuchea regime was based on humanitarian grounds. This was 
potentially a powerful argument due to the genocidal policies of the KR under Pol Pot. Vietnam 
allowed the Western media access to Cambodia in order to witness the extent of the KR atrocities in
an attempt to influence international opinion41. Had international opinion been swayed to recognise 
the credentials of the PRK and acquiesced to Vietnam's occupation, then Vietnam would likely have
gained endorsement for its revolutionary leadership. Regionally Vietnam sought to legitimise it as 
part of the 'indigenous great power buffer' role conception. The Indochinese foreign ministers 
argued that by opposing Vietnam's actions in Cambodia, regional states were taking part in a 
Chinese plan to expand China's influence and territory into Southeast Asia. Instead they should 
legitimise Vietnam's dominance by signing non-aggression treaties42.  
Vietnam's claims were unsuccessful, due in a large part to ASEAN's opposition. The means 
through which Vietnam claimed its role – its use of force against another sovereign state – was 
highly problematic for ASEAN. Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia - despite its assurances of non-
interference just weeks earlier – underlined its rejection of ASEAN's espoused coexistence order 
based on the rule of non-interference and the concepts of regional resilience and autonomy. 
40  Between 1975 and 1989 Cambodia was known as Kampuchea. Cambodia is used throughout the chapter except when
specifically referring to names from the time that include Kampuchea. 
41  Chanda (1986: 382).
42 "Statement of the Conference of Foreign Ministers between Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam," July 18, 1980, History 
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114455> accessed 1/9/14. 
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Regional resilience was undermined by the prospect of new insurgencies sponsored by the Soviet-
Vietnamese axis, and regional autonomy encroached upon by the reconfigured great power rivalry. 
Joint meetings between the Indochinese leaders throughout the 1980s mirrored and challenged 
ASEAN's corporate position. Vietnam's intransigence was highlighted by the repeated declarations 
at these meetings that the situation in Cambodia was “irreversible”43. ASEAN viewed Vietnam's 
invasion as removing the Cambodian buffer between Thailand and Vietnam, increasing the risk of 
revolutionary fervour spreading throughout ASEAN as well as Vietnamese assistance reaching 
insurgent movements. Former Malaysian Foreign Minister Ghazali Shafie stated that Vietnam's 
actions represented for ASEAN “an exercise … in the fulfilment of a committed dream to unite 
Indochina under one political control as a prelude to turn the rest of Southeast Asia into a sort of 
Vietnamese comecon44”. ASEAN's intervention in the Cambodian conflict thus aimed to tie Vietnam
down within Cambodia so that it could not support insurgent movements outside Indochina45. On 
top of this, having failed to co-opt Vietnam to its vision of regional order, ASEAN sought to 
incorporate Cambodia by asserting that Cambodia came under the purview of its rules. If Vietnam 
could not be kept out of great power alignment and rivalry, then it should be denied the fruits of its 
efforts to overrun Cambodia and Cambodia re-established as an independent and neutral buffer 
between Thailand and Vietnam. 
Shortly after Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, China carried out its punitive invasion of 
Vietnam and began its ‘bleeding’ strategy. China's attack involved at least 450,000 troops and lasted
one month from February to March 1979. The Chinese captured some of Vietnam's northern-most 
territory but quickly withdrew in order to keep the action limited. In terms of an isolated military 
campaign it was a failure due to the high casualty rates and difficulty the PLA faced in overcoming 
Vietnamese resistance46. However, as part of its wider strategy to 'bleed Vietnam white' it showed 
China's willingness to engage in direct military action and gave credibility to the threat of a 'second 
lesson'. China justified its punitive invasion in terms of its 'regional great power guarantor' role 
conception. China's Ambassador to Thailand Zhang Weilei told the Bangkok Post that China's 
military action was a protection against 'hegemonism', claiming that China would protect ASEAN 
and support neutrality through militarily resisting Soviet-Vietnamese hegemony in the region47. 
Troops were maintained at the Sino-Vietnamese border after the invasion, holding out the threat of 
another lesson and diverting Vietnamese troops from the Thai-Cambodia border. Pressure was kept 
43  Leifer (1985/86: 627).
44  Quoted in Haacke (2003: 97). 
45  Jones (2012).    
46  See O'Dowd (2007).
47  Chang (1979: 254). 
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on the Vietnamese within Cambodia through supplying the Khmer Rouge with arms so it could 
maintain military resistance. Through this, China claimed to 'hold the line' as the principal or even 
sole guarantor of Southeast Asian order.  
ASEAN's official response to China's invasion was to call for the removal of all foreign 
forces in Indochina48. This linked China's actions with Vietnam's and indirectly legitimised the 
presence of Chinese troops in Vietnam as long as the Vietnamese continued to occupy Cambodia. 
However, having been so outspoken in opposing Vietnam's invasion on the basis of non-
intervention, ASEAN could not reasonably endorse China's invasion. As China withdrew after a 
month this was no longer an issue. Thailand welcomed the credibility China's invasion gave its 
promise of 'holding the line'. Lee Kuan Yew was apparently thankful that the Chinese had taught 
Vietnam a lesson but was concerned that if the 'lesson' was too successful it could increase China's 
regional influence over insurgency movements in the long run49. Malaysian and Indonesian 
suspicions were enhanced by the invasion. Ghazalie Shafie expressed that if China's lesson led to 
Vietnam losing Indochina forever, then China would be “free to pursue her own 'hegemonism' in 
Asia”50. There was concern regarding the extent of China's claim and the implications of endorsing 
its use of force against a Southeast Asian state, especially if this led to a significantly weakened 
Vietnam. Vietnam provided the most credible Southeast Asian military balance against China. 
These concerns regarding China's potential regional hegemony were heightened by the US' desire to
subcontract responsibility for opposing Vietnam to China, to which the chapter now turns.
US endorses China 'holding the line' in Indochina 
As we have seen, the process of China's great power role-taking at the international and regional 
levels was initiated by the Sino-US rapprochement. Over the course of the 1970s the US aligned 
with China against the Soviets as a way to buttress its policy of détente. US officials hoped this 
would act as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Soviets and also provide a means to contain 
Soviet influence51. The US-China strategic alignment was exercised in South Asia as early as 1971 
when both provided support for Pakistan in its conflict with India. This developing alignment was 
enabled by the downplaying of the Taiwan issue. In the 'Shanghai Communiqué' released during 
Nixon's visit to China in 1972, the US acknowledged that there was one China and promised a 
48  Narine (2002: 47). 
49  Ang (2013: 22).
50  Ang (2013: 22).
51  Goh (2005) documents the various, and sometimes competing, logics for the pursuit of rapprochement with China 
and how this was discursively constructed during the Nixon-Kissinger era. 
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steady reduction of troops from Taiwan. This allowed the US to effectively recognise Beijing as the 
legitimate government of China even before normalisation in 1979. 
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 
changed the mood in Washington from détente to confrontation and containment of perceived 
Soviet expansionism. China became even more important in this respect. The fact that China was 
willing to oppose Vietnam in Southeast Asia militarily meant the US could support containment of 
the Soviets without direct involvement. It did so by endorsing China's performance of 'holding the 
line' against Soviet-Vietnamese expansion in Indochina and by extension China's 'regional great 
power guarantor' role in Southeast Asia. The US performatively endorsed China's role in three 
ways: 1) prioritising normalisation with China over Vietnam after the Vietnam War; 2) acquiescing 
to China's punitive invasion of Vietnam and supporting its arming of Cambodian rebels; and 3) 
providing technology and arms transfers to China in order to further China's military modernisation.
The decision to prioritise normalisation with China over Vietnam (and the Soviet Union) 
was the prerogative of National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Even before normalisation 
Brzezinski had sought to work out a division of labour with China against the Soviets. On a trip to 
China in May 1978 he agreed the US would take a tougher stance with the Soviets internationally 
whilst China took care of Vietnam regionally52. Brzezinski informed President Carter that his trip 
aimed to “deepen our consultations on strategic matters of common concern and, where possible, to 
make our separate actions in such places as the Horn, Southern Africa, South and Southeast Asia, 
and Japan mutually reinforcing”. He suggested that one way the US could reinforce Chinese actions
in Indochina was to stop saying that the US wished to normalise relations with Vietnam and to 
“delete this sentence from its standard descriptions of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia”53. Deng 
Xiaoping's trip to the US in January 1979 finalised normalisation.  
Deng's trip also revealed the US' acquiescence to China's 'lesson'. Deng informed Carter of 
Chinese intentions to conduct the military operation but stated it would be “restricted and limited in 
scope” and would “not affect the general situation” but “may play a certain role to check the 
ambitions of Vietnam and … benefit peace and stability of this region”. He expected to “have the 
understanding and support of ... the U.S. Government”54. President Carter warned Deng that 
52  Garrett (1981: 202).
53 “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter, 25th May
1978” FRUS 1977-1980 Vol XIII Doc 113.
54 “Oral Message From Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping to President Carter, Undated” ibid Doc 212.
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military action could have adverse consequences for China's international image and that diplomatic
isolation was the best course of action55. Deng reassured Carter that international opinion, although 
negative at first, would turn more favourable because the action would be limited56. He also invoked
ASEAN states' apparent support for Chinese action saying that “they expressed the hope that China 
will be able to do something” and that “[s]ome friends even criticized China for being too soft”. 
Carter replied that “[i]t would be difficult for us to encourage violence. We can give you 
intelligence briefings. We know of no recent movements of Soviet troops towards your borders”57. 
This position amounted to “[m]ild disapproval shaded into vague, tacit endorsement”58. The US was
not willing to formally support China's action but was willing to offer intelligence that would 
directly contribute to such an action. 
The reason for the US' quiet support was a fear of being accused by the Soviet Union of 
complicity in the action. President Carter was keen for Deng's advance warnings to be kept quiet, 
but also expressed that he felt more sympathy for the Chinese in the conflict and that the US had “a 
responsibility to protect Chinese confidence in us to inform us of their plans”59. Brzezinski 
apparently met with the Chinese Ambassador every evening of the Chinese punitive action in order 
to inform him of Soviet troop deployments along the Sino-Soviet border and provide satellite 
intelligence that would otherwise be unavailable to the Chinese60. The US did not want to appear to 
be directly involved in the affairs of Indochina but was happy to allow China to carry out the 
military containment of Vietnam and the Soviet Union. This was further confirmed by the fact that 
the Chinese invasion did not affect normalisation. Indeed normalisation allowed China to redeploy 
troops from Fujian Province (opposite Taiwan) to the Vietnamese and Soviet borders61. 
After China's punitive action, US-China relations continued to improve. In August 1979 
Deng told Vice President Walter Mondale that it would take a number of years to see change in 
Vietnam but until then pressure should be put on Vietnam to isolate it. Deng addressed the US 
saying: “[o]n your part you should take political and economic measures; on our part, we will add 
military pressure and after a certain period of time I can say for sure that a change will take place”. 
Mondale made clear that the US was playing its part, saying that “we never passed up an 
55 “Oral Presentation by President Carter to Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, 30th January 1979” ibid Doc 206.
56 “Memorandum of Conversation, 30th January 1979” ibid Doc 207.
57 “Memorandum of Conversation, 29th January 1979” ibid Doc 205.
58  Kissinger (2011: 365).
59 “Record of a National Security Council Meeting, 16th February 1979” FRUS 1977-1980 Vol XIII Doc 214.
60  Menétrey-Monchau (2006: 80).
61  Garrett (1981: 210).
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opportunity to encourage people supplying aid to Vietnam to cease doing so. We had some luck 
with Australians. We also hope to be able to persuade Swedes to stop. We urged Japan to stop, and I 
will do so again when in Japan”62. Regarding ASEAN he assured that “we have placed major 
emphasis on the closest consultation with ASEAN countries including improved security assistance 
to Thailand, more modern planes, more economic assistance and military assistance. I personally 
traveled to Bangkok to reaffirm the Manila Pact. I went to the Philippines to get the long-stalled 
negotiations on Subic Bay extended on a permanent basis … This relationship with ASEAN has 
been a crucial part in the process of increasing stability in the ASEAN and Pacific region”63. The 
US left the function of militarily 'holding the line' in Indochina to China, but assured ASEAN states 
that it would continue to provide security public goods in the maritime region thus holding the line 
in non-mainland Southeast Asia and the Rusk-Thanat line, but not beyond.  
The third aspect of the US' performative endorsement of China's role was the initiation of 
defence relations after Secretary of Defence Harold Brown's visit to China in January 1980. Brown 
made clear that the US saw a distinction between 'arms' and 'military equipment' and although not 
willing to transfer arms, the US was willing to make military technology available such as 
surveillance equipment and vehicles as well as dual use civilian equipment64. The US was 
constrained domestically in terms of transferring arms to China but it removed its opposition to 
arms sales from other NATO allies65. In the late 1980s, the US moved to directly transferring arms. 
Between 1985 and 1987 the US and China agreed to four Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
programmes which included the modernisation of artillery ammunition production facilities and the 
modernisation of avionics in F-8 fighters, as well as the sale of four Mark-46 anti-submarine 
torpedoes and four AN/TPQ-37 artillery-locating radars66. The US was committed to China's 
military modernisation.
The US' endorsement of China's 'holding the line' clearly showed the ASEAN states where 
the US stood in relation to the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. However, China's 'regional great power 
guarantor' role claims needed the endorsement of ASEAN as the regional constituency of 
legitimation in order to become a legitimate social role. We now turn to these regional responses.  
62  Mondale visited Japan shortly after China.
63 “Memorandum of Conversation, 28th August 1979” FRUS 1977-1980 Vol XIII Doc 265.
64  “Memorandum of Conversation, 7th January 1980”, “Memorandum for the Record, 7th January 1980”, “Memorandum 
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RESPONSES FROM THE REGIONAL CONSTITUENCY OF LEGITIMATION
The contest between Vietnam and China had serious implications for ASEAN. Vietnam's invasion 
and occupation of Cambodia had a negative effect on sovereignty. It reduced the salience of the 
norm of non-intervention and the TAC as an instrument for establishing rule-governed order in 
Southeast Asia. ASEAN had a stake in upholding this norm in opposition to Vietnam because rule-
making was a key function of its 'primary manager' role. As we have seen, non-interference was 
related to the strategic imperative of regime consolidation which was also challenged by a 
strengthened Vietnam with Soviet backing potentially becoming a new sponsor of communist 
insurgency. However, China was the traditional source of external support and because it still 
maintained links with communist parties, it remained the principal threat for some in the region. In 
the longer term there was also the issue of regional hegemony. There was a concern to check 
Vietnam's potential hegemony on the mainland, especially for Thailand, but also a long term 
concern regarding China's potential hegemony over the whole of Southeast Asia. To a certain 
extent, regional states were united in a common concern for not letting China's influence go too far, 
especially in the context of improving US-China relations. This gave ASEAN significant impetus to
use its 'primary manager' role to establish some control over events in Indochina in order to limit 
both Vietnam's and China's influence over post-occupation Cambodia. However, this collective 
effort involved managing the significant differences within ASEAN over Vietnam and China's role 
claims. 
Overall China's 'regional great power guarantor' role was endorsed, meaning China could 
use it to facilitate its containment of Vietnam and its support for the KR by mobilising resources 
through Thailand (as the principal endorser) and legitimising its military presence on the Sino-
Vietnamese border, poised for a potential second lesson. Vietnam's 'indigenous great power buffer' 
role was contested, meaning that it was unable to use the role for political, social or economic gains.
It was bogged down in Cambodia fighting the KR, alienated within international forums and cut off 
from sources of aid and external support. As a consequence, Vietnam was increasingly reliant on the
Soviet Union as its only backer. Ghazali Shafie summed up ASEAN's view of China and Vietnam's 
attitude to regional order and the part they should play when he described how “Pham Van Dong 
had, a few days before the Kampuchean adventure, personally assured ASEAN leaders of Vietnam's
peaceable attitude. China by that time had already made the oral commitment not to subvert other 
countries, an abandonment of previous subversive policies. Because of the Vietnamese misleading 
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assurances [sic], ASEAN was more fearful of the aggression of the Vietnamese kind. In that 
atmosphere the combined response of ASEAN was solid”67.
Despite this, disagreements within the regional constituency of legitimation, which had their
roots in the perceptions of domestic constituencies, limited the extent of to which China's role claim
could be endorsed. For all ASEAN constituencies, aspects of China's role claim were problematic. 
Its identity as an 'older brother' and the idea that it could provide regional political leadership or be 
the sole great power guarantor for Southeast Asian order challenged ASEAN's 'primary manager' 
role by encroaching on ASEAN's diplomatic leadership as part of the role bargain reached with the 
US. The ASEAN-China role bargain therefore saw China accept its own external (to Southeast 
Asia) identity and withdraw its claim to regional political leadership, instead committing to non-
interference and endorsing ASEAN's 'primary manager' role in the whole of Southeast Asia. In 
return, ASEAN endorsed China's 'holding the line' in the specific circumstances of the Cambodian 
conflict. ASEAN states also worked to maintain the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role to 
ensure China was not left as the sole guarantor of Southeast Asian order. This helped to manage the 
concerns of key constituencies within individual states that alter-cast China as an external, 
communist state, with a malign status as a subversive potential hegemon, which should perform no 
function in Southeast Asian order. These same constituencies tended to sympathise with Vietnam's 
indigenous identity as a Southeast Asian state, its independent status as a nation that had fought 
against imperialism and accepted that it could perform a balance of power function as a 
counterweight to China. The differing responses, and how they were managed, will be explored in 
this section in two parts: regional legitimation from Thailand and ASEAN collectively, and regional 
reticence and resistance from Malaysia, Indonesia as well as ASEAN.   
Regional legitimation
Thailand embraces China
Thailand was the ASEAN state most directly threatened by Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. The 
military was the dominant Thai constituency and since the Vietnam War had feared reprisals by 
Vietnam for Thailand's support for the US in the conflict. Even left-leaning Thai constituencies 
feared Vietnam. Previous links established between Thai and Vietnamese groups during the Viet 
67   Ghazali (2000: 127).
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Minh's struggle against the French were severed by the Vietnam War68. Academics and the press 
supported a hard-line opposition to Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia and did not raise any 
questions regarding Thai support for the KR until the late 1980s69. This built on the Thai perception 
of historical rivalry with Vietnam over the trans-Mekong region. The invasion of Cambodia 
removed the buffer of the independent Democratic Kampuchea and the presence of a preponderant 
Vietnam with troops mounted at the Thai-Cambodian border represented for some a direct threat of 
invasion. In early 1979 there was widespread fear that Vietnam would continue its push westward70.
This fear dissipated when it became clear Vietnam would be bogged down in Cambodia, but the 
threat to security remained from border tensions, refugee influx and particularly the transformation 
of Cambodia into a base for infiltration and support for the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT)71. 
Any debate over whether to accept a fait accompli and reach a compromise with Vietnam was 
quashed by Vietnamese border incursions in 198072. With first General Kriangsak and then General 
Prem Tinsulanonda in power, and Siddhi Savetsila as Foreign Minister, Thailand took a hard-line 
against Vietnam. 
Thailand intervened in the conflict during the Vietnamese invasion by evacuating Pol Pot's 
deputy Ieng Sary, preventing his capture. In January 1979, a meeting between Chinese officials and 
Prime Minister Kriangsak established the basis of the Sino-Thai partnership, with Kriangsak 
agreeing that Thailand would facilitate the arming of the KR through its territory73. Camps were set 
up along the Thai-Cambodia border where KR soldiers were fed, given treatment and transported 
back into Cambodia to fight; 15,000 troops were transported in just three days in April 197974. As 
the conflict went on, refugees were rounded up into camps along the border and put under the 
control of the DK government. The refugee camps re-established a buffer between Thailand and 
Vietnam and greatly aided diplomatic efforts as these camps were treated as 'liberated' Cambodian 
territory under DK control and Vietnamese actions against the camps were condemned75.     
Thailand needed assistance to check Vietnamese expansionism and ensure that Vietnam 
could not support insurgency within its borders. The Thais knew the US would no longer perform 
military functions in Indochina, especially having requested the US leave Thailand in 1976 and 
68  Interview with Kraisak Choonhaven, Chatichai Foundation, Bangkok, 25/2/14. 
69  Rungswasdisab (2004). 
70  Indorf and Suhrke (1981: 67).
71  Paribatra (1984: 34).
72  Dawson (1985: 154-156). 
73 Chanda (1986: 348-349).
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considering domestic constraints within the US. President Carter reaffirmed the US' commitment to 
Thai security under the Manila Pact in 1979 but the credibility of the US as a security guarantor had
waned. For this reason Thailand looked to China to provide a countervailing military force on the 
mainland and entered into a quasi-alliance giving substantive endorsement to China's 'holding the 
line' function in Indochina. China was second to the US in supplying Thailand with military 
assistance and weapons sales. However, as stated by former Thai Foreign Ministry official 
Sukhumbhand Paribatra: “[t]he credibility of China's contribution [was] based on the demonstration
in February-March 1979 that alone among the great powers involved in the affairs of Southeast Asia
it is prepared to use force, and suffer great losses, to contain Vietnam's expansion”76. Thailand 
facilitated the arming of the Khmer Rouge by China through Thai territory, prolonging the 
Cambodian conflict and preventing a fait accompli in Vietnam's favour. In return for Thai 
cooperation, China ceased its support for the CPT and offered Thailand a security guarantee in case 
of Vietnamese invasion. China closed the Voice of the People of Thailand radio station, which had 
been broadcast from Southern China since 1962, and was seen by Thailand as a symbol of China's 
aggressive intent77. Indeed the Sino-Vietnamese conflict virtually removed the threat from the CPT. 
The CPT was ejected from its bases in Laos when it chose China over Vietnam, severely weakening
its position. In terms of guaranteeing Thai security, China responded to Vietnamese offensives on 
the Nong Chan and Phom Chat camps in early 1983 with artillery barrage and intermittent shelling 
at the Sino-Vietnamese border78. During the 1984-1985 dry season offensives Chinese Foreign 
Minister Wu Xueqian warned Vietnam to stop its intrusions into Thai territory, saying that China 
reserved the right to “teach Vietnam a second lesson”79. The 'second lesson' did not come, but China
maintained constant pressure on Vietnam at the Sino-Vietnamese border. 
The Thai policy of embracing China was made easier by the fact that the ethnic Chinese 
population within Thailand had been successfully assimilated, meaning there was no issue with 
overseas Chinese and links to China. The removal of the threat from the CPT increased the military 
and the National Security Council's trust of China. China was no longer considered a malign 
subversive power, but rather a benign partner. Debate continued however as to whether it was wise 
to have such close links with China. Officials were keen to make clear that relations were based on 
mutual benefit with respect to deterrence of Vietnam. As one Thai academic stated in a discussion 
between academics and officials in 1985: “[w]e should avoid any actions indicating that our 
76  Paribatra (1987: 24-25).
77  Paribatra (1988: 297).
78  Van der Kroef (1984: 331).
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relations with China are so close that they begin to take on symbolic meaning of their own, lest we 
lose support from the public or international community”80. The fact that Thailand also maintained 
strong relations with the US throughout the conflict showed that it was not becoming a client of 
China. 
Over time the Sino-Thai partnership became increasingly institutionalised. John Ciorciari 
has argued that by 1980 Thailand had entered a “tight alliance” with China81. A 'tight alliance' is “an
arrangement involving at least two of the following features: a formal defence treaty or widely 
acknowledged informal pact, semi-permanent or permanent basing rights, joint combat operations, 
or a significant alliance bureaucracy”82. Thailand and China had a widely acknowledged informal 
pact that China would come to the aid of Thailand in case of Vietnamese aggression and Thailand 
would facilitate the arming of the KR rebels, as well as a significant alliance bureaucracy based on 
cooperation and coordination in the arming of rebels. From early 1987, China began supplying 
equipment at 'friendship prices', including T-69-2 Battle Tanks, armoured personnel carriers and air 
defence and long range artillery83. In January and February 1988 China and Thailand conducted 
their first formal intelligence exchange exercise and began working out details for a joint war 
reserve stockpile of Chinese spare parts and ammunition on Thai soil. This was still dwarfed by US 
assistance which by the mid-1980s included almost $2 billion per annum in FMS credits84. The US 
made regular port visits, initiated the joint military exercise Cobra Gold and offered counter-
insurgency training. In October 1985 President Reagan increased US support by signing a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on logistics support85. The US also affirmed that its 
commitment to Thai security through the Manila Pact stood, despite the disbanding of SEATO.
The debate regarding Vietnam was not over however. The military and foreign ministry 
retained their hard-line throughout the conflict; however, the civilian government of Chatichai 
Choonhaven elected in 1988 unilaterally initiated a turnaround in Thai policy. The Prime Minister's 
office, motivated by economic considerations, wanted to accommodate Vietnam and turn the 
'battlefield into a marketplace'. Divisions were heightened by political rivalry between Chatichai 
and his Chart Thai Party and Siddhi and his Social Action Party, the two dominant parties within the
80  Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University (1985: 62). 
81  Ciorciari (2010: 76). 
82 Ciorciari (2010: 8).
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coalition government86. This led the foreign ministry to rely on an informal coalition of the US, 
Singapore, China and Japan to fight its battles in international forums in the later years of the 
conflict as it was constrained by the PM's office87. The MFA brought officials from this informal 
coalition together in Bangkok before the Paris Conference on Cambodia in 1989 and they met 
regularly during the conference to ensure that pressure was maintained on Vietnam. 
The turnaround in Thai policy caused confusion in Beijing, but did not negatively affect 
relations. The Chinese were initially concerned that Thailand was betraying them and reaching out 
to the Soviets. Chatichai and his team of advisers visited Beijing in 1989 to clarify the new policy. 
After Deng lectured Chatichai on the evils of Soviet 'hegemonism', Chatichai assured him that 
Thailand would always be a friend of China and that the policy was an attempt to advance peace 
and had nothing to do with the Soviets88. The Chinese subsequently acquiesced to Thailand's policy. 
After the Paris Conference in 1989, a Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs told the Thai 
Ambassador to Beijing Tej Bunnag that China was happy for Thailand to do what it wanted, as long
as it kept China informed89. 
However, the change in policy put strains on ASEAN's solidarity. Indonesia viewed it as a 
betrayal considering the sacrifice it had made in supporting Thailand's position within ASEAN 
throughout the conflict. This sacrifice will be discussed in the section looking at regional reticence 
and resistance. The next section will consider how this collective ASEAN response was exercised in
a division of labour with China that legitimised China's 'holding the line' function.  
ASEAN's diplomatic leadership
The ASEAN states collectively identified their security with Thailand, stating from 1980 that 
Vietnamese incursions into Thailand affected the security of all ASEAN member states. In support 
of Thailand, ASEAN entered into a tacit alliance with China, through which a division of labour 
emerged with China 'holding the line' and ASEAN providing the legitimacy work internationally 
through its diplomatic leadership. A relationship of legitimacy interdependence with respect to the 
conflict emerged as China needed ASEAN to legitimise the struggle internationally and ASEAN 
needed China to bolster the military opposition to give the championing of the rebel cause 
86  Niksch (1989: 169).
87  Ang (2013: 129).
88  Interview with Kraisak Choonhaven, Chatichai Foundation, Bangkok, 25/2/14. 
89  Interview with Tej Bunnag, Thai Red Cross, Bangkok, 24/2/14. 
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credibility. ASEAN's tacit alliance represented an endorsement of China's 'regional great power 
guarantor' role expressed through the function of 'holding the line'; however, it was not the case that 
ASEAN became subservient to Chinese wishes. ASEAN was keen to ensure that China's role was 
limited to this function. We will see in the section on resistance to China's role-taking how ASEAN 
used its 'primary manager' role, further endorsed by China and the US within the division of labour, 
to assert its diplomatic leadership and the salience of its rules within Southeast Asia, and in the 
process limit the extent of China's great power role-taking. For now we will look at how ASEAN 
exercised its diplomatic leadership within the division of labour with China in opposition to 
Vietnam, and what impact this had on ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. 
ASEAN established its position on the Cambodian conflict in January 1979 at a Special 
Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Bangkok. It condemned the armed intervention against Cambodia's 
sovereignty and called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces and support for the 
Cambodian people to determine their future free from interference or influence from outside 
powers90. In determining ASEAN's position, Bangkok was aided by the keen support of Singapore. 
Foreign ministers Siddhi and Rajaratnam provided a “winning combination” in ASEAN meetings; 
their firm line prevailed over the Indonesian and Malaysian foreign ministers' wishes to find other 
ways for ASEAN91. The Singapore Foreign Ministry also employed its advocacy, drafting and 
lobbying skills to great effect in the UN and the NAM92. Singaporean officials ensured that 
delegates at the UN General Assembly were aware of the issues with respect to ASEAN's yearly 
resolutions and even actively herded delegates into the voting chamber.
Singapore's distance from Indochina meant it did not face a direct threat from either China 
or Vietnam and had more strategic scope in determining how it would act. Singaporean officials 
viewed Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in global terms as an expression of the Sino-Soviet conflict
played out by their proxies. Singapore saw the need to involve the US and other Western powers in 
the resolution of the conflict. This was consistent with Singapore's general strategy to involve all 
key powers in regional affairs to offset its sense of vulnerability to regional forces. Indeed, since 
1972 Singapore had tried to market itself as a 'global city' in an attempt to “transcend its regional 
locale”93. The principle of non-intervention was also extremely important in this respect and 
Singaporean officials were most vocal in opposing Vietnam's actions as a violation of non-
90  Ang (2013: 20-21). 
91  Interview with Tej Bunnag, Thai Red Cross, Bangkok, 24/2/14. 
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intervention. At the same time however, Singapore was concerned with the sensitivities of its 
neighbours and wanted to avoid accusations coming from some in Indonesia that Singapore was 
acting as a 'loudspeaker' for Chinese interests94. To distance itself from China, Singapore postponed 
normalisation of ties with China until after Indonesia. It also expressed its concerns that efforts to 
oppose Vietnam did not pave the way for the emergence of Chinese hegemony over Southeast 
Asia95. To a large extent ASEAN's diplomatic leadership was carried forward by Singapore as it 
sought to balance Thailand's interests with those of Malaysia and Indonesia. For example, 
Singapore drafted the International Conference on Kampuchea declaration in a way that would limit
Vietnam and China's influence in a post-settlement Cambodia.  
ASEAN's response also depended on Indonesia's deference to the Thai stance as Indonesia 
chose not to assert its own position with respect to China and Vietnam, supporting Thailand in 
ASEAN joint statements and UN resolutions. As we will see below this was because Suharto and 
the Foreign Ministry saw solidarity within ASEAN as more important than opposing China and 
supporting Vietnam. As Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaadmatja stated: “If it were 
not for Thailand, the Indonesian reaction [to Vietnam] would have been more flexible”96.
ASEAN's diplomatic leadership involved three principle achievements with respect to the 
Cambodian conflict. Firstly, ASEAN was able to internationalise the conflict by successfully 
defining the fundamental root of the conflict as Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia 
rather than an internal civil conflict. Defining the conflict in terms of a violation of rule-governed 
interaction, meant Vietnam's actions could be condemned on the grounds of the UN Charter; it 
constituted an illegal intervention in another sovereign state rather than as a humanitarian action 
undertaken in support of the Cambodian people. In late 1979 ASEAN sponsored a resolution in the 
UN General Assembly that demanded a ceasefire, the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the right 
of self-determination for the Cambodian people97. The resolution passed by a large majority and 
subsequent resolutions sponsored yearly by ASEAN passed by even larger majorities. Singapore, 
especially through UN Ambassador Tommy Koh, was particularly active in ensuring that the 
conflict was internationalised and defined as an illegal intervention - an expression of Soviet-
Vietnamese communist expansionism.  
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Secondly, ASEAN denied the legitimacy of the PRK regime in the UN and NAM and 
maintained recognition for first the Democratic Kampuchea government, and then the Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) from 1982. This prevented the de facto 
recognition of the Phnom Penh regime under Vietnamese dominance. Vietnam challenged 
Democratic Kampuchea's seat at the UN in 1979 and the PRK submitted their credentials to the 
Credentials Committee of the General Assembly. The Credentials Committee, under pressure from 
the US and ASEAN, voted to keep the DK in Cambodia's seat without even reviewing the PRK. 
They submitted their resolution to the General Assembly for a vote which was approved by 71 votes
to 35 with 34 abstentions. Before the vote, Tommy Koh successfully thwarted an Indian attempt to 
amend the resolution to leave the Cambodian seat empty98. This politicisation of Cambodian 
representation at the UN was unprecedented as it was routine to recognise the credentials of new 
governments in third world states regardless of how they got there99. A similar effort to ensure the 
non-recognition of the PRK was undertaken within the NAM. ASEAN was unable to have the DK 
recognised but prevented the PRK from being recognised. At the Havana meeting in September 
1979 the hosts, also an ally of the Soviet Union, tried to help the Vietnamese by physically 
preventing the DK representatives from entering the conference hall, thus leaving the Cambodian 
seat empty100. It was to remain empty over the course of the conflict. 
Thirdly, ASEAN ensured the social estrangement of Vietnam in international society. 
Vietnam was denied access to international assistance and forced to depend on the Soviet Union. 
ASEAN kept the Cambodian conflict on the international agenda throughout the decade by 
sponsoring yearly resolutions on the situation in Cambodia. In the NAM, Singaporean officials 
argued that Vietnam was an agent of the Soviets, imposing Soviet alignment on the NAM through 
invading and occupying a non-aligned country101. From 1982, Vietnam no longer tried to oppose 
ASEAN's UN resolutions, knowing that it had essentially lost the diplomatic battle for recognition. 
A stalemate ensued diplomatically and militarily despite big dry season offensives in 1984/1985. 
This military push gave the impetus in February 1985 for ASEAN's most strongly worded joint 
statement calling on the international community to increase its support for the Khmer people's 
political and military struggle against the Vietnamese102. ASEAN also made a direct appeal to the 
Soviet Union to stop its material support to Vietnam. Indeed, Indonesia had come round to the idea 
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of the need to bolster the military resistance against Vietnam in 1984 after a series of diplomatic 
initiatives put forward by Indonesia had failed. Suharto opined that diplomatic initiatives would not 
work unless military pressure was put on Vietnam. He directed Foreign Minister Mochtar to work 
out a division of labour with other ASEAN states concerning the resistance with others supporting 
the military aspect and Indonesia keeping the line open with Vietnam diplomatically. He reasoned 
that if Indonesia were also to give aid to the non-communist Cambodian factions then no one within
ASEAN would be able to talk to Vietnam. Singapore was supportive of this103.
Along with China, the US strongly endorsed ASEAN's diplomatic leadership on the 
Cambodian conflict. Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke explained in November 1979 that the 
US supported Thailand and ASEAN, because Thailand was “the key to ASEAN, and ASEAN the 
key to Southeast Asia”104. Secretary of State George Shultz told ASEAN foreign ministers in 
Bangkok in June 1983 that “we follow your lead … we know that the chances of persuading 
Vietnam to change its course are greater if the message comes from its neighbors”105. More 
specifically, subcontracting diplomatic leadership meant that US opposition to Vietnam's actions 
was easier to sell domestically as it could demote itself to a supporting role whilst also taking up the
cause of the refugee issue, relieving the pressure on ASEAN states106. This became particularly 
salient as further revelations of the extent of the Khmer Rouge atrocities surfaced during the 1980s, 
raising questions within Congress as to how US policy may be supporting the KR. When 
scrutinised, White House and State Department officials pointed to the fact that they were merely 
following ASEAN on the issue and that US policy on Cambodia was ultimately about support for 
ASEAN107. 
ASEAN was unable to resolve the Cambodian conflict through its diplomatic efforts108. The 
ultimate resolution was determined by factors outside of ASEAN, particularly the emerging Sino-
Soviet rapprochement in the late 1980s and the removal of Soviet support which forced the 
Vietnamese to withdraw their troops in 1989 and for the issue to be taken up by the Security 
Council. Indeed, after 1989 diplomatic leadership on the Cambodian conflict passed to the Security 
Council. A division of labour was still apparent though as the UNSC focused on a comprehensive 
framework agreement whilst ASEAN states, particularly Thailand and Indonesia, focused on 
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national reconciliation of the Cambodian factions and the formation of the Supreme National 
Council (SNC) which would become the Cambodian decision making body during the transition 
phase109. 
The Cambodian conflict highlighted that, although conflict resolution involving the great 
powers was beyond the reach of ASEAN, diplomatic leadership as a means for legitimising great 
power imperatives and roles was further established as a function that ASEAN performed. In this 
way, ASEAN did not 'manage' regional order and security in the sense of resolving outstanding 
conflicts and issues. It did however contribute to the negotiation and management of regional order 
during this period by ensuring the Cambodian conflict was addressed within international society as
a violation of the rule of non-intervention – a violation of rule-governed interaction. Furthermore, it 
was determined as a violation of ASEAN rules defined as applicable and salient in the whole of 
Southeast Asia, not just within non-communist Southeast Asia but also in Indochina. That such a 
rule was promoted selectively to benefit ASEAN states' interpretation of order as a means for 
upholding their non-communist regimes is clear from ASEAN's acquiescence or even tacit support 
for Indonesia's annexation of East Timor110. However, this does not take away from the fact that the 
US and China endorsed ASEAN's 'primary manager' role and the salience of its norms in the region.
This endorsement was crucial for how ASEAN used its 'primary manager' role in resisting China's 
role-taking, considered in the next section. 
ASEAN's diplomatic leadership on the Cambodian conflict advanced ASEAN's 'primary 
manager' role. Practically, the need to coordinate policy on the Cambodian issue improved the 
mechanisms and habits of consultation and cooperation within ASEAN111. The fact that ASEAN 
held together despite its divisions reaffirmed for members the importance of regional unity for 
ASEAN's 'primary manager' role, especially as the united front ASEAN presented internationally 
improved its standing as an organisation. Ambassador K Kesavapany, former Singaporean 
permanent representative to the UN, identified the Cambodian conflict as “ASEAN's greatest 
success story in the political arena”. Singaporean diplomat Tony Siddique stated that it “put ASEAN
on the map, substantively”; ASEAN was suddenly being consulted on a variety of diplomatic 
initiatives, not just Cambodia112. On top of its efforts within the UN, ASEAN's PMC provided 
another platform for coordinating the opposition to Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia and 
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discussing the Indochinese refugee problem. It contributed to ASEAN becoming a hub for regional 
diplomatic activity by providing a formal and regular contact between ASEAN and key external 
states113. This too laid important practical as well as social foundations for the launch of ASEAN-led
initiatives in the post-Cold War period, especially as the PMC was used as the venue for launching 
the ARF in 1993.   
This status recognition of ASEAN internationally and regionally provided a mutually 
reinforcing logic for maintaining ASEAN solidarity during the period, especially for Indonesia. This
needed to be managed in a way that reduced the potential for China's long term role-taking whilst 
also reasserting Indonesia's position within ASEAN. These aspects will be considered below as we 
turn to regional reticence and resistance to China's role-taking. First we will look more specifically 
at the perceived threat that China posed to the region, which had an impact on the way Malaysia 
and Indonesia viewed and responded to China's role claim. 
Regional reticence and resistance
A China threat?
In the 1980s there were three major aspects to the perceived China threat: China as a trespasser into 
maritime Southeast Asia, its ambiguous relationship with overseas ethnic Chinese and its support 
for regional communist movements114. All three compounded its identity as an external actor and for
some its status as a malign, subversive potential hegemon.  
China was viewed as a trespasser into maritime Southeast Asia because of its claims to 
nearly the full extent of the South China Sea. China's modernisation entailed a growth in  naval 
capabilities that could lead to it asserting its claims through the use of force. Indeed, China had 
come into conflict with Vietnam in the South China Sea in 1974 when it occupied the Paracel 
Islands and again in 1988 over the Spratlys, already showing it was willing to use force with respect
to these claims. 
On top of this direct military threat, there was the issue of China's ambiguous position with 
respect to overseas Chinese, which concerned Malaysia and Indonesia particularly because their 
113  Emmers (2003: 113).
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ethnic Chinese minorities were much less well assimilated than in Thailand and the Philippines. The
perceived business success of the ethnic Chinese bred deep resentment amongst other ethnic groups 
in Malaysia and Indonesia which led to frequent anti-Chinese protests and riots. Concern was 
especially acute after the deterioration of Chinese-Vietnamese relations in 1978 over Vietnam's 
treatment of ethnic Chinese in South Vietnam. China protested vehemently and even sent boats to 
evacuate ethnic Chinese from Saigon. Indonesian leaders drew a direct parallel with 1959 when 
China sent boats to Indonesia to evacuate ethnic Chinese after Sukarno brought in discriminatory 
measures115.
With respect to China's support for communist insurgencies, the PRC made a distinction 
between government-to-government relations and part-to-party relations. The former could be 
established through normal diplomatic channels and entailed the PRC respecting governing regimes
as legitimate. The latter were separate and meant that the CCP could maintain its links with other 
communist parties and provide 'political and moral' support. Chinese officials argued this was 
necessary so that Southeast Asian communist parties did not look to Vietnam or the Soviet Union 
for support. This did little to reassure the Malaysian and Indonesian governments. 
Lee Kuan Yew expressed to Deng Southeast Asian concerns, explaining in 1978 that China's
difficulties mobilising support for an anti-Soviet coalition in Southeast Asia were due to the fact 
that there were no 'overseas Russians' leading communist insurgencies supported by the Soviets; 
however, there were 'overseas Chinese' supported by the Chinese Communist Party and 
government116. Lee later made it clear to Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang that China had to make up 
its mind about its political priorities in Southeast Asia. It could not maintain friendly relations with 
ASEAN states whilst reserving the right to interfere in their affairs through supporting insurgency 
movements117. China had to accept its external identity and recognise non-interference and 
ASEAN's 'primary manager' role in order to reverse its status as a subversive potential hegemon. 
Some re-conceptualisation of China's role was evident amongst the Chinese leadership. 
Deng explained to Lee that China wanted to see a strong ASEAN, “the stronger the better”118. He 
also told Lee that China would end its links with communist parties but just needed time to manage 
the transition119. Zhao toured the region in 1981 assuring his hosts that links between the CCP and 
115  Williams (1991: 152).
116  Lee (2000: 598-599).
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Southeast Asian communist parties were leftovers from the past and that China considered them 
domestic issues and would not interfere in the internal affairs of ASEAN states. In Malaysia he 
assured that China had dissociated itself with the MCP and that extant CCP-MCP ties were merely 
'political and moral', not substantive120. The return of MCP Chairman Musa Ahmad from Beijing to 
Malaysia the previous November seemed to provide a concrete example of China's intentions121. 
Zhao also provided China's position on a post-conflict Cambodia as example of its benign 
intentions and lack of any ambition to create a sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. He explicitly 
told his hosts that China supported an independent, neutral and non-aligned Cambodia and had no 
intention of imposing a communist regime or making Cambodia a Chinese satellite122. Despite this, 
prominent constituencies within Malaysia and Indonesia still regarded China as a significant threat, 
moving these states to show active resistance towards China's 'regional great power guarantor' role-
taking.  
Resistance from Malaysia and Indonesia
Malaysia and especially Indonesia were uncomfortable with ASEAN's tacit alliance with China and,
although they acquiesced to China's role-taking through ASEAN, they also showed resistance by 
pursuing alternative diplomatic initiatives. This represented a dual policy of performative 
endorsement through acquiescence alongside contestation of China's role claims. These states did 
more than any other to ensure that China's role-taking was limited to the specific circumstances of 
the Cambodian conflict. Indeed Malaysia and Indonesia pursued alternative diplomatic initiatives 
that sought to reach out to Vietnam and suggested the possibility of an alternative regional role 
bargain whereby ASEAN recognised Vietnam's 'indigenous great power buffer' role in return for 
Vietnam recognising ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. Specifically they sought to define the 
Cambodian conflict in terms of Vietnam's position that it was a civil conflict that could be dealt 
with through Southeast Asian regional negotiations and Vietnam's legitimate interests in Indochina 
should be accommodated. In return, Vietnam should withdraw from Cambodia and end its alliance 
with the Soviet Union, recognising ASEAN's rule-making as applicable to the whole of Southeast 
Asia. This by definition excluded China and contested China's (as well as Thailand and Singapore's)
hard-line position that the root of the conflict was Vietnam's invasion and that no settlement could 
be negotiated until after Vietnamese withdrawal. It therefore indicated a reconciliation along the 
lines of the 'autonomy' principles set out in ZOPFAN, which had been sidelined in ASEAN's role 
120  Bahari (1988: 245).
121  Lee (1981: 73-74).
122  Chang (1985: 123).
167
bargain with China. In this way it sought to undermine the China-ASEAN role bargain by removing
the raison d'etre for China's performance of 'holding the line'. However, Vietnam's intransigence 
prevented Malaysian and Indonesian initiatives from being successful. They consistently fell back 
in line with the other ASEAN states for the sake of maintaining the unity necessary to uphold 
ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. 
The domestic context within Malaysia that led to its dual policy lay in its delicate ethnic 
balance. There was a large minority of ethnic Chinese and the political bargain struck with the 
Malay majority since the early days of self-government was that the Malays would hold the 
political power but would not upset the economic position of the ethnic Chinese. This meant an 
uneasy social balance; widespread Malay resentment towards the perceived wealth of the ethnic 
Chinese sparked riots in Kuala Lumpur in 1969. On top of this, the authorities were constantly 
concerned about links between Chinese-Malaysians and China. This was especially so because the 
Malayan Communist Party was considered predominantly ethnic Chinese. During the Malayan 
Emergency in the 1950s, British and Malayan propaganda had established China as an external 
threat with links to the MCP and this threat perception became embedded within official thinking123.
After normalisation in 1974, Malaysia sought to manage MCP-CCP links by operating strict 
controls on Malaysian citizens travelling to China. However, Malaysian officials believed that the 
PRC was circumventing Malaysian law by offering permits to ethnic Chinese to visit China and 
treating them as if they were returning Overseas Chinese by processing them through the Office for 
Overseas Chinese. This, coupled with the encouragement by China that overseas and ethnic Chinese
contribute to China's modernisation through investment and expertise, was viewed as interference in
Malaysia's internal affairs in order to promote China's regional interests. Malaysian leaders thus 
worked hard to block the ethnic Chinese constituency from interaction with China.
Malaysia was also concerned that China's 'regional great power guarantor' claim was merely 
a means to justify removing other great powers from the region whilst legitimising China as the 
remaining guarantor. This was dangerous as long as China maintained its support for subversion. 
Foreign Minister Ghazali Shafie stated that “the Chinese global position is circumscribed and 
should not be construed to include a role by China as the sole restraining hand for the security of 
Southeast Asia” adding that “China has dangerous ambitions of her own in the region which she has
refused to renounce”124. Malaysia was clearly concerned that its neutrality proposal and ZOPFAN 
123  Hamilton-Hart (2012: 113-115) has documented from interviews with current officials that this link between China 
and the MCP has become 'historical fact' in Malaysian thinking despite evidence to the contrary. 
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were not used to justify a guarantor role just for China, but remained applicable to all the great 
powers.
After Mahathir Mohammed took power in 1981, Malaysia's view of China began to soften. 
Mahathir's primary focus was economic, introducing a 'Look East' policy that sought to rebalance 
Malaysia's economic dependence on the West by improving links with Japan and exploring 
economic ties with China. A domestic business constituency built up that sought to exploit the 
economic opportunity that an opening China represented. With annual GDP growth rates of around 
9 per cent, China was viewed as an important link in Mahathir's policy of diversification. The 
recession and commodity prices crisis in the mid-1980s further raised economic considerations as 
the primary driver of foreign policy. Foreign Minister Rithauddeen stated that the foreign ministry 
became an economic-oriented ministry125. Mahathir sought to counter China's status as a subversive 
hegemon by arguing that China was a benign power, having never tried to colonise Southeast Asia 
as Western states had done. Mahathir played a key part in changing the nature of China's rise from a
threat to an economic opportunity126. As part of this, Mahathir made a visit to China in 1985 where 
discussion of party-to-party relations was avoided in a spirit of 'economic pragmatism'127. Mahathir 
said that “instead of talking about our differences during the visit we should concentrate on our 
similarities . . . on economic matters where we can achieve more”128. In light of this, a more 
liberalised application process for Malaysian businessmen visiting China was put in place129. In the 
economic sphere, China was seen as more of a legitimate regional actor and the Malaysian business 
constituency was given special privileges to build economic links with China. 
Malaysia's view of Vietnam was generally positive. Having been one of the pioneer ASEAN 
states reaching out to North Vietnam in the 1970s, the foreign ministry had developed extensive 
links. Foreign Minister Rithauddeen also developed a good personal relationship with Vietnamese 
Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach. In 1979 and 1980 Rithauddeen made a number of trips to 
Hanoi and was reportedly very much involved in developing the Kuantan Principle in 1980 which 
sought to respect Vietnam's legitimate interests in Indochina (discussed below). The principle 
caused controversy within the Malaysian parliament and in the foreign ministry as critics 
questioned the logic of pursuing a near impossible diplomatic formula at the expense of ASEAN 
and Diplomacy, Boston, US. 11th November 1981. Emphasis added. 
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solidarity and good relations with Singapore130. There was therefore a significant domestic 
constituency that saw relations within ASEAN as far more important than accommodating Vietnam.
For the sake of maintaining the unity necessary for ASEAN's 'primary manager' role and because 
Thailand was a front-line state, Malaysia supported the opposition to Vietnam131. Malaysia 
considered Thailand a buffer and needed Thai cooperation to combat MCP guerillas stationed in 
southern Thailand. Malaysia also realised its strategic proximity to the mainland at this time when 
in 1978/79 a large number of refugee 'boat people' arrived on its shores fleeing Vietnam and 
Cambodia. Some Malaysian officials saw the refugee crisis as a deliberate attempt by Vietnam to 
subvert and destabilise ASEAN states, especially as many of the refugees were ethnic Chinese. In 
this way it was less costly domestically for Malaysia to support the hard-line position of Thailand 
and Singapore than Indonesia when it came to presenting ASEAN solidarity. 
Indonesia's leadership shared many of the concerns of other ASEAN members regarding the 
implications of Vietnam's actions but three things in particular prevented Indonesia from taking the 
same hard-line stance as Thailand and Singapore. Firstly, the military were sympathetic to the 
Vietnamese and deeply suspicious of China. They viewed Vietnamese communists as essentially 
nationalist, taking necessary action to defend themselves against China by overthrowing the 
Chinese-backed KR. China on the other hand was seen as subversive, based on its perceived 
involvement in the abortive coup in 1965. The Indonesian military was therefore highly sceptical of 
China's legitimacy claims regarding its 'regional great power guarantor' role. Army Commander-in-
Chief General Benny Moerdani favoured a resolution that did not involve China and upheld 
Vietnam in the 'indigenous great power buffer' role between Southeast Asia and China132. Whilst 
inspecting military installations at the Sino-Vietnamese border on a high profile visit to Vietnam in 
February 1984, Moerdani stated explicitly that the real threat to Southeast Asia was not from 
Vietnam133. 
Secondly, part of the Suharto regime's domestic legitimacy lay in its independent and active 
foreign policy and commitment to realising ZOPFAN. Giving China a great power role in Southeast
Asia directly challenged Indonesia's regional leadership and compromised the aim of freeing the 
region from great power involvement. With the political challenges to the Suharto regime mostly 
dealt with by the mid-1980s, it was harder to justify Indonesia's 'leading-from-behind' role 
130 Jeshurun (2007: 146-147). 
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conception. The perception within the military was that the low-key position Indonesia was taking 
within ASEAN on the Cambodian conflict showed that it had given in to Chinese wishes134. The 
initiatives Indonesia pursued in the late 1980s such as the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) were 
attempts to satisfy domestic constituencies that called for a more active foreign policy135. It was thus
principally for domestic reasons that Indonesia showed active resistance to this hard-line. Foreign 
Minister Mochtar stated: “what is the use for us if for the sake of foreign policy interests then we 
created domestic problems?”136.
Thirdly, Indonesia hoped to win acquiescence to the incorporation of East Timor into 
Indonesia after its invasion in 1975. In many ways Indonesia's invasion paralleled Vietnam's; both 
involved foreign powers using local forces to legitimise their occupation137. A hard-line opposition 
based on the principle of non-intervention thus shone a light on Jakarta's own actions. Jakarta also 
feared that confronting Vietnam would spur Hanoi to support East Timor's guerilla resistance.
To balance these factors, Indonesia's dual policy involved support for a common ASEAN 
stand against Vietnam's occupation whilst also exploring other channels and initiatives towards 
Vietnam outside of ASEAN. Indonesia had a huge stake in ASEAN's 'primary manager' role, 
especially as the primus inter pares within the Association. Indonesian elites saw ASEAN as the 
mechanism for realising the goal of regional autonomy as well as a key bargaining tool in 
international society, contributing to Indonesia's own international status and good name138. Suharto 
made the final decision to support ASEAN, even if this meant support for China instead of 
Vietnam139. This showed how important ASEAN’s role was to Indonesia. 
One means to maintain ASEAN solidarity but also accommodate domestic opposition to 
China's regional involvement was to hold out on normalisation. Jakarta officially separated 
negotiations over a Cambodian settlement from the question of normalisation with China despite 
the arguments of Adam Malik and Jusuf Wanandi, director of the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, that Indonesia could not hope to play any role in such a 
134  Sukma (1999) details the divisions within Indonesia during this period and the impact it had on relations between 
Indonesia and China 
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settlement without diplomatic relations with China140. Indonesia made the admission of Chinese 
involvement in the abortive 1965 coup and concrete assurances that it would not support communist
movements in Indonesia as conditions for normalisation141. As China continued to hold the 
distinction between government-to-government and party-to-party relations, Indonesia refused to 
normalise. At the same time, the foreign ministry performed a balancing act between slowly 
opening ties with China whilst appearing to hold a firm line in resisting China's growing influence. 
For instance, negotiations on direct trade ties opened in 1985 and were carried out by a non-
governmental body, the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, so as not to appear to be a substantive 
step towards normalisation142. 
Having covered the domestic reasons for Indonesia and Malaysia's reticence towards China's
role-taking, it is necessary to explore the initiatives put forward to undermine the China-ASEAN 
role bargain and try to reach an alternative bargain with Vietnam. The clearest example of this was 
the Kuantan Principle articulated in a meeting between Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn and 
President Suharto in March 1980. The Kuantan Principle declared that Vietnam should be neutral 
between the Soviet Union and China and that the resolution of the Cambodian conflict should be 
political rather than military, recognising Vietnam's security interests in Cambodia143. It suggested 
that the problem in Indochina was the intrusion of great power rivalry rather than Vietnam's 
invasion. By acknowledging Vietnam's legitimate interests in the political identity of Cambodia, the
principle seemed to endorse Hanoi's hegemony in Indochina and by extension its 'indigenous great 
power buffer' role144. Indonesia and Malaysia thus held out the possibility of a bargain: ASEAN 
would recognise Vietnam's interests in Indochina if Vietnam recognised ASEAN's 'primary 
manager' role by acknowledging that ASEAN's rule-making applied to Indochina. Withdrawing 
from Cambodia would recognise non-interference and ending its links with the Soviet Union would 
recognise regional autonomy. Vietnam's withdrawal would also remove the raison d'etre of China's 
military guarantee to Thailand and ASEAN, reversing China's 'regional great power guarantor' role-
taking. However, the principle made no mention of any reciprocal ASEAN moves to remove the 
US' military presence, essentially asking Vietnam to accept the role bargain that ASEAN had made 
with the US. 
140   Wanandi (2012: 168-169) reports that he sent a memo to Suharto in 1983 which discussed the positive changes 
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Thailand and Singapore opposed the Kuantan Principle and Vietnam also rejected it because 
it failed to mention the US. Vietnamese military incursions into Thailand in 1980 showed they were 
unwilling to accept a solution on such terms and also reinforced the relevance of China's military 
guarantee for Thailand. Malaysia and Indonesia fell back in line with the established ASEAN 
position in support of Thailand, but the logic of the Kuantan Principle underlay further efforts 
throughout the 1980s to seek a resolution to the conflict outside of the China-ASEAN division of 
labour. 
At the NAM summit in 1983, Malaysia called for 'five plus two' talks between the ASEAN 
Five, Vietnam and Laos. Thailand and China opposed the talks on the basis that they excluded the 
CGDK and that accepting such talks would challenge the internationalisation of the conflict. They 
were unwilling to accept the principle of post-invasion regional talks which Hanoi had previously 
proposed as an alternative to the ICK145. In September 1983 the “ASEAN appeal on Kampuchean 
Independence” issued by the ASEAN foreign ministers in Jakarta offered a conciliatory stance to 
Vietnam by making the demand for Vietnamese withdrawal no longer immediate but phased. By 
making no mention of the UN, it suggested a regional solution. Hanoi rejected the appeal, fearing 
that a phased withdrawal would allow the KR to infiltrate back into Cambodia. Malaysia again 
proposed 'proximity talks' between the PRK and the CGDK via mediators in 1985. Ghazali Shafie 
considered the Heng Samrin the core of any future regime in Cambodia146. The proposal seemed to 
legitimise the PRK and the idea that the conflict was an internal Cambodian conflict. The CGDK 
rejected this idea and the proposal was changed to involve talks between Vietnam and the CGDK 
with the PRK as part of the Vietnamese delegation. This re-established the position that the basis of 
the conflict was Vietnam's invasion. 
In 1984 Indonesia opened up bilateral dialogue with Hanoi. To maintain its solidarity, 
ASEAN officially recognised Indonesia as ASEAN's interlocutor with Vietnam, blessing its dual 
track policy147. This was a moderate success for Indonesia in promoting its interests within the 
ASEAN process and reasserting its independent and active credentials and leadership within 
ASEAN. Indonesia also maintained its interest in promoting the principles of ZOPFAN as a basis 
for regional reconciliation throughout the 1980s. To breathe new life into the ZOPFAN formula, 
Indonesian officials sought to discuss within ASEAN the possibility of Southeast Asia as a Nuclear 
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Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) in the hope that this would provide a new basis for Vietnam to 
accept ZOPFAN148. However, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines were reluctant to pursue the 
proposal, which the US adamantly opposed. Indonesia subsequently pursued what was termed 
'cocktail diplomacy': informal talks between the Cambodian factions on equal terms but with no 
political labels. Jakarta hoped this would be followed by talks that included Vietnam and ASEAN. 
Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach agreed to this formula at a meeting with Mochtar in
Hanoi in July 1987. The momentum of cocktail diplomacy led to talks between Sihanouk and Hun 
Sen in Paris in December 1987 and January 1988 and the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) held in 
1988 and 1989. Singapore noted that the JIM process reflected the Indonesian assessment that 
Indonesia and Vietnam, as the major indigenous powers, should shape regional order and not let 
external powers dominate. This worried Singapore which felt that it would need to submit to the 
wishes of Indonesia149. Former Singaporean Deputy Prime Minister S. Rajaratnam was sceptical 
about any opening on Vietnam's part, seeing this as just the latest trick to continue its spread of 
communism. He was critical of the JIMs as a forum for Vietnam to manipulate Southeast Asian 
states to endorse its regional hegemony150. Singaporean officials also noted that Indonesia seemed to
remain passive throughout the International Conference on Cambodia (ICC) in 1989 despite being a
co-chair. They suggested Indonesia had a vested interest in the failure of international negotiations 
and a resuscitation of the JIM process151.
These efforts outside of the China-ASEAN division of labour were for the most part 
unsuccessful because of Vietnam's intransigence and because they diverged too much from the 
established line that ASEAN had promoted through its 'primary manager' role. Vietnam refused to 
recognise ASEAN's coexistence order and 'primary manager' role so efforts to promote negotiations 
towards reaching an alternative regional role bargain did not lead anywhere. More successful 
resistance however came from within the China-ASEAN division of labour; ASEAN asserted its 
'primary manager' role by pushing back against China's military strategy and strong support for the 
KR and asserting the salience of ASEAN's norms and processes in the whole of Southeast Asia. 
This served as a means to limit the KR and China's influence over a post-occupation Cambodia.  
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Asserting ASEAN's 'primary manager' role
ASEAN's first major attempt to limit the KR's influence in post-occupation Cambodia came during 
the International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) initiated by ASEAN and held in New York in 
July 1981. As a substantive step towards conflict resolution the conference was a failure because of 
Vietnam and the Soviet Union's absence. For ASEAN however, it established the terms for which a 
settlement for Cambodia could be based. The resulting agreement on the ICK framework fell short 
of ASEAN's original expectations due to Chinese opposition but demonstrated ASEAN's efforts to 
reduce both Vietnamese and Chinese influence in post-occupation Cambodia and assert the salience 
of its own rules and processes in Indochina. Lee Kuan Yew was instrumental in developing a draft 
declaration for the conference which called for the establishment of an interim government, free 
elections and the disarming of Cambodian factions. The draft acknowledged “the legitimate 
concerns of neighbouring states of Kampuchea (i.e. Vietnam) that it should not in any way become 
a threat or be used by any state for subversion or aggression against them”152. It implicitly laid some
of the blame for the conflict on the KR and its actions against Vietnam and tried to orchestrate a 
situation where the KR would not dominate Cambodia after a Vietnamese withdrawal. 
China opposed the draft and the ASEAN initiative to get non-governmental representation 
for the Heng Samrin regime at the ICK. ASEAN hoped the US would support its position based on 
the KR's appalling human rights record. US officials instead put pressure on ASEAN officials to 
compromise. Secretary of State Haig and Assistant Secretary of State Holdridge told the ASEAN 
foreign ministers that they should support China because Deng was a moderate under pressure from
the left. The US Ambassadors in Bangkok and Manila even contacted Prime Minister Prem and 
President Marcos respectively to bring their foreign ministers into line153. In the resulting ICK 
declaration, the line about legitimate concerns of neighbouring states was watered down to 
“recognises the legitimate security concerns of all states of the region” whilst the interim 
government was changed to “appropriate measures for law and order” and the line on disarming 
factions changed to “appropriate arrangements to ensure that armed Kampuchean factions will not 
be able to prevent or disrupt the holding of free elections”154. Tommy Koh reportedly fought hard on
the issue of disarming the factions running up against China's UN Ambassador Lin Qing who tried 
to defend the KR according to international law. Koh stated that international law did not apply to 
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the 'barbarous' KR and proceeded to list the KR's atrocities155. The fact that ASEAN gave in to 
Chinese wishes showed acquiescence to China and the US. However, Koh pointed out that the ICK 
was a success in demonstrating ASEAN's sincerity in seeking a political solution which would take 
into account the security concerns of Vietnam, and also that ASEAN was not colluding with China 
but pursuing its own position156.
Although ASEAN could not get agreement from China on disarming the Khmer Rouge after
a Vietnamese withdrawal, China was willing to accept a neutral Cambodia that was not ruled by the 
KR. This was a positive step for ASEAN's vision of order; however, the KR was still the dominant 
force in opposition to the Vietnamese and therefore a non-communist 'third force' was needed that 
could usurp the KR and gain the support of the majority of the Cambodian population who were 
opposed to the KR and the Vietnamese. This would reduce the risk of a post-conflict Cambodia 
becoming a satellite of China. Ghazali Shafie said that “since the Chinese do not want to disarm the 
KR we'll have to build a countervailing non-communist force”157. Because ASEAN had been given 
diplomatic leadership in the division of labour opposing Vietnam, it was able to use its 'primary 
manager' role to create a coalition between the Cambodian factions, providing a practical means of 
diluting the KR's influence, and by extension China's influence. Tony Siddique, the Singaporean 
diplomat who led the coalition negotiations, reported that this was the long-term aim of the 
CGDK158. The opportunity to do so came when maintaining diplomatic recognition for the 
Democratic Kampuchean government became difficult as further revelations of KR atrocities 
emerged. By 1980, the UK and Australia had withdrawn their recognition and India had formally 
recognised the PRK as the legitimate Cambodian government. On Lee Kuan Yew's visit to Beijing 
in November 1980 Deng agreed that the Khmer Rouge were detrimental to the legitimacy of the DK
and so a coalition should be sought. Deng agreed to support and encourage the establishment of a 
non-communist force and that it would accept the emergence of an independent Cambodian 
government even if China did not have special influence159. 
Singapore led the coalition negotiations involving the KR, the Kampuchean People's 
National Liberation Front (KPNLF) led by Son Sann and the faction loyal to Prince Sihanouk 
known as the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative 
Cambodia (FUNCINPEC). Singapore offered the non-communist factions assistance if they joined 
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the coalition and then publicly denounced them when they stalled negotiations. They were warned 
that they risked legitimising the PRK if they did not unite. An agreement was brokered in Singapore
in October 1981 with Sihanouk serving as President, Son Sann as Prime Minister and the Khieu 
Samphan of the KR serving as Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs. Malaysia also offered 
material assistance to the coalition should a full agreement be reached. After negotiations again 
stalled, ASEAN stoked speculation that the DK would lose its UN seat. The formation of the CGDK
was finally announced in Kuala Lumpur in June 1982160. Lee Kuan Yew informed Sihanouk that it 
was essential for the non-communists to create a countervailing force to the KR and that Sihanouk 
and other non-communists in the CGDK should go on a diplomatic offensive to rally support as 
well as encourage their forces to fight as the KR fight. This would give them more credibility in the 
search for aid161. Securing China's agreement on the CGDK went some way to making up for the 
compromises made at the ICK. However, the ASEAN states realised the task of bolstering the non-
communist Cambodian resistance factions would require the US assistance. 
Keeping the US as the 'offshore great power guarantor'
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were also keen to maintain the US' 'offshore great power 
guarantor' role so that China did not de facto become the sole guarantor of Southeast Asian order. 
They tried to bring the US into the plan to bolster the non-communist factions within the CGDK. 
Tommy Koh revealed that Singapore lobbied aggressively in Washington for the US to provide 
aid162. Lee Kuan Yew similarly stated that he and S Rajaratnam had worked hard to ensure the US 
remained interested in the region163. He found the Americans reluctant to be involved in a guerilla 
war on the Asian mainland but that Singaporean officials were able to get them to provide modest 
aid. In June 1981 Lee reported to President Reagan how Deng had assured that China did not want 
any satellites in Southeast Asia and would respect whoever won a free vote. This helped win 
Reagan's support and in August 1982, US officials committed $4 million of non-lethal aid to non-
communist groups. In July 1984 Lee sought more support from the US, warning Secretary of State 
George Shultz that China was benefiting from the current arrangement because it was receiving 
political support for its arming of the KR. The US should consider increased aid to the non-
communists because they had shown promise on the battlefield and were enjoying more support 
from the people164. There seemed to be hope when in 1985 Reagan announced a new doctrine of 
160 Jones (2012: 86).
161 Ang (2013: 59).
162 Koh (1998: 189).
163 Lee (2000: 336)
164  Lee (2000: 337-338).
177
support for “freedom fighters” battling against Soviet proxies around the world165. A Thai-
Malaysian-Singapore-US group was set up to coordinate aid to the non-communist Cambodians, 
but opposition in the US Congress prevented the US from providing large amounts of aid. The 
group's Singaporean representative estimated that the US dispensed $150 million in covert and 
overt aid to the non-communists with the Southeast Asian states providing a further $65 million. 
This was dwarfed by China's $100 million to non-communist forces and $1 billion to the KR166. 
However, the assistance to the non-communist factions buttressed the diplomatic initiative of 
creating the CGDK, which by extension was aimed at reducing China's influence in Cambodia.   
Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia also worked to maintain US provision of security public 
goods through its military presence in the maritime sub-region and assistance to ASEAN states. As 
mentioned above, the Carter administration reduced assistance to ASEAN states between 1975 and 
1979. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia reignited US concern to bolster the ASEAN states 
with increased economic and military aid in the face of the intruding Sino-Soviet conflict. It also 
provided further impetus to the US-Philippines bases treaty negotiations, concluded just days after 
Vietnam began its invasion. The Philippines accepted only half the amount of aid Marcos had 
requested and there were no new US commitments to Philippine security. Marcos accepted this less 
favourable offer - which he had previously rejected in 1976 - because of pressure from other 
ASEAN states167. 
However, there remained concerns that the US was overlooking ASEAN in its efforts to 
improve ties with China. This became especially acute after the US' decision to consider selling 
arms to China in June 1981 without any prior consultation with Indonesia or Malaysia, as well as its
decision to support China rather than ASEAN in their disagreements over the ICK declaration168. 
Specifically it was feared that any efforts to enhance China's modernisation would increase the 
CCP's capability to support subversion. For Suharto this added to concerns that Indonesia was being
shunned by the US as a regional leader in favour of China169. Suharto addressed this issue on a state 
visit to the US in October 1982. US officials hoped the visit would symbolise “U.S. recognition of 
Indonesia as a major Asian power”170 and allay fears that the US would sacrifice ASEAN interests 
165  Martini (2007: 108).
166 Lee (2000: 338).
167 Simon (1982: 8).
168 Buszynski (1983: 241-242).
169  Haacke (2003: 105).
170  Memorandum to the President from Deputy Secretary of State, Kenneth W Dam, “Your meeting with President 
Soeharto of Indonesia, October 12 1982”  October 1st 1982. 
<http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB242/19821000_briefingpaper.pdf> accessed 30/9/13.
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in pursuing ties with China. Suharto told President Reagan of his concerns regarding China and said
that in US efforts to modernise China, attention should also be paid to assisting ASEAN in 
combating subversion. Reagan replied that Indonesia had “[the US'] full cooperation to maintain 
stability in Southeast Asia and not to disturb it through [US] policies towards China”171. 
Suharto brought up the issue again with Vice President George H. W Bush in May 1984 in 
the wake of President Reagan's trip to China. Bush reiterated that the improvement of US-China ties
would not be pursued at ASEAN's expense and went further to state that “if [the US] saw evidence 
of Chinese support to insurgencies within ASEAN [it] would voice [its] opposition to the Chinese 
immediately”. He reported that the Chinese had learnt from Reagan's visit that the US would “not 
turn away from old friends like Taiwan, Indonesia and other ASEAN countries” and assured that 
“[t]he PRC respects this”. He expressed the US' desire for an “inward-looking China with improved
trade and economic ties … but not armed so as to threaten its neighbours”. Suharto was apparently 
reassured and said that he would pass these views along to other ASEAN leaders who had instructed
him to raise these concerns172. To show that it was committed to Indonesia's modernisation as well 
as China's, in 1986 the US approved a record breaking $300 million dollars’ worth of military sales 
to Indonesia including a batch of twelve F-16 fighter jets.  
Indonesia also took steps to involve the US more directly in the resolution of the Cambodian
conflict. In 1985 Mochtar tried to appeal to Vietnam's desire to normalise ties with the US by 
linking a resolution to the conflict to US-Vietnamese normalisation. Chinese Foreign Minister Wu 
reportedly agreed to the proposal which constituted a softening of China's approach towards a 
political rather than military resolution173. Although there was no official US response to the 
proposal, Reagan seemed to indicate a more active US involvement in regional conflicts in a speech
to the UN General Assembly shortly afterwards. He called on the Soviet Union to be more active 
with the US in negotiating such conflicts. Nothing materialised at the time, but in 1988 at the US-
Soviet summit meeting Reagan indicated that the two leaders would discuss Cambodia and that he 
would urge the Soviets to encourage Vietnam to be more responsive to efforts at conflict 
resolution174. This mainly took on momentum in the late 1980s as the great power environment 
became more amenable to conflict resolution rather than being a direct result of Indonesian efforts. 
171  Memorandum of Conversation, “Summary of President's plenary session with President Soeharto” October 12th 
1982 <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB242/19821000_summary_plenary.pdf> accessed 30/9/13
172  Memorandum from the Embassy in Jakarta to the White House, “Vice President's meeting with President Suharto” 
12th May 1984 <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB242/19840512.pdf> accessed 30/9/13.
173  Van der Kroef (1986c: 41-42).
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Indonesia's activism clearly reflected its desire for status recognition regarding its own 
position within ASEAN and the wider region. However, Indonesia was unable to do more to retain 
the US' engagement through its military presence than merely express concerns privately and hope 
that the US would acknowledge them. The difficulty in publicly declaring such support became 
apparent after the fall of Marcos in 1986 reopened the debate on US bases in the Philippines. 
Nationalist Philippine constituencies were far more critical of US bases, making the task of 
negotiating with the US more difficult for the new Aquino government. Foreign Secretary Raul 
Manglapus sought to legitimise the US military presence by eliciting a public ASEAN expression of
its benefits and possibly redistributing military facilities throughout Southeast Asia. Manglapus 
argued that the bases were for wider regional security and to protect 'choke points' which were not 
in the Philippines but rather in the straits abutting Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore175. The other 
ASEAN states considered such a declaration of support as too public. This was especially so for 
Indonesia as it was considered to compromise bebas actif and ZOPFAN, which would incite 
nationalist opinion176. The reluctance of leaders to engage in public debate on the US' presence 
again highlighted how sensitive certain domestic constituencies were to links with external powers. 
This raised difficulties in terms of ensuring the maintenance of the US' 'offshore great power 
guarantor' role if the bases in the Philippines were closed. As we will see in the next chapter, these 
uncertainties were heightened as the Cold War came to an end and the strategic logic for US bases 
throughout the region was removed.
Implications for China's 'regional great power guarantor' and ASEAN's 'primary manager' 
roles
As outlined in the introduction to this thesis, roles help us capture the relationships of legitimacy 
between actors that are constitutive of power177. By successfully claiming a legitimate social role, an
actor is enabled to use the role as a resource to facilitate political and social action178. This is 
because through negotiation the role becomes associated with certain order functions that contribute
to the management of regional order. They have a shared existence within international society and 
contribute to maintaining the shared rules that govern interaction, which in turn enable actors to 
pursue their private and collective goals. Through becoming a performer of a particular role, the 
175  Manglapus (1988: 52). 
176  Ba (2009: 162-165).
177 Bukovansky et al (2012).
178Baker and Faulkner (1991), Callero (1994).
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actor can legitimately mobilise material and social resources in the performance of these associated 
functions.
The response to China’s role claims took two broad forms: regional legitimation and 
regional reticence and resistance. The legitimation of China's role included Thailand's substantive 
endorsement through its quasi-alliance with China and ASEAN's borderline 
performative/substantive endorsement through providing diplomatic leadership that complimented 
China's 'holding the line' function. This provided the cumulative endorsement that gave China’s 
'regional great power guarantor' role legitimacy. The endorsement of China's role claim by the US 
and ASEAN enabled it to employ political and military action to enact its containment strategy. This
is because through negotiation between the US, China and ASEAN states, the function of 'militarily 
holding the line' against Vietnamese-Soviet expansionism became a shared order function intrinsic 
to the 'regional great power guarantor' role. China's performance of this function was viewed by 
ASEAN and the US as contributing to the management of regional order. China's punitive invasion 
of Vietnam and its support for the KR as part of its strategy of 'bleeding Vietnam white' were 
facilitated by China’s successful framing of these actions as part of its military guarantee. It was 
using the 'regional great power guarantor' role as a resource to gain access to material, logistical and
political support, particularly from the US and Thailand but also less directly from the other 
ASEAN states and other key actors such as Japan. 
In contrast, the denial of Vietnam's claim to the 'indigenous great power buffer' role was a 
major constraint. Its strategy was made far more costly in terms of material resources and also 
socially. It could not achieve recognition for the PRK in Cambodia, was bogged down within 
Cambodia fighting the strengthened KR resistance and was alienated in international forums cutting
it off from sources of external aid and assistance. It became increasingly dependent on the Soviet 
Union and as such, when Soviet aid and assistance was withdrawn in the late 1980s, it had to 
abandon its strategy and its 'indigenous great power buffer' role conception experienced role death. 
This was despite the fact that Vietnam's role claim appealed to some constituencies within the 
region - particularly in Indonesia - that identified China as a threat. The indigenous character of 
Vietnam's claim resonated with the Indonesian understanding of ZOPFAN as insulating Southeast 
Asia from great power involvement. The means through which Vietnam claimed its role – 
alignment with a great power in order to use force against another state, coupled with a blatant 
rejection of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role and apparent establishment of an alternative 
communist regional order - meant that even constituencies sympathetic to Vietnam could not sway 
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the opinion of the majority of ASEAN stakeholders.   
The degree of endorsement for China's role was circumscribed by the regional reticence and 
resistance to China’s role-taking that came from Malaysia and Indonesia. This was driven by 
concern that endorsement of China's 'regional great power guarantor' role would contribute to 
Chinese hegemony in the longer term. Considering the scope of China's 'regional great power 
guarantor' role claim - as a military guarantee for the region - and in the context of its military 
modernisation, there was a danger that the US might subcontract security public goods in general to
China and that ASEAN may de facto endorse China's sole guarantor role in Southeast Asia. 
However, China's legitimacy as a regional great power turned not just on its provision of military 
functions in Indochina but more crucially on its support for regional insurgency movements, its 
position on overseas Chinese and its long term interests and behaviour in view of its modernisation. 
That these last three aspects remained uncertain created a sense in the region of a 'China threat'.
The efforts to reach out to Vietnam and try to resolve the conflict in a way that excluded 
China and established an ASEAN-Vietnam role bargain failed both because of Vietnamese 
intransigence and because maintaining ASEAN unity in the performance of its 'primary manager' 
role within the China-ASEAN bargain was considered more important. The overall result was the 
limiting of China’s 'regional great power guarantor' role to the specific circumstances of the 
Cambodian conflict and the assertion of ASEAN’s 'primary manager' role in providing diplomatic 
leadership as a means to secure its vision of regional order over the full extent of Southeast Asia. 
ASEAN subsumed Cambodia within its own vision of regional order through ensuring a post-
occupation Cambodia remained independent and that the influence of the KR (and by extension 
China) was diluted. ASEAN was able to fully enact its role in mainland Southeast Asia after the 
Cambodian conflict was resolved and the Indochinese states committed to the process of joining 
ASEAN. China's role-taking was limited to the functional aspects specific to the Cambodian 
conflict rather than a full great power role-taking at a structural level179. The push to maintain the 
US' engagement in the region, its military presence in maritime Southeast Asia and provision of 
security public goods, aimed at ensuring that the US' endorsement of China performing security 
functions did not go too far and that the US remained the 'offshore great power guarantor'. Events in
1989 relieved some of the pressure in this respect, although the end of the Cold War and resolution 
of the Cambodian conflict created further uncertainties. 
179  We can think of a more structural level role-taking in terms of Thies' (2012) socialisation game whereby a successful 
socialisation occurs when a state is socialised into a 'meta role' that accords with the structural distribution of 
capabilities as well as the normative structure. See chapter One.
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The end of the Cold War and resolution of the Cambodian conflict
The years 1989-1990 presented a certain paradox with respect to China's role-taking. The 
normalisation of relations between Indonesia and China removed the last major obstacle to the 
recognition of the PRC as a legitimate actor in Southeast Asia. It represented the downgrading of 
the threat from communist subversion and the decoupling of the question of relations with China 
from internal ethnic Chinese issues. At the same time, the resolution of the Cambodian conflict 
removed the basis for role-taking thus far and delegitimised China's military activity in Southeast 
Asia180. China's 'regional great power guarantor' role was no longer relevant because there was no 
longer a 'holding the line' function to perform. 
Despite this, relations with China were much improved as two of the major issues regarding 
the China threat were no longer particularly relevant. Communist insurgencies no longer threatened 
regime stability. The MCP ended its insurgency against the Malaysian government in 1989 and Chin
Peng's reappearance at the Thai-Malaysian border was seen by many to have been encouraged by 
China181. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen promised Suharto in February 1989 that China would no 
longer support communist parties in Southeast Asia and Indonesia's Minister of State for the State 
Secretariat Moerdiono expressed his conviction that China's commitment to non-interference meant 
both non-interference from the government and the CCP182. Similarly, the ethnic Chinese issue was 
also downgraded when in 1989 China signed the Law of Citizenship which essentially severed ties 
with overseas Chinese. This resolved the issue of China's residual status as a subversive communist 
state.
On top of this, the June 1989 Tiananmen crackdown reduced fears regarding improving 
Sino-US relations; sanctions stopped US military exports to China and the event highlighted China's
domestic problems which would keep it preoccupied and inward-looking. The international 
condemnation of China in the wake of Tiananmen made ASEAN states more wary that their own 
domestic policies could be subject to scrutiny by the West as the strategic imperatives of the Cold 
War were removed. This was a particular concern because of dependence on Western foreign 
investment and exports to Western markets. For this reason ASEAN made a point of not joining the 
condemnation of China.
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There thus arose a perceived need to reduce economic dependence on the West. In this 
respect China increasingly came to be seen as an economic opportunity. Indeed economic 
considerations were prominent in the Indonesian decision to pursue normalisation. Until the early 
1980s Indonesia's economy had enjoyed sustained growth. This was seriously affected by the 
decline of oil prices which made up 80 per cent of Indonesia's exports and 70 per cent of 
government revenue183. In this context, the opening and reforming China provided an opportunity 
for diversifying Indonesia's export markets and boosting non-oil exports. The business community 
pushed throughout the 1980s for Indonesia to gain access to Chinese markets. Normalisation was 
made more imperative by the fact that the Suharto regime's domestic legitimacy increasingly relied 
on its ability to provide economic growth and development. It could no longer rely on its claim to 
be maintaining stability because the myth of an imminent threat from communist subversion was no
longer credible184. A similar logic motivated other regional leaderships as we saw with Mahathir's 
administration. With subversion no longer a serious threat, China and Vietnam could both contribute
to, and have a stake in, regional order through economic links. Indeed, Vietnam would 
enthusiastically pursue the path to membership within ASEAN.
Despite this, concerns regarding  China's potential hegemony and claims to the South China 
Sea became more salient as China continued its military modernisation and as the end of the Cold 
War and Philippine nationalism threatened the withdrawal of the US' military presence in Southeast 
Asia. US retrenchment had significant implications for regional order as the ASEAN states would 
be left alone to face a rising China and a potentially resurgent Japan. Within this strategic 
uncertainty, the ASEAN states, individually and collectively, took steps to provide a new basis for 
legitimising not only the US' engagement, but also the engagement of other great powers within the 
region. This involved ASEAN's creation of its 'regional conductor' role which the next chapter will 
turn to.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown how the Third Indochina Conflict can be viewed within a broader 
negotiation of social roles in Southeast Asia. It showed how the key negotiation was China's 
'regional great power guarantor' role-taking in opposition to Vietnam's role claim, but also how 
183  Sukma (1999: 144).
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ASEAN asserted its own 'primary manager' role in an effort to limits China's role-taking. China's 
'regional great power guarantor' role was based on the specific circumstances of the Cambodian 
conflict. The negotiations focused quite specifically around the Third Indochina Conflict and the 
guarantee was based on protecting non-communist Southeast Asia from Soviet-Vietnamese 
expansion. With this threat gone, there was no longer a basis for China's military guarantee. 
Coming to the end of the period there remained many uncertainties as to China's long term 
aims. Despite this, social foundations were laid. China as a regional great power was here to stay. It 
no longer posed the same threat of subversion and offered an economic opportunity for regional 
states seeking to diversify their economic dependence. China's role would increasingly take on this 
economic aspect but as a broader great power. China needed a new basis for its legitimacy to be 
negotiated. Also, ASEAN members further realised the value of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role  
and the importance of unity for this role. This, together with the fact that this period affirmed for 
external powers that ASEAN, and not the great powers, performed the function of diplomatic 
leadership in the region, provided social foundations from which ASEAN engaged in creating its 
'regional conductor' role. ASEAN would attempt to use the role to address post-Cold War 
uncertainties and provide a legitimate basis for a new bargain on a post-Cold War division of labour
to shape the emerging order.   
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Chapter Four - Role creation: ASEAN and post-Cold War East Asia
In the last two chapters we saw how a key aspect of the role bargains reached between ASEAN and 
the US and China was ASEAN's 'primary manager' role in Southeast Asia. ASEAN's performance 
of diplomatic leadership as part of its 'primary manager' role served to legitimise the common goal 
of containment, firstly of communism more generally, and then more specifically Soviet-
Vietnamese communism during the Cambodian conflict. The US and subsequently China, 
performed the function of 'holding the line' within Indochina as part of their respective great power 
guarantor roles. However, the end of the Cold War and the resolution of the Cambodian conflict in 
1991 removed the need for containment and thus the basis upon which the previous role bargains 
had been built. There was no longer a threat to hold the line against and there was no longer the 
common goal of containment which the great powers required ASEAN to legitimise through its 
diplomatic initiatives. How would ASEAN cope in a context where the strategic rationale for the 
division of labour between itself and the US and China was removed? It was possible that ASEAN 
would become irrelevant in the emerging order.
Yet, since the end of the Cold War ASEAN has been central to negotiations over regional 
cooperation not just in Southeast Asia, but in Asia more generally. In the early 1990s ASEAN 
supplied an inclusive forum to bring together all the major regional powers and players, something 
that other actors were unable to do. Through this process all powers agreed to ASEAN's TAC as a 
regional code of conduct, and to dialogue as a key aspect of regional strategic engagement, no mean
feat considering the US' and China's scepticism and opposition to multilateralism in the initial post-
Cold War years. Since then, despite challenges, ASEAN has remained central to further negotiations
over regional institutions, regional trade agreements and the broader regional agenda. All the great 
powers and regional players have participated in ASEAN processes and have acceded to the TAC, 
committing themselves to rules defined by ASEAN. ASEAN has thus extended its diplomatic 
leadership beyond its own subregion into the wider Asia-Pacific. ASEAN is no longer just 
legitimising great power imperatives with respect to common causes such as in the Indochina 
conflicts, but actually leading great powers in shaping institutions and establishing rules in the 
wider region. Considering ASEAN's limited material resources, it seems that it has had too much of 
a say in how regional order should look and be managed. This chapter argues that this extension of 
ASEAN's diplomatic leadership is part of its newly created 'regional conductor' role, built on the 
foundations of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. ASEAN developed an institutional and normative 
framework through its diplomatic leadership within Southeast Asia. This gave ASEAN a platform 
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for practically engaging the great powers in the post-Cold War years, but also a basis for ASEAN to 
claim its competence to perform similar functions at the wider Asia-Pacific level.
ASEAN's post-Cold War diplomatic leadership takes us right back to the central puzzle that 
this thesis began with: why have a group of small to medium sized states played such a prominent 
part in order negotiation and management during times of transition and crisis? The thesis' 
introduction highlighted how the role negotiation framework addresses this puzzle in a more 
comprehensive and nuanced manner than realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism, which
all ultimately end up relying on a structural argument for ASEAN's prominence, whether material or
normative1. Realism roots ASEAN's prominence in a material-structural explanation of great power 
rivalry: the great powers had subcontracted institution-building and norm provision to ASEAN 
because it is too costly to do so themselves2. As already outlined, this explanation does not account 
for ASEAN's agency nor the ebb and flow of great power endorsement and contestation for 
ASEAN's prominence. Likewise, Kawasaki's argument does not account for these either as his 
'assurance game' also relies on players remaining in a particular context whereby making reassuring
moves is considered beneficial3. If they begin to defect then ASEAN will no longer be relevant. He 
also relies on an analysis of the ARF rather than a broader analysis of ASEAN-led institutions. 
Acharya's constructivist approach looks extensively at ASEAN's agency in building a number of 
institutions and promoting its norms4. Ultimately however, Acharya also relies on a structural 
explanation for ASEAN's prominence: ASEAN has developed a normative structure in the region 
that supports its leadership. As we saw, the evidence for the existence of such an ASEAN-
determined normative structure can be questioned, especially in light of great power rivalry and 
ASEAN states' own deviation from established norms5. It is necessary to apply a framework that is 
less rigid and can thereby better accommodate ASEAN and great power agency in determining the 
shape of the region. The role negotiation framework can do this by capturing the mutual 
understandings ASEAN and the great powers develop in terms of their role bargains. This chapter 
builds on the analysis of Chapter Two and Three and argues that ASEAN has created a 'regional 
conductor' role in the wider Asia-Pacific region that is embedded within a division of labour that 
includes complementary functions for the US, China and Japan. ASEAN has been able to use its 
1 See the 'Alternative Explanations' discussion in the Introduction to the thesis.
2 Tow (2012). See also Leifer (1996), Emmers (2003).
3Kawasaki (2006).
4Acharya (2009, 2014). Ba's (2009) account is not structural but looks at 'complex interaction'. She does not look at 
ASEAN-great power negotiations over the performance of functions in the region however, focusing mostly on 
ASEAN's identity and status.
5See Jones (2012).
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'regional conductor' role to keep itself central at key points of order negotiation and management 
because it has been able to successfully re-conceptualise, reclaim and renegotiate the legitimacy of 
its role. ASEAN has also sought to steer negotiations over functions in a way that maintains, and 
further entrenches, a division of labour which includes: the US continuing to provide security public
goods, but maintaining its identity as the 'offshore great power guarantor'; China providing regional 
economic public goods but also strategic restraint, emphasising its “responsible” identity as the 
'responsible regional great power'; Japan performing regional economic and financial public goods 
through its 'regional economic great power' role; and ASEAN providing diplomatic leadership as 
the 'regional conductor'.
This chapter proceeds by analysing role negotiation between the great powers and ASEAN 
to see how ASEAN created its 'regional conductor' role, and how ASEAN has used the role to 
maintain its position in regional order negotiation and management. The chapter has three key 
findings.
First, a division of labour can be identified in the post-Cold War period. ASEAN has upheld 
its 'regional conductor role' and negotiated great powers into complementary roles that utilise their 
material capabilities in performing regional order functions. For example, the US' superior military 
capabilities for security public goods provision and Japan and China's economic resources for 
regional financial public goods. However, this has been realised through a series of transitional role 
bargains and therefore, the post-Cold War period has lacked the clear role bargains of the previous 
chapters. The post-Cold War bargains have been transitional because they have only served to 
manage the challenges of that particular phase of negotiation and therefore the tentative mutually 
reinforcing legitimacy dynamics are soon challenged, making a new round of negotiation necessary.
In particular, the US' tendency towards interference in terms of human rights, democracy 
promotion, economic liberalisation and doctrine of 'pre-emption' during the War on Terrorism, has 
challenged the 'offshore' identity of its great power guarantor role and ASEAN's status as a 
successful manager of Southeast Asian order. China's desire to institutionalise regionalism that 
excludes the US challenges ASEAN's performance of 'inclusive engagement' function and suggests 
it wants to take on diplomatic leadership for itself. China's actions in the South China Sea also raise 
questions over whether it will be a 'responsible' regional great power and contest ASEAN's rule-
making function in the SCS. The legitimacy of ASEAN's role has to constantly be fought for.
Second, the 'regional conductor' role has been maintained despite challenges because 
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ASEAN has been able to re-conceptualise, reclaim and renegotiate the legitimacy of the role at each
of these junctures of role negotiation. At times of challenge from one constituency of legitimation - 
when role deterioration seemed possible - ASEAN leveraged off endorsement from another 
constituency to use its role to negotiate another transitional role bargain. However, to keep receiving
endorsement from different constituencies, ASEAN has had to balance competing role expectations;
this avoids role deterioration on the one hand, but also precludes role consolidation on the other. For
its Chinese constituency, ASEAN has had to maintain informality and a pace comfortable for all, as 
well as keeping the ASEAN Plus Three exclusive regionalism open to channel China’s attention and
interest. To satisfy its Western constituency, ASEAN has had to pursue internal reforms led by 
liberal constituencies within ASEAN. These reforms have sought to uphold ASEAN's status as a 
successful manager of intra-Southeast Asian relations by taking on functions such as democracy and
human rights promotion as part of the 'primary manager' role. As in the previous chapters, we 
therefore see how the 'primary manager' and 'regional conductor' roles need to accommodate or 
advance great power agendas. This is made all the more complicated however by ASEAN's 
perceived neutral status. Unlike in the previous two chapters - when ASEAN exercised its 
diplomatic leadership to legitimise great power strategic imperatives, clearly taking sides in conflict
- in the post-Cold War context, ASEAN's diplomatic leadership has been based on it explicitly not 
taking sides. ASEAN's efforts to appear neutral hinder its ability to take substantive positions on 
regional issues as it could be accused of taking sides6. This ostensibly keeps ASEAN as the only 
actor able to accommodate all the great powers' interests, but at the same time undermines 
ASEAN's claims to its 'centrality' in regional affairs as it cannot address substantive issues between 
the great powers.
Third, ASEAN has created the 'regional conductor' role to try to shape the regional order 
outside of Southeast Asia, whilst maintaining the 'primary manager' role with respect to intra-
Southeast Asian order. The two roles are linked by the fact that the perceived competence of 
ASEAN to perform functions at the wider East Asian/Asia-Pacific level depends on its perceived 
success as the 'primary manager' within Southeast Asian order. This has created a tension between 
the two roles as the 'primary manager' role seeks to insulate Southeast Asia from external 
interference whereas the 'regional conductor' role requires ASEAN reform norms such as non-
interference in order to give the impression to liberal domestic constituencies and Western states 
that it is acting as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order. Newer members in particular have
viewed ASEAN's 'primary manager' role in the narrow sense of insulating regimes from external 
6  Interview with Rodolfo Severino, ISEAS, Singapore, 3/3/14.
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pressure for political liberalisation. Older members see the necessity of seeking to shape the wider 
East Asia/Asia-Pacific region to maximise ASEAN's autonomy and avoid domination and 
marginalisation. The need for ASEAN unity has meant that the less progressive views within 
ASEAN have needed to be accommodated within ASEAN agreements. This results in 
dissatisfaction for liberal domestic constituencies and Western constituencies as reform falls well 
short of that anticipated, showing ASEAN up as a rather unsuccesful manager of Southeast Asian 
order when it comes to promoting liberal norms and values.
This chapter explores three phases of role negotiation that have brought about cumulative 
transitional role bargains, as well as corresponding re-conceptualisation of ASEAN's identity. First, 
the 'regional conductor' role was created between 1989 and 1994 through early negotiations over the
US' military presence in Southeast Asia, how to manage China and the ARF. This established the 
first transitional role bargain by improving the context for US engagement with East Asian states 
through its 'offshore great power guarantor' role, providing a forum for the on-going negotiation 
over China’s emerging 'responsible regional great power' role and creating ASEAN’s 'regional 
conductor' role.
The second phase between 1997 and 2005 saw ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role threatened
with deterioration and possible death by Western contestation and the Asian Financial Crisis. 
ASEAN leveraged off Japanese and Chinese endorsement to institutionalise East Asian regionalism,
establishing mechanisms through which to channel Sino-Japanese competition over the provision of
regional economic and financial order functions and a vision for regional community. When Sino-
Japanese competition came to a head over the East Asia Summit, ASEAN reasserted its control over
the direction of regionalism by brokering a compromise with itself at the centre. ASEAN thus ended
this phase by further entrenching its 'regional conductor' role within an East Asian transitional role 
bargain.
These challenges were followed by major re-conceptualisation of ASEAN's identity as it 
enlarged to encompass all 10 states of Southeast Asia and committed to creating an ASEAN 
Community. Through enlargement, ASEAN increased its collective clout but also came under 
significant pressure from the US and the EU to not admit Myanmar. ASEAN asserted its autonomy 
as 'primary manager' by admitting Myanmar, but to address its legitimacy deficit with the West, also
took responsibility for democracy and human rights promotion in Southeast Asia. Through the 
ASEAN Community initiative, ASEAN more clearly took on the responsibility for democracy and 
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human rights promotion as well as some security functions; however, different understandings of 
ASEAN's 'primary manager' and 'regional conductor' roles by different members hindered progress.
The final phase saw ASEAN expand its 'regional conductor' role after 2008 by seeing off 
other proposals for new regional architecture, receiving renewed endorsement from the US and 
developing additional forums with which it performed the 'inclusive engagement' function. Chinese 
assertiveness in the South China Sea and the US rebalance to Asia complicated the performance of 
ASEAN's role however because great power rivalry began to test ASEAN unity and neutrality. The 
final re-conceptualisation was therefore concerned with maintaining ASEAN's united identity and 
collective neutrality with respect to great power politics.    
This chapter concludes with the wider implications of these negotiations for East Asian 
regional order in the post-Cold War period. In particular these negotiations show that ASEAN’s 
performance of its 'regional conductor' role is not entirely satisfying to any constituency of 
legitimation, within ASEAN or external to ASEAN. The fact that there is periodic contestation and, 
at most, performative endorsement of the role as opposed to substantive endorsement, means that it 
sits in a precarious balance between consolidation and deterioration. In this way, ASEAN's 'regional
conductor' role is limited in its impact on regional order. ASEAN cannot address a foundational 
bargain over order and great power roles, which must be agreed between the great powers 
themselves.  
CREATING THE REGIONAL CONDUCTOR ROLE: 1989-1994
This section shows how ASEAN addressed the uncertainty surrounding social roles in the initial 
post-Cold War years through engaging the US and China and establishing the ARF. Through doing 
so, ASEAN was able to legitimise the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role in the post-Cold 
War context, begin a process of socialising China into a 'responsible regional great power' role and, 
most notably, create its own 'regional conductor' role.
Post-Cold War uncertainty
With the end of the Cold War and Cambodian conflict, ASEAN's most acute concern was possible 
US retrenchment, which would represent a reneging of the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role
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based on the provision of security public goods7. The end of the Cold War removed the rationale for
the US' military presence and domestic pressure within the US raised questions over the necessity 
of maintaining military commitments to East Asian states that were considered economic 
competitors. Japan in particular was accused of free-riding on the US' security guarantee – allowing
the US to bear the cost of security whilst it reaped the benefits of an economic strategy - and the 
US' trade deficit with Japan was a source of friction. With the US' commitment to alliances in 
doubt, ASEAN states saw the need to provide a sound basis for US strategic and military 
engagement in East and Southeast Asia in order to ensure the continued provision of security public 
goods.
 
A rising China also needed a legitimate basis for its involvement in the region after the end 
of the Cambodian conflict. Unlike the US, China was in the region to stay. China’s opening and 
growing economy posed a challenge for ASEAN states as it could serve to divert investment away 
from Southeast Asia. However, the Chinese market also represented an economic opportunity for 
ASEAN investment. There was thus potential for China to contribute to regional economic 
development. Strategically, China still represented a possible threat because of its sheer size and the
uncertainty surrounding its claims to the South China Sea (SCS). In 1992 it passed the Law on 
Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas through which it formally asserted its claim to over 80 per 
cent of the South China Sea and stipulated the right to use force to protect its sovereignty over 
islands in the Spratly and Paracel groups. This represented a southern expansion of China's 
sovereign rights deep into the heart of Southeast Asia and meant its claims overlapped with ASEAN
states including Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei, as well as a future member, Vietnam. 
Considering its use of force against Vietnam in 1974 and 1988, ASEAN states feared that China 
could seek to secure its claims through coercion and the use of force to the detriment of rule-
governed order within Southeast Asia. They were especially concerned considering the US’ 
withdrawal from the Philippines. ASEAN needed to negotiate China’s emerging role in a way that 
would prevent it seeking hegemony or asserting its claims to the SCS through use of force and 
coercion.
On top of this was the potential irrelevance of ASEAN in the emerging order. With the Cold 
War and the Cambodian conflict over, the goal of 'containment' was no longer relevant and there 
was less need for the great powers to use ASEAN to legitimise their strategic imperatives. ASEAN's
'primary manager' role thus no longer had the same strategic import as it had once had. Unlike in 
7  For post-Cold War uncertainty in Southeast Asia see Khong (2004) and Goh (2014b).
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previous decades, the principal conflicts and issues in Asia were not concentrated in Southeast Asia 
and so ASEAN faced being marginalised within regional discussions on security. ASEAN needed to
find a means of ensuring its continued relevance, avoiding marginalisation on the one hand and 
domination on the other.
The US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role: places not bases
To ensure the US' continued provision of security public goods as the 'offshore great power 
guarantor', the ASEAN states came to a consensus on the basis upon which the US presence could 
be accommodated. As we saw in the previous chapter, in the late 1980s an open debate on the 
benefits of the US' military presence was impossible for Malaysian and Indonesian leaders 
committed to the principles of ZOPFAN. In the early 1990s however, the closure of US bases in the 
Philippines meant that Malaysian and Indonesian leaders could no longer officially espouse a non-
aligned stance whilst relying on the US presence in the Philippines.
This shift was seen particularly in the contrasting responses to Singapore's moves to increase
its ties with the US in 1990 and 1992 and offer the US logistical alternatives for its military 
presence in place of Philippine base closures. In 1990, Singapore signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) with the US, offering access to Sembawang Dockyard, training facilities at 
Paya Lebar Airport as well as allowing some US service personnel to be stationed in Singapore. 
This provoked a strong response from Malaysian and Indonesian officials who criticised the move 
as undermining regional resilience. The response to a second MOU in 1992 however, was one of 
support8. Singapore offered to host the US' logistics command for the western Pacific and, by this 
point, there was a significant rolling deployment of US naval and air personnel coming through the 
city state9. Malaysia and Indonesia began pursuing their own access agreements with the US, 
accompanied by explicit expressions of support for the US presence. Malaysian Defence Minister 
Najib Razak stated that Malaysia “would like to see a fair degree of American military presence in 
the region” and that he was “happy [with] an expanding military relationship with Washington”10. 
Ambassadors from ASEAN states stationed in Washington organised the ASEAN Washington 
Committee (AWC) and lobbied the Clinton administration to show that, despite the Philippines 
asking the Americans to leave, Southeast Asians wanted the US’ military presence in the region11.
8  Ba (2009: 165-168).
9  Ciorciari (2010: 98).
10  Quoted in Ciorciari (2010: 99).
11  Nathan (2011: 573-574).
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Despite this, the establishment of new bases was unacceptable to ASEAN states. For 
example, Thailand rejected a US proposal to host a navy flotilla depot in the Gulf of Thailand. The 
new consensus within ASEAN over types of security arrangement acceptable within Southeast Asia 
became known as “places not bases”. Permanent forces stationed in the region was not appropriate, 
but a steady rotation of US naval capabilities was. Through this, the ASEAN states signalled their 
substantive endorsement of the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role in the post-Cold War 
context and provided a practical basis for the US' provision of security public goods. However, the 
Clinton administration still needed to persuade domestic constituencies within the US of the 
importance of continued engagement in Asia, without at the same time alienating regional states by 
appearing to be too assertive in pushing a regional agenda. A broader political basis upon which the 
US could be invited into the region, was considered by US officials to be useful in this context12.  
China: engagement towards a 'responsible regional great power'
The ASEAN states, individually and collectively, chose to engage China with the hope of reaping 
the benefits of an economic opportunity and 'socialising' China into considering itself a 'responsible 
regional great power' rather than a revisionist power or regional hegemon13. ASEAN sought to do so
by drawing China into a pattern of cooperative regional interaction and persuading Chinese leaders 
of the benefits of abiding by international and regional norms14. Essentially, the ASEAN states 
perceived that if China was given status recognition as a 'responsible regional great power', it would
begin to see itself as having a 'responsible great power' identity and act accordingly. For example, 
Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong reflected the hope ASEAN had in the socialisation 
effects of this engagement when he stated that “it's not preordained that China's military power will 
turn into a threat"15.
In 1990, Indonesia and Singapore normalised ties with China, meaning that all ASEAN 
states had normal diplomatic relations with the Chinese. Collectively, ASEAN recognised China as 
a “consultative partner” in July 1991 in disregard to Western attempts to isolate the CCP leadership 
after the crackdown on protesters in Tienanmen. ASEAN recognised the legitimacy of the CCP 
12  Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training “Interview with Winston Lord, 28/4/98” Foreign Affairs Oral 
History Project <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004lor02/2004lor02.pdf> accessed 8/5/14.  
13  See Wanandi (1996), Deng (1998), Cheng (2001: 423).
14  Goh (2014b: 470).
15 “Treading Softly”, Far Eastern Economic Review 3 Aug. 1995: l6-20.
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regime despite its domestic politics, demonstrating its commitment to the norm of non-interference. 
The ASEAN states, led by Indonesia, also engaged China in informal workshops on the issue of 
overlapping claims in the South China Sea. This was the start of ASEAN's attempts at rule-making 
in the South China Sea, getting claimants to avoid the issue of sovereignty and focus on the 
management of resources, navigation, communications and shipping, and pollution control16. 
ASEAN's response to China's Law on Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas was to issue its own 
declaration on the South China Sea calling on all parties to the SCS dispute to exercise restraint and 
to apply the principles of the TAC as a basis for a SCS code of conduct17. China's willingness to 
manage these disputes in a cooperative way, exercising restraint, adhering to ASEAN's norms and 
not asserting its claims through threat or use of force, were key aspects of its 'responsible regional 
great power' role for ASEAN18.
The ASEAN states also pressed the case for engagement with China in the US, particularly 
through the AWC. Former Singaporean Ambassador to the US, S R Nathan reported that the AWC 
lobbied Congress during the debate over China’s Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status. President 
Clinton had promised to link any extension of China’s MFN status to progress in human rights. The 
AWC argued that “China had made progress and … believed that acknowledgement of that fact was
helpful to peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia” reasoning that being closer to China 
geographically, Southeast Asians were able to see that such changes were significant19. Whether or 
not the AWC had any impact on Clinton’s decision to extend MFN status in 1994 - considering 
pressure from American business constituencies eager to invest in the Chinese economy - the fact 
that ASEAN states were seeking to sway the US towards engagement of China, showed their 
commitment to this strategy as the key to guiding China into a 'responsible regional great power' 
role.
ASEAN's relevance: Conceptualising and claiming the 'regional conductor' role
Although ASEAN could address the US' and China's roles through bilateral channels, it could not 
secure its own relevance in the evolving regional order without responding to the widespread calls 
within the Asia-Pacific for a post-Cold War regional security dialogue. By the early 1990s, the 
Soviet Union, Canada and Australia had put forward proposals that challenged ASEAN’s previously
16  Singh (1992: 9).
17  ASEAN (1992a).
18  Goh (2013: 100).
19  Nathan (2011: 575-576).
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negotiated diplomatic leadership by threatening to marginalise ASEAN by either excluding it, or 
subsuming it within a broader regional agenda dominated by Western states. The Australian and 
Canadian proposals were also made at the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC), a forum 
that had been used for coordinating external support for ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. ASEAN 
was able however to use the PMC for rebutting the proposals from other actors, and for launching 
its own regional security dialogue. Through debating and rejecting external proposals, and 
establishing its own proposal based on the ASEAN model, ASEAN began to articulate and claim its
conception of the 'regional conductor' role. 
Conceptualising the 'regional conductor' role
As described in the Introduction to this thesis, the 'regional conductor' role is based on an analogy 
that sees the region as an orchestra where the different great powers make up the different sections 
(brass, percussion etc). They possess the instruments which represent the material capabilities 
(military hardware, economic and financial resources etc); it is they that essentially 'make the 
music'. The problem of great power rivalry however means that the different sections want the 
orchestra to play their own musical score (their own vision of regional order) and thus exist in a 
state of competition. Instead, the 'regional conductor', analogous to a musical conductor who does 
not possess any instrument (lacks material capabilities), steps up to provide a score for the orchestra
to play: a framework of norms, rules and institutions within which the region can operate. The 
provision of a mutually agreeable 'score' is the conductor's key contribution. It is able to do so 
because it is universally acknowledged as neutral and competent.
As shown in Table 9 below, when we apply this to ASEAN we see that ASEAN's neutral 
status as a collective actor (despite individual members having various alignments) and its 
competence - based on its status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order - gives it the 
legitimacy to claim the 'regional conductor' role. ASEAN already developed mechanisms and 
experience in convening meetings and developing norms for mutual restraint and cooperation20. Its 
legitimacy is also based on its indigenous identity as an 'Asian' actor, as well as its unity, being able 
to maintain a common position when acting collectively.
20  See Eaton and Stubbs (2006) on ASEAN's 'competence power'.  
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Identity Status Function
Primary Secondary
Indigenous Neutral Diplomatic 
Leadership
Inclusive 
engagement
Rule-making
(score)United
Successful manager of Southeast
Asian order
Table 9 – ASEAN's 'Regional Conductor' Role
The Introduction to this thesis discussed how understanding ASEAN's role as a 'regional 
conductor' adds value because it captures the two secondary functions ASEAN performs for 
regional order: 1) convening all major powers and players together through the 'inclusive 
engagement' function and 2) providing a 'score' that all players can agree to through its 'rule-
making' function. It also argued that it avoids the ambiguity of the commonly used 'ASEAN driver' 
role. Likewise, the analogy of the 'orchestra' helps us understand when ASEAN's 'regional 
conductor' role is relevant: when the full orchestra is convened. Smaller groupings are possible 
(such as US-led alliances or coalitions) that may play more sophisticated 'Chamber music' because 
the members share common visions of regional order and values, but these are generally not seen as
a threat within ASEAN to its 'regional conductor' role. However, when it comes to large-scale 
cooperative security that involves all the major powers, ASEAN takes the lead as the 'regional 
conductor', and jealously guards its role. This section will now outline how ASEAN conceptualised 
and claimed the different identity and status aspects of the 'regional conductor' role.
Indigenous identity ASEAN emphasised its indigenous identity by rejecting external 
proposals for security dialogue as inappropriate for Asian culture and instead promoting its model 
of dialogue based on consultation and consensus because it better suited the 'Asian' context. The 
initial proposals for post-Cold War security dialogue put forward by the Soviet Union, Canada and 
Australia were based on the Conference for Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Canadian 
proposal envisaged a North Pacific dialogue which did not include Southeast Asia but was based on 
a cooperative security model, whereas the Soviet and Australian proposals were inclusive but based 
on common security with more formal confidence-building mechanisms and broader agenda linking
issues such as human rights to security21. The ASEAN states accepted that some form of 
confidence-building measures could be beneficial but that a formal structure like the CSCE did not 
21  See Dewitt (1994).
197
fit within an Asian context. Indicative of this was Tommy Koh's explanation that “[t]he Asian 
preference, unlike the Western preference, is to take a very non-legalistic approach to things. We 
take actions step by step and allow things to evolve, rather than to sit down and say, a priori, we 
want to create an institution, this is our character, this is our mission statement"22. 
United identity The Singapore summit in 1992 saw ASEAN push to shore up its identity as a
united actor. This served both as a continued assertion of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role in 
Southeast Asian order and as a means for boosting ASEAN's credibility and competence within 
wider forums. ASEAN agreed to create an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) to increase its 
attractiveness to foreign investors and present ASEAN as a united actor within the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. ASEAN also enhanced its institutional make-up by giving 
the Secretariat new stature to initiate, propose and supervise policies and action plans and upgrading
the office of Secretary-General to Secretary-General of ASEAN rather than just of the Secretariat. 
ASEAN also gave a formal schedule to summit meetings, to take place every three years rather than
on an ad hoc basis23. These amounted to symbolic claims regarding ASEAN's unity and competence
to extend its diplomatic leadership.
Neutrality ASEAN made claims about its neutral status primarily through its design of the 
emerging security dialogue. It was keen to assert that regional security dialogue would be based on 
the 'ASEAN way': informal dialogue, moving at a pace comfortable to all, with all decisions based 
on consensus24. The 'ASEAN way' has been described as ‘counter-realpolitik’25 because it makes all 
participants equal rather than according larger actors more of a say. This ensured that the process 
would not be dominated by any single power, showing that ASEAN was not favouring any single 
great power but instead acting as a neutral facilitator of inclusive security dialogue. ASEAN was 
therefore claiming that it was a 'non-threatening' actor, because it had no 'hidden agenda'26.
Status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order ASEAN's promotion of its own 
model and its use of the PMC to launch regional security dialogue showed that ASEAN was also 
making a statement about the success of its existing processes in managing regional relations at the 
Southeast Asian level. As we saw in the previous chapters, ASEAN's 'primary manager' role 
involved ASEAN taking on responsibility for diplomatic leadership within Southeast Asia through 
22 Antolik (1994: 118).
23 See Antolik (1992).
24 See Acharya (1997).
25 Johnston (2003).
26 Almonte (1997/98: 81).
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which it engaged in regional reconciliation and rule-making around the core norm of non-
interference. Through promoting such reconciliation, and acting collectively provide the diplomatic 
vanguard for the opposition to Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, ASEAN had gained much 
credibility. ASEAN therefore was making a statement about how it had already demonstrated its 
competence to perform key diplomatic/normative functions through performing the 'primary 
manager' role within Southeast Asian order. As early as 1988, Malaysian Foreign Minister Abu 
Hassan Omar recommended ASEAN's model for the wider Asia-Pacific, arguing that ASEAN had 
provided the “much needed structure for mutual understanding, confidence, trust and goodwill 
among the ... member states ... [and  had] ... enabled the [member] states to resolve differences 
between them”27. In 1991 ASEAN-ISIS, a grouping of nationally-affiliated think tanks, proposed 
using the PMC as the basis for a regional security dialogue that could extend the existing diplomatic
practice of ASEAN without the need to create a new institution. At the Singapore summit in January
1992, the ASEAN leaders declared that “ASEAN could use established fora to promote external 
dialogues on enhancing security in the region … ASEAN should intensify its external dialogues in 
political and security matters by using the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conferences (PMC)”28. 
Singaporean Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng made the link between ASEAN's model and regional
peace by stating that it “builds confidence … while minimizing conflict. It is this approach, of 
broadly engaging our neighbours in Southeast Asia and others in the larger Asia-Pacific that will 
help promote and strengthen conditions for regional peace and stability”29.
Performative claims to ‘inclusive engagement’ 
In 1992, ASEAN began making performative claims to the function of 'inclusive engagement' by 
inviting China and Russia to attend the ASEAN AMM as guests. At the AMM, Vietnam and Laos 
also signed the TAC. States that had previously rejected ASEAN were now embracing its norms and
processes. Singapore, as the most enthusiastic proponent of the ARF, injected momentum into the 
process when it took up the chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee in 1992-1993. Singaporean 
officials were influenced by the CSCE and saw security dialogue as a way to get all the regional 
stakeholders together in the post-Cold War context30. Singapore hosted the first ever meeting of 
PMC Senior Officials in May 1993 where participants agreed that a multilateral process of security 
dialogue should be established and that China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea 
27  Katsumata (2009b: 59).
28  ASEAN (1992b).
29  Reginald Chua and Mary Kwang, “Signing of Pact by Vietnam, Laos Will Boost Peace, Stability.” Straits Times 
23/7/1992.
30  Interview with Tommy Koh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, 7/3/14.
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should be invited. Singapore proposed the name ASEAN Regional Forum for the new dialogue 
process31. Some preferred 'Asian' Regional Forum, but Singapore's insistence on the latter provided 
a clear symbol of ASEAN's control over the emerging security dialogue. The SOM Chairman's 
statement outlined the rationale of 'inclusive engagement', stating that “[t]he continuing presence of 
the United States, as well as stable relationships among the United States, Japan and China, and 
other states of the region would contribute to regional stability” and called on “ASEAN and its 
dialogue partners to work with other regional states to evolve a predictable and constructive pattern 
of relationships in the Asia-Pacific”32. At an informal dinner after the July 1993 PMC, ASEAN 
hosted all the major players where they agreed to convene the first ARF meeting in Bangkok the 
following year.
By extending its diplomatic leadership through performing this new function of 'inclusive 
engagement', not only could ASEAN engage the great powers itself, but also foster an environment 
where the great powers could engage with each other. This could occur within a context of mutual 
commitment to ASEAN rules and norms, particularly as ASEAN introduced the TAC as a code of 
conduct for the emerging dialogue. In this way, we see the emergence of the conception of ASEAN 
as the 'regional conductor', providing the forum for the full orchestra to assemble as well as the 
normative score from which they could all play by. ASEAN leaders highlighted the hierarchy within
the ARF, already alluded to with respect to its name, by pointing out that it was ASEAN taking the 
initiative to invite other powers to be involved in regional dialogue. Thai Deputy Foreign Minister 
Surin Pitsuwan stated that “ASEAN is still at the helm. ASEAN is in the driver's seat. ASEAN will 
be in the chair at the Forum; others are coming in as interested bystanders -they won't be in the 
driver's seat”33. These were ambitious claims, but they needed to be endorsed in order for the role to
be firmly established.
Responses from constituencies of legitimation
The US endorsed ASEAN's claims to perform the function of 'inclusive engagement' because of 
ASEAN's indigenous identity, its status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order and 
because doing so suited US domestic and foreign policy aims. Although initially reluctant to join 
any multilateral initiatives in the Asia-Pacific, by 1993 the US had come to support regional 
31  Caballero-Anthony (2005: 126).
32  Emmers (2003: 115).
33  Yang Razali Kassim, “When Asean becomes a player on the world stage: interview with Surin Pitsuwan.” Business 
Times (Singapore), 3/8/94.
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security dialogue as a supplement to the 'hub and spokes' system of bilateral alliances. The priority 
for the incoming Clinton administration was to highlight the stakes the US had in Asia for its 
domestic population and to convince regional states of the US' staying power. The administration 
raised APEC to the summit level – meaning the US president would travel to Asia almost every year
– and called for the creation of a Pacific Community “built on shared strength, shared prosperity 
and a shared commitment to democratic values”34. Officials within the State Department were 
concerned however that the US had overstepped its mark as it experienced resistance to its push for 
a Pacific Community and promotion of democracy and human rights. This revealed the tension 
created when the US, as an external actor, appeared to be claiming its own diplomatic leadership. 
State Department officials working on Asia thus saw participation in the ARF under 
ASEAN's indigenous leadership as necessary to demonstrate the US' engagement on the region's 
terms, forestalling any attempts to develop an exclusive Asian grouping. In a memo to Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher, Assistant Secretary of State for Asia Winston Lord stated how 
participation in ASEAN meetings like the ARF could help assuage regional concerns that the US 
was acting like an “international nanny”. He stated that “[w]hile Asians want us engaged, they are 
increasingly conscious and proud of their accomplishments, in contrast to trends in other regions. 
Their growing prosperity and power require that our relations be seen as founded on equality. We 
need a sophisticated diplomacy that is better calibrated to the changing Asian environment”35. US 
officials also regarded ASEAN as competent based on its performance of diplomatic functions in 
managing Southeast Asian order. State Department official David Brown reflected that “because of 
its economic success and its diplomatic contribution, ASEAN was quite highly regarded in that 
period”36. Participation was made easier as the ARF was a low-stakes commitment only involving 
the Secretary of State, with no treaties to sign and no secretariat to contribute towards37. An official 
in the East Asia and Pacific Bureau at the time summed up the feeling within the US that “the U.S. 
had nothing to lose and potentially something to gain over the long term by getting people together 
and seeing if they couldn't build “habits of cooperation” as we put it then. To talk about security 
issues, to understand each other's concerns and fears and build habits of cooperation where they had
not existed before”38. For those officials working on Asia, the ARF provided a means to ensure 
34  President William Clinton, “Remarks by the President in Address to the National Assembly of the Republic of 
Korea.” Seoul, Korea. 10/7/1993.
35  Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training “Interview with Winston Lord, 28/4/98” Foreign Affairs Oral 
History Project <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004lor02/2004lor02.pdf> accessed 8/5/14.  
36  Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training “Interview with David G. Brown, 28/1/03” Foreign Affairs Oral 
History Project <http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Brown,%20David%20G.toc.pdf> accessed 18/5/14.
37  Goh (2004).
38  Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training “Interview with David G. Brown, 28/1/03” Foreign Affairs Oral 
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regular Secretary of State visits to Asia39. This aspect was key for the US' endorsement of the 
'inclusive engagement' function that ASEAN could perform. The Secretary of State could build into 
his/her visit to the region meetings with other foreign ministers at a bilateral level. This was 
especially important with respect to China.   
 
However, the US did not endorse ASEAN's performance of 'inclusive engagement' 
unconditionally. US criticism of ASEAN's leadership with respect to decisions over ARF 
membership showed that it viewed some regimes as unworthy of engagement. The US reacted 
angrily to ASEAN's decision to admit Myanmar in 1996 without extensive consultation40. This 
reflected its general view that ASEAN's 'constructive engagement' with the Myanmar junta was not 
working and that the regime should be isolated. Outside of the ARF, the US, to a certain extent, 
contested ASEAN's role as a collective actor by preferring to deal with states individually.
Australia's attempts to initiate regional dialogue showed that it felt it could perform a similar
role to ASEAN based on its own diplomatic experience and non-threatening identity as well as its 
activism in initiating APEC. After the opposition to their proposals however, Australian officials 
came to realise that a new organisation could not be created. Since the ASEAN states shared the 
imperative of keeping the US engaged in Asia, it was best as a first step to support grafting the ARF
onto ASEAN41.
As a result, the US and Western states recognised ASEAN's ability to convene dialogue 
because of its indigenous identity and status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order – 
ASEAN's 'competence power'42. In conceding to ASEAN by endorsing its role claims however, 
certain role expectations emerged from this key constituency of legitimation. If ASEAN was to be 
the 'regional conductor', the US and other Western states expected it to provide more formal and 
concrete functional cooperation, rather than cooperation based merely on process. For example, the 
repeated emphasis on Weapons of Mass Destruction, notably by Secretary of State Winston Lord at 
the ASEAN PMC in July 1993, showed that the US was keen to develop effective mechanisms to 
tackle specific security issues43.
History Project <http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Brown,%20David%20G.toc.pdf> accessed 18/5/14.
39  Ashizawa (2013: 183).  
40  Haacke (2003: 144).
41  Smith (2007).
42  Eaton and Stubbs (2006).
43  Glosserman (2010: 39).
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Japan showed strong endorsement of the ARF and ASEAN's leadership in these early years. 
Japan supported Singapore during its chairmanship of the Standing Committee in pushing for a 
consensus within ASEAN on a regional security dialogue. It also played an important part in 
bringing the US round to supporting the dialogue. In June 1992, Prime Minister Miyazawa made a 
speech in Washington DC in which he called for a two-track approach to regional security: one 
being sub-regional initiatives to address specific security issues and the other a broad security 
dialogue to enhance the sense of regional reassurance44. The Miyazawa proposal sought to impress 
on the US that the 'hub and spokes' system by itself was not enough to address post-Cold War 
security issues. Japan saw a regional security dialogue as a means to address its concerns regarding 
China as well as a means for ensuring US regional engagement. It was also seen as a way exercise a
more assertive regional policy, but within a context that would reassure regional states. Providing 
behind-the-scenes support for ASEAN’s initiative on the issue ensured that a dialogue could indeed 
be set up but without Japan taking the lead. This was significant considering the unsuccessful 
attempt by Prime Minister Mahathir to promote Japanese leadership within an exclusive East Asian 
economic bloc in 199045. The US had successfully blocked this idea and Japan and other ASEAN 
states instead supported APEC.
China showed reluctance to participate in regional security dialogue in the early years of the 
post-Cold War period. Chinese officials were sceptical about multilateralism, seeing it as another 
means to contain China in the wake of the Tienanmen Square killings. ASEAN was keen to 
emphasise the need for the dialogue to be informal with any decision-making being based on 
consensus. Decisions would be non-binding, with discussion moving at a pace comfortable to all. 
This was reassuring to China because it knew that within this structure it could not be singled out as
'recalcitrant' and it also would not have to line up voting coalitions to reject motions it felt went 
against its interests46. The fact that ASEAN was to lead the process also assured China. Many 
leaders of ASEAN states had championed “Asian values” in the early 1990s, appealing to China's 
resistance to the Western human rights agenda. That the ASEAN states were willing to defy Western
states on the issue of human rights, and promote the norm of non-interference, meant that it was less
likely the ARF could be used by Western states to push their normative agenda. China therefore 
viewed ASEAN's indigenous identity and neutral status as the most important aspects in endorsing 
ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role. China also saw support for ASEAN as part of its quest for a 
44  Yuzawa (2007: 40).
45  Known as the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG).  
46  Foot (1998: 428).
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multi-polar world through diluting US influence in the region47.
The attendance of these major powers at the inaugural ARF dinner in 1993 gave 
performative endorsement for ASEAN's claims to perform the new function of 'inclusive 
engagement'. This conferred legitimacy on ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role, meaning it had taken
on a shared existence within regional society and could now be used by ASEAN.
Role enactment
ASEAN enacted its 'regional conductor' role by establishing the ARF, its membership, institutional 
form and agenda over the first few years of its existence. It convened the first full regional 
'orchestra' involving all the regional powers and players. Through this, ASEAN provided a new 
basis for its own relevance in the emerging post-Cold War context by providing the function of 
'inclusive engagement'. ASEAN also provided the 'score' for the regional 'orchestra'; the TAC was 
accepted in the ARF Concept Paper “as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a 
unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political 
and security cooperation”48. ASEAN therefore contributed to the emerging Asia-Pacific regional 
order by ensuring that it would be norm-governed, based on ASEAN norms provided in the TAC. A 
discursive commitment to adhere to the 'score' of the TAC was sufficient at this stage for 
membership within the regional 'orchestra'. This served to assuage Indonesian concerns that 
opening up the TAC to be signed by the great powers would invite more interference into Southeast 
Asia by external powers because of the provisions on the High Council within the TAC. Agreed to 
by all members of the ARF, the Concept Paper also formally recognised ASEAN's status as a 
successful manager of Southeast Asian order due to its “demonstrable record of enhancing regional 
cooperation in the most diverse sub-region of the Asia-Pacific” and that “[t]he annual ASEAN 
Ministerial Meetings have contributed significantly to the positive regional environment today. 
There would be great hope for the Asia-Pacific if the whole region could emulate ASEAN's record 
of enhancing the peace and prosperity of its participants”49. The member states agreed to three 
stages with which the ARF was to evolve: confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and finally 
elaboration of approaches to conflicts. The fact that this represented greater institutionalisation than 
ASEAN itself may have reflected a concession to the Western participants which desired more 
47  Cheng (1999).
48  ASEAN (1995).
49  ASEAN (1995).
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formal cooperation50. Certainly the wording of the third stage, watered down from 'conflict 
resolution mechanisms', represented a concession to China which objected to the original wording51.
ASEAN also gave all member states a stake in the ARF process through co-chairing Inter-sessional 
groups, which met in between ARF meetings to discuss different aspects of the ARF agenda. The 
importance of ASEAN’s diplomatic leadership through 'inclusive engagement' was further 
highlighted by India’s efforts to gain full dialogue partnership status and membership of the ARF. 
According to former Indian Ambassador to Indonesia Sudhir Devare, Indian officials lobbied hard 
in Jakarta and elsewhere to gain membership. Indian officials celebrated their admission in 1996 as 
an important step in breaking out of South Asia and strategically entering the Asia-Pacific52. This 
highlighted the importance regional players attached to ASEAN’s 'regional conductor' role and the 
way it could act as a gatekeeper for membership in the Asia-Pacific 'orchestra'.
First transitional role bargain
ASEAN situated its 'regional conductor' role within reciprocal role bargains with the US and China.
The reciprocal role bargain between ASEAN and the US legitimised the US' 'offshore great power 
guarantor' role and ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role. The US continued to provide security public 
goods through its renewed bilateral alliances and relationships, whilst ASEAN provided the 
function of 'inclusive engagement'. The US supported ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role in return 
for ASEAN not challenging the US' bilateral alliances through its proposed security dialogue, nor 
'drawing a line down the Pacific' by developing an exclusive East Asian regional grouping. This 
bargain was upheld by reciprocal legitimacy dynamics: ASEAN was able to demonstrate regional 
autonomy in shaping the emerging regional order in a way that maintained its relevance; the US, by 
being invited to engage the region in security dialogue, was able to better sell its Asia-focused 
foreign policy domestically in a way that did not alienate regional states through appearing as an 
'international nanny'. The ARF also provided the US with a forum for engaging states with which it 
had troubled bilateral ties. This was especially true of China. For example, after the downturn in 
bilateral relations following the visit of Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui to the US in 1995, the 
ARF provided a politically neutral forum for China-US bilateral engagement. Former office director
of the US State Department's desk on Regional Security Policy for East Asia Pacific, Ernestine 
Heck, reported that the ARF meeting in 1996 “was really the first decent chance for us to engage 
the Chinese at the level of Secretary of State in the course of what had been almost a year. So it was
50  This point was expressed by Ralf Emmers in conversation with the author, RSIS, Singapore, 4/3/14.  
51  Emmers (2003: 32).
52  Devare (2011).
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very important to us from the bilateral point of view”53. This lack of engagement between China and
the US reflected the US' failure to clearly provide a convincing strategic rationale for 
rapprochement and engagement with China, meaning the relationship was held hostage to 
competing domestic constituencies within the US: those that reviled China's human rights violations
on the one hand and business constituencies that opposed sanctions against China on the other. 
Winston Lord reportedly pushed hard for Clinton to give a speech dedicated to presenting a 
“strategic approach to China laid out to the public in a broader framework, so that these constant 
problems that we had on human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, trade, and Taiwan wouldn't be the 
only things that people noticed. These issues could be put in a broader context of the need for 
engagement on some of the more positive aspects of the agenda”54. Clinton failed to do so in his 
first term and Lord believed the US paid the price with respect to encouraging reform within China 
because the PRC was able to take advantage of the clear divisions within Washington55.
ASEAN contributed in this context by using its new role to provide a mechanism through 
which to engage China in a way that would reassure Beijing that its rise would not be contained and
at the same time socialise it into a 'responsible regional great power' role. The ARF therefore added 
another layer to ASEAN's engagement of China and established a ASEAN-China role bargain. In 
return for China recognising ASEAN as the 'regional conductor', ASEAN recognised China's 
interests as the 'responsible regional great power', but China needed to adhere to regional norms and
show strategic restraint. For example, ASEAN accommodated China's concerns by emphasising the 
informality of the ARF, not inviting Taiwan to join the ARF and keeping the Taiwan issue off the 
ARF agenda. Early signs that China was showing restraint appeared to be positive, with the notable 
exceptions of the Mischief Reef incident and the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1995 and 1996. China 
published a Defence White Paper and also acquiesced to the South China Sea conflict being 
discussed at the second ARF meeting in Brunei in 1995. The Brunei meeting came just months after
Mischief Reef and through doing so China indicated for the first time that it would abide by 
international law in sovereignty negotiations with other claimants to the Spratly islands. This 
represented a major concession as previously China had just insisted that the Spratlys were Chinese 
territory56. The ability of ASEAN to persuade China to discuss the issue at the ARF showed the 
benefit of ASEAN's performance of 'inclusive engagement'. A US state department official reported 
53  Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training “Interview with Ernestine S Heck, 11/12/97” Foreign Affairs Oral 
History Project <http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Heck,%20Ernestine%20S.toc.pdf> accessed 19/5/14.
54 Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training “Interview with Winston Lord, 28/4/98” Foreign Affairs Oral 
History Project <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004lor02/2004lor02.pdf> accessed 9/9/14.
55 ibid
56 Cheng (1999: 190).
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that “this was one of the things that convinced people that having the ASEAN Regional Forum was 
a useful forum. The ARF couldn’t challenge the Chinese, but it could put a certain amount of 
pressure on the Chinese and force the Chinese to take opinions in the region into account in ways 
that the Chinese wouldn't have had to do if the organization didn't exist. Winston [Lord] and 
[Warren] Christopher were all really very pleased with the way this worked out. One year after its 
creation, the ARF was serving as a significant forum for discussion”57.
Creating the 'regional conductor' role enabled ASEAN to extend the primary function of 
diplomatic leadership to the wider Asia-Pacific, this time through 'inclusive engagement' and rule-
making. This built directly on ASEAN's 'primary manager' role, especially through the use of the 
PMC for launching the ARF, and the two roles were fundamentally linked: the 'regional conductor' 
role consisted of the status of being a successful manager of Southeast Asian order and thus relied 
on the perceived performance of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. Questions would soon be raised 
regarding ASEAN's performance of its 'primary manager' role, which would threaten its new 
'regional conductor' role with deterioration. 
 
AVOIDING ROLE DETERIORATION: 1997-2005
The first transitional role bargain only lasted until the late 1990s when severe economic crisis hit 
the region. The crisis had a negative impact on ASEAN's status as a successful manager of 
Southeast Asian order, which, when added to frustrations within the ARF, led to growing 
contestation from Western constituencies of legitimation. This threatened ASEAN's 'regional 
conductor' role with deterioration and possible role death. After the attacks of September 11th 2001, 
when US foreign policy became focused on a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), ASEAN faced 
further irrelevance to advancing US strategic objectives. By 2005 however, ASEAN had reasserted 
its 'regional conductor' role in the latest incarnation of the regional 'orchestra', the East Asia Summit
(EAS). The EAS was a leader-led forum where formal accession to ASEAN's 'score' (TAC) was a 
condition for membership. This section shows how ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role went from 
possible deterioration to being further entrenched within an East Asian transitional role bargain.
57 Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training “Interview with David G. Brown, 28/1/03” Foreign Affairs Oral 
History Project <http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Brown,%20David%20G.toc.pdf> accessed 18/5/14.
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Western challenge to ASEAN's status as a successful manager
Western contestation mainly centred on the US' concerns regarding ASEAN's usefulness and 
competence. The US was frustrated with the lack of progress within the ARF and critical of 
ASEAN's inability to address the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). The US' actions during the AFC 
and during the GWOT after 2001, engendered a sense within Southeast Asia that the US was 
neglecting ASEAN and acting in ways that served its own interests without consideration for 
ASEAN's concerns. The US appeared to be a major soloist that would not submit to ASEAN as the 
'regional conductor', destabilising the first transitional role bargain.
The ARF and AFC
Western frustration with the ARF in the late 1990s challenged the need for the function of 'inclusive
engagement' and revealed Western expectations that the ARF produce more concrete outcomes. The
US was also critical of the ARF's inability to address the North Korean nuclear issue and its silence 
on the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1996. US officials were also frustrated with the failure to move from 
confidence-building measures to preventative diplomacy. They tended to view military transparency
as key to confidence-building and considered preventive diplomacy as effective if backed up by the 
thereat of the use of force58. US officials were therefore unimpressed by the limited steps taken 
within the ARF towards confidence-building, which included the voluntary publication of defence 
White Papers. To encourage institutional progress, the US supported Australia's proposal to 
establish an 'ARF Troika' consisting of the ARF chair and a non-ASEAN ARF member. In 1995, US
Secretary of Defence William Perry spoke out in favour of formal multilateral security discussions 
within APEC as it was seen as less encumbered by the 'ASEAN way'. There were also quiet 
proposals to change the name of the ARF from ASEAN Regional Forum to Asian Regional 
Forum59. This reflected more general discontent over ASEAN's monopoly on deciding membership 
and form of the regional dialogue. US Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth stated that the 
“ARF's non-members now outnumber its ASEAN creators, and so some means must be devised to 
reflect this, perhaps by permitting an equitable sharing of the privileges and responsibilities of 
chairmanship”60. His predecessor, Winston Lord, reported that US officials met with other non-
ASEAN members of the ARF regularly to align their strategies so that the agenda would not be 
58  Haacke (2003: 153).
59  Haacke (2003: 150).
60  Quoted in Haacke (2003: 154).
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dominated by ASEAN61.
Even Japan, a strong supporter of the ARF and ASEAN's leadership within the process, 
became disillusioned with the lack of progress by the late 1990s. Japanese officials tried to 
introduce concrete CBMs such as the publication of defence white papers and participation in the 
UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNRCA) as a means to bridge the gap between Western 
members and China and ASEAN members that preferred informal and voluntary CBMs62. In this 
task Japan was joined by Singapore which also saw the need to advance the ARF's progress in order
to maintain its credibility as an effective forum. However, even the CBMs that were agreed to were 
not fully implemented over the course of the first few years because of resistance from reluctant 
members.  
Western frustrations challenged ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role; if major regional states 
like the US and Japan did not see their own security interests being addressed within the ARF, then 
this increased the risk of ASEAN being marginalised as these states sought other mechanisms to 
address security issues. Indeed, the revision of the US-Japan alliance in 1996/97 further underlined 
that the US' alliances were the primary focus for US engagement in the region. US attention for the 
ARF depended on the degree to which it could be useful in selling Clinton's engagement strategy 
towards China domestically63. If it was not clear that the ARF could evolve beyond confidence-
building, and show that China was evolving with it, then this reduced the efficacy of the argument 
for the importance of the ARF within the US' strategy64. On top of this were bureaucratic and 
scheduling pressures which meant the ARF had to compete with other events and forums for US 
attention.         
A more fundamental challenge for ASEAN however was that the Asian Financial Crisis and 
the transboundary haze problem revealed ASEAN's inability to deal with internal Southeast Asian 
issues, severely affecting its perceived competence as the 'primary manager'. The AFC began in 
Thailand and quickly spread around the region as individual states took preventative measures that 
tended to exacerbate the crisis. The US and the EU blamed the crisis on poor macroeconomic 
61  Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training “Interview with Winston Lord, 28/4/98” Foreign Affairs Oral 
History Project <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004lor02/2004lor02.pdf> accessed 8/5/14.  
62  Yuzawa (2010).
63  Goh (2004).
64  The principal multilateral mechanisms through which the US was engaging China were economic: the WTO and 
APEC. These reflected the interests of the major engagement lobby within the US that sought economic opportunities in
a liberalising Chinese market.  
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management and insufficient financial liberalisation mixed with crony capitalism, corruption and 
bad governance. The necessary response was to pursue structural adjustment under the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The Managing Director of the IMF Michel Camdessus described the AFC as
a “blessing in disguise” allowing a window of opportunity to sweep away crony capitalism and 
open up Asian markets along Western lines65. In contrast, ASEAN leaders viewed the crisis as a 
result of unregulated global financial markets, which allowed for unaccountable behaviour, 
especially by currency speculators who could play off the weaknesses of Southeast Asian states. A 
strong negative perception of the US' involvement in the crisis developed. Regional states accused 
the US of taking advantage of Southeast Asia's weakness and asserting US interests through the 
IMF. There was bitter resentment towards the IMF reforms that were seen as promoting economic 
liberalisation but providing no mechanism to regulate and supervise markets. ASEAN states also 
resented the US blocking Japan's 1997 proposal to provide emergency liquidity through an Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF). In Indonesia for instance there was a growing fear that an unrestrained US 
would use issues such as human rights, as well as institutions like the IMF, for political 
subversion66.
This fear was especially acute as the legitimacy Southeast Asian regimes had built on their 
capacity to provide continued economic development crumbled in the face of financial and 
economic chaos. Indonesia was the worst affected where widespread protests brought down the 
Suharto regime in 1998 and provoked communal unrest, targeted mostly at the economically 
dominant ethnic Chinese. The economic crisis also sparked fragmentation as independence 
movements re-emerged in East Timor and Aceh. This was a major blow to ASEAN as Suharto had 
personally been associated with Indonesia’s commitment and leadership within ASEAN. His 
downfall and the ensuing instability created a leadership deficit within the Association67. This 
instability also exacerbated the transboundary haze crisis as it affected the Indonesian government's 
ability to address the forest fires that were causing the damaging haze, which engulfed large areas of
Southeast Asia in 1997/98.  The lack of a regional mechanism to deal with the problem, and the 
norm of non-interference, which appeared to act as a barrier to establishing and implementing such 
a mechanism, further highlighted for Western critics ASEAN's lack of competence as the 'primary 
manager'.
65  Higgot and Phillips (2000: 360).
66 Novotny (2010: 123-126).
67 Smith (1999).
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The Global War on Terrorism
Just as regional states began their recovery after the AFC, the US-led GWOT served to exacerbate 
existing concerns regarding the US' neglect of ASEAN and tendency towards unilateralism. 
Although all Southeast Asian states took advantage of the new strategic context by further 
developing bilateral ties and gaining access to military assistance, the Bush administration's narrow 
security focus on counter-terrorism led it to further question the usefulness of ASEAN's processes. 
Indicative of this was Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's failure to attend the ARF in 2005 and 
2007 and US officials’ attempts to introduce security matters into APEC. There was no mention of 
multilateral initiatives in the Quadrennial Defence Review and only mention with regards to 
economics in the National Security Strategy 2002. Although supportive of the ARF overall, former 
assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific Stanley Roth stated that one of the ways the 
ARF could realise its real potential would be for ASEAN to give up some of its control68. The US' 
frustration with the ARF in the late 1990s had turned into a tendency to bypass the ARF altogether. 
This was a major contestation of ASEAN’s 'regional conductor' role because it showed the apparent 
irrelevance of ASEAN to the US as it pursued its primary strategic imperative of counter-terrorism. 
This undermined the initial goal of the creation of the ARF as a means to ensure and maintain the 
US’ broad engagement in the region as the 'offshore great power guarantor', disrupting the 
reciprocal legitimacy dynamics of the first post-Cold War role bargain. The US was in this sense 
unavailable to balance the perceived growing influence of China. One Singaporean diplomat stated 
that “[t]he United States may still dominate the [regional] balance of power, but not the balance of 
influence”69.
On top of this there were more specific concerns regarding the Bush administration’s 
unilateralism and apparent “crusade” against Islam. This was especially acute because the 
administration's doctrine of ‘pre-emption’ maintained that the US could unilaterally act to pre-empt 
any kind of terrorist attack. This could involve military strikes against terrorist groups operating 
within other states’ territories, undermining not only ASEAN’s 'primary manager' role, but also 
individual states' authority within their own territories. It suggested that the US no longer saw the 
need to retain the 'offshore' aspect of its great power role, but take necessary actions unilaterally 
regardless of the wishes of regional states. Within Malaysia and Indonesia in particular there was a 
growing political challenge from Islamic parties as well as large Islamic constituencies within the 
population that were bitterly opposed to US policy. Malaysian and Indonesian leaders were able to 
68  Glosserman (2010: 42-44).
69  Shambaugh (2004/05: 66).
211
counter this to a certain extent after the Bali bombings in 2002, by pointing to a clear threat to the 
region from Muslim extremist groups70. However, these states remained highly sensitive to US 
policy, especially if the US conducted pre-emptive strikes against Southeast Asian terrorists. For 
example, Indonesia and Malaysia condemned US interference in regional affairs when the 
Indonesian press mistakenly reported that the US wanted to position US Special Operation Forces 
in the Malacca Straits as part of a Regional Maritime Surveillance Initiative (RMSI) proposal in 
200471. Despite Secretary of State Colin Powell’s efforts to reassure Malaysia and Indonesia that 
RMSI proposed cooperation between the US and Southeast Asian states to address transnational 
security threats within existing international and domestic law, their opposition killed the proposal.
Institutionalising East Asia
With the US apparently acting as a 'soloist' ignoring ASEAN as the 'regional conductor', ASEAN 
took steps to convene an 'East Asian' regional 'orchestra' as a hedge against the perceived excesses 
of US unilateralism and uphold ASEAN's role as the 'regional conductor'. In the wake of the crises 
ASEAN faced in the late 1990s, ASEAN leaders were determined to stick together. Then ASEAN 
Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino reflected that “ASEAN's attitude at that time was: we had to 
have political cohesion, economic integration, regional cooperation, if each of us is going to 
survive”72. Regional unity was imperative, as was the need to address ASEAN's shortcomings so as 
to present ASEAN as a credible institution73. However, ASEAN remained dependent on external 
partners for economic and security public goods. As noted by one ASEAN official, the AFC 
exposed what was already known within ASEAN: ASEAN was weak and needed help from external
partners. In the context of the US’ perceived neglect of ASEAN, Japan and China became more 
important partners to draw on for external support. Indeed, through the AFC “[ASEAN] found who 
could help [it] and who could not”74. The US' behaviour contrasted with Japan's willingness to 
provide emergency funds and China's decision to not devalue its currency during the AFC (which 
would have improved the competitiveness of its exports hurting Southeast Asia's exports). China 
also offered loans to regional states with few conditions. Even though China was acting in its own 
interests, this confirmed for many states that China was moving towards being a 'responsible 
regional great power' and put it in a better position to be negotiated into performing economic 
functions within an East Asian framework. Prior to this, China had mostly been viewed as an 
70  Chin (2003: 11).
71  Storey (2009: 40).
72  Interview with Rodolfo Severino, ISEAS, Singapore, 3/3/14.
73  Singh (2000: 4).
74  Interview with Termsak Chalermpalanupap, ISEAS, Singapore, 3/3/14.
212
economic competitor and threat to the regional economy75.
Japanese and Chinese willingness to engage with and support ASEAN, meant ASEAN was 
able to keep its 'regional conductor' role from deteriorating. Indeed, ASEAN used its 'regional 
conductor' role to channel emerging Sino-Japanese competition into two order-building processes: 
negotiating regional order functions and providing a 'vision' for regional 'community'. ASEAN did 
so through its ASEAN Plus One and ASEAN Plus Three (APT) frameworks, which ASEAN raised 
to the Summit level by inviting China, Japan and South Korea to the Kuala Lumpur informal 
summit in December 199776. In Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN convened its own summit first, then 'plus 
one' summits with each Northeast Asian partner individually before convening the APT. The APT 
was the first exclusive East Asia-only grouping, giving institutional form to an 'East Asian' region 
that did not include the US. ASEAN nested the APT within the ASEAN process rather than creating
a strictly independent institution meaning it was able to maintain control over how the process 
developed77. This again demonstrated ASEAN's capacity to convene large-scale meetings despite its
limited material capabilities. As stated by one prominent ASEAN watcher, the AFC and its 
aftermath produced “[t]he realisation of ASEAN's limitation, as well as the usefulness of ASEAN 
because it was the ASEAN mechanism that you could develop, to develop an ASEAN Plus 
Three”78. The eventual outcome of negotiations over regional order functions and a vision for East 
Asian community was an East Asian transitional role bargain within which ASEAN further 
embedded its 'regional conductor' role. 
Regional order functions
The key regional order functions that ASEAN has negotiated with China and Japan have been trade 
agreements, development assistance and investment, and financial leadership. 
Trade ASEAN has channelled Sino-Japanese competition over trade agreements primarily 
through its ASEAN Plus One processes. Trade is a key aspect of order because it provides 
connections between states, which contribute to a sense of interdependence, but also because it is an
area of interaction in international society that is significantly rule-governed. Trade agreements can 
also boost economic growth in participating states by providing access to new markets. In 2000 
China proposed a free trade agreement with ASEAN and the two sides agreed to the China-ASEAN 
75  Ba (2003).
76  Interview with Termsak Chalermpalanupap, ISEAS, Singapore, 3/3/14.
77  Dent (2010: 8).
78  Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Secretariat of the Vice President, Jakarta, 11/3/14.
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Free Trade Area (CAFTA) in 2002. CAFTA proposed creating a free trade area by 2010. This was 
the first time an external power had treated ASEAN as a single economic actor. It was also a 
turnaround in China's trade policy as it had previously focused on global negotiations within the 
WTO. In 2003, China introduced the Early Harvest Programme within CAFTA by eliminating 
tariffs on certain products, further highlighting its benign intentions towards ASEAN. Japanese 
officials saw China's policy, especially CAFTA, as potentially marginalising Japan in East Asian 
economic and political cooperation79. To counter this, Japan hosted a commemorative Summit with 
ASEAN in Tokyo in December 2003, which was the first summit meeting held outside of an 
ASEAN member state. Japan also proposed a Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership, emphasising the complimentary economies of itself and ASEAN in contrast to the 
generally competitive economies of China and ASEAN. Analysts have questioned the extent to 
which these trade agreements have added substantive economic value in terms of reduction of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers, as many states have continued to protect key industries. However, these 
agreements have taken on a political and symbolic significance for demonstrating regional 
benevolence80. By channelling this competition through its processes, ASEAN has contributed to 
order by putting in place frameworks within which Japan and China can compete to show their 
benignity and also where further trade negotiation can develop81.
Development assistance and investment These are key for economic growth and 
development in the region, which in turn is considered crucial for security and regime legitimacy in 
Southeast Asia. ASEAN has shown concern for narrowing the gap between mainland and maritime 
Southeast Asia through promoting economic development in the CLMV states. China and Japan 
have been crucial in this respect and ASEAN has again channelled Sino-Japanese competition into 
commitments to support ASEAN’s integration and the development of the Greater Mekong 
Subregion (GMS). China has made significant investments in mainland Southeast Asia and agreed 
to cancel the debts of the newer members of ASEAN citing its support for the Initiative for ASEAN 
Integration82. China has also participated in the GMS Economic Cooperation Programme and 
ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (AMBDC) forum, providing infrastructure 
investment including developing a network of highways and railways to link its southern provinces 
physically with Southeast Asia83. Chinese leaders sought to dispel fears that China was taking 
79  Terada (2010: 80).  
80  See Ravenhill (2010).
81  Goh (2007/08) shows how such competition still constitutes power balancing, but channelled through less conflictual
arenas. 
82  Hourn and Chanto (2005).
83  See Goh (2007). For an analysis of China’s use of infrastructure investment to increase influence see Holstag (2010).
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foreign direct investment (FDI) away from Southeast Asia by promising at the Bali Summit in 2003
that China would increase its own commitment to invest in the region. By 2007, China’s ODA and 
FDI into the CLMV consisted of just over US$2 billion84. 
Whereas China's investment in ASEAN started from a low base, Japan has long been 
Southeast Asia's largest source of overseas development assistance (ODA) and one of the top 
sources of FDI. In recent years, Japan's attention has also turned towards supporting ASEAN's 
economic integration and development of the Mekong region. At the ASEAN-Japan ministerial 
meeting in 2000, Japan announced its special commitment to the GMS. At the 2003 Japan-ASEAN 
Commemorative Summit a new 'Mekong Region Development' concept was announced where 
Japan committed to expand cooperation with ASEAN to promote trade and investment and 
sustainable economic growth in the Mekong region85. In 2009, Japan hosted the first Japan-Mekong 
Summit with Thailand and the CLMV. At the 4th Japan-Mekong Summit meeting in 2012 these 
states adopted the 'Tokyo Strategy for Mekong-Japan Cooperation' and Japan committed ¥600 
billion (US$7.5 billion) in ODA86.   
Regional financial leadership This comes in the form of liquidity provision and acting as a 
'lender of last resort' during times of crisis. Such leadership was deemed important on a regional 
basis after the AFC and the perceived bullying of crisis-hit states by the US and the IMF. Financial 
regionalism has mostly developed within the APT through the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). The 
APT finance ministers agreed to the CMI in 2000, partly realising the abortive AMF. Through the 
AMF Japan proposed providing a fund of $100 billion based on a pooling of currency reserves by 
regional states, of which Japan would provide the predominant share87. The CMI also worked on the
basis of pooling resources through a series of bilateral currency swaps. By 2007 16 bilateral 
agreements had been set up amounting to $82.5 billion88. It has since developed into a multilateral 
(CMIM) arrangement with a reserve pooling of $120 billion consisting of contributions from all 
APT members. China and Japan competed over the amount that each would contribute, seeing this 
as symbolic for establishing financial leadership within the region. The compromise was to give 
China and Japan equal contributions of 32 per cent each, South Korea 16 per cent and ASEAN 20 
84  Hao (2008). 
85  Thuzar (2014: 77).
86  Japanese MOFA “Tokyo Strategy 2012 for Mekong-Japan Cooperation” <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
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per cent89. The ASEAN states boosted their weight within CMIM by contributing collectively; 
however, even collectively, ASEAN's share of 20 per cent highlights it lack of financial capacity 
relative to its Northeast Asian neighbours. To maintain some centrality within the CMIM ASEAN 
successfully lobbied for the surveillance mechanism for CMIM, known as the ASEAN+3 
Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), to be located Singapore in 201190. The CMI is the most 
developed aspect of East Asian financial regionalism and has provided the most explicit example of 
negotiation over regional contributions to financial order functions.
On top of regional economic public goods, China and Japan have competed to show 
commitment to ASEAN's 'score'. China agreed to sign onto the protocol to the Southeast Asian 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) treaty in 1999, the first nuclear weapon state to agree to 
do so. In 2002 China even agreed to negotiate with ASEAN as a group on the South China Sea 
conflict signing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the South China Sea. During 
the early 2000s China made no attempt to seize further disputed features in the Spratlys91. This was 
followed in 2003 by China becoming the first great power to sign the TAC. Japan also signed the 
TAC in 2004 after refusing to do so for years. This created a lot of good will within ASEAN, 
especially with respect to China. ASEAN officials were optimistic that the strategy to socialise 
China into a 'responsible regional great power' role was paying off92. A notable example of this sea 
change was the Strategic Partnership announced between Indonesia and China in 2005, a major 
achievement considering the long-held suspicions within Indonesia regarding China93.  
Vision for East Asian community
The second aspect of Sino-Japanese competition that ASEAN channelled through its “ASEAN 
Plus” processes was competition over a vision for an 'East Asian Community' (EAC). The APT-
appointed East Asia Study Group (EASG) submitted in their report of 2001 that the APT members 
should develop an EAC as a long-term aim. Japan then initiated competition over the form of an 
EAC when in 2002 Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi stated that it should comprise the APT 
members and also Australia and New Zealand as 'core members'94. The Japanese hoped the 
89  See Grimes (2011).
90  Yoshimatsu (2014: 183).
91  Emmers (2010: 127).
92  Ba (2006) highlights how the process of engagement and reassurance worked both ways raising the question of who 
was socialising whom within the ASEAN-China relationship.
93  Novotny (2010) notes still widespread uncertainty within Indonesia regarding China’s rise and growing nationalism 
within China. He also notes the positive view of China’s rise, that China provides a needed check on US unilateralism.
94  Terada (2010).
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inclusion of other economically developed US allies would help check the potential dominance of 
China. Japan subsequently insisted that the East Asia Summit (EAS), recommended as a medium-
term objective by the EASG, be based on “open regionalism” and that membership be extended to 
Australia, New Zealand and India.
In contrast, China saw East Asian community-building as based on an 'Asian' identity and so
the Caucasian nations were necessarily excluded. China proposed that the EAS should represent the
evolution of the APT, with the same membership and a rotating chair, and that China should host 
the first summit. China's proposal challenged ASEAN's monopoly on hosting East Asian 
regionalism. Without US involvement, China saw no need for ASEAN's diplomatic leadership and 
was staking a claim to perform the function itself.  
At the 2004 APT meeting, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi proposed moving 
ahead with the EAS. China was immediately supportive and secured Badawi's support for China to 
host the second summit in return for China’s support for the inaugural summit to take place in 
Kuala Lumpur in 200595. Japan responded by offering to co-chair the first summit in KL, which the 
Chinese opposed, advocating that only the host country could chair the summit.  
Indonesia reacted negatively to Malaysia's proposal as it was reticent about evolution to the 
EAS. Establishing East Asian regionalism based on 'community' would subsume ASEAN and 
minimise Indonesia’s own role in Southeast Asia96. Indonesia was however persuaded of the 
necessity of establishing an EAS because of the economic rationale. China and India's rapid growth 
raised concerns in ASEAN that these states would emerge as major competitors to ASEAN. 
ASEAN needed to take the initiative quickly to establish a mechanism for engagement with these 
neighbours so that it could increase its economic leverage with them and avoid being marginalised. 
As then ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong reported, the prevailing view at the time was 
that “[e]ither you join them, or you will be left by the wayside”97. Indonesia remained opposed to an
EAS based on the membership of the APT however, as such a grouping would be dominated by 
China. Indonesian officials held that, if a wider grouping was necessary, then it should be opened up
and not be exclusive98. Singaporean officials agreed, believing that no power could check China 
95  Terada (2006: 8).
96  Interview with Ong Keng Yong, Singapore High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, 19/3/14.
97 Ibid.
98  Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Secretariat of the Vice President, Jakarta, 11/3/14.
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within an APT-based EAS99. Malaysia was persuaded by Indonesian and Singaporean pressure to 
invite India, Australia and New Zealand to the first summit100.
China and Malaysia subsequently asserted that there should be a two-tier “ASEAN+3+3”, 
with a 'core' APT basis for an East Asian Community and a peripheral place for the other three 
states101. On the eve of the summit, China proposed that the APT remain the core group for 
establishing an EAC, which was apparently supported by not just Malaysia but also South Korea, 
Myanmar and Thailand102. The two-tier EAS was opposed by Japan, Indonesia and Singapore which
wanted the increased pro-US membership to be equally involved and a link left open for other 
future members (such as the US) and for coordination with global economic institutions. This was 
aimed at diluting China's influence by blocking the exclusive APT-based East Asian community 
initiative, within which China would have a dominant position.
As China and Japan seemed intent on blocking each other's proposals for the EAS, ASEAN 
was granted an opportunity to use its 'regional conductor' role to take control for itself. ASEAN had 
previously conceded to alternate hosting the EAS between ASEAN and non-ASEAN states, but 
instead rejected China's offer to host the second EAS, insisted on expanded membership and also 
insisted on hosting all summits within Southeast Asia alongside the other yearly summit 
meetings103. The move to take control of the EAS was justified by the argument that Sino-Japanese 
competition endangered the community-building project and therefore ASEAN needed to keep it on
track104. To hold the regional 'orchestra' together, ASEAN used its prerogative as 'regional 
conductor' to convene the EAS as part of its existing ASEAN-led processes and put forward its own
criteria for membership. ASEAN's criteria were reportedly inserted by Singapore as a means to give
ASEAN ownership over the process105. The conditions were: 1) signing of the TAC, 2) official 
dialogue partner status, 3) substantial relations with ASEAN and 4) agreement of all ASEAN 
members. 
By making the TAC one of the criteria for membership in the new forum, ASEAN further 
politicised the treaty making it more difficult for states not the accede. ASEAN thus further claimed
its rule-making function in the region; membership in the regional 'orchestra' now required a formal 
99  Terada (2010: 76-77).
100  Kim et al (2011: 393).
101  Interview with Professor Lee Poh Ping, Institute of China Studies, Kuala Lumpur, 18/3/14.
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commitment to ASEAN's 'score'. Arguments (such as Japan’s and the US’) that accession could not 
be achieved because of legal reasons were now less useful against the potential loss of influence 
through the symbolic rejection of ASEAN 'score' and potential alienation from the premier leader-
led regional summit. For example, Australian Prime Minister Howard's remark that the TAC 
reflected “a mind-set that we've really got to move on from” offended not just the ASEAN states, 
but also the Northeast Asian states that had signed the TAC. Prime Minister Badawi rebuked 
Howard, stating that members of the East Asian community had “a role to play and standards to 
uphold”; Australia's acceptance within the EAS depended on it upholding ASEAN’s ‘score’106. 
Australia reluctantly signed the TAC a week before the first EAS meeting in Kuala Lumpur, giving 
symbolic endorsement to ASEAN's rule-making. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer 
described the signing as “the price we paid” for Australia to be involved107. A key western state, that
had previously been critical of ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role within the ARF, was now 
submitting to ASEAN's authority as 'regional conductor' as the price for membership in the regional
'orchestra'.
China and Japan both acquiesced to ASEAN's EAS proposal because it partially fulfilled 
their respective regional visions, but also because giving ASEAN control meant blocking the other's
chance at taking the lead. ASEAN's neutral status and its proven competence in convening such 
meetings made it an acceptable leader. China and Japan refrained from pushing their proposals any 
further, giving performative endorsement to ASEAN's continued performance of 'inclusive 
engagement'. ASEAN agreed that, rather than the APT evolving into the EAS, the APT should 
remain as the primary vehicle for East Asian Community-building alongside the EAS. This 
represented a concession to China but also assuaged concerns of a China-dominated exclusive 
regionalism because the APT would remain ASEAN-led. Indeed the APT continued as a forum for 
negotiation over East Asian provision of regional economic and financial public goods (as seen 
above in the evolution of the CMI/CMIM). By keeping the APT alongside the EAS, ASEAN was 
able to accommodate both China and Japan's visions for East Asian regionalism by offering 
alternative forums for them to pursue their goals. This was seen in China's promotion of an East 
Asian Free Trade Agreement (EAFTA) within the APT and Japan's promotion of a Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA) within the EAS.
106  Kerr and Tow (2008: 178).
107  Kerr and Tow (2008: 181).
219
Second transitional role bargain
The negotiations between 1997 and 2005 produced a transitional role bargain at the East Asian 
level. The developing links between Southeast Asian states and China at an individual and 
collective level, further legitimised China's 'responsible regional great power' role through 
increasing the economic and financial functions China was to perform. However, the result of 
negotiations over the EAS underlined that this role did not include the function of diplomatic 
leadership in an exclusive regionalism. The negotiations also further legitimised Japan in its 
'regional economic great power' role and it joined ASEAN in opposing China's diplomatic 
leadership. ASEAN kept diplomatic leadership through ensuring the EAS was “open and outward-
looking” and based on ASEAN leadership. ASEAN thus reasserted its 'inclusive engagement' 
function at the summit level and its 'rule-making' symbolised through EAS membership being 
dependent on accession to ASEAN's TAC. ASEAN thus further consolidated its 'regional conductor'
role in the latest incarnation of the regional 'orchestra', and commitment to its 'score' was the major 
criterion for membership in the 'orchestra'. However, this bargain was necessarily transitional 
because it essentially delayed any fundamental agreement between China and Japan over the future 
of East Asian regionalism. It was also problematic in the sense that it did not include the US. 
However, the fact that membership in the EAS regional 'orchestra' was left open to those states 
willing to make a formal commitment to ASEAN's 'score', meant that the US was welcome to join if
it gave up its resistance to signing the TAC. It would take a new administration within the US for 
this to take place. In the meantime ASEAN worked on re-conceptualising its own identity to boost 
its status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order. 
RE-CONCEPTUALISING: ASEAN ENLARGEMENT AND COMMUNITY
Although ASEAN was able to avoid role deterioration by negotiating its place in an East Asian 
division of labour, it still depended on Western endorsement to further consolidate its 'regional 
conductor' role and therefore it was imperative to address the legitimacy deficit with Western 
constituencies. Also, to protect its 'primary manager' role, ASEAN needed to take on new functions 
to avert interference in Southeast Asian affairs by the US and other Western states, especially in the 
context of Western promotion of democracy and human rights and the US' war on terrorism. 
ASEAN's re-conceptualisation of its 'primary manager' role involved enlargement to include all the 
states of Southeast Asia, as well as moves towards building an ASEAN Community.  
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Enlargement and Myanmar
Through including the CLMV108 states between 1995 and 1999, ASEAN went from a collective of 
non-communist states to an Association that spoke for 'One Southeast Asia'. The idea of 'One 
Southeast Asia' had been espoused since the Association's creation and, as we saw in the last 
chapter, provided the basis for ASEAN's assertion of its rules and processes in Indochina before and
during the Cambodian conflict. Enlargement bolstered the collective weight of ASEAN and further 
asserted ASEAN’s internal role as the 'primary manager' of Southeast Asian order.
A problematic issue for ASEAN's enlargement however was Myanmar's membership. 
Myanmar was ruled by a military junta that took control after the National League of Democracy's 
(NLD) election victory in 1990. Since then, the junta had suppressed dissent and kept many NLD 
leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi, under arrest. Western sanctions and diplomatic pressure had 
sought to isolate the junta but ASEAN instead sought to encourage change through a Thai-led 
strategy of 'constructive engagement'. When ASEAN offered Myanmar membership, the US and the
EU applied pressure on ASEAN to reverse its decision. By doing so, the US and the EU challenged 
ASEAN's right to determine its own membership and by extension ASEAN's autonomy within 
Southeast Asia. Western pressure signalled the end of the role bargain that we saw reached between 
the US and ASEAN during the Cold War based on the common imperative of containment of 
communist insurgency. The US was reneging on its commitment not to interfere in the management
of ASEAN affairs so that ASEAN states could show their autonomy to domestic constituencies. 
This had also been apparent in the US' post-Cold War requirement that US provision of military 
assistance be based on a commitment to democracy and human rights. In the early 1990s, both 
Thailand and Indonesia found themselves subject to the withdrawal of military assistance because 
of domestic politics. In this context, ASEAN autonomy was now exercised in actively resisting 
these Western pressures.
This became clear in the turnaround in Malaysia and Indonesia's position on Myanmar's 
admission. They initially opposed Thai proposals in the early 1990s to have Myanmar join the 
AMM as an observer due to the junta's treatment of Rohingya Muslims. However, increased 
criticism from Western dialogue partners over ASEAN's 'constructive engagement' policy had the 
effect of changing the minds of constituencies in Malaysia and Indonesia towards Myanmar's early 
admission. This added to concerns regarding Myanmar's links to China and how China could gain 
108  Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam.
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access to the Andaman Sea via naval ports in Myanmar. ASEAN hoped Myanmar's membership in 
ASEAN would mean the junta would adhere to ASEAN's norm against hosting bases for external 
powers. Blocking Myanmar's entry into ASEAN on the other hand could potentially drive it closer 
into China's sphere of influence109. 
In 1995, Bangkok succeeded in securing Ang San Suu Kyi's release from house arrest, 
enabling Myanmar to sign the TAC and then formally apply for membership. This was shortly 
followed by a junta crackdown on the NLD in 1996. Despite this, Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir took advantage of his chairmanship of ASEAN to unilaterally advance Myanmar's 
membership to 1997110. Thai, Philippine and Singaporean officials expressed doubts about admitting
Myanmar so soon. Philippine President Fidel Ramos went on record to express his desire to see 
membership postponed and Singapore's President Goh Chok Tong also expressed reservations, 
although he argued that Myanmar was not ready to be part of AFTA rather than pointing to political 
developments111. The hastened moves towards admitting Myanmar led to further criticism from the 
West, reflecting the US' and the EU's desire to perform the functions of democracy and human 
rights promotion globally in the post-Cold War context. The US, EU and Japan applied sanctions on
Myanmar and the EU indicated that if Myanmar joined ASEAN, then Myanmar would not be 
allowed to take part in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) if it was hosted by an EU member and the
EU would not attend an ASEM meeting hosted by Myanmar. US State Department spokesman 
Nicholas Burns said that the US was "trying to use our influence to make the point that Burma 
should be given a stiff message that it is not welcome [in ASEAN]"112. Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright personally wrote to the ASEAN leaders urging them to delay Myanmar's admission and 
even suggested that admitting Myanmar may affect the US' participation in the ARF113. This 
amounted to a major challenge to ASEAN’s 'regional conductor' role because there would be no 
'orchestra' for ASEAN to conduct if key players refused to engage with the Association. More than 
this however, Western partners were undermining ASEAN’s 'primary manager' role by challenging 
ASEAN's regional autonomy within Southeast Asia.
Western pressure thus had the contrary effect of galvanising ASEAN states into realising 
'One Southeast Asia' at the 30th Anniversary meeting in 1997 as an act of regional self-
determination. However, by asserting its 'primary manager' role and insisting that external powers 
109  This was especially salient for the Indonesians whose concerns also extended to Thailand.
110  Moller (1998).  
111  Intra-ASEAN debates over Myanmar's membership are dealt with extensively by Ba (2009: 117-124).
112  Moller (1998: 1092).
113 Kavi chongkittavorn “Asean to push back new admission to December” The Nation 30/5/97.
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not interfere in regional affairs, ASEAN was taking responsibility for the reform process in 
Myanmar. Consequently there was pressure to reform the norm of non-interference as it applied to 
intra-ASEAN affairs so that ASEAN could prove its competence in encouraging reform within 
Myanmar114. This was spearheaded in the late 1990s by liberal constituencies within Thailand and 
the Philippines in particular. Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim initiated the debate 
however when he argued with respect to the Cambodian coup in 1997 that ASEAN should apply a 
principle of “constructive intervention” because its prior non-involvement had contributed to the 
collapse of national reconciliation. The principle of “constructive intervention” was picked up by 
Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan who re-branded it as “flexible engagement” and argued that it
should be a general principle covering areas where domestic issues in one member state have an 
effect on the wider region115.
This revision was a sign of frustration within Thailand at the failure of 'constructive 
engagement' to bring about meaningful reform within Myanmar. It was also viewed by Thai 
officials as a means for Thailand to take on regional leadership. Indeed, despite the rejection of the 
proposal by other ASEAN states – who watered it down to “enhanced interaction” - Thai policy-
makers thought the process reflected positively on Thailand. Former Ambassador to Vietnam 
Surapong Jayanama, who was prominent in the negotiations over Myanmar's entry into ASEAN, 
said that “Thailand wanted to play a leading role in Southeast Asia. We had the potential to do so. It 
was the politics of identity-making and we needed to show clearly that we could lead on democracy
and human rights issues”116. This highlights the tension over individual states' identity and 
ambitions and the collective identity of ASEAN. ASEAN unity was a crucial aspect of ASEAN’s 
'regional conductor' role and maintaining the appearance of unity was seen as crucial if ASEAN 
wanted to maintain its role. It seemed however that Thailand wanted to claim the functions of 
democracy and human rights promotion within Southeast Asia to get status recognition from 
external partners, perhaps over and above ASEAN. Thailand even aligned with external actors in 
pressuring Myanmar's regime to reform. Together with the Philippines it was part of a 'contact 
group' including the US, Japan and the UK trying to find ways to leverage the regime through aid117.
Thailand also broke ranks with other ASEAN states at the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
in 2000. It refused to join them in helping Myanmar avoid sanctions regarding its use of forced 
labour by voting against amendments to the ILO resolution that would have postponed the ILO's 
114  Jones (2012: 104).
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decision and given Myanmar more time to satisfy the ILO's criteria118. However, the advent of the 
Thaksin administration in 2001, driven by Thai business constituencies with interests in Myanmar, 
brought Thailand's espousal of liberal values to an end.  
ASEAN's willingness to debate non-interference and to formally introduce a mild revision to
the principle amounted to a legitimacy claim regarding its credibility and competence in dealing 
with Myanmar. Older members of ASEAN recognised that Myanmar “truly stands out like a sore 
thumb” and that there was a need for some kind of interference119. An informal ASEAN retreat in 
Sentosa in 1999 was publicised by ASEAN as representing implementation of 'enhanced 
interaction'. ASEAN leaders reported that they had had “frank discussions” and Singaporean 
Foreign Minister Jayajumar stated: “I have never come across discussions with such candour. The 
Foreign Ministers spoke of views which they told me they would not have expressed, if not for the 
retreat”120. This was accompanied by the setting up of an ASEAN Surveillance Mechanism with 
respect to economic integration as well as the agreement on an ASEAN Troika in July 2000121. The 
Troika was intended to provide a mechanism for preventive diplomacy within Southeast Asia so 
that ASEAN could respond to crises within member states that may have a detrimental effect on 
ASEAN as a whole. This was potentially a mechanism for interference, boosting ASEAN's status as
a manager of Southeast Asian order by showing its ability to respond to crises and reducing the 
need for external interference in the region. Indonesia proposed using the Troika in the wake of 
attacks on Suu Kyi and NLD members by agents of the junta government in 2003. However, 
Myanmar instead accepted 'bilateral crisis diplomacy' with select countries including China, Japan 
and Thailand122. ASEAN willingness to introduce institutional mechanisms represented symbolic 
claims to competence in performing the functions of democracy and human rights promotion and 
regional monitoring. However ASEAN's reluctance to use such mechanisms, showed it was 
unwilling to substantiate these claims.
In the end, the US and the EU acquiesced to Myanmar's admission into ASEAN but made it 
clear that they would hold ASEAN accountable for the reform process within Myanmar. US 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright said that “by admitting Burma as a member, ASEAN assumes 
a greater responsibility, for Burma's problems now become ASEAN's problems”123. Likewise, a 
quid pro quo was struck between ASEAN and the EU in 2000. The EU agreed to resume the Asia-
118  Jones (2012: 194).
119  Interview with Kraisak Choonhaven, Chatichai Foundation, Bangkok, 25/2/14.
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Europe Meeting (ASEM) and offer support for ASEAN, as long as Myanmar was represented by 
lower-ranking officials in meetings and that the Myanmar regime resumed talks with the NLD. The 
EU made clear that it was up to ASEAN to ensure Myanmar kept its word124. ASEAN was 
subsequently explicit in noting discussion of Myanmar's political situation and ASEAN's 
encouragement of 'national reconciliation' and 'transition to democracy' in joint communiques 
released after ministerial meetings in the early 2000s. Much of these discussions took place at the 
informal ASEAN 'retreats' and the fact that they were mentioned in the joint communiques - which 
would have needed Myanmar's agreement - shows how ASEAN was keen to demonstrate that it was
actively trying to promote reform in Myanmar125.  
All this represented a new agreement over ASEAN's 'primary manager' role, which mirrored 
the earlier role bargain where ASEAN’s diplomatic leadership within Southeast Asia provided the 
legitimacy work for external powers’ regional imperatives. This time it was not a battle against 
communism however but democracy and human rights promotion. The difficulty with this 
particular bargain was that the imperatives of democracy and human rights promotion were not 
shared between ASEAN states and Western states in the same way that the counter-revolutionary 
struggle against communism was. ASEAN states were more concerned with reducing interference 
in their region and boosting ASEAN’s status as a successful manager rather than reform in itself. 
This was problematic as Western expectations of ASEAN’s progress in this area would not be 
fulfilled, limiting the degree of endorsement these partners would give. This was also true of 
domestic constituencies within ASEAN that advocated reform within Myanmar. As stated by the 
former president of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus, Kraisak Choonhaven: “If 
Burma keeps on going in an opposite direction and does not improve at all politically, ASEAN will 
never grow into a decent, world class organisation that we can look up to”126. This revealed the 
tension between the imperative of the 'primary manager' role to insulate Southeast Asia from 
external interference, and the need to meet external expectations regarding what constituted 
'success' in managing Southeast Asian order in order to show competence to perform the 'regional 
conductor' role. This tension would be further exacerbated during moves to create an ASEAN 
Community.
124  Jones (2008: 277), Jones (2012: 196-197).
125  See Severino (2006: 138-140).
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ASEAN Community
This section shows how negotiations over establishing an ASEAN Community clearly revealed the 
tension between the 'regional conductor' role and the 'primary manager' role, rooted in the different 
understanding of ASEAN's roles amongst member states. Older members more concerned with 
demonstrating ASEAN's competence as a successful manager have sought to introduce practical 
cooperation and liberal values into the ASEAN framework. Newer members have opposed deeper 
cooperation and especially any ASEAN responsibility for democracy and human rights promotion, 
holding strongly to the traditional concern for insulating domestic regimes from external 
interference. This has limited the substance of ASEAN's claims to be a successful manager to 
merely discursive claims. The more productive aspect of ASEAN's re-conceptulisation was to put in
place frameworks for engagement on new issues such as defence dialogue, which ASEAN was able 
to expand in the final phase of role negotiation this thesis deals with.   
In 2003, ASEAN agreed to create an ‘ASEAN Community’ consisting of three pillars: the 
ASEAN Security Community (renamed ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) in 2007), 
ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-cultural Community. This section focuses on the
APSC pillar, which has been the site of the most significant re-conceptualisation of ASEAN's 
'primary manger' role, and therefore the most contentious. Indonesia has been the principle driving 
force behind the APSC, seeking to bolster ASEAN 'primary manager' role and demonstrate 
competence as the 'regional conductor' by taking on more regional order functions, as well as 
reinstating Indonesia's own ASEAN leadership in the post-Suharto era. Indonesia introduced the 
APSC initiative during its chairmanship of ASEAN in 2003-2004. The idea of a Comprehensive 
Security Community came from a paper by Rizal Sukma, based at the Jakarta think-tank Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). It envisioned developing ASEAN mechanisms for 
preventing and resolving conflicts127. A plan of action for achieving a security community was yet to
be outlined, but the ASEAN states agreed in the Bali Concord II in 2003 to “explore innovative 
ways to increase its security and establish modalities for the ASEAN Security Community, which 
include, inter alia, the following elements: norms-setting, conflict prevention, approaches to 
conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building”128. There have subsequently been two major 
aspects to ASEAN's re-conceptualisation as a security community. Firstly, there has been a more 
conscious effort to take on security functions such as peacekeeping, counter-terrorism and security 
127  Acharya (2014: 226-227).
128  ASEAN (2003).
226
of sea lanes in response to the GWOT. Secondly, there has been a further push to take on 
responsibility for the functions of democracy and human rights promotion as part of the ASEAN 
community-building project. 
Security functions
Peacekeeping Indonesia promoted a peacekeeping function for ASEAN as a means to avoid 
external intervention as had happened in East Timor. Indonesia included an ASEAN Peacekeeping 
Centre in its draft plan of action towards achieving a security community in 2004. The other 
ASEAN states rejected the proposal, raising a number of concerns regarding differing defence 
capabilities, command control, whether it would be ASEAN helmets or national, whether force 
could be used and whether consensus would be needed129. However, ASEAN did establish the 
ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting (ADMM) in 2006, a significant development considering the 
previous norm within ASEAN where defence cooperation and formal dialogue were restricted to the
bilateral or trilateral level. Institutionalising defence dialogue reflected a sense amongst the ASEAN
leaders that ASEAN could not become a single community without having in place a complete set 
of ministerial dialogues130. The ADMM became a forum for discussing the possibility of an ASEAN
peacekeeping function and ASEAN adopted a concept paper on the establishment of an ASEAN 
Peacekeeping Centres Network (APCN) in 2011. The concept paper put forward short-term aims of 
information-sharing and capacity-building and the long-term aim of developing a “formal 
framework for collaboration among Member States in developing a common standby arrangement to 
support peacekeeping operations”131. The APCN held its first meeting the following year. ASEAN 
thus put in place a process for establishing its performance of the function of regional peacekeeping,
even if this remained a long-term aim. Considering ASEAN's subsequent decision to expand the 
ADMM process to include its dialogue partners (discussed below), there is scope for negotiating 
external partners into supporting ASEAN's performance of peacekeeping function through funding 
and capacity-building.    
Counter-terrorism The APSC also specifically mentioned counter-terrorism cooperation as 
part of its aims. This is significant considering the US' concern for terrorism and showed ASEAN 
again adopting a great power's strategic agenda as part of its 'primary manager' role. This allowed 
ASEAN to deflect opportunities for US interference and also try to define what 'counter-terrorism' 
129  See Weatherbee (2005).
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would mean in a Southeast Asian context. For example, ASEAN signed the ASEAN Convention on 
Counter-Terrorism in 2007, emphasising that counter-terrorism cooperation would be undertaken in 
a manner consistent with sovereignty and territorial integrity – a clear response to the US' previous 
discussion of 'pre-emptive' strikes. ASEAN also signed a series of joint declarations on counter-
terrorism with its dialogue partners also emphasising sovereignty and territorial integrity. The latter 
have focused on external partners providing capacity-building to ASEAN states132. However, most 
of the practical cooperation was left to the bilateral or trilateral level, in partnership with the US. 
Other ASEAN members were still concerned about giving ASEAN, and perhaps Indonesia, too 
much control over regional security. ASEAN states were more comfortable with external powers 
providing security public goods133.
Security of sea lanes In the context of the GWOT and US unilateralism however, there were 
limits to what was considered acceptable for the US as the 'offshore great power guarantor', as we 
saw above with respect to the controversy over the Regional Maritime Security Initiative. This is 
also true of Malaysia and Indonesia's opposition to the operational implementation of the US' 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which allows the US and its allies to interdict ships suspected 
of carrying WMD134. The US' provision of security public goods did not mean that it could 
unilaterally undertake operations in an area littoral states considered under their responsibility. 
Indeed, the RMSI provided an opportunity for regional states to claim responsibility for security of 
sea lanes in the Malacca Straits where they had previously failed in the 1970s (see Chapter Two). 
Indonesia proposed coordinated patrols of the Malacca Straits by Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore, where each state was responsible for patrolling its section of the Straits. In 2006 the 
three states signed the terms of reference and standard operating procedures of the Malacca Straits 
Patrols (MSP). This included the Malacca Straits Surface Patrols (MSSP), the Eyes in the Sky (EiS)
which provided aerial surveillance, and the Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG) which itself 
developed the Malacca Straits Patrols Information System (MSP-IS) to improve coordination and 
situational awareness at sea among the three countries. Thailand joined the MSP in 2008. This 
indigenous effort to perform the function of security of sea lanes in the Malacca Straits was 
supplemented by a broader multilateral mechanism promoted by Japan called the Regional 
Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). ReCAAP 
came into force in 2004 and includes as signatories the 10 ASEAN states as well as Japan, China, 
South Korea, India and the US, among others. In 2006 an Information Sharing Center (ISC) was set
132  See Hafidz (2009). 
133  Haacke (2005).
134  Newman and Williams (2006: 118-119).
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up in Singapore to facilitate the sharing of information and expertise135. Information sharing became
ReCAAP's substantive contribution to combating piracy; incidents of piracy detected by ReCAAP 
were passed onto the nearest maritime authority, which in the case of the Malacca Straits was 
usually one of the MSP participants. Indonesia and Malaysia have so far refused to ratify the 
ReCAAP agreement citing concerns over sovereignty, but this has not prevented their involvement, 
especially as incidents of piracy in the Malacca Straits have risen dramatically. Through the MSP 
and ReCAAP, littoral states have had the endorsement, and significant funding and support for 
capacity-building, of the US and Japan. Although not part of the ASEAN framework, the MSP-
ReCAAP division of labour with respect to security of sea lanes in the Malacca Straits provides a 
boost to ASEAN's 'primary manager' role, especially as the MSP could be 'scaled up' to an 
institutionalised ASEAN maritime security mechanism136.  
As can be seen, ASEAN has sought to position the newly claimed security functions as part 
of its 'primary manager' role within a division of labour with external partners. This follows a 
similar pattern to that developed during the Cold War with respect to counter-insurgency. ASEAN 
collectively, or ASEAN states on a subregional level, have sought to avoid interference in regional 
affairs by taking responsibility for security functions, whilst also taking advantage of the 
capabilities external partners have for boosting ASEAN states' own ability to manage security issues
within Southeast Asia. 
Democracy and human rights promotion
The push for ASEAN to more formally take on the functions of democracy and human rights 
promotion has more clearly been aimed at improving ASEAN's credibility as a successful manager 
of Southeast Asian order. However, newer ASEAN members have resisted this process. Indonesia's 
position when introducing these functions into the community-building initiative was that in order 
to have a more integrated and cohesive ASEAN, members needed to develop a common perspective
on fundamental matters such as the relationship between state and society137. The newer members 
wanted to insulate themselves from dissenting views, within and outside of their own borders. For 
example, the CLMV states insisted that the mention of 'democracy' in the Bali Concord II be 
accompanied by 'harmony', leading to the document stating: “[t]he ASEAN Security Community is 
135  For a recent discussion of Japan’s interests and involvement in maritime security in the South China Sea, see Storey 
(2013).
136  See Koh (2013). 
137  Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Secretariat of the Vice President, Jakarta, 11/3/14.
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envisaged to bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that 
countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, 
democratic and harmonious environment”138. Likewise, Indonesia's subsequent draft plan of action 
that described democracy and human rights as 'shared ASEAN values' was also watered down in the
final plan adopted at the Vientiane summit in 2004. ASEAN listed democracy as a 'common value' 
alongside peace, stability and prosperity. Also, where Indonesia had drafted that ASEAN would not 
tolerate unconstitutional or undemocratic political change, the final plan said that ASEAN should 
not condone unconstitutional and undemocratic change, adding that ASEAN members' territory 
should not be used to undermine peace, security and stability of another member139. The less 
democratic regimes upheld the traditional concern for non-interference alongside any references to 
democracy to ensure that other ASEAN states did not provide refuge or support for dissidents and 
political opponents. Indeed, the virtual silence of ASEAN over the two coups in Thailand in 2006 
and 2014 showed that ASEAN would tolerate unconstitutional political change.
The ASEAN Charter, which sought to turn ASEAN from an Association based on 'soft' 
regionalism to one that is rules-based, again revealed the tension between member states' different 
understandings of the functions ASEAN should perform. The Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the 
ASEAN Charter, charged with proposing major steps towards achieving the ASEAN Community, 
suggested ambitious reforms to decision-making procedures, dispute settlement mechanisms and 
monitoring – including procedures for sanctions140. They sought to establish a 'responsibility to 
cooperate' by ensuring that members did not use the non-interference norm in a way that damaged 
the Association and the 'regional interest'141. However, the High Level Task Force (HLTF), who 
drafted the Charter under the supervision of the foreign ministers, rejected many of the bolder 
proposals from the EPG142. The major point of controversy was the article referring to setting up a 
human rights mechanism. The CLMV members opposed its inclusion with Myanmar's participant 
Aung Bwa stating that human rights was “a very delicate and sensitive issue, and could be 
politicised” and required “caution against double standards”. He criticised other participants for 
adopting a “holier-than-the-Pope” attitude and cautioned that “[t]hose who live in glass houses 
should not throw stones”143. Similarly, the participant from Laos, Bounkeut Sangsomak, noted the 
138  ASEAN (2003), Emmerson (2005: 179).
139  Acharya (2014: 229-230).
140 “Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter”, December 2006. 
<http://www.asean.org/archive/19247.pdf> accessed 14/1/14.  
141Jones (2012: 207-208).
142Reports on the drafting negotiations by members of the HLTF can be found in Koh et al (2009).  
143Aung Bwa (2009: 32-33).
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differences surrounding the concept of human rights, with some emphasising ASEAN should 
adhere to their universal value, while others thought ASEAN should uphold the value of “Southeast 
Asia” as a region with weak political institutions still engaging in nation-building144. During the 
drafting process the newer members repeatedly threatened to walk out145.
The CLMV’s resistance to human rights revealed their narrow understanding of ASEAN’s 
role as providing protection from external interference. By more explicitly taking on democracy and
human rights promotion functions, ASEAN would no longer be a form of protection but perhaps 
itself be a source of interference. ASEAN overcame this resistance however by reaching a 
compromise that upheld the rights of states along with the rights of individuals. For example, the 
Charter stated that one of the purposes of ASEAN was “[t]o strengthen democracy, enhance good 
governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN”146. 
This upheld the idea that the norms of sovereignty and non-interference were themselves rights that 
needed to be balanced against the espoused liberal values147.
Despite the differences over human rights, the foreign ministers realised the need to develop 
a human rights body due to the reputation costs of not having one for ASEAN's status as a 
successful manager148. Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, who served on the EPG, 
asked: “how can we avoid having [a human rights body] when all other regional organisations have 
one already?”149. The Chair of the HLTF Rosario Manalo said that the establishment of a human 
rights body would “keep ASEAN relevant. It will announce to the world that ASEAN honors its 
human rights commitments”150.  As a result, ASEAN created the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2009. This again represented a compromise; ASEAN's 
approach to human rights promotion and protection would be 'evolutionary' and consistent with the 
norm of non-interference151. The AICHR was intergovernmental with decisions based on 
consultation and consensus, meaning it remained in the control of member states, with each having 
an effective veto. The AICHR was criticised by civil society groups within Southeast Asia for 
144Sangsomak (2009: 164-165).
145Jones (2012: 208).
146 ASEAN (2007). Article 1(7).
147 Ciorciari (2012: 712).
148 Patra (2009: 13).
149 Salim Osman, “Alatas lauds new human rights body”  Straits Times 6/8/07.
150  Speech at the Sixth Workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights, Manila, 17/7/07 
<http://www.aseanhrmech.org/downloads/Ambassador%20Manalo%20speech.pdf> accessed 14/1/14.  
151 ASEAN (2009).
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effectively excluding civil society from participating152. Likewise, the ASEAN Declaration on 
Human Rights adopted in November 2012, also drew widespread criticism for emphasising that 
human rights promotion should recognise the national and cultural context. The US expressed 
concern over this 'cultural relativism', and stated that “we are deeply concerned that many of the 
ASEAN Declaration’s principles and articles could weaken and erode universal human rights and 
fundamental freedoms”153. ASEAN defended the Charter and the ADHR by describing them as 
'living documents', not an end in themselves but part of a continuing evolutionary process. The fact 
that the US encouraged ASEAN to engage with civil society in revising the declaration however, 
showed that a major constituency of legitimation did not buy ASEAN's legitimacy claims.      
The fact that ASEAN adopted the Charter during the height of international attention over 
the Myanmar government's crackdown on protesters in 2007, also seemed to show that its claims to 
democracy and human rights promotion were merely symbolic at this stage. ASEAN had previously
stepped up its rhetoric in criticising Myanmar. Indonesia called on Myanmar to “exercise maximum
restraint and desist from any acts that could cause further violence” and Singaporean Foreign 
Minister George Yeo, as ASEAN chair, expressed ASEAN's “revulsion” to Myanmar's Foreign 
Minister Nyan Win154. The issue of Myanmar hung over the summit meetings in November 2007. 
The US Senate passed a resolution calling on ASEAN to expel Myanmar and the US' Trade 
Representative Susan Schwab cited the political situation in Myanmar as hindering negotiations 
over a US-ASEAN FTA. She reiterated the common refrain that "[t]he reputation and credibility of 
ASEAN as an organization has been called into question because of the situation in Burma"155. 
Myanmar prevented the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor Ibrihim Gambari from briefing the
EAS on the situation in Myanmar. Singaporean Foreign Minister Yeo's response as ASEAN Chair 
was to declare that Myanmar was on its own in dealing with the UN until the Junta was ready to 
accept ASEAN's help. ASEAN also changed its language from calling for “national reconciliation” 
to actively calling for the peaceful transition to democracy and implementation of free and fair 
elections. However, the lack of any significant sanctions against Myanmar, and its presence at the 
signing of the ASEAN Charter, showed the lack of substance to ASEAN’s claims to competence at 
democracy and human rights promotion. As a consequence, the high expectations that had been 
raised regarding the Charter were not met156.
152 Ciorciari (2012: 718-720).
153  US Department of State press statement “ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights” 20/11/12 
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200915.htm> accessed 9/4/14.
154  Quoted in Davies (2012: 9).
155  Wayne Arnold, “Myanmar crackdown tests a core value of Asean.” New York Times 19/11/07
 <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/world/asia/19iht-asean.1.8388055.html?_r=0> accessed 29/1/14.
156  Cabellero-Anthony (2008).
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Results of ASEAN's re-conceptualisation of the 'primary manager' role
ASEAN's re-conceptualisation had two aims: to insulate Southeast Asia from external interference 
through bolstering ASEAN's 'primary manager' role, and to address the legitimacy deficit ASEAN 
faced with respect to Western constituencies by demonstrating its status as a successful manager of 
Southeast Asian order. ASEAN has been more effective on the first count by taking on some 
security functions as part of its 'primary manager' role within a division of labour with external 
partners. Although only nascent at this point, as instutionalised security functions as part of the 
ASEAN framework still involves major re-conceptualisation of ASEAN norms against formal 
security and defence cooperation, there is potential for this to develop. ASEAN and external 
partners have been able to identity common threats from issues such as piracy and terrorism, and a 
division of labour between them towards addressing such issues is emerging. Such a division of 
labour has taken a similar form of that which we saw developed during the Cold War in Chapters 
Two and Three with respect to counter-insurgency: ASEAN states providing the vanguard, with the 
US and other external partners providing funding and support for capacity-building. 
ASEAN has been less effective in addressing its status as a successful manager of Southeast 
Asian order through taking on the functions of democracy and human rights promotion. This is due 
to the gulf between the older and newer members' understanding of ASEAN's roles. Older members
have shown more concern for ASEAN’s 'regional conductor' role as a means to maximise autonomy
and thus credibility is important. They have therefore seen the need to more explicitly demonstrate 
the performance of the functions of democracy and human rights promotion as part of the ASEAN 
framework. Newer members have generally viewed ASEAN’s roles more narrowly as providing 
some form of protection from external pressures for liberalisation and political reform. The 
resulting consensus on ASEAN agreements as part of the community-building project has reflected 
the balance between the need for unity and the need for demonstrating ASEAN’s status as a 
successful manager of Southeast Asian order. The changes ASEAN has made to its framework 
amount to merely discursive – at most symbolic - claims to this status and therefore its competence 
as the 'regional conductor'. This made it difficult for Western constituencies to give more than 
discursive or symbolic endorsement to the process. The grand ideas also had the effect of raising 
expectations among civil society, which were not met by the reality of the Charter, AICHR or 
ADHR. ASEAN officials insisted however that the point is the process in itself and how, by putting 
these things in motion, ASEAN claims to be a credible institution that partners can work with. 
Indeed, this may have been the principal achievement of ASEAN's re-conceptualisation: ASEAN 
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established processes which can be worked with and built upon, reducing the need for creating 
alternative institutions.  
This way of thinking was revealed in the development within ASEAN circles of the concept 
of 'ASEAN centrality'. ASEAN saw itself as the central core upon which open and inclusive 
regional architecture would be built. ASEAN centrality was enshrined in ASEAN's Charter as one 
of the principles of ASEAN, and maintaining this centrality was enshrined as one of the purposes of 
ASEAN157. It was directed at external actors but also at domestic constituencies within ASEAN 
states to support a common ASEAN position in negotiations with larger powers (rather than 
demanding dogged adherence to a national position). ASEAN represented each member state and 
ASEAN's centrality meant that a better deal for each individual member state could be reached if 
they held a common position as a group158.  ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role was now formalised 
as part of its corporate identity and 'ASEAN centrality', as pointed out by ASEAN Deputy 
Secretary-General of Community and Corporate Affairs AKP Mochtan, has become “sacred” to 
ASEAN159. ASEAN's 'centrality', its unity and neutrality, would all be challenged and defended in 
the final phase of role negotiation dealt with in this chapter. 
PROTECTING AND EXPANDING THE CONDUCTOR ROLE: 2008-PRESENT
The latest phase in ASEAN's role negotiation began with Australia's challenge to the 'regional 
conductor' role when it proposed new regional architecture based on the leadership of the great 
powers. ASEAN was able to successfully defeat the proposal and gained significant endorsement 
for its 'regional conductor' role from the new Obama administration in the US that was keen to 
demonstrate its re-engagement with Asia on the region's terms. ASEAN was subsequently able to 
expand its role by developing new ASEAN-led forums within which to exercise its diplomatic 
leadership. However, 2009 also saw an escalation of tensions in the South China Sea with ASEAN 
struggling to employ its 'regional conductor' role to negotiate a code of conduct with China. 
Escalating great power rivalry over maritime disputes and the US' 'rebalancing' have complicated 
ASEAN's task of staying united and neutral, posing significant challenges for the future of the 
'regional conductor' role.   
 
157  ASEAN (2007). Article 1(15) refers to the purpose and Article 2(2)(m) refers to the principle.
158  Interview with Ong Keng Yong, Singapore High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, 19/3/14.
159  Interview with AKP Mochtan, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 12/3/14.
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APC: challenging ASEAN's diplomatic leadership
In 2008 Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd presented another vision for the region through his 
Asia-Pacific Community (APC) proposal. The proposal was part of the Rudd government's attempt 
to claim a more proactive middle power role in Asia and break away from the US 'deputy sheriff' 
image Australia acquired under the previous Howard government160. Rudd argued that none of the 
existing regional mechanisms were capable of achieving the substantive goals of developing a 
security community, the capacity to deal with transnational security issues, open trading regimes 
across the region as well as providing long-term energy, resource and food security161. Instead, a 
more coordinated, outcomes-based mechanism was needed, led by a 'core group' of states. This 
group included the US, China, Japan, India and Indonesia together with unspecified “other 
countries”162. The list notably did not include ASEAN. This contestation of ASEAN's 'regional 
conductor' role had two levels. Firstly, there was an explicit challenge: Australia proposed re-
organising the regional ‘orchestra’ under great power leadership, dispensing with ASEAN’s 
‘regional conductor’ role. Secondly, there was a more implicit challenge as Australia itself was 
making a claim to the function of multilateral institution-building, usurping ASEAN’s ‘regional 
conductor’ role. Although some in Indonesia were intrigued by the status given to their country 
within the APC proposal, overall the ASEAN states opposed it. Singapore's Ambassador-at-large 
Tommy Koh was highly vocal, criticising the idea of having a core group of leading states as being 
“anti-democratic and elitest” and saying that it would have the effect of marginalising ASEAN163. 
For Koh, the deficit of trust amongst the great powers means only ASEAN, because of its 
independence and neutrality, can lead regional institution-building164. This pointed straight back to 
ASEAN's unique ability to ‘conduct’ the ‘orchestra’ by convening all major players together and 
providing a mutually agreeable ‘score’ to play from.
As had happened with respect to the PMC in the early 1990s, the EAS meeting in 2009 was 
used by Australia, as well as Japan, as an opportunity to map out visions for evolving regional 
cooperation. By this point, the APC proposal had accommodated ASEAN by removing the great 
power 'core' grouping of states. However, it died out both because the successful opposition of 
ASEAN and also the lack of interest of key players such as the US. However, according to former 
Political-Security Director at the ASEAN Secretariat Termsak Chalermpalanupap, “it stimulated 
160  Baba and Kaya (2014).
161 Frost (2009: 6).
162 Kraft (2012: 65).
163  Tommy Koh “Australia must respect ASEAN's role.” The Straits Times 24/6/09.
164  Interview with Tommy Koh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore. 7/3/14.
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ASEAN to examine ourself and to redouble our efforts to make good our claim ... to be the primary 
leading force of all these regional processes for dialogue and cooperation”165. This was boosted by 
renewed endorsement from the US, which also came with further expectations, increasing the need 
for ASEAN to demonstrate its claim to 'centrality'.
US re-engagement: endorsement with new challenges
The Obama administration's 2009 re-engagement with Asia constituted an attempt to reverse the 
sense of neglect engendered by the actions of the previous administration. Secretary of State Hilary 
Clinton made sure her first official trip was to Asia, during which she made a point of publicising 
that the US was ‘back’. The tour included an unprecedented visit to the ASEAN Secretariat in 
Jakarta. Clinton signed the TAC in July 2009 stating that, although potential disagreements could 
not be ruled out, US admission to the treaty reflected its “commitment to an honest and open 
dialogue”166. The US had now formally acceded to ASEAN's 'score', meaning it was eligible for 
membership in the EAS. However, the US signed the TAC on the stated condition that TAC 
provisions would not limit action the US considered necessary to address a threat to its own national
interests167. This showed that although the US was symbolically willing to submit to ASEAN's 
authority as the 'regional conductor', it did not wish for its commitment to ASEAN's 'score' to limit 
its strategic mobility168. In November 2009, Barack Obama attended the first US-ASEAN Summit 
where he announced the US would open a mission at ASEAN with a serving Ambassador. This 
showed the US' willingness to have a summit with all ASEAN members together rather than just 
select members. The US reversed the perceived neglect of previous years by re-engaging on 
ASEAN’s terms, offering firm symbolic and even performative endorsement of ASEAN's 'regional 
conductor' role. Indeed, there was a sense within ASEAN that Obama had given Southeast Asia the 
same priority as Northeast Asia, the first US president to do so since the Vietnam War169.
The US' engagement and support for “ASEAN's continuing role in multilateral efforts where
ASEAN has a growing ability to make a contribution”170 also came with expectations. In 2010 
Clinton set out the US' principles regarding regional architecture. These included the reaffirmation 
165  Interview with Termsak Chalermpalanupap, ISEAS, Singapore, 3/3/14.
166 Ali (2012: 120).
167 Crook (2009: 741).
168 All the great powers signed the TAC on terms that limited its applicability. 
169 Interview with Tommy Koh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, 7/3/14.
170 ASEAN (2009). Joint Statement - 1st ASEAN-US Leader's Meeting: Enhanced Partnership for Enduring Peace and 
Prosperity Singapore, 15th November 2009.
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of alliances as the cornerstone of US engagement, but also stated that regional institutions needed to
address concrete issues and be effective in delivering results. The US also expected regional states 
to choose the premier grouping from existing institutions, with the EAS and APEC as contenders171. 
This presented a challenge to ASEAN to work with the US and others in developing existing 
institutions to be more effective rather than supplying the region with more ASEAN Plus initiatives.
Another challenge to ASEAN was the US' promotion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
The TPP represents a more exclusive and ‘high quality’ trade pact for the region than previous 
proposals such as China’s East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) based on ASEAN Plus Three and 
Japan’s Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) based on ASEAN Plus Six. 
The intrusive terms of the TPP, such as the elimination of all exemptions to tariff reductions, require
domestic reform in most states and have complicated negotiations; even the US Congress has 
significant reservations regarding the TPP. China initially criticised the TPP as a US attempt at 
economic containment. However, the internal Chinese debate is ongoing and there are also voices 
arguing that China should join negotiations172. As four ASEAN states have joined negotiations - 
Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and Vietnam – there has been concern of a split within ASEAN 
regarding the right approach forward for a free trade area.
ASEAN's Response
In response to the challenges raised by the APC proposal and the US' strategic and economic 're-
engagement' of Asia, ASEAN expanded its 'regional conductor' role by increasing the number of 
forums within which ASEAN convened the regional 'orchestra' and provided the 'score'. By putting 
in place further forums where ASEAN performed the 'regional conductor' role, ASEAN closed off 
opportunities for other actors to set up alternative forums that could bypass ASEAN. Specifically 
ASEAN: ended the debate over regional architecture by making the EAS the primary leader-led 
forum in the region through including the US and Russia; prevented the Shangri La Dialogue from 
being formalised by expanding the ADMM to include all major players; and protected its control 
over the pace of trade negotiations by providing an inclusive regional trade agreement as an 
alternative to an East Asia-only free trade pact, and the more intrusive trade pacts of CEPEA and 
TPP.
171 Ali (2012: 122).
172  See Paul Bowles “China debates the TPP.” East Asia Forum 20/3/14 
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Directly in response to the challenge of the APC in proposing to re-organise the regional 
‘orchestra’ and dispense with ASEAN’s ‘regional conductor’ role, the ASEAN foreign ministers 
announced in July 2010 that Russia and the US would join the EAS in 2011. There were reportedly 
two options on the table in the run up to the announcement: an ASEAN Plus 8 that could meet 
whenever the APEC summit was in Asia whilst the extant EAS met annually, and an expanded 
EAS. Singapore strongly pushed for the ASEAN Plus 8 as it felt that the US' inclusion in the EAS 
would negatively affect free trade negotiations based on EAS membership. It also saw the ASEAN 
Plus 8 putting less pressure on the US president to attend annually, avoiding the embarrassment of 
the president being unable to attend. Indonesia and Malaysia pushed for the expanded EAS because 
it meant there was no need to create a new framework and provided a means to balance the 
influence of China within the EAS173. Singapore could not rally strong support for its proposal, and 
the US made known its preference for full EAS membership, so ASEAN chose the expanded EAS. 
By doing so, ASEAN ended the debate over visions for regional community. The US and Russia 
were now members of the primary leader-led forum of the regional 'orchestra' and had both 
formally committed to ASEAN's 'score' by signing the TAC. This partially fulfilled the APC 
proposal for an inclusive leaders' meeting but removed the 'great power concert' aspect and instead 
reasserted ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role. This made it more difficult to argue the case for ‘new’
regional architecture; ASEAN had already put the necessary forums in place and regional states 
should work within them174. In demonstration of its policy shift, Australia appointed a full-time 
Ambassador to the ASEAN Secretariat and stated its official endorsement of ASEAN's 'centrality' to
regional cooperation in Asia175. 
In a similar vein ASEAN initiated wider Asia-Pacific formal defence dialogue in the ADMM
Plus, expanding its performance of 'inclusive engagement' into the defence sphere and forestalling 
challenges from elsewhere to set up defence dialogue176. In particular the Shangri-la Dialogue 
(SLD), an unofficial forum organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 
involving regional defence and military officials, had served as a platform for increased regional 
defence dialogue. In 2002 Japanese Defence Agency Director General Nakatani Gen proposed 
turning the SLD into a formal Asian Defence Ministerial Meeting, which ASEAN rejected177. 
173 Graeme Dobell “Scoop: ASEAN's Divide on US” The Interpreter 16/10/10 
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176Capie (2013).
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However, the growing prominence of the SLD in the yearly calendar of meetings showed ASEAN 
leaders that the region was ready for defence dialogue and that ASEAN should take the initiative to 
include external partners in the ADMM process before any further proposals to formalise the SLD. 
Formalising the SLD threatened the ARF as the premier regional security dialogue and by extension
also threatened ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role by developing mechanisms for regional actors to 
discuss security that bypassed ASEAN. If formalised defence dialogue was going to be set up, it 
was going to meet as part of the full regional 'orchestra' under ASEAN's authority as the 'regional 
conductor'.Having previously inaugurated the ADMM, as well as convening the ARF Defence 
Officials Dialogue (ARF-DOD), ASEAN showed that it had competence in promoting formal 
defence dialogue. Indeed, from the start the ADMM was promoted as “outward-looking in respect 
of actively engaging ASEAN's friends and Dialogue Partners” and that “ASEAN shall be in the 
driver's seat in the ADMM's interactions with ASEAN's friends and Dialogue Partners and ASEAN 
Defence Officials should take the lead in ADMM process”178. 
At the May 2010 ADMM, ASEAN adopted two concept papers on the 'configuration and 
composition' and 'modalities and procedures' of the ADMM Plus. As with the EAS in 2005, ASEAN
provided criteria for membership within the new defence track of the regional 'orchestra': full 
dialogue partner status, significant interactions and relations with ASEAN defence establishments 
and ability to work with the ADMM to build capacity and enhance security179. ASEAN invited 
Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, Russia and the US to join the process. 
ASEAN determined that the ADMM Plus chair would follow the ADMM chair, and so be limited to
ASEAN members, and that the chair, with ASEAN consensus, would hold the prerogative of 
inviting the dialogue partners to participate180. ASEAN's 'centrality' within the process, and 
prerogative to determine the composition and development of the ADMM Plus, was safeguarded as 
ASEAN would have control from the beginning. All the invitees accepted and joined the ASEAN 
defence ministers in Hanoi in October 2010. The Joint Statement of the first ADMM Plus meeting 
reaffirmed ASEAN’s centrality and described the forum as “the highest ministerial defence and 
security consultative and cooperative mechanism for regional security issues among the ASEAN 
member states and the eight ‘Plus’ countries”181. The meeting in Hanoi also provided an opportunity
for bilateral defence talks between China and the US as well as Japan and China, significant 
periods.
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considering their clash over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands the month before.     
In a similar pattern to the ARF, the non-ASEAN countries were given a stake in the ADMM 
Plus process through co-chairing Expert Working Groups with an ASEAN member. These were 
tasked with promoting practical cooperation on a range of non-traditional security issues. The 
outcome of the first round of EWGs were a series of training exercises, including the ADMM Plus 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and Military Medicine exercise in Brunei in 
June 2013. This exercise included approximately 3200 personnel, seven ships, 15 helicopters as 
well as military medical, engineering and search and rescue teams and assets from the 18 member 
states of ADMM Plus182 . Admiral Locklear, chief of PACOM, called it a “substantial” 
achievement183. ASEAN has thus sought to embed the ADMM Plus within a division of labour with 
the ARF and SLD. The ADMM Plus' focus on practical cooperation is considered to complement 
the ARF's focus on strategic-level consultations and the SLD's “track 1.5” nature, where defence 
ministers attend in an 'unofficial' capacity184. The latter ostensibly allows for less restrained sharing 
of views on traditional and non-traditional security, as well as the clarification of states' security 
positions. 
On top of the EAS and ADMM Plus, ASEAN also captured the process of negotiating a 
regional trade agreement through its proposal for a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP). This was a notable response considering the US' expressed preference for economic issues 
to be kept off the EAS agenda and addressed within APEC (and the TPP) whilst the EAS focused 
on broader security issues185. China and Japan had previously offered competing proposals, with 
China pushing for an EAFTA based on APT membership, and Japan proposing a CEPEA based on 
ASEAN Plus 6. These, together with RCEP, were subject to a series of expert group studies into 
their feasibility. At a meeting of EAS Economic Ministers in August 2011, China and Japan made a 
joint proposal on speeding up the establishment of EAFTA and CEPEA and the ministers 
acknowledged that ASEAN was working on a proposal for an ASEAN ++ FTA186. Speeding up 
Chinese and Japanese-led proposals could have taken the pace of trade negotiation out of ASEAN's 
182  Official Press Release of the Singapore Government, “SAF and Other Militaries Conclude the ADMM-Plus 
HADR/MM Exercise .” 
<http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2013/jun/20jun13_nr.html#.UtPQcvRdUQh> 
accessed 13/1/14.
183 Mukherjee, A., “ADMM-Plus: Talk Shop or Key to Asia-Pacific Security?” The Diplomat 22/8/13
<http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/admm-plus-talk-shop-or-key-to-asia-pacific-security/1/> accessed 13/1/14.  
184  Tan (2012: 243-244).
185  Heng (2012).
186  ASEAN (2011a).
240
hands, which ASEAN had managed through its various ASEAN Plus One PTAs187. ASEAN 
therefore took charge of the process by dropping references to the EAFTA and CEPEA and 
announcing a framework for RCEP at the ASEAN summit in November 2011. RCEP was promoted
as a means to link together the existing ASEAN Plus One PTAs into an overarching agreement. It 
was however based on openness, allowing members to join if they desired. In November 2012 
ASEAN, together with Japan, China, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand signed a 
declaration to begin negotiations on the RCEP which concluded their third round in Malaysia in 
January 2014. The declaration recognised ASEAN’s centrality in the regional economic integration 
process.
By intersecting the RCEP proposal in-between the Chinese and Japanese proposals, ASEAN 
was again able to exploit the rivalry between China and Japan to gain endorsement for its ‘regional 
conductor’ role in the economic sphere. It also provides a more inclusive pathway towards regional 
trade liberalisation than the TPP. This is notable considering China’s absence from TPP negotiations
and China has been keen to give its endorsement to the RCEP negotiations188. RCEP serves to 
accommodate China as a major economic partner and performer of key economic functions and 
provides a pathway to regional free trade that is inclusive of developing Asian states concerned by 
the intrusive measures of the TPP. For ASEAN members engaged in TPP negotiations, it serves as a
hedge as well as a complement to TPP and most of all, keeps ASEAN’s position as the hub of 
regional trade negotiations. Some ASEAN members maintain that RCEP and TPP negotiations are 
compatible because of RCEP’s focus on border barriers (i.e. tariffs) and TPP’s focus on behind-the-
border barriers including intellectual property rights, labour standards, competition policy, 
investment rules, the environment and the role of state-owned enterprises. RCEP negotiations are 
due to end in 2015, with TPP negotiations predicted to go on for another number of years. Indonesia
has indicated that it could join TPP negotiations if RCEP negotiations go well189.    
Through expanding the remit of its 'regional conductor' role, ASEAN was able to begin 
addressing the challenges to its role posed by the APC and US re-engagement. A more significant 
challenge emerged however due to renewed great power tension in the South China Sea, severely 
straining ASEAN's unity and neutrality and thus its ability to manage the dispute.
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Chinese assertiveness: SCS and the limits of the 'regional conductor' role
Since 2009, tensions in the SCS have increased. The UN set 2009 as a deadline for the submission 
of claims for extended continental shelves. China protested Vietnam and the Philippines' 
submissions and submitted its own nine-dashed line map, which stakes an historical claim to over 
80 per cent of the South China Sea. Thereafter, there have been a number of low-level clashes as 
claimant states seek to consolidate their jurisdiction over disputed waters. This has included land 
reclamation and building on occupied features, with China conducting the most extensive upgrading
including the building of an air strip on Fiery Cross Reef capable of accommodating the full range 
of Chinese aircraft and thereby improving China's power projection in the area190. Southeast Asian 
claimants have blamed China's assertive behaviour for increased tensions and the Chinese blame 
Vietnam and the Philippines' provocative moves in collusion with the US191. The South China Sea 
dispute has therefore been a major stumbling block for negotiating China into the 'responsible 
regional great power' role, and a serious challenge for ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role. China's 
assertiveness represents a substantive challenge to three aspects of ASEAN's 'regional conductor' 
role: ASEAN's rule-making in the SCS, ASEAN's neutral status and ASEAN's united identity. 
China has insisted that negotiations over management of the dispute be restricted to the China-
ASEAN context. ASEAN's dilemma is that it cannot wield its authority as the 'regional conductor' 
in the ASEAN-China context because it cannot gain leverage from the support of another great 
power; however, ASEAN compromises any perceived neutrality with respect to the dispute when 
bringing the issue before the full regional 'orchestra' within the ARF or EAS as China accuses it of 
siding with the US in an effort to contain China. This has exacerbated divisions within ASEAN 
between members that want to challenge China and those that want to accommodate China, 
affecting ASEAN's ability to take a united stance. Protecting ASEAN's collective unity and seeking 
to present ASEAN neutrality has thus become a key challenge for maintaining ASEAN's 'regional 
conductor' role in the context of renewed great power rivalry.  
Rule-making ASEAN has tried to expand its rule-making into the SCS conflict by focusing 
on conflict avoidance, having claimants shelve the question of sovereignty and negotiate rules to 
manage the dispute peacefully, until the disputes themselves can be resolved192. This has produced 
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea agreed between ASEAN and 
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China in November 2002. The DoC stipulated the parties' adherence to the TAC and Five Principles
of Peaceful Coexistence. It represented a commitment to discuss the development of a code of 
conduct but did not lead to a halt in the building of structures on islets by various claimants. 
Through expanding its rule-making, ASEAN has tried to commit China to a policy of restraint, 
which is seen as even more salient due to the growing asymmetry between China’s naval 
capabilities and those of regional claimants. In previous decades, China was limited in its projection
of naval capabilities into the South China Sea. Since 2010 however, China has conducted military 
exercises involving North, East and South Sea Fleets (previously only the South Sea Fleet had 
operated in SCS) and has further developed the Yalong Bay naval base in Hainan. These 
developments suggest China is able to project and sustain its naval capabilities further South for 
longer periods of time. Regional actors fear that as China's relative military strength grows, it may 
be even less willing to be bound by ASEAN's normative framework193. This is exacerbated by the 
apparent insensitivity of Chinese officials towards Southeast Asian neighbours that stood in stark 
contrast to the reassurances offered a few years earlier. In 2010, the SCS was reportedly listed as a 
‘core’ interest alongside Taiwan and Tibet by Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Cui Tiankai, and 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi also stated that "China is a big country and other countries are small 
countries, and that's just a fact"194.
China has however pursued an inconsistent strategy with respect to negotiations with 
ASEAN, showing at times a willingness to engage ASEAN, but more often resisting and 
demanding that negotiations take place at the bilateral level. This suggests that ASEAN is unable to 
wield the authority of its 'regional conductor' role in China-ASEAN relations because there is less 
of an opportunity to leverage off another great power. China's inconsistency is part of a delaying 
strategy with respect to any agreement over the disputes, buying time for China to consolidate its 
claims through shoring up jurisdiction over waters195. China's insistence on bilateral negotiations 
ostensibly shows a willingness to negotiate without having to actually engage in negotiations 
because it knows other claimants will not accept such terms196. Having signed the TAC, China has 
taken the position that its norms do not apply to maritime areas, showing that ASEAN's 'score' is not
particularly relevant in this context197.
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Neutrality As a result of this, some ASEAN members have sought to bring the SCS issue 
before the full regional 'orchestra' and use the US and Japan as leverage in trying to commit China 
to strategic restraint. In recent years the US and Japan have accused China of increased 
assertiveness in its claims not only to the SCS but also in the East China Sea198. They have therefore
endorsed ASEAN's rule-making with regard to the SCS as part of an effort to constrain China. 
Japan has shown its support for ASEAN in creating maritime rules in the South China Sea, even 
calling a special ASEAN-Japan summit to strengthen maritime security cooperation199. The US has 
recently been vocal in its support for negotiations on the issue and has been firm in stating its 
interest in the freedom of navigation, especially since USNS Impeccable came into conflict with 
Chinese patrol boats 120km off the coast of Hainan in 2009. The US is concerned about China's 
challenge to its traditional dominance in the maritime sphere, with these fears being amplified since 
the discovery of China's extensive land reclamation activities on its occupied features in late 2014. 
These concerns increasingly overlap with Southeast Asian concerns, providing an opening for the 
US to “multilateralize and thus legitimate its specific security concerns through existing regional 
mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-
Plus (ADMM-Plus), as it did in 2010”200.
The US' outspoken support for negotiations on a CoC shows endorsement of ASEAN's rule-
making, but further highlights the problem of ASEAN's supposed neutrality in the disputes. From 
the Chinese perspective, ASEAN is not neutral because its calls to resolve the conflict in accordance
with international law, conflict with China's sovereignty claims based on historical interpretation 
rather than being rooted in modern international law. ASEAN's position therefore necessarily rejects
China's claim and in particular the nine dash line. When viewed in light of US support for ASEAN's
rule-making, ASEAN appears even less neutral from the Chinese perspective especially as rivalry 
between China and the US increases. If China views ASEAN as taking the side of the US it may be 
even less likely to engage in multilateral negotiations. China has tried to delegitimise any US 
diplomatic intervention into the dispute by stating that it is exclusively for claimants to resolve and 
has lobbied to keep the SCS off the agenda of multilateral meetings such as the ARF and the EAS, 
away from the full regional 'orchestra'201. Vietnam and the Philippines have been keen to discuss the
issue in these wider fora however whilst also developing security ties with the US. In August 2014, 
the Philippines' called for a “triple action” plan on the SCS at the ARF meeting. The plan included a
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moratorium on any activities that could escalate tensions, the full implementation of the DoC and 
negotiation on a CoC and the use of arbitration to settle the disputes. The US and EU supported the 
plan with Secretary of State John Kerry making the most forceful diplomatic intervention into the 
dispute so far. ASEAN was split over the plan: only Brunei, Indonesia and Vietnam supported it, 
whereas ASEAN members more willing to accommodate China did not support it. In August 2015, 
in the context of China's reclamation and building work, a 'freeze' on undertaking any activities on 
occupied features was again brought up at the ARF. Despite ASEAN foreign ministers warming to 
the idea, China rejected the proposal meaning it did not go anywhere202. However, the meeting 
revealed that certain member states such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, were becoming 
more willing to confront China on the issue in light of its reclamation activities.
The US' more assertive diplomatic posture, and strategic 'rebalancing' to Asia - which 
included a commitment to position a rotation of 2500 marines in Darwin, deploy up to four littoral 
combat ships in Singapore and shift sixty percent of US naval forces to Asia by 2020 - has given 
Vietnam and the Philippines new confidence in challenging China on the SCS. This has worried 
ASEAN officials due to the impact such alignment may have on ASEAN's efforts to maintain an 
apparent neutral status as a collective actor. For example, the Philippines and Vietnam have begun 
to push ASEAN to support a more assertive position against China. Indeed, they have lobbied to 
have ASEAN specifically name China as the source of increased tensions. ASEAN has so far 
avoided this; however, Secretary-General Le Luong Minh's public comment that ASEAN should 
"get [China] out of the territorial waters of Vietnam" again upset the collective appearance of 
neutrality203. In 2015, ASEAN offered its most strongly worded statements to date. At the August 
2015 round of ASEAN and ARF foreign ministers' meetings, despite China expressing beforehand 
that the SCS should be off the agenda, ASEAN discussed it “extensively” and stated that land 
reclamation activities had “eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions and may undermine 
peace, security and stability in the South China Sea” in both the AMM joint communiqué and the 
ARF chairman's statement204. Coupled with Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak's call for 
ASEAN to take a more active role in resolving the SCS dispute and other regional issues, it appears 
ASEAN may be beginning to take a more assertive stance205. Despite continuing to not name China 
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in its statements, the fact that ASEAN continues to deliberately defy China to discuss the SCS issue,
shows that the ASEAN states may have given up on the pretence of ASEAN appearing to be 
neutral. Indeed, on an individual basis most ASEAN states have endorsed the US' rebalance because
it provides further access to US assistance, although publicly they have expressed some concern. 
For example, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa criticised the US' announcement of a 
rotation of 2500 US marines in northern Australia as potentially provoking a “vicious cycle of 
tensions and mistrust”206. This was despite the Indonesian military supporting the idea that they 
could interact with US Marines stationed nearby in Darwin207. There has also been a split between 
maritime and continental states in terms of supporting the US' rebalance208, which is also evident in 
approaches to challenging or accommodating China on the SCS issue.
United identity ASEAN disunity over the SCS was no more evident than in July 2012 when 
the ASEAN states were unable to agree on the wording of a joint declaration at their AMM for the 
first time in ASEAN's history. Although they agreed on an outline for a proposed CoC, Cambodia as
chair objected to the mention of the Scarborough Shoal incident and China's decision to award 
drilling rights to a foreign company in Vietnam's EEZ. Many analysts believe China directly 
influenced Cambodia's refusal to offer a joint statement based on its objection to this paragraph209. 
Mutual recriminations followed, making the ASEAN disagreement highly public. This has 
increased fears within Southeast Asia that ASEAN may not be able to present a united stand in 
negotiations on a CoC with China. If so, then the Philippines and Vietnam may increasingly see 
their interests served in starker balance of power strategies by further aligning with the US. Indeed, 
the Philippines has already stepped up security cooperation with the US, signing an Enhanced 
Defence Cooperation Agreement in April 2014 which provides for increased rotation of US forces 
through the Philippines. It has also submitted a case against China's 'nine dash line' at the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea at The Hague. Even Malaysia, which has traditionally 
downplayed its disputed claims with China, has recently been reassessing its policy in the light of 
Chinese naval exercises near James Shoal. In October 2013 it announced that a naval base would be
developed near James Shoal and that Marine Corps would be established to provide amphibious 
capabilities in the SCS. Malaysian officials also became more active in ASEAN consultations in the
lead up to ASEAN-China negotiations on a CoC210. Indonesia has also recently formally 
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acknowledged that China's extensive claims overlap with Indonesia's sovereignty over Riau 
province including the Natuna islands211.
In 2013, China's new Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced that China was willing to begin 
negotiations with ASEAN on a CoC, but on the condition that ASEAN eliminate outside 
'interference' which Wang blamed for holding up previous discussions212. Wang's reference to 
'interference' meant specifically US interference. This suggested a quid pro quo: China would show 
the restraint ASEAN desired by engaging in negotiations over a CoC, if ASEAN agreed not to draw 
the US into the dispute. This is becoming less likely however, as revelations of Chinese land 
reclamation and ASEAN's defiance of China's requests not to discuss the issue at the 2015 ARF 
show. Despite the new leadership in Beijing declaring the renewal of China’s ‘good neighbour’ 
policy during President Xi Jinping’s and Premier Li Keqiang’s respective tours of Southeast Asia in 
October 2013, China's recent behaviour has raised further questions in Southeast Asia over China's 
willingness to take on a 'responsible regional great power' role. For example, China’s declaration in 
late 2013 of its Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea raised regional 
tensions in Northeast Asia and alarmed Southeast Asian states. This was compounded when China’s
ambassador in Manila stated China’s right to declare a similar ADIZ over the SCS213. In early 2014, 
China also announced the unilateral imposition of a fishery law in disputed waters, stating that 
fishermen needed to request permission from Chinese authorities before fishing in the area. On top 
of this, in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan, which devastated parts of the Philippines in November 
2013, China appeared to punish Manila by offering an initial contribution of $100,000, although 
this was eventually raised to $1.4 million and included the dispatch of a hospital ship. In contrast, 
the US offered $37 million in aid and dispatched Osprey helicopters, the USS George Washington 
carrier group and had up to 13,000 military personnel providing relief. Likewise, Japan offered a 
$52 million aid package and dispatched 1000 Self Defence Forces personnel214. This raised 
questions regarding China's ability to transcend political issues to provide regional public goods 
such as humanitarian relief. Chinese officials' claims that their land reclamation and upgrading 
activities have the aim of improving China's ability to provide such goods as humanitarian 
assistance, have done little to reassure ASEAN states215. In the context of uncertainty over China's 
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'responsible regional great power' role, ASEAN states may see the US' provision of security public 
goods as even more salient as a check against the expansion of the Chinese security presence. 
Third transitional role bargain
Events since 2008 have seen an evolving, but incomplete, transitional role bargain. The US has 
returned to a similar role bargain with ASEAN as was reached in the early 1990s. The US continues
to provide security public goods through its renewed strategic engagement and presence both in 
bilateral and multilateral channels, further legitimising its 'offshore great power guarantor' role in 
the context of China's rising regional and global profile. In return the US has endorsed ASEAN’s 
‘regional conductor’ role and agreed to participate in ASEAN's processes, but also made clear it 
expects more concrete results. This has been a boon for ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role as the 
former 'soloist' has returned to the regional 'orchestra' under ASEAN's authority. ASEAN has 
subsequently expanded the forums within which it performs the 'regional conductor' role and had all
major players commit to its 'score' by signing onto the TAC. It now performs the function of 
'inclusive engagement' in defence sphere (ADMM Plus), trade negotiations (RCEP) and the 
expanded EAS. In these forums, it has more discursive endorsement now from the key 
constituencies than ever before.
However, the US' strategic re-engagement/re-balancing towards the region has aggravated 
China, which fears possible containment and has become more assertive in its claims to the SCS. 
China's behaviour has raised questions regarding its 'responsible regional great power' role as its 
lack of restraint has served to heighten tension in the region rather than contribute to stability. 
ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role has therefore seen limits to its expansion; China endorses 
ASEAN’s ‘regional conductor’ role in the context of convening the full ‘orchestra’ including Japan 
and the US, but contests ASEAN’s attempts to use the ‘regional conductor’ role with respect to the 
SCS dispute. ASEAN has been unable to successfully use its 'regional conductor' role to commit 
China to a policy of restraint through its rule-making. China has contested ASEAN's rule-making in
this area and the dispute has contributed to raising great power tensions in the region as states such 
as the Philippines and Vietnam turn towards the US for support. In the context of renewed great 
power tensions, ASEAN's 'inclusive engagement' potentially has even more relevance in providing 
forums for dialogue and mediation. However, pressure from great powers for ASEAN to take sides 
in the developing tensions has impacted ASEAN's united identity and neutral status216. As unity and 
216  This sentiment was expressed repeatedly by regional officials and academics in discussion with the author during 
248
neutrality are key aspects of the 'regional conductor' role, this could have implications for ASEAN's 
ability to continue to perform the role. For this reason, recent internal efforts have focused on trying
to maintain this unity and neutrality.  
Re-conceptualisation: Maintaining ASEAN's unity and neutrality?
The failure to present a united front at the 2012 AMM was a shock to ASEAN officials, and as 
Singapore's Ambassador-at-Large Tommy Koh pointed out, served as “an example of our fragility 
and of the risk that ASEAN may no longer be united, and will be split apart … If that happens we 
can no longer play the regional role we do”217. Indonesia has worked more than others to maintain 
ASEAN’s unity and collective neutrality. This was clearly seen in the aftermath of the AMM in 
Cambodia when Marty Natalegawa engaged in ‘shuttle diplomacy’ around ASEAN capitals to re-
establish a common ASEAN position on the SCS dispute. The result was a six point proposal, 
which acted as a face-saving alternative to the failed AMM declaration. It was also seen the year 
before in Natalegawa's efforts to mediate the Thai-Cambodia border conflict which had broken out 
into military exchanges of fire. At the ASEAN Summit in May 2014, ASEAN was also determined 
to show a united stance. The summit was overshadowed by Sino-Vietnamese tensions over China's 
decision to place an oil rig in disputed waters. The ASEAN foreign ministers released a separate 
statement on the South China Sea rather than embedding a paragraph within the larger joint 
statement. The statement made no direct mention of China in an effort to show neutrality, but the 
fact that a separate statement was issued sought to serve notice that ASEAN was not divided in the 
way it was in 2012. However, the recent two day delay in ASEAN issuing a joint communiqué from
its 2015 AMM, shows that the divisions over how to deal with the China and the SCS issue 
remain218. 
Indonesia's goal to promote ASEAN unity was also seen in its request to chair ASEAN in 
2011 in place of Brunei, rather than 2013 as scheduled. It sought to push for the further 
implementation of the APSC and promote a common ASEAN position on global issues219. The 
resulting Bali Concord III entitled “ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations” 
determined that ASEAN would forge such a common position by the time of Indonesia's next 
fieldwork in Southeast Asia February and March 2014.  
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chairmanship in 2022220. Indonesia faces problems of its own in terms of its focus on ASEAN 
however. There have been questions raised within Indonesia over whether ASEAN should remain 
the cornerstone of foreign policy considering its potential to play a larger role in its own right221. 
This has come in response to status recognition of Indonesia's global importance through its 
membership in the G20, as well as it being given a place amongst other major powers within Kevin 
Rudd's APC proposal. The process of democratisation has also impacted on Indonesia's ability to 
lead within ASEAN as the pressures of the general public force the government to focus on 
domestic issues and not commit extensive energy or resources on foreign policy222. The Foreign 
Ministry firmly believes in ASEAN however, and newly elected President Jokowi's intention to 
prioritise the ASEAN Summit over the G20 in the face of a busy domestic agenda, suggests that 
Indonesia will keep ASEAN as a high priority223. 
Another initiative to promote ASEAN unity has been a concern to strengthen the ASEAN 
Secretariat and increase the mandate of the ASEAN Secretary-General as the basis of the 
institutional identity of ASEAN. ASEAN's dependence on the rotating Chair means that its ability to
deal with issues and crises that arise depend on whether there is a strong Chair at that time. In this 
respect, Cambodia was a weak chair allowing internal divisions, which should remain behind closed
doors, to impact ASEAN's projected unity. Former Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong has pointed 
out one practical measure of expanding the Secretary-General's mandate such that he/she is able to 
issue statements on behalf of ASEAN224. This would reduce the lag time of a Chair trying to get 
agreement from all members on the wording of a statement. In terms of the Secretariat, a High 
Level Task Force was set up to review the ASEAN organs and to assess ways of better coordinating 
organs and strengthening the Secretariat as a whole. They had their first meeting in March 2014 and
are due to submit their report at the AMM at the of 2014225. We will perhaps need to wait until 2015 
and the full announcement of the post-2015 agenda to see where ASEAN will go but, regardless of 
the specifics, member states will need to address the issue of unity and neutrality if they want 
ASEAN to continue to perform the 'regional conductor' role.
220  ASEAN (2011b).
221  Hadi (2012).
222  Interview with Lina Alexander and Dr Shafiah Muhibat, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 
11/3/14.
223 “Jokowi to attend ASEAN summit, may skip G-20 meet” The Jakarta Post 8/10/14 
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/10/08/jokowi-attend-asean-summit-may-skip-g-20-meet.html> accessed 
17/10/14. 
224  Interview with Ong Keng Yong, Singapore High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, 19/3/14.
225  Interview with AKP Mochtan, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 12/3/14.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown how, through a series of negotiations, ASEAN has created and maintained 
its 'regional conductor' role. ASEAN created its role in order to maximise its own autonomy and 
voice and avoid domination on the one hand and marginalisation on the other. It has sought to place 
itself in the centre of broader negotiations over regional order and the regional division of labour. It 
has negotiated transitional role bargains at the functional level facilitating regional great power 
competition for influence through the provision of functions, a means for avoiding more 
competitive balance of power competition. As has been shown, these bargains are for the most part 
transitional and functional, highlighting ASEAN's inability to address substantive issues between 
great powers. They work to stave off more overt competition but also delay addressing the more 
substantive great power issues226. They work towards entrenching a division of labour with the US 
providing security public goods through its 'offshore great power role', China providing regional 
economic public goods and restraint through its 'responsible regional great power' role, Japan 
providing regional economic and financial public goods through the 'regional economic great 
power' role, and ASEAN providing diplomatic leadership as the 'regional conductor'. 
The problem is the extent to which the great powers - as the key constituencies of 
legitimation - endorse their own role or each others' roles. Indeed, the last section of the chapter 
showed how recent Chinese assertiveness suggested that its own role conception may not align with
ASEAN's idea of China's “responsible” role. Similarly, the US' reassertion of its presence may see it
becoming less of an “offshore” great power. Also, domestic debate in Japan is currently reassessing 
Japan's own idea of its regional role and whether it wants to remain merely an economic great 
power or try to a take on more of a strategic role. This indicates the precarious nature of the 
mutually reinforcing legitimacy dynamics of the post-Cold War division of labour. A full account of
all these factors is beyond the limit of this study; however, it shows that the transitional bargains 
that ASEAN has brokered do not fundamentally and fully address the underlying structural 
dynamics of shifting capabilities. To the extent that they do, they perpetuate US hegemony with 
regional powers being negotiated into lower ranking positions in what has been termed a 'layered 
hierarchy'227. That this has been negotiated primarily vertically between ASEAN and the respective 
great powers, rather than horizontally between the great powers themselves, raises questions 
regarding the durability of this structure considering the potential for competition over rank228. 
226  Goh (2011).
227  Goh (2013).
228  See the concluding chapter in Goh (2013). For  discussion of the dynamics of legitimacy with respect to the 
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There is no foundational bargain over respective distributions of capabilities and how these should 
be employed with respect to a great power-agreed division of labour.
Notwithstanding the limits of ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role, this chapter shows how 
social roles can enable actors with limited material capabilities to play an important part in regional 
order negotiation and management. Whereas the previous two chapters dealt primarily with the 
redefinition of the 'great power' role – a role that had a prior existence in international and regional 
society - this chapter shows the creation of ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role, a new role in 
regional society. ASEAN created its 'regional conductor' role, giving it a shared existence within 
regional society, and ASEAN has since been able to use its role to keep itself central to negotiations 
over regional order and management. Specifically, each time the 'regional conductor' role's 
legitimacy has been challenged, ASEAN has developed a new basis for the role by using existing 
ASEAN-led forums to launch new initiatives with ASEAN at the centre. ASEAN would have been 
unable to do this without initially creating the 'regional conductor' role in the early 1990s. However,
it remains to be seen how long ASEAN can continue to use the 'regional conductor' role in the face 
of the great powers' dissatisfaction over their own roles within the transitional role bargains. For the
regional 'orchestra' to play more beautiful music, the great powers themselves will have to negotiate
a more complicated 'score' and establish mutually acceptable parts for each of them to play.   
negotiation of hegemony, see Clark (2011).
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Conclusion
This thesis has addressed the puzzle of the prominent part ASEAN has played in negotiating and 
managing regional order in East Asia during times of transition and crisis. As a group of small to 
medium sized states, operating in a region that contains numerous great powers and major regional 
players, ASEAN has contributed more to the negotiation and management of East Asian order than 
IR theory would expect. This thesis has shown that ASEAN’s unusually prominent contribution is 
not merely an accident of the structural dynamics of great power competition and rivalry, but rather 
results from the cumulative role negotiation that Southeast Asian states and great powers have 
engaged in since the early Cold War years. This thesis explored this role negotiation through three 
empirical chapters that covered early negotiations between the US and newly independent Southeast
Asian states, China’s negotiations with ASEAN during the Cambodian conflict and ASEAN’s 
negotiations with the great powers since the end of the Cold War. This concluding chapter outlines 
the key findings of the thesis and situates the thesis’ contribution to the literature on ASEAN, the 
English School and role theory. It also discusses the limitations of this thesis, but shows how these 
same limitations also provide opportunities for further research.   
FINDINGS 
This thesis has four key findings related to ASEAN's place in East Asian regional order. First, 
ASEAN's prominence in East Asian order negotiation and management is due to its 'regional 
conductor' role. ASEAN's prominence is not merely a result of the structural conditions of great 
power competition within East Asia, nor the unique normative context of Asia; rather, it is based on 
the cumulative negotiations over what type of order should prevail in Southeast and East Asia and 
which actors will perform which functions in upholding that order. As we saw in the Chapter Two, 
the US and ASEAN agreed that order in Southeast Asia would serve the twin goals of 'containment' 
and 'autonomy'. The US-ASEAN reciprocal role bargain that upheld this order saw the US provide 
security public goods as the 'offshore great power guarantor' in return for the ASEAN states 
managing their own relations through regional institution-building and rule-making and providing 
diplomatic initiatives to legitimise the US' position in Indochina. Through this role bargain the great
power role was redefined in Southeast Asia. The primary function of diplomatic leadership – a key 
function of the European great power role – was decoupled from the great power role and 
transferred to ASEAN. 
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Similarly, in Chapter Three we saw that ASEAN's collective decision to align with China 
and oppose Vietnam during the Cambodian conflict, was based on the fact that China was willing to
recognise ASEAN's understanding of order in Southeast Asia based on rules of coexistence, as well 
as ASEAN's part in making and managing that order as the  'primary manager'. The China-ASEAN 
role bargain, through which China took on the 'regional great power guarantor' role, further 
reinforced the redefinition of the great power role that resulted from earlier negotiations between 
ASEAN and the US. China endorsed ASEAN's diplomatic leadership in the whole of Southeast 
Asia by recognising the salience of ASEAN's norms and processes in Cambodia. Through the 
China-ASEAN bargain, ASEAN expanded its 'primary manager' role.     
Chapter Four showed how the redefinition of the great power role and ASEAN’s assumption
of diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia during the Cold War, provided practical and social 
foundations from which ASEAN was able to create its ‘regional conductor’ role. ASEAN used its 
Post-Ministerial Conference to launch the ARF and made arguments regarding its supposed 
neutrality and competence as the only actor able to bring all regional great powers and major 
players together. ASEAN won endorsement for its TAC as the regional 'score'. When challenged by 
one constituency of legitimation, ASEAN skilfully leveraged off the endorsement from another 
constituency to save its role from deterioration. This was most clearly demonstrated after the AFC 
and how ASEAN channelled Sino-Japanese competition in a way that contributed to order and 
enabled it to broker an East Asian bargain that further consolidated its 'regional conductor' role. 
ASEAN successfully asserted that accession to its TAC was one of the key criteria for membership 
in the regional orchestra, which the US then joined as a key element of its re-engagement of Asia.  
The second finding of this thesis is that, ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role is nested within 
a mutually beneficial, if tentative, role bargain with the great powers. In the post-Cold War period 
ASEAN has not only tried to maintain its own 'regional conductor' role but also negotiate great 
powers into complementary roles that utilise their material capabilities in performing regional order 
functions. ASEAN legitimised the US' use of its superior military capabilities for security public 
goods provision and Japan and China's economic resources for regional financial public goods. 
However, ASEAN has done so through brokering a series of transitional role bargains which have 
only served to manage the challenges of that particular phase of negotiation. The tentative mutually 
reinforcing legitimacy dynamics of the transitional bargains are soon challenged, making a new 
round of negotiation necessary. In particular, the US' tendency towards interference in terms of 
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human rights, democracy promotion, economic liberalisation and doctrine of 'pre-emption' during 
the War on Terrorism, has challenged the 'offshore' identity of its great power guarantor role and 
ASEAN's status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order. China's desire to institutionalise 
regionalism that excludes the US challenges ASEAN's performance of 'inclusive engagement' 
function and suggests it wants to take on diplomatic leadership for itself. China's actions in the 
South China Sea also raise questions over whether it will be a 'responsible' regional great power and
contest ASEAN's rule-making function in the SCS. The legitimacy of ASEAN's role has to 
constantly be fought for. This contrasts with the US-ASEAN and China-ASEAN role bargains 
during the Cold War which were much more stable as they had clearer goals and mutually 
reinforcing legitimacy dynamics. 
This finding regarding ASEAN-great power divisions of labour, better captures the basis for 
ASEAN's roles over time, and how this has been negotiated/re-negotiated, than the more fixed 
explanations that see ASEAN's role as rooted in great power rivalry/buck passing or the region's 
normative structure1. It is indeed the case that ASEAN has been highly active in promoting its 
norms and processes in the region. However, in contrast to previous constructivist work that has 
focused on whether ASEAN has successfully socialised great powers into the norms themselves 
through its institutions, this thesis shows that ASEAN's institution-building and norm provision 
(rule-making) are functions that ASEAN performs – functions that are considered by the great 
powers as legitimate for ASEAN to perform. The focus on legitimacy and ASEAN's ability to nest 
its performance of such functions in a division of labour, takes our focus away from the norms 
themselves and, in a sense, 'lowers the bar' with regard to analysing great power endorsement. We 
do not need to show that the great powers have internalised ASEAN norms, but instead look for the 
instrumental and normative reasons for why the great powers consider ASEAN's performance of 
diplomatic/normative functions as legitimate. At the same time as this finding tempers some of the 
conclusions of previous constructivist scholars, it also provides a 'thicker' understanding than realist
conclusions regarding great power rivalry. Great power rivalry has (so far) not diminished great 
power attention in ASEAN – indeed, it may have increased such attention, particularly on the part 
of the US – showing that the great powers have more of a stake in ASEAN's diplomatic leadership 
than we might expect based on an analysis that primarily focuses on material balance of power. This
thesis has shown that ASEAN's diplomatic leadership has served to legitimise great power 
imperatives from the early days of the 'primary manager' role. ASEAN has also managed so far to 
be useful to all great powers in respect to legitimising their identities and strategies in the post-Cold 
1 On the former, Tow (2012), also Leifer (1996), Emmers (2003). On the latter Acharya (2014). 
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War period within the prevailing political and normative context2.
Third, ASEAN's impact on regional order is limited because of its inability to take 
substantive positions on key regional issues and because great power rivalry threatens its unity and
neutrality. ASEAN cannot address, and often seeks to avoid, divisive issues between the great 
powers to avoid being accused of taking sides and to avoid internal splits because of its members 
diverse security perspectives. However, without being able to address the principal issues over 
which the great powers disagree, ASEAN can only really maintain the status quo. This finding is 
consistent with Goh's analysis of ASEAN's impact on regional order through its brokerage of 
'minimalist institutional bargains' in the region, but inability to broker a 'grand bargain' between the 
great powers3.
Fourth, ASEAN's difficulties in presenting a united and neutral position are exacerbated by 
the inherent tensions between ASEAN's 'primary manager' and 'regional conductor' roles. The two 
roles are linked by the fact that the perceived competence of ASEAN to perform functions at the 
wider East Asian/Asia-Pacific level depends on its perceived success as the 'primary manager' of 
Southeast Asian order. However, the 'primary manager' role seeks to insulate Southeast Asia from 
external interference whereas the 'regional conductor' role requires ASEAN reform its norms such 
as non-interference in order to uphold its status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order. 
Newer members view ASEAN's 'primary manager' role in the narrow sense of insulating regimes 
from external pressure for political liberalisation. Older members see the necessity of seeking to 
shape the wider East Asia/Asia-Pacific region to maximise ASEAN's autonomy and avoid 
domination and marginalisation. In trying to maintain ASEAN unity, older members have 
accommodated the less progressive views within ASEAN agreements. This results in dissatisfaction
for liberal domestic constituencies and Western constituencies as reform falls well short of that 
anticipated, limiting ASEAN's status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order. This finding
aligns with that of other scholars, who have noted the effect ASEAN's expansion and its external 
relations have had on the Association. Acharya again focuses on the impact on ASEAN's norms 
rather than ASEAN's role per se. He notes that the burdens taken on by ASEAN through its 
expansion and its responsibility for driving East Asian/Asia-Pacific regionalism might impact “the 
sanctity of ASEAN's norms and the credibility of the ASEAN Way” - the very aspects from which it
has previously drawn strength as a potential 'security community'4. Likewise, for Ba, ASEAN's 
2 See Goh (2011).
3 Goh (2011, 2013). 
4 Acharya (2014: 262).
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relations with external powers, especially the US, have acted as a trigger for reassessing ideas about
regional identity and regionalism. This is evident in ASEAN's efforts to branch into exclusive East 
Asian regionalism. In practice though, this branching out has challenged the very idea of 'Southeast 
Asia' as a distinctive political space5. Ba therefore goes further than this thesis, and also Acharya. 
For Ba, ASEAN's efforts to develop its unity and strengthen its processes through the community-
building process and Charter are not merely about upholding its status to maintain its roles or its 
norms; they are about strengthening 'Southeast Asia' as a founding idea that can hold its own 
alongside other regional conceptions such as East Asia, Asia-Pacifc and Indo-Pacific6.
CONTRIBUTION
This thesis makes three key contributions. Firstly, it contributes to the literature on ASEAN by 
bringing a new perspective to ASEAN's part in regional order negotiation and management in East 
Asia. As we have seen, realists tend to downplay ASEAN’s contribution to regional order because 
they regard material capabilities as the primary variable in explaining international outcomes. For 
this reason, great power relations – and particularly the balance of power between the great powers 
- is the most important aspect of regional order. ASEAN, as a group of states with limited material 
capabilities, cannot have a significant impact on the regional balance of power aside from the 
choices individual states make in terms of their alignment with any particular great power. 
Constructivists on the other hand tend to be too optimistic regarding ASEAN’s agency in 
developing regional norms and socialising great powers into those norms. Trying to ascertain 
whether norms have been internalised and have changed great power interests and identities is 
increasingly difficult, especially considering East Asia's tendency to revert to more 'traditional' great
power politics. Role theory provides a good middle ground that enables us to get at the negotiations 
between the great powers and ASEAN over regional order and what part different actors will play in
making and managing order. 
Secondly, this thesis contributes to the English School literature by introducing a framework 
for understanding role negotiation in international society. The English School has long emphasised 
the relational aspect of states interactions and has shown how states’ relations are governed not 
merely by impersonal systemic processes, but rather by the rules and institutions states develop 
through negotiation. Although English School scholars have had a lot to say about the great powers 
5 Ba (2009).
6 Ba (2009: 246).
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and their 'special responsibilities' in international society7, they have had less to say about other 
types of actors and especially small powers. This thesis provides a framework for exploring how 
social roles may be negotiated within international society between different types of actors. It 
situates role negotiation within the English School institution of 'order management' – a reworking 
of 'great power management'. Understood more broadly as 'order management', this key institution 
of international society need not be limited to the role of great powers but could be expanded 
through studies that explore the various functions that different actors perform in negotiating and 
managing global order and regional order8.   
Thirdly, this thesis contributes to role theory in IR by providing a framework to analyse how
roles can be created and redefined within the actual interactions of states. In doing so, this thesis 
transcends the largely theoretical debate over whether to locate roles within the social structure of 
international society or within states’ own subjectivity and allows us to look at how states negotiate 
roles that serve particular order functions within a particular social context. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
A key advantage of this thesis is its scope and its ability to trace role negotiation over a number of 
decades. However, this scope is also a limitation in that it reduces the depth at which the thesis can 
go into each case study. This was somewhat inevitable considering the limited space available 
within the thesis. However, this provides an opportunity for future research. More time and focus 
could be given to each of the three periods as part of a bigger project. This would help us make 
even firmer conclusions on the nature of respective actors' roles in Southeast and East Asia at each 
period, and more clearly identify the links between each period. In particular, an interesting future 
study could use the role negotiation framework to focus on the US, China and Japan's roles in post-
Cold War East Asia. This would compliment this thesis' focus on ASEAN's role and help us better 
understand the extent to which a mutual understanding exists a on division of labour not just 
between ASEAN and the great powers, but also between the great powers themselves. This would 
contribute to our understanding of the foundations of regional order in East Asia9.  
Another limitation is the lack of access to Southeast Asian primary sources. Southeast Asian 
archives remain mostly closed to scholars studying the diplomatic history of the region. For this 
7 Bull (1995), Buzan (2004b), Clark (2011), Bukovansky et al (2012), Aslam (2013). 
8  Bukovansky et al (2012) provides the clearest example to date of this scholars taking this step. 
9  The most comprehensive study so far in this vein is Goh (2013). 
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reason, the historical chapters have mostly relied on US documents. This is helpful in building up a 
picture of how US officials perceived Southeast Asian positions and what Southeast Asian officials 
said to US officials. However, access to Southeast Asian sources would provide a more accurate and
nuanced picture of what key actors within Southeast Asian states thought of their own country's or 
other countries' roles. Again, this also provides a clear avenue for future research in case regional 
archives become more widely accessible to scholars10. As part of a bigger research programme, an 
in-depth insight into key states' role conceptions and role expectations of other states could be built 
up through exploring the archives of individual Southeast Asian states. Although access to historical
archives would help develop the historical aspects of this project, it would not necessarily help with 
the contemporary post-Cold War period. A limitation for this thesis with respect to the post-Cold 
War period was the limited time available for interviews with key regional officials and academics. 
A more extensive programme of interviews with more focused questioning based on the findings 
from this thesis, could constitute a key aspect of future research. This would allow for a broader 
pool of primary source material and enable a more in-depth empirical study into negotiations that 
have taken place since the end of the Cold War. 
The final and less significant limitation of this thesis is that it is based on the study of a 
single region. This means that its findings are primarily limited to Southeast/East Asia rather than 
generalisable to other regions or the global level. As stated in the introduction and Chapter One of 
the thesis however, the role negotiation framework provides a tool for getting at complex 
negotiations in international society. In this sense, the framework itself should be transferable to 
other regions and contexts. Future research could apply the role negotiation framework developed 
in this thesis to other regions to see what kinds of roles have been developed in different social 
contexts. This would enable comparison with East Asia and would allow us to draw more 
conclusive implications for our understanding of roles in international relations more generally. In 
particular it would help us build a more comprehensive picture of great power and small power 
roles which could expand our understanding of the English School institution of 'order 
management'.    
10  Ang (2013) provides a major contribution to regional diplomatic history based on his unprecedented access to 
Singaporean archives.  
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